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Abstract: This project examines how Chicago’s public housing was policed from 1937 to 2000,
when the city announced plans to redevelop public housing into privately-owned mixed-income
communities under the Plan for Transformation. Drawing upon interviews, historical
newspapers, and archival records, it centrally argues that policing contributed to making public
housing into a carceral space: one that resembled the prison in design and management and also
funneled residents into the criminal-legal system. Writing against popular narratives of public
housing as an inherent site of crime and violence, this project instead positions the police—and,
by extension, the state—as a central contributor to violence in these spaces. That is, far from
mitigating crime, policing often spurred it. Ultimately, the inability of police to effect law and
order in public housing provided a justification for its ultimate demolition, resulting in the
privatization of subsidized housing and the gentrification of former public housing
neighborhoods. Thus, through detailed historical-geographical reconstruction of both everyday
practices and extraordinary events, this study shows how policing, through violence enacted
upon the housed urban poor, contributes to upholding and reproducing racial capitalist property
relations in the contemporary U.S. city.
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Policing Public Housing
“The communal luxury of the black metropolis, the wealth of just us, the black city-within-acity, transforms the imagination of what you might want and who you might be, encouraging you
to dream. Shit, it doesn’t even matter if you’re black and poor, because you are here and you are
alive and all these folks surrounding you encourage you and persuade you to believe that you are
beautiful too. This collective endeavor to live free unfolds in the confines of the carceral
landscape.”—Saidiya Hartman, Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments, p. 24
Producing Public Housing
In opening his book Great American City, lauded sociologist Robert Sampson rehearses
the by-now mainstream narrative about Chicago’s public housing. The story, as he retells it, goes
like this: “[T]he South Side of Chicago once housed the most infamous slum in
America. Chicago showed it knew how to build not just skyscrapers but spectacular high-rises
for the poor; the Robert Taylor Homes alone once held over twenty-five thousand residents—
black, poor and isolated, outdoing Cabrini Green, another national symbol of urban despair. . . .
Officially recognized as a failed policy, the last building of Robert Taylor was closed at the end
of 2006.”1 In what he deems to be an “especially haunting reflection” on the past, Sampson
further recalls of his own visit to the Robert Taylor Homes in 1992, noting that, “Passing
inoperable metal detectors and walking up urine-strenched stairs because the elevators were
broken, the physical signs of degradation were overwhelming. . . . I remember thinking at the
time that surely anything would be an improvement over the prisonlike towers.”2 Sampson is not
alone in his analysis. Today, scholars and policymakers alike widely consider U.S. public
housing, known primarily as a racialized site of concentrated, intergenerational poverty and
crime, to be, as he puts it, “a failed policy.”3
Meanwhile, Sampson’s own case site of Chicago, as home to infamous projects like the
Taylor Homes and Cabrini-Green, was and for many still is the paradigmatic site of U.S. public
housing and its failures in the national imagination: again, as Sampson writes, a “national symbol
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of urban despair” whose objectionable conditions superseded their own local context. By the late
twentieth century, media portrayals fueled this understanding. For example, Alex Kotlowitz’
1991 book There Are No Children Here, in which he writes about the horrific conditions facing a
pair of brothers the Henry Horner Homes, was not only a national bestseller but was adapted into
a 1993 Oprah-produced film.4 The popular 1992 horror film Candyman was set at CabriniGreen, but was partially based on a series of reports of criminals crawling through bathroom
mirrors that connected one apartment to another at the Horner Homes.5 The Cabrini
neighborhood remained the scene of the remake in 2021.6 Some documentaries attempted to
portray these sites with more nuance, including Frederick Wiseman’s 1997 documentary film
Public Housing, which focused on Chicago’s Ida B. Wells development.7 However, such films
still drew widespread attention to problems in Chicago’s public housing. Meanwhile, media
reports in major papers like The New York Times labelled life in public housing as “hellish,”
calling developments like Cabrini-Green “among the most frightful addresses in the country.”8
Thus, by the 1990s, plentiful fictional and nonfictional representations portrayed Chicago’s
public housing—as metonym for all public housing—as a site of desperation, decrepitude, and
perhaps most of all, crime. Given this bleak picture, for cities like Chicago, there seemed to be
only one answer to public housing’s woes by the end of the twentieth century: demolition.
Multiple scholars have analyzed the downfall of public housing in Chicago, arguing that
factors like segregationist policymaking, a demographic imbalance that led to an overabundance
of youth in the projects, and poor management doomed the projects.9 And indeed, all of these
factors arguably played a role. But one explanation stands out in both the popular and scholarly
literature above all else: crime, which came to be seen as both the proximate and the ultimate
cause of public housings’ failure. However, if crime was a fundamental justification for the
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eradication of public housing in Chicago and other U.S. cities, in this project I argue for a
heretofore overlooked factor that contributed to the ‘failure’ and consequent demolition of the
projects: how they were policed. Rather than seeing crime as a foregone conclusion in public
housing, or as its own actor driving public housing’s ‘failure,’ I instead ask: what was the role of
the police—the de facto institution of crime control in the U.S.—in shaping the spaces, policies,
and social life of public housing? In asking this question, I posit that what Sampson and other
scholars overlook in their all-too-frequently maudlin and monochromatic portrayals of failed and
fearsome public housing, are the ways in which the state, via the police, contributed to crime and
violence in public housing developments and thus, fueled their eradication.
In the case of Chicago, the end of public housing found its particular expression in the
Plan for Transformation, an ambitious scheme to demolish high-rise public housing and replace
it with mixed-income, lower-density developments. A sympathetic read of the Plan views the
sweeping urban redevelopment project as a well-intentioned effort to improve housing
conditions for the urban poor and in doing so, increase social mobility amongst this group. Some
uphold these intentions but critique the way that the Plan was implemented.10 Intended to take
ten years, it took twenty. Jumpstarted with federal HOPE VI funds, the Plan also relied on
private investment and the financial crash in 2008 meant that parts of the Plan never actualized—
particularly, for-sale and market-rate aspects of the development that theoretically would have
increased each neighborhood’s social mix.11 Perhaps most prominently, critics cite the mass
displacement of public housing residents, who were dispersed as the old public housing buildings
came down.12 Many of these residents were lost in the lengthy redevelopment process, never able
to return to the new, improved communities on the land they once inhabited, while the new
mixed-income developments have not proven to promote meaningful social or economic
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mixing.13 Other critics still launch a deeper critique of the Plan, arguing that—intentionally or
otherwise—the effect of the transformation was to expropriate land occupied by the racialized
urban poor, privatize public housing by putting it under the control of developers rather than the
state, and gentrify former public housing neighborhoods to the benefit of urban elites.14 In this
way, as planning scholar Lawrence Vale has argued, the Plan turns former public housing
neighborhoods into “twice-cleared” communities: cleared once during urban renewal and now
twice in public housing demolition (thrice if you include indigenous dispossession).15 For this
latter group of critics, and I count myself among them, the Plan for Transformation is a modernday manifestation of the housing question, identified by Friedrich Engels in Manchester in 1872,
in which housing conditions for the urban poor are never fully improved under capitalism, but
“merely shifted elsewhere.”16 In what follows, I review the narrative that scholars and other
commentators have compiled, and typically rehearse, to explain the trajectory of public housing
in Chicago, as in other parts of the U.S.

The Standard History of Public Housing
Policy’s wholesale abandonment of public housing as a strategy to house the urban poor
belies the program’s initial aspirations, which reflect a modernist, utopian spirit unrecognizable
in contemporary depictions of public housing. Created in 1937 as a social program to upgrade
the housing conditions of the urban poor, many of whom had been living in cramped and
substandard tenements, public housing was also a New Deal program to boost the economy by
fueling the construction industry. Within a few years, it further provided a way to house war
workers during World War II.17 At its outset, many public housing residents were white, working
families.18 As the twentieth century wore on, however, public housing was increasingly
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populated by Black residents, and some other families of color, who were left behind in cities as
white families ‘flew’ to the suburbs.19 And, public housing residents were increasingly
impoverished as deindustrialization took its toll on Northern cities in particular.20 Fewer
households had parents who were gainfully and regularly employed in the formal economy and,
with the rise of mass incarceration in the U.S. as well as other social shifts, more and more
public housing households were headed by single women.21 Increasingly, public housing
changed from a respectable place of social mobility for the working poor, to heavily stigmatized
housing of last resort.22 Modernist high rises built with the sparsest of materials quickly began to
crumble and were expensive to maintain and repair, making public housing’s built environment
increasingly inhospitable as well.23
In Chicago, several local factors exacerbated these problems. First, aldermanic control
allowed local aldermen to veto the siting of public housing in their wards. White aldermen used
this power to block the construction of public housing in their neighborhoods, so most of the
developments were built in majority-Black neighborhoods.24 Compounding the problem, the
public housing program in its early years followed a “Neighborhood Composition Rule,”
meaning that the demographics of public housing residents were required to match those of the
surrounding neighborhood.25 What this meant in practice was that most developments were sited
in majority-Black wards and were then populated with majority-, if not exclusively, Black
residents. Taken together, these practices reinforced the city’s already-entrenched patterns of
racial residential segregation.26 In addition to racial segregation, public housing also—by
definition—concentrates poverty, a phenomenon that contemporary policy consensus (rightly or
wrongly) views as inherently problematic.27
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In the 1980s, the nationwide crack epidemic only furthered the social problems in
Chicago’s public housing developments. Several factors made the high-rises vulnerable to the
drug trade. First, the buildings provided a captive population of impoverished residents, some of
whom looked to drugs as a distraction from their problems and others of whom were eager to
work in the drug economy, which provided one of the few avenues to earn income. The
building’s open-air lobbies made for convenient marketplaces, while proximity to local highways
made the developments accessible to suburban drug buyers, who could make a quick stop on
their commute into or out of the city. And, public housing was relatively obscure in the eyes of
the wider city: secluded in neighborhoods characterized by organized abandonment, drug dealing
could operate without interfering in the day-to-day business functions of the larger city.28 Not
everyone in public housing bought, sold, or used drugs, but the developments became
increasingly stigmatized as drug- and crime-ridden as local gangs vied for control of particular
sites in the trade.29 In turn, the presence of the drug economy only furthered the territorial
stigmatization of public housing. As Loic Wacquant describes it, territorial stigma is “the
powerful stigma attached to residence in the bounded and segregated spaces to which the
populations marginalized or condemned to redundancy by the post-Fordist reorganization of the
political economy and the post-Keynesian reconstruction of the welfare state are increasingly
consigned.”30 Thus, territorial stigmatization is a self-reinforcing process in which a particular
space and its occupants are likewise stigmatized.31
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Figure 1.1 Map of CHA Family Properties in 198532

A map of Chicago’s family public housing as of 1985, with construction dates and number of units per site. Today, CHA has just
under 7,000 units of family housing sited across 14 remaining, 100% traditional family housing properties. The rest have been
converted to Section 8 vouchers or project-based vouchers in mixed-income communities.33

The association of public housing with crime was particularly salient in the eyes of the
public, as the media took every opportunity to reinforce the depiction of public housing as crimeridden through sensational headlines and monochromatic coverage. In Chicago alone, decades of
lazy reporting painted public housing exclusively as a site of human misery, neglecting the very
real forms of beauty, flourishing, and mutual aid that also took place in the “projects.”34 Despite

7

repeated, intensive policing efforts, the developments came to be seen, by the 1990s, as lawless
and ungovernable sites—places of social ills that would infect the rest of the city if left untreated.
As scholars such as Arnold Hirsch, Lawrence Vale, Brad Hunt, and Ed Goetz have
argued, this combination of factors—financial insolvency, crumbling infrastructure, racial
segregation, concentrated poverty, and high rates of crime—led (rightly or wrongly) to the
widespread conclusion by the end of the twentieth century that public housing was a failed
experiment, in Chicago as in other parts of the country.35 The city’s response to the perceived
failure of public housing was social change via environmental design. And thus, under the Plan
for Transformation, high rise after high rise was torn down in the early 2000s, leaving only a few
low-rise developments remaining today.

Towards an Alternate History
What the aforementioned scholars neglect to consider is the role of the police in public
housing communities, as spaces infamous for crime and violence. In what follows, I retell the
history of public housing in Chicago, focusing on the very policing efforts that, for decades,
attempted to reform public housing and its residents and—in the eyes of city officials—regain
control over these spaces and their inhabitants. In doing so, I argue that policing did not play a
neutral or incidental role in this history but rather, comprised an integral and heretofore
overlooked element of daily life in the developments. As geographer Nicholas Fyfe argues,
"Orthodox police histories present the police as a politically neutral, progressive and beneficent
institution" where the deployment of the police in urban communities is seen "as an inevitable
response to the social disorder caused by rapid industrial and urban development."36
Unfortunately, far too many of these urban histories fall into the same trap, either overlooking
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the role of police in public housing entirely, or unquestionably assuming that police were a
beneficent actor, who did their best to control crime in public housing, but failed. In contrast,
and inspired in part by recent journalistic developments that have revealed systemic, predatory
policing practices in Chicago’s public housing, I argue that policing comprises a heretofore
overlooked, but incredibly important factor behind the so-called ‘failure’ of Chicago’s public
housing.37 Policing, and its inability to control crime, was not the only reason the buildings came
down, of course, but it has been understudied to date.
As I elucidate further in my concluding Note on Methods, my arguments in this project
draw upon 81 semi-structured interviews; an archival newspaper database of about 1,800 articles
dating back to the 1930s from Chicago-area newspapers; archival planning and policy documents
collected from Chicago-area repositories and via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request
from the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA); and participant observation of nine virtual CHA
and neighborhood public safety meetings that took place between September 2020 and May
2021. While there are always more data sources, particularly for a topic as broad as this one,
these sources collectively constitute a rich portrait of how Chicago public housing and its
residents were policed prior to the Plan for Transformation and, while it is beyond the immediate
scope of this project, how these communities (which mostly take the form of new, mixed-income
arrangements) are policed today.
In the chapters that follow, I thus interweave first-person accounts of policing in
Chicago’s public housing with the historical record found in newspapers and planning
documents. The discussion unfolds in two parts: Actors (Part 1) and Tactics (Part 2). In
structuring the project this way, I do not mean to suggest that policing actors can ever be
divorced from the tactics they employ. Instead, employing this two-part structure allows me to
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focus first on the various policing actors working in public housing over the decades—and they
are many—before taking a closer look at the tactics they employed. It also allows me to balance
a more-or-less chronological narrative with some more in-depth, thematic chapters, which are
needed in order to understand how specific policies played out on the ground in all of their
complexity, often over the course of many years.
In Part 1, I rely particularly heavily on interview data, centering the voices of both police
and residents to better understand how cops understood their work in public housing, on the one
hand, and how residents experienced that work, on the other. I do this for several reasons. First,
firsthand accounts of this particular aspect of public housing history—that is, the role of police in
public housing—are rare. Second, the rich trove of interview data I draw upon in this project
speaks volumes about how policing was enacted and experienced on the ground, by the
individuals who lived it. As Mat Coleman has noted, researching the police comes with
difficulties in terms of both access and openness.38 In this study, and as I reflect upon further in
the Note on Methods, I was able to collect a data set of refreshingly—sometimes disturbingly—
open interviews with current and former police officers, whose reflections say as much about the
institution of policing as they do about the personal recollections of individual officers.
Institutions, after all, are comprised of people and particularly in the case of the police, the
institution is shaped as much by the actions and decisions of individuals on the ground as it is by
high-level policies and plans. Both aspects—the individual and the organizational—are
important for this analysis.
Additionally, while I rely heavily on news articles to fill out the historical record
throughout the project, doing so also raises a series of methodological challenges. As Stuart Hall
and his coauthors argue in Policing the Crisis, media coverage is neither comprehensive nor

10

objective but instead, in deciding what is ‘newsworthy’ and how to cover it, newspapers produce
the category of “news.”39 As they write, “‘News’ is the end-product of a complex process which
begins with a systematic sorting and selecting of events and topics according to a socially
constructed set of categories.”40 Particularly when it comes to coverage of crime and violence,
news reports need to be interpreted in this light—as selective, cultural products rather than
comprehensive, objective records of history. As I discuss further in Chapter 8, I rely on
newspaper records in this project both for the facts they report and as evidence of how news
sources both reflect and shape popular discourses at particular points in time. That is; how and
why newspapers report what they do is as important for this dissertation as what they report. The
three major papers included here—the Chicago Tribune, Chicago Sun-Times, and Chicago
Defender—all have different coverage that reflects different readerships and priorities. However,
even collectively, their record should not be considered comprehensive or objective; rather, these
news archives indicate what mattered—in the eyes of journalists and, depending on the
newspaper, city leaders and elites—at a given point in time.
Reading the historical record about policing at CHA induces a repeated sense of déjà vu.
Year after year, decade after decade, the newspapers reported “new” efforts to police the
projects—tactics like vertical patrols, in which teams of police were dispatched to patrol the high
rises floor-by-floor. The careful reader of that record, or of this project, will note that such tactics
were tried over and over again, with little to no demonstrable success. That is, for over fifty
years, CHA and the Chicago Police Department (CPD) kept experimenting with practices that
did not work to meaningfully improve the safety of public housing residents or the wider
community, to protect CHA’s property, or to solve crimes that had already taken place. Reading
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this history invokes questions about the present: to what extent are we stuck on the same hamster
wheel of ineffective, if not counterproductive, police practice in our cities today?
This project focuses on Chicago’s public housing and certainly, as I will argue, public
housing in that city was in many ways a unique space: an ideal case study for understanding how
the housed urban poor are policed insofar as it reveals a set of social problems and dynamics in
“particularly clear relief.”41 However, in making this argument, I do not mean to suggest that the
policing that took place at CHA sites was divorced from police practice or logics more generally.
That is, policing at CHA may starkly reveal some truths about our institutions of policing and
their general inability to make communities safer. Nevertheless, the policing strategies
chronicled in these pages were in no way unique to CHA, just as CHA developments were
always part of the greater city of Chicago, even if policymakers did not always treat them as
such. The research chronicled in these pages shows that, if policing practices have changed since
the high rises came down, their underlying logics remain: for example, the assumption that more
police will bring more safety.
In what follows, I argue that the histories of policing and public housing are inseparable
in Chicago; that the two institutions shaped one another in ways that can no longer be ignored or
overlooked. In the U.S., the police are a multi-scalar institution that take their most salient form
in municipal police forces that primarily operate locally (unlike in other contexts, such as many
parts of Europe, where police are organized at the level of the nation-state).42 However, the ethos
of policing is shaped by federal policies and even international engagements, as local police
forces take many of their tactics, logics, and tools directly from the U.S. military.43 As David
Correia and Tyler Wall succinctly explain of police as an institution, “The police are a political
idea, a public institution, and a product of sociohistorical forces. . . . [C]ops are the everyday
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executives that make the liberal capitalist state possible.”44 For decades, public housing provided
a testing ground for new police practices, many of which were later exported to other contexts
both within and beyond the city.45 As this work shows, the two institutions shared leadership
over the years and they shared money—lots of it. Through intergovernmental agreements and
special government grants, the cash-strapped CHA funneled—and continues to transfer—
hundreds of millions of dollars to the CPD, one of the largest and most militarized police forces
in the country. In doing so, CHA and city officials further legitimized police as the sole recourse
for public safety, even as policing consistently failed to provide it.
As I argue throughout this project, spending money on police and security was also a
political choice for CHA, one that came at the cost of other line items for the perennially
impoverished housing agency. Thus, CHA’s practice of transferring funds to CPD not only made
CPD richer and more authoritative, but also diminished the funds available for building
maintenance, social programming for residents, and any other number of potential expenditures
that would have improved resident safety in other ways not reliant upon policing. Thus, choices
about how CHA housing should be policed ultimately contributed to the mounting operating
expenses of the public housing program itself, further threatening its fiscal viability.
Meanwhile, policing—whether through mundane, run-of-the-mill patrols or
extraordinarily abusive and corrupt acts on the part of officers—contributed to making public
housing over the decades into a carceral space. As articulated by Brett Story, carceral spaces can
be understood as “the sites and relations of power that enable and incentivize the capture,
control, and confinement of human beings through structures of immobility and dispossession.”46
This definition relies on an understanding that “the local geography conditions carceral
practices,” and indeed, public housing became, over time, a space that resembled a prison in its
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design and management and, indeed, funneled a great number of residents into the auspices of
the criminal-legal system.47 To posit public housing as a carceral space is not to equate it to a
prison which, indeed, is a peculiar and total institution that should not be watered down through
its comparison to relatively more free spaces.48 However, to name public housing as a carceral
space is to place it along what Loïc Wacquant, drawing on Michel Foucault, calls the carceral
continuum, or the range of spaces and institutions that “ensnares a supernumerary population of
younger black men . . . in a never-ending circulus between” the prison and the urban ghetto.49
The carceral continuum is part and parcel of poverty governance, wherein a “carceral-assistential
complex . . . carries out its mission to surveil, train, and neutralize the populations recalcitrant or
superfluous to the new economic and racial regime” of post-industrial cities.50 Through
pervasive modes of surveillance, discipline, and punishment of residents, Chicago’s public
housing became a place that, in the words of geographer Rashad Shabazz, “primed a generation
of Black men for life behind bars by fusing the elements of prison and the quotidian realities of
home.”51 At its core, this project thus tells a story about how a set of policies and institutions and
the people behind them made public housing into a carceral space, and how it did not have to be
this way.
This story does not end, however, with public housing becoming—through police policy
and practices—a carceral space. Instead, this project argues that it was the very carceral nature of
public housing that was levied to justify its demolition; that the eradication of Chicago’s public
housing as we knew it reflects, in part, a failure of policing rather than an endemic failure of the
housing program itself. In making these arguments, I posit policing as an important component
of real estate—that is, a particular form of capitalist property relations52—and of what Samuel
Stein has termed “the real estate state,” to argue that policing in public housing always, on some
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level, functioned to protect and serve capitalist property relations, over and above people.53 This
is not to argue that policing successfully protected the actual property—that is, the physical
infrastructure and built environment—of public housing. After all, policing was ultimately
ineffective at protecting the buildings themselves from near-constant graffiti, broken lightbulbs,
broken elevators, and other forms of defacement. However, it is to say that policing—as it was
collaboratively organized by law enforcement groups, the CHA, and the City of Chicago—had
the long-term effect of facilitating the redevelopment of the built environment of public housing
to the benefit of capital and a more thoroughly capitalist sense of property. Drawing on urban
theorist Henri Lefebvre, I argue that policing thus contributed to remaking the spaces of public
housing as more abstract—that is, exchangeable—space.54 Police were not the only actor in this
story and policing alone did not bring down the projects; as other scholars have noted, public
policy enacted by the city planners, elected officials, and CHA administrators played an integral
role in designing public housing’s “failure” over the decades.55 However, policing was one
important and heretofore unacknowledged mechanism that laid the groundwork for the
demolition of state-owned and -managed public housing in Chicago and its replacement with
new forms of subsidized housing more amenable to investment, privatization, and
financialization. In the process, policing ushered in the gentrification of the city’s former public
housing landscapes.

Policing Space
In making these arguments, this project fundamentally provides a case study in how
policing produces space, something that urban scholars have largely overlooked but that, I argue,
is vital to understanding the role police play in shaping urban life, particularly for marginalized
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groups. Urban scholars have demonstrated that space is central to policing, in ways that are both
obvious and hidden. In his ethnographic study of the Los Angeles Police Department in the wake
of the Rodney King riots, Steve Herbert argues that police rely on territoriality—control over
specific spaces and specific understandings of those spaces—to undertake their work. Indeed,
particular understandings of the built environment centrally undergird “broken windows”
policing, which has been the dominant approach to policing in the U.S. and beyond in recent
decades.56 Originally articulated by criminologists George Kelling and James Q. Wilson in 1982,
broken windows policing posits that visual signs of disorder and crime are inextricably linked,
where even such minor aesthetic disturbances as a broken window indicate neglect and signal
that an area is ripe for “criminal invasion.”57 Rather than focusing on crime fighting, Kelling and
Wilson argued that police should focus on order maintenance.58 “Order” of course, is highly
subjective, and broken windows policing has resulted in the coding of all kinds of people and
spaces as ‘disorderly’ or ‘out of place,’ often in ways that align with prevailing stigmas against
the poor and people of color.59 In turn, as geographer Brian Jordan Jefferson has shown, broken
windows policing is normalized through discursively tailored representations of space.60 Beyond
racialized fearmongering, broken windows rhetoric is legitimated through geographic knowledge
produced and circulated by social scientists, technocrats, and state officials alike.61 Thus, specific
spatial understandings and representations underlie broken windows policing.
Spatial technologies also augment police understandings and use of urban space.
CompStat, the police industry’s standard statistical platform, maintains an aura of neutrality, all
while producing and analyzing data that reproduces racial stigmas and stereotypes.62 In cities like
New York, the adoption of biometric profiling practices in specific neighborhoods or “hot spots”
creates what Kaufman terms “bio-spatial profiling,” imposing coercive forms of mobility on
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marginalized urban residents as they travel the city.63 One of the dangers of these technologies is
that they appear invisible and banal, operating without much public attention or scrutiny.64
Geographers have further shown how specific technologies like closed circuit television (CCTV)
curtail “geographies of survival” for the homeless,65 while police increasingly use forms of
technology ranging from cell towers to data centers to extend the carceral state into urban
space.66 Data-driven policing systems, including ones that seek to predict where crime will
occur, claim to be colorblind and objective, but are deeply embedded with racialized
understandings of urban space.67 In turn, these technologies justify practices of differential
policing in Black and brown neighborhoods.68
Space has also increasingly been leveraged by the police against the urban poor and
marginalized. For example, in cities like Seattle, banishment orders target and ban individuals—
again, typically the poor and racial minorities, as well as the addicted and the mentally ill—from
occupying public urban space.69 All too often, these civil sanctions lead to criminal charges,
further ensnaring marginalized urbanites in the carceral web.70 These types of orders build upon
the logic of anti-homeless laws, which proliferated in U.S. cities in the 1990s and which rely
upon police for enforcement. In what geographer Don Mitchell has called “the annihilation of
space by law,” anti-homeless laws work to eradicate homeless individuals from the city by
destroying the public urban spaces they rely upon for everyday life.71 Anti-homeless laws thus
render the homeless as targets for the police, criminalizing their very existence in urban space.
All of this scholarship makes clear that space is fundamental to police work, be it through
territorial control, particular spatial understandings and representations, or police data and
technologies that justify the targeting of particular urban sites for intervention and disparate
policing. What is less clear is the impact of police on urban space; that is, what role does policing
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play in not just utilizing, but producing urban space? Urban scholar Henri Lefebvre developed
the theory known as the production of space in the 1970s, positing that “(Social) space is a
(social) product.”72 Much as Marx sought to uncover the private abode of commodity
production, Lefebvre sought to reveal the active relations that produce a space in order to
understand space as it both reflects and mediates those same social relations.73 Drawing on
Lefebvre, I seek in this project to understand: what role did policing play in producing the
spaces, policies, and social life of Chicago’s public housing? To date, scholarship on Chicago’s
public housing has had much to say about crime and violence, particularly in the high-rise
developments. A few studies mention the police, or briefly discuss the inefficacies of police to
control crime in CHA housing. However, no study to date has centered the role of police in these
spaces.* But if—as multiple scholarly accounts attest—the Plan for Transformation was at least
partially predicated on high crime rates in the projects and the city’s inability to control crime
there, then we must ask: what were the police doing, or not doing, in these spaces that led to the
seeming need to destroy them?

Police, Property, and the Production of Space
Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space provides a useful entry point for
interrogating the role of police in Chicago’s public housing. It moves us from seeing public
housing as merely a site—coordinates on a plane—where police did their work to one that was
actively shaped, at least in significant part, through police action. According to Lefebvre, space
both manifests and is produced by social relations. In this way, space is more than an empty

*

Though not about Chicago, several studies do examine policing of public housing in other U.S. cities; for example,
New York City (Flint 2003; Umbach 2011) and Nashville (Websdale 2013). However, these studies tend to focus on
the models of policing deployed in these communities and do not theorize more broadly about policing’s role in
transforming public housing spatially and institutionally.
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container or medium distinct from its contents, as folk wisdom might suggest. Taking this
argument further, Lefebvre posits that social relations only exist “in and through space.”74 Space,
then, is produced through what he identifies as a triad comprised of spatial practices,
representations of space, and representational spaces: in other words, space as perceived,
conceived, and lived.75 These three aspects, or “moments,” of social space shed light on the
spaces where human interactions take place.76
Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space thus highlights the ways in which society
and space are fundamentally imbricated. However, as Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden point out,
Lefebvre’s analysis urges not an apolitical deconstruction of this interrelationship but rather, a
critical investigation of the role of the state and of class struggle in producing space, as well as
the inherent contradictions of capitalist space.77 For Lefebvre, capitalist space functions as a
means of production, an object of consumption, a political instrument, and the intervention of
class struggle alike.78 In the case of the latter, Lefebvre specified that, as he saw it, “Class
struggle intervenes in the production of space, today more than ever.”79 For Lefebvre, capitalism
seeks to homogenize space, to privilege space as abstract—i.e., capable of being measured,
monetized, and financialized. Class struggle pressures this tendency of capitalist space,
producing “spatial differences” that resist spatial homogenization and abstraction.80
Since Lefebvre’s time, urban scholars have contributed further analyses of capitalist
space. Of particular relevance for this study, geographer Nick Blomley has advanced a theory of
property not as a thing but as a set of spatialized relations.81 Under capitalism, property follows
an “ownership model,” where property is predicated on the right to exclude, and all property is
seen as private property.82 Property relies upon legally sanctioned forms of violence: constructed
and upheld through spatial technologies like the frontier, the survey, and the grid, property rests
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upon bounding, exclusion, and dispossession.83 Today, most people live under conditions of
what Blomley calls “precarious property,” in which they access land over which other people
have legally sanctioned powers.84 Because it is not natural but a set of historically produced
relations that require ongoing work to be upheld, property is inherently a site of struggle.85
Twentieth-century public housing provides a fascinating case study in property relations
because, as a market-sheltered site, modernist public housing necessarily pressured capitalist
space. As it was practiced at the outset, public housing provided homes—not vouchers, rent
relief, or other housing subsidies—but homes to the poor. These homes were built and managed
by the state, through public funds unavailable for investment or speculation. As such, public
housing inherently opposed the commodification and, later, the financialization of housing—two
hallmarks of housing under contemporary capitalism.86 This fact never escaped public attention:
Indeed, both the 1937 and 1949 housing acts were met with staunch opposition from private
construction and real estate lobbies, who even used red scare tactics to attempt to sway Congress
away from funding public housing, likening the program to communism.87 In 1952, Congress
required public housing tenants to take an oath of loyalty when they moved in, lest the socialist
nature of public housing make for a breeding ground for Communist Party activity.88 The real
estate lobby also spurred the inclusion of cost-containment measures in the bills, emplacing
limits on how much the public housing program could spend on construction.89 Private
developers believed that public housing should not be so attractive as to compete with housing in
the private market.90
The politics of public housing were explicit in Chicago where, for example, a city council
meeting in February of 1950 got contentious over the discussion of where to site two new CHA
projects containing 10,000 new units. An audience of over 500 people jostled for space in the
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council chambers, where a Communist Party representative spoke in favor of the project, while
representatives of the private construction and real estate industries argued that the land should
be kept open for private development. And, 24 police officers were called in to keep order at the
meeting, which lasted eight hours.91 Just a few years later, the Chicago Tribune editorial board
explained that “Public housing is a Marxist idea, which means that Communists and Socialists
embrace it with equal fervor. It is an attack on private ownership in its most useful field, the
ownership of homes which gives the citizen that alertness to tax spending that is essential to
good government.” Of note here is not only the assumption that public housing would inherently
attract “Communists and Socialists,” but indeed, that it would inculcate communists by
sheltering its residents from paying property taxes. The paper further elaborated that, “The staff
of the Chicago Housing Authority was reluctant to enforce the congressional ban on Communists
as tenants. When the members of the Chicago Housing Authority demanded that their employees
also take noncommunist oaths, the staff screamed in rage.”92 Whether or not staff pushback to
anti-communist policies was as dramatic as reported, public housing’s reputation as a hotbed of
communism was secured in public discourse.
And yet, despite the Red Scare discourse associated with public housing as a stateowned, de-commodified form of housing, public housing was also constantly riddled by
contradictions between public and private over the course of the twentieth century: publicly
funded, the developments were nevertheless intended to provide private dwelling space,
predicated on tenants’ ability to exclude non-residents. As practiced, this was not always the
case, and the state, as landlord, frequently intruded on its tenants’ privacy, as this study and
others document.93
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Additionally, as sociologist George Lipsitz argues, the split between public and private
space has always, in the American imagination, carried racial meaning. He describes a dominant
white spatial imaginary “based on exclusivity and augmented exchange value.”94 In contrast, he
says a black spatial imaginary “favors public cooperation in solving public problems.”95 While
neither are reducible to embodied identities, these opposing, racialized forms of spatiality help
“describe how social relations take on their full force and meaning when they are enacted
physically in actual place.”96 Thus, following Lipsitz’ analysis, from its beginning and even
before the resident population became primarily Black, U.S. public housing modelled a black
sense of space—one that privileged publicity, collectivity, and solidarity over privatization,
exclusion, and autonomy. While Lipsitz specifies that not all white people embrace a white
spatial imaginary and some Black people can benefit from it, every white person benefits “from
the association of white places with privilege.”97 Thus, public housing, from its inception,
threatened not only capitalist property relations, predicated as they are on the ability to exclude,
but a white supremacist racial and spatial order.
Indeed, no analysis of public housing is complete without careful, ongoing attention to its
social and particularly its racial composition. Unfortunately, Lefebvre’s spatial analysis failed to
explicitly account for forms of social identity other than class. However, just because Lefebvre
failed to address other axes of identity does not mean that his spatial triad is incapable of or
irrelevant to theorizing space in the contemporary U.S. context, in which race, gender, and other
forms of social identity play key roles.98 Because colonial dispossession—the root of
contemporary property systems—unfolded in particular racial contexts, current property systems
must be conceptualized, as legal scholar Brenna Bhandar argues, as “racial regimes of
ownership.”99 In the U.S., the production of space unfolds against a backdrop of racial
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capitalism, which, as Ruth Wilson Gilmore reminds us, is all capitalism.100 Capitalism, in her
words, “requires inequality and racism enshrines it.”101 Indeed, racial domination has always
been central to the governance of capitalist society.102 And, indeed, whiteness has functioned as a
form of legally legitimated property in the U.S.: more than a social identity, whiteness is a
propertied interest and protected resource that carries material meaning.103 For this reason,
whiteness comprises what Lipsitz has characterized as a possessive investment: something that
accrues financial advantages for those who can claim it.104 This manifests most obviously in the
intergenerational wealth transfer that occurs when real estate is handed down from one
generation to the next: a benefit from which Black Americans and other Americans of color have
largely been excluded.105 Thus, property has not only actualized but fueled identity-based forms
of inequality as well as structural poverty in the U.S., evidenced by ongoing racial gaps in
educational outcomes, lifetime earnings, criminal justice contact, and public health, among other
measures.106
The U.S. further operates under what planning scholar Ananya Roy has identified as a
“paradigm of propertied citizenship.”107 Under this framework, to be without property is to be
excluded from the full rights of citizenship and to be viewed as a trespasser in the space of the
nation-state.108 For the urban poor and racialized for whom access to property is always
precarious, basic rights are thus at stake. Public housing residents, who rely upon the state for
housing, occupy a liminal space between homelessness and being housed. This precarious
property relation makes them particularly vulnerable to human rights violations as well as
second-class treatment by the state.
Urban policing, then, has historically served to uphold and protect private property under
the capitalist, ownership model.109 Indeed, modern U.S. policing found an early form in slave
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patrols, when slaves themselves were understood as property rather than people, so policing their
movement and preventing escape functioned to uphold the economic order of plantation
capitalism.110 Police powers thus developed in and through racial differentiation as police made
and enforced decisions about who was capable of owning property and who was property.111 In
doing so, policing has served to delineate and uphold racial boundaries and particularly to
enforce dominant understandings of whiteness.112 But it has also, more specifically, served to
uphold the class interests of white property owners, who have a material stake in maintaining
racial capitalist property relations.
Today, where and how police interact with urban residents contributes to the racialization
of neighborhoods and impacts where individuals of color are seen to be ‘out of place’ and thus,
subject to further police intervention.113 While implicit, the ownership model of property upholds
these processes: if property were not fundamentally understood as private and if property did not
undergird a possessive, material investment in whiteness, police would have no reason to target
particular individuals or impose limits on their mobility in urban space. Indeed, race and crime
both play into the politics of residential property, where housing itself functions as a race-making
institution with key connections to the carceral state.114 For example, legal scholar Jonathan
Simon argues that mass incarceration is linked to the rise in homeownership in the latter half of
the twentieth century on the premise that racially anxious homeowners are more likely to spend
on prisons and police and vote for tough-on-crime laws to protect their property investment.115
In turn, police are a crucial component of the carceral state, in which policing renders
public space carceral, criminalizes racialized and precarious workers, and manages the mobility
of urban residents.116 As “street-level bureaucrats,” police play a crucial role in disciplining
populations and funneling criminalized individuals into the carceral system.117 Police are also,
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crucially, workers, whose labor involves violence even when they are not actively being violent:
as anthropologist Micol Siegel argues, drawing on Max Weber, police are “violence workers”
insofar as they represent the human form of the state and its monopoly on the legitimate use of
violence.118 To help conceptualize how police and others contribute to a bloated carceral state
that operates beyond the boundaries of the prison itself, Gilmore offers “expansive carceral
geographies.”119 Under this framing, the prison is best conceived not as a building but as a set of
relationships that stretch across carceral space.120 As Katherine McKittrick argues, “prison life”
refers not only to what is lived behind bars, but rather describes “the everyday workings of
incarceration as they are necessarily lived and experienced, as a form of human life and struggle,
inside and outside prisons.”121 Policing, then, is a crucial part of the everyday operations of the
carceral state beyond the prison gates.
Drawing on these frameworks, this project thus interrogates the role of policing in
producing public housing as a space—one that inherently pressures property relations in the
context of racial capitalism—and, more specifically, as a carceral space. As Bhandar asserts,
struggles over land are nothing less than struggles over life.122 The history of Chicago’s public
housing has, at least thus far, culminated in a transformation that undermined poor residents’
claim to urban land. Thus, even when police contact appears banal—that is, when contact does
not end in physical violence or even death—the ways in which policing mediates and shapes
residents’ access to urban space and urban property is not trivial, but rather, vital. As Lefebvre
asserts, the right to the city is nothing less than the right to urban life.123
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Policing the Real Estate State
In what follows, I argue that policing contributed to producing Chicago’s public housing
as a carceral space and that in doing so, it fueled the city’s eventual expropriation of public
housing from its residents. In other words, police action—and sometimes, inaction—laid the
groundwork for the eventual remaking of former public housing sites into landscapes more
amenable to investment, speculation, and private capital. Policing, in this analysis, helps
establish the conditions for housing transformation under capitalism; like other processes of the
carceral state and as Gilmore has argued, this process is deliberate, though not conspiratorial.124
That is, my data do not suggest that individual police officers or leaders purposefully worked to
destroy public housing or to privatize it—far from it.
Instead, what my data do show is that police practices and policies in public housing
supported the interests of the real estate state by enabling the conditions for gentrification to take
place in the long run, in conjunction with other agencies at the local, state, and federal levels. By
“conditions for gentrification,” I mean that policing—in producing public housing as a carceral
space—effectively deepened what geographer Neil Smith called a rent gap, wherein active
disinvestment depressed public housing’s land values below their theoretical value—something
that public housing, as a decommodified form of housing, already tends towards.125 Rent gaps
create a vacuum that attracts new investment, resulting in the active displacement of people over
a given time frame. Collectively, this is the specific process I mean when I name gentrification, a
word that has otherwise been adopted to refer to a wide range of urban transformation processes.
Thus, in this project, I argue that policing helped produce a rent gap at CHA properties by
producing these spaces as carceral. On the one hand, the carceral nature of the developments
reproduced their territorial stigmatization, thereby driving down real estate values by making
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them appear ever-more dangerous and therefore, less desirable. The more prisonlike, violent, and
hopeless these spaces became—or at least, appeared to outsiders—the less worthy they appeared
of public investment and the larger the rent gap grew. On the other hand, officials also pursued
policing and punishment as primary strategies of poverty governance in public housing
developments. Throughout the history recounted in these pages, policymakers often opted to
invest in law enforcement at the direct expense of building maintenance, social programs, or
other forms of community uplift that could have increased the desirability of these communities
and their surrounding neighborhoods. In doing so, policing, even if unintentionally, helped effect
the eventual displacement of public housing residents as their homes were expropriated so that
new forms of capital could take hold in their former environments.
Numerous studies have documented that policing plays an important role in urban
transformation processes and, particularly, processes of land and property speculation. Indeed,
police proponents and critical scholars alike have made such arguments, albeit from different
political perspectives. Even in their initial argument for Broken Windows policing—that is, for
police as facilitators of order maintenance, rather than law enforcement per se—Kelling and
Wilson linked lack of public order to “urban decay” processes that began after World War II.126
In Fixing Broken Windows, George Kelling and Catherine Coles detail at length what they see as
the deleterious effects on urban spaces when the police fail to uphold order and in turn, what they
see as the promises of Broken Windows policing for regaining control over urban public
space.127 As Heather Mac Donald, George Kelling’s Manhattan Institute colleague and longtime
proponent of Broken Windows policing, writes as recently as the summer of 2020, “Broken
Windows recognizes that physical disorder and low-level lawlessness . . . telegraph that social
control in a disordered environment has broken down.”128 Critiquing the decision of then-New
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York City Mayor Bill de Blasio to end a graffiti-eradication program, Mac Donald lauds former
Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s famous adoption of Broken Windows policing, which, she writes,
resulted in not only the “steepest crime drop of any big city in the country” but also “[n]ewly
restored storefronts and avenues cleared of aggressive panhandlers” that in turn “invited a flood
of tourists and new residents who bolstered the city’s lawful street life and revived its
economy.”129 As Nicole Stelle Garnett points out in her book on land use, policing, and public
order, “Many order-maintenance policies are land-use policies” because they dictate and
enforce, among other things, how specific pieces of urban land are allowed to be used in
practice.130 Garnett further argues that order-maintenance policies, of which policing is just one
component, may help convince “middle-income families with children to forgo the amenities of
suburbia and make their lives in cities”—for example, if fear of crime is meaningfully
reduced.131 For police boosters, then, if a degraded built environment signals a need for police
intervention, that intervention is believed capable of transforming the urban landscape in ways
that are explicitly favorable to reinvestment and maintaining or increasing property values.
Critical scholarship likewise points to the role of police in promoting and upholding
processes of urban transformation and particularly, gentrification. Los Angeles’ Skid Row, a
one-mile zone of downtown Los Angeles that is home to a concentrated homeless population and
also one of the most heavily policed sites in the U.S., is similarly one of the most studied in this
vein.132 As Jordan Camp notes, “The gentrification of downtown Los Angeles has been
accompanied by mass criminalization. . . . Aggressive policing and surveillance has been
deployed to criminalize resistance to these uneven developments. . . . Policing has been central to
this urban strategy of capitalist development.”133 As Lipsitz argues, however, housing insecurity
on Skid Row is not a discreet phenomenon but rather the product of multilayered, racialized
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historical and structural injustices in the housing system itself including racial zoning and
restrictive covenants, mortgage redlining and predatory lending.134 Thus, the policing of Skid
Row residents “individualizes the disorder created by the histories of structural racism and
systemic class exploitation. Presuming that people who have problems are problems confuses
the consequences of poverty with its causes.”135 In his own analysis of the same space, Mitchell
argues analogously that in the context of Skid Row, “Urban decline is seen to be the result of
homelessness.”136 To reverse decline, planners turn to police to eradicate the homeless from
urban space and thus, improve urban aesthetics in order to remake the city as a playground for
capital.137 Meanwhile, policing reproduces rather than mitigates poverty and inequality in Skid
Row, where police are the primary face of poverty governance.138
In these ways, the policing of LA’s Skid Row reflects what Lipsitz identifies as a
neoliberal perspective on the space that “elevates the potential exchange value of Skid Row over
its use value. Its utility as the home of a social world for a population with nowhere else to go
counts for nothing from a neoliberal perspective. Its potential as a site for new development and
investment is all that counts from a perspective that sees all space as only market space.”139 And
thus, he continues, “When police officers in Los Angeles fan out across Skid Row each day to
harass houseless people, they act not as individuals but as part of a national and international
pattern organized around the needs of neoliberalism.”140
The case of Skid Row policing, while extreme, epitomizes the extent to which policing
regimes support structures of capital accumulation in cities. Data from New York City, for
example, shows a strong association between gentrification and the use of order maintenance
policing.141 Additionally, as city neighborhoods gentrify (measured by an influx of middle-class
families and/or an increase in real estate market growth), calls to the police increase as do
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proactive arrests.142 In Los Angeles, one study found that census tracts experiencing
gentrification reported more police citations.143 Finally, expanded economic reliance on housing
price appreciation in the late 1990s and early 2000s has been found to correlate with a
heightened demand for expanded law enforcement.144
While these studies describe broad trends, specific policing tactics increasingly enforce
and support gentrification processes in particular locales in the U.S. as well as internationally. In
doing so, these tactics also uphold racial and class boundaries in cities ranging from Oakland to
Philadelphia, Seattle to Boston.145 These tactics include banishment orders, gang injunctions,
nuisance abatement policing, closed circuit televisions, and hot spot policing.146 Increasingly,
private security forces augment local police efforts and provide specialized policing within
delineated city improvement districts.147 Collectively, all of these tools and tactics function to
securitize public urban spaces by excluding racial others and the urban poor in the name of
increasing a given area’s marketability and thus, its potential to attract and accommodate capital.
As such, all of these policing efforts tend towards supporting the production of abstract
space—again, as Mitchell describes, “space abstracted out of its particularity and made fully
commensurable; that is, the space of capitalism.”148 He continues, “If capitalism has a goal, an
end, then it is the full abstraction of space, the complete remaking of space into commensurable
or exchangeable space, the total reduction of space into only a commodity—a commodity that
embodies value that expands, circulates, and is ‘realized,’ allowing for ever more
accumulation.”149 In supporting gentrification processes, policing aids and abets the remaking of
urban space as more abstract and less differentiated.
Thus, as the literatures reviewed above make clear, this study is certainly not the first to
identify a link between policing and the remaking of urban space in ways that serve capital.
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Cities deploy public and private police officers alike to securitize gentrifying areas and uphold
the possibility of their further economic development.150 As such, though not often thought of in
these terms, policing is itself an urban planning mechanism, a conclusion that this project
likewise supports. This study diverges from the ones described above, however, in several key
respects. First, it examines how policing unleashes these processes among the spaces occupied
by the housed urban poor, rather than the houseless, where most scholars have focused their
attention. Second, by drawing extensively upon interviews with both police officers and former
public housing residents, I show how these policing regimes are operationalized and
experienced, connecting these individual perspectives to the larger forces reshaping urban space.
And third, my analysis reveals how policing helped effect an eventual transformation in the
spaces and property relations of public housing, contributing to what many have decried as the
‘failure’ of public housing and its subsequent ‘transformation.’ In doing so, my analysis supports
those that say public housing was not doomed to fail. Policing, like the other policy choices, state
actions, and state inactions that shaped the program over the decades, contributed to public
housing’s trajectory.

Outline of Chapters
The arguments in this project proceed as follows. Part 1 highlights the actors responsible
for policing Chicago public housing over time. Chapter 2 provides critical historical background,
investigating how early CHA developments were policed between 1937 and 1970. I argue that
initially, police were primarily called upon to police integration in Chicago’s nascent public
housing, which was racially diverse but segregated, following both neighborhood composition
rules and the city’s entrenched color lines. Under the CHA’s first leader, Elizabeth Wood, the
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agency pushed to integrate its developments, a move that was met with resident reactions
ranging from antipathy to hostility. At two key sites—the Airport Homes and the Trumbull Park
Homes—the arrival of the development’s first Black tenants was met with hostility that escalated
into full-blown race riots. Police were called in to manage the unrest but were entirely ineffective
at quelling the tensions. In the case of Trumbull Park, a massive police presence was deployed to
patrol the property for months on end in a move that required the hiring of additional officers and
thus, the expansion of the Chicago Police Department itself. However, the officers were
incapable of settling the crowds and, ultimately, the first Black family to move into Trumbull
Park gave up after months of harassment and moved back out. Simultaneously, CHA realized a
growing need for security across its portfolio of properties and leaned on the City Council to
expand the CPD budget to provide additional officers to staff their sites. Thus, even from the
early days, CHA and CPD quickly developed a close relationship—one that supported the
expansion and legitimation of the police department—even as CPD proved ineffective at
improving social relations or promoting public safety at the city’s public housing.
If police were initially invited to CHA to police integration efforts, dynamics between
officers and residents shifted dramatically as the demographics of public housing changed in the
mid-twentieth century: specifically, as the resident population became almost entirely Black.
Thus, Chapter 2 also explores how hostilities escalated between police and public housing
residents through the middle of the twentieth century and up until 1970. Amidst
deindustrialization and early retrenchments to welfare state policies and other social safety nets,
public housing residents led increasingly precarious lives. As we would expect under such
conditions, reports of crime at the developments increased over this period, which provoked a
heightened police response. At this time, tenants began to complain of feeling simultaneously
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over-policed and under-protected, a dynamic that would endure for many years and is still
expressed by some CHA residents today. Mounting tensions between residents and the police
culminated in one ‘flashpoint’ event in 1970: the murder at Cabrini-Green of two police officers,
Sergeant James Severin and Officer Anthony Rizzato. As portrayed in popular media coverage
from the time, this incident seemingly cemented the growing impression of public housing as an
ungovernable, lawless space. It also further solidified the sense that police and public housing
residents were on opposing sides of an ongoing contest over urban space.
In Chapter 3, I analyze the role of the municipal police in public housing from 19702000, when the Plan for Transformation began. By examining specific ways that CPD and CHA
organized policing in the projects—from special patrols to the tactics employed by officers—I
show how CPD’s policing of public housing during these years became simultaneously more
intensive and more counterproductive. Relying heavily on interview accounts from officers who
worked in public housing during these decades, I examine how police officers saw the purpose of
their work. For officers working in a variety of roles in public housing, the mission of the job
was to protect “good” tenants from “bad” ones, a dichotomy that positions the police officer as a
hero figure in the midst of a chaotic and even dangerous environment. And indeed, officers also
speak about public housing, particularly in its high-rise form, as another world: a place where the
built environment itself engendered crime and made police work more difficult.
In Chapter 4, I juxtapose police accounts of their work in public housing with how
residents experienced this policing during the same time period. In particular, I examine the
impact of police policies and practices on residents’ everyday life, arguing that abuse was
endemic, rather than exceptional at CHA. If police saw their work as protecting “good” tenants
from “bad” ones, tenants felt universally targeted by police. For their part, they too had to
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discern “good” cops from “bad,” but because policing was so harmful to the community as a
whole, residents tend to understand policing in more institutional terms, as a broken structure
rather than a problem of individual officers. As this chapter demonstrates, CPD’s ever-more
intensive efforts to regain control over public housing during this period not only failed to
mitigate crime, but often spurred it—not only through widespread corruption and horrific
abuse—but also through mundane, everyday police activities that rendered public housing more
carceral, and less domestic.
Chapter 5 chronicles the creation and decade-long run of the CHA’s in-house police
force. Created in 1989 with the help of federal funding, the CHA Police Department (CHAPD)
operated as an autonomous force endowed with full police powers, including powers of arrest.
The force was intended to address problems of crime and security at CHA that tenants said were
being ignored by the Chicago Police Department. The force, which at its height employed about
700 officers working across CHA’s portfolio, was known for its relatively high proportion of
Black officers and its putative ‘community policing’ approach. However, just as they
experienced with CPD officers, residents found CHA’s police force to contain more than a few
‘bad apples’—officers who raped, harassed, abused, or grifted off of tenants. Having an in-house
police force at the housing authority led to key changes in the nature of the developments,
including the installation of lock-up facilities—miniature jails—inside some of the high rises
themselves. The existence of the force also reinforced the sense that CHA was its own ‘city
within a city’—a space apart from the rest of Chicago and with its own set of parallel
institutions.151 In other words, the force did not make CHA sites safer—only more intensively
policed—yet CHA spent massive amounts of money and administrative attention on running the
police force (something that few if any of its top officials were trained or capable of doing).
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CHA leadership repeatedly insisted that they needed the force, even if tenant opinions were
mixed. Increasingly, the CHAPD gained a reputation for being ‘fake cops’ or ‘glorified security
guards’—full of officers who did not make the cut to work for CPD—despite the fact that they
were trained at the city’s police academy. Lacking in respect and legitimacy, the force was also
small enough that some residents did not know it existed. In 1999, as CHA was on the precipice
of announcing the Plan for Transformation, the force was suddenly disbanded and policing duties
returned to CPD.
In Part 2, I examine in depth the tactics and strategies that police actors employed in
public housing to police both the space and its occupants in the latter decades of the twentieth
century—that is, the years leading up to the Plan for Transformation. Chapter 6 details the
practice of police raids in public housing. From the late 1980s through the 1990s, the CHA
regularly oversaw police ‘sweeps’ of public housing buildings, in which scores of officers and
CHA administrators would raid the developments in search of guns, drugs, and unwanted
tenants. During these warrantless searches, residents were often awoken before dawn to scores of
officers descending upon their building, knocking on or—in some reports—kicking in doors,
upending drawers and cabinets, interrogating residents, and terrorizing children. Residents would
be rounded up, sometimes subjected to fingerprinting or retinal scans, and issued ID cards that
they would have to use from then on to access their buildings. Lobbies were ‘secured,’ metal
detectors and security guard outposts installed to monitor those coming and going. Unauthorized
boarders were evicted and vacant units sealed off, and CHA installed CCTV cameras in public
spaces. Officers would confiscate any drugs and weapons discovered in the searches, which
turned out to be relatively rare. Justified as a way to rid public housing of drugs and gangs once
and for all, the CHA spent hundreds of millions of dollars to carry out these raids every year,
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often paid for with funds borrowed from modernization moneys (intended for building repairs
and upkeep) as well as federal grants. The ACLU sued the CHA repeatedly, citing
unconstitutional search and seizure, and CHA was ultimately sanctioned by the court, which put
limits on the extent and nature of the raids. However, area newspapers and HUD both supported
the practice, which was facilitated not only by CPD and the CHAPD, but also a slew of other
agencies including the Drug Enforcement Administration; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives; the Illinois State’s Attorney Police; the Federal Bureau of
Investigation Police; and the Illinois State Police.
Chapter 7 explores what I argue was a turning point in the history of CHA and another
flashpoint in the agency’s relationship with the police: the 1992 murder of seven-year-old
Cabrini-Green resident Dantrell Davis, who was shot in the head by a stray bullet while holding
his mother’s hand on his morning walk to school. Though certainly not the first child’s death in
public housing and far from the first murder there, the incident created local and national uproar,
and functionally became the nail in the coffin for the city’s public housing. In this chapter, I will
argue that the Plan for Transformation, whose seeds had already been planted by 1992, was
intended, among other things, to eradicate public housing in an attempt to eradicate the kind of
crime that led to Dantrell’s death. Through the figure of the innocent child and his bereaved
mother, policymakers mobilized public sentiment against public housing and sold the public on a
new idea: low-rise, low-density mixed-income developments where it was believed that a
contrived economic mix and new built form would prevent gang-related and violent crime. Of
course, this story was never totally about Dantrell himself, nor his mother, Annette Freeman, so
this chapter will also explore how, in the wake of Dantrell’s death, the CHA and police went on a
crime-prevention frenzy that perversely ended with Freeman herself being evicted by the very
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policies intended to make Cabrini-Green safer for children like Dantrell. I argue that this story
represents the apotheosis of carceral logics in CHA housing: how policies supposedly intended
to protect residents from violent crime ended up criminalizing and punishing a victim of that
very crime—a resident, in this case, arguably most in need of protection and assistance. In all of
these ways, Dantrell’s death set the stage for and created an opening for change that CHA
administrators and city officials had long hoped for.
In the years following Dantrell Davis’ death, police sweeps in Chicago public housing
became ever-more draconian, the debates around their legality ever-more contentious. In Chapter
8, I draw on the work of Stuart Hall and his colleagues in Policing the Crisis to argue that in
1990s Chicago, gang violence, while real, also constituted a moral panic fueled by the media,
elected officials, and even the police themselves. However, the panic was never only about the
violence itself but rather, the ways in which gang violence threatened the order of the city as well
as the legitimacy of city institutions and their ability to govern. Increasingly, policing public
housing became an explicit effort to police gangs—an effort that manifested in increasingly
desperate and draconian tactics from the creation of brand-new gang policing units to ongoing
illegal searches. These tactics, I argue, fueled the fear of gang violence as much as they
responded to it and increasingly, Chicago’s public housing took on national prominence as the
quintessential site of gang violence in the national imagination. As such, CHA developments
played an important role in President Clinton’s campaign to pass the 1994 Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act, thus re-scaling Chicago’s gang violence from a local to a national
issue. Ultimately, drawing on the experiences of residents from the time, I argue that the police
tactics employed to counter gang violence in CHA’s developments during this time demonstrate
what Terra Graziani et al term the “lawlessness of the law,” in which the actions of police
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increasingly mirrored those of the gangs they ostensibly sought to confront. In turn, their actions
made public housing feel more like a prison and less like a home.152 Meanwhile, ongoing gang
activity challenged the authority of the state—a challenge that, if it could not be solved through
policing, would need to be resolved in other ways, up to and including the demolition of public
housing.
In making these arguments, this chapter offers an ongoing history of the tactics employed
in public housing, while also offering an analysis of why the end of public housing unfolded as it
did. The panic, I argue, was not brand-new; in fact, it had been building over the course of the
history recounted in this study. Had it not been for the ground laid in the racialized politics and
policing recounted in Chapter 2, the constant struggles of the residents as discussed particularly
in Chapter 4, and the remarkably consistent but counterproductive responses by city, CHA, and
police leaders over the whole of this history, it would have been just another moral panic. By the
1990s, it was more than that: it is that whole history coming to a head and this time, it led to a
different set of outcomes. The mid-1990s thus presented a historical conjuncture in which the
panic over—and reality of—both violence and violent policing in public housing led to a
different outcome than it had in the past: the end of public housing as we knew it.
Chapter 9, my concluding chapter, reviews the key arguments of my study: that policing
and public housing are deeply enmeshed institutions in Chicago; that shifting housing policies
have spurred the expansion of the city police department over the years; that money spent on
policing detracted from the housing authority’s ability to pay for maintenance, upkeep, and
social services; and that the close partnership between the institutions reflects many shared
guiding logics including, most pertinently, the use of punishment as a primary technique of
poverty governance. Despite extreme measures to prevent and eradicate crime in public housing,
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policing was ineffective at promoting public safety and in many cases, made residents less safe.
On the whole, policing practices contributed to making Chicago’s housing both a violent and a
carceral space. For a time, this arrangement worked for police and the city alike, who treated
CHA developments as a de facto vice zone where they could contain crime. As time went on,
however, the problem grew untenable: conditions in CHA housing were too great a stain on the
city and, indeed, the nation and the gap between actualized and potential ground rent grew too
wide to suit the needs of capital. Demolition and redevelopment provided an answer to
seemingly solve both problems simultaneously. Thus, this project argues that to understand the
history of public housing in the U.S., and to begin to imagine more just housing futures, we must
understand the role of police in these spaces.

Notes on the Text
This study is, centrally, a historical geographic narrative. That is, my choice to employ a
historical presentation within this project crucially underlies the geographic themes discussed
throughout: to understand policing’s effect on public housing as a space, I had to tell this story
through the lens of its history. This choice of presentation does several things for the project.
First, it allows me to show the historical linkages between different eras of CHA history to
demonstrate how, for example, the call for more police by white residents protesting integration
in Chapter 2 laid the foundation for the forms of racialized policing discussed in Chapters 3
through 5. Second, and relatedly, approaching this project as a historical geographic study allows
the story to drive the theory. That is, rather than sorting the data purely by themes or focusing on
a more contained period of time, the historical narrative allows for both an understanding of how
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policies unfolded as they did and how institutional relationships developed as they did, but also
the effects of these trends on the spaces of public housing over time.
There are a few important caveats to note about the arguments contained in this project.
First, this is not a story about police abuse, nor about so-called “bad apples,” though the
following pages certainly document many instances of both. In what follows, I do my best to
differentiate the officers employed by the various policing agencies I mention from the
institutions of policing. Institutions, however, are comprised of people, and in many cases, those
people did bad things. My emphasis on institutions does not, in other words, absolve the people
involved of their actions. Instead, by focusing on institutions, I aim to show how the failures of
policing that I document were and continue to be structural, rather than individual. They are
problems that, perhaps frustratingly, will only be solved by system change, and not by swapping
out individual officers or police leaders; diversifying the police force; or introducing new police
technologies, for examples.
For the purposes of this project, it is also important to remember that police are not
monolithic and that police officers often play multiple roles in a city or even in a given
neighborhood—as street-level bureaucrats and violence workers, yes, but also frequently as
homeowners or residents themselves. As Sir Robert Peel, founder of the London Metropolitan
Police and widely known as the father of modern policing, explained it in 1829, “the police are
the public and the public are the police.”153 Officers’ perspectives on the city and its public
housing are thus shaped by these multiple identities and experiences. For example, one Black
female officer I interviewed spoke from the perspective of a resident frustrated by the former
public housing residents who had moved into her neighborhood. Her narrative demonstrates the
blurring between officers’ identities as police and as city residents.
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Throughout, I employ the word “projects” to refer to public housing developments. I do
so cautiously, recognizing that this word has taken on a stigma—one that I do not desire to
reproduce. However, it is also a word used by many former public housing tenants to refer to
their home communities and, more importantly for my purposes, it embodies the experimental
ethos that characterized public housing throughout its history; that is, public housing as,
explicitly, a project. By using the word, I seek to amplify this sense of public housing as an
ongoing experiment in a certain way of living, a certain style of community, and a certain form
of placemaking. Thus, Policing the Project is centrally about policing the boundaries of an
experimental form of housing.
Another danger of this study is that, in focusing on crime and responses to it that
occurred in public housing, I will unintentionally reinforce a monochromatic portrayal of public
housing as merely a space of crime and violence. As writers like Ben Austen, Audrey Petty, and
Jamie Kalven have shown, life in Chicago’s public housing was complex and nuanced; it was,
for many, a site of domesticity, familiarity, and mutual aid as much as it was a site of struggle.154
If I focus too much on policing, and therefore crime and violence, in what follows, it is because I
feel that too much scholarship on public housing has failed to account for the often deleterious
role of police in these spaces; the ways that the state, in the form of police, actually produced
criminality in the projects. That is, if this reads as yet another grim account of crime and violence
in public housing, the difference—as I hope I make clear in what follows—is that this time,
police are at the center of it.
One of the key conceits of this study is that, if Chicago public housing was an
experiment, it is an experiment we must learn from. As such, I contend that this project offers
lessons for housing policy and policing alike. The history chronicled in the following chapters
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thus provides an opportunity not just to reflect but to reimagine public safety. The history of
policing at CHA also matters because, for many police officers, CHA was the training ground
where they began their careers. Additionally, policing practices established in CHA in some
cases were exported to other contexts, be it other parts of Chicago or other housing authorities in
other cities.155 Edward King*,† a former CPD and CHA officer, describes it thusly: “Public
housing is a microcosm of the rest of the world. The rest of the city. It’s just more concentrated .
. . All the lessons are there . . . It’s all there, waiting for someone to have the sense enough to
decipher the information.”156
Finally, a note on the scope of this work: While I do attempt to capture a wide-ranging
historical narrative, dating back to the 1930s, as well as a city-wide view of public housing, my
focus for the purposes of this study is on family public housing. There is much to be said about
public safety at senior housing developments, scattered site public housing, and Section 8 (now
Housing Choice Voucher) housing, but such spaces are not the focus here. Similarly, I take a
wide-ranging view of policing: while the Chicago Police are often the focus of my analysis, as
the primary actor responsible for municipal policing, this study also considers how other law
enforcement actors as well as softer policing techniques, such as those enacted by city
bureaucrats, contributed to the policing of public housing and its residents. I do not, however,
examine the role of other emergency services, such as fire department or emergency medical
services, which were a frequent presence in public housing as well.

†

* indicates name is a pseudonym to protect participant’s confidentiality
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Conclusion
I opened this chapter with an epigraph from Saidiya Hartman’s Wayward Lives, Beautiful
Experiments, in which she describes the black metropolis—in her case, early twentieth century
Harlem—as a “collective endeavor to live free” that “unfolds in the confines of the carceral
landscape.”157 In their own way, CHA developments also comprised a “black city-within-a-city,”
though as this project demonstrates, Chicago’s public housing—however segregated socially,
racially, and economically from the rest of the city—was never wholly distinct from its larger
structures and forces. That is, unlike what Hartman describes in her quote, for its residents, CHA
housing was never only about being “just us,” but was instead constantly subject to intrusions
from administrators, journalists, politicians and, indeed, police. Nevertheless, what Hartman
usefully demonstrates—and the reason I employ her quote to open this chapter—is the beauty
that can be found in community, often in unexpected ways, as well as the contradictions inherent
in Chicago’s public housing as in the neighborhoods she describes: the constant struggle to live
free within a prisonized landscape. In what follows, I chart the myriad ways that policing
rendered public housing carceral and thus, constrained the agency of public housing residents
and limited the life chances of the resident population as a whole. However, at every turn,
residents found—and continue to express—ways to push back against the forces that sought to
diminish, stigmatize, abandon, and otherwise harm their communities. As much as anything, this
study is about the collective endeavor to live free.
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Chapter 2. Protecting Property, Policing People
As a New Deal-era slum eradication and replacement program, Chicago’s public housing
manifested a highly utopian, modernist logic: that families moving into a new and improved
environment would not only be more adequately housed, but indeed, learn to conform to
standards of middle-class social respectability.1 However, upon building its early projects, the
Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) quickly realized that social transformation did not
automatically accompany environmental transformation. Early disturbances at several
developments prompted CHA to implement security services across its portfolio, by both hiring
private guards and developing close partnerships with the city police. In this chapter, I explore
early police interventions in public housing, tracing how the relationship developed between
police, CHA leaders, and CHA residents over the period from 1937 to 1970. I draw primarily on
newspaper coverage to do so—admittedly, a data source replete with blind spots and biases, as
discussed in Chapter 1. If newspaper coverage cannot be considered comprehensive or objective,
however, what it does reveal is first, highly publicized events and second, the public discourse
around crime and policing at CHA, a topic that received increasing—and increasingly
sensationalized—coverage as the decades wore on.
What the historical record from this period shows is that, in the early years, police were
primarily called in to quell racial tensions in newly integrating projects—whether they were
there to protect CHA property or its residents was less clear. In either case, the police were
ultimately ineffective at managing racial unrest, although these interventions laid the
groundwork for a close partnership between CHA and the Chicago Police Department (CPD).
This relationship continued to strengthen over the years. As the racial composition of CHA
tenants shifted to be nearly all-Black, and as reports of crime at the developments rose due to
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deepening poverty and high population densities, tenants began to express the enduring dynamic
of feeling simultaneously under-protected and over-policed. By 1970 and in the aftermath of
extensive civil-rights era urban conflict, residents had a largely antagonistic relationship with
local police, who they felt were responsible for targeting and brutalizing young men in the
community in particular, but who were seemingly never around when they could have used
protection. Tensions were further heightened that year when two police officers were killed at
Cabrini-Green. Meanwhile, as public housing residents led increasingly precarious lives, and as
their physical surroundings began to fall into disrepair, the City of Chicago and CHA funneled
more and more money and, along with it, legitimacy to the municipal police department.

The Early Years: Policing Integration from 1937-1960
The close relationship between the Chicago Housing Authority and the Chicago Police
Department developed early in the housing authority’s existence. Founded by the U.S. Housing
Act of 1937, also known as the Wagner-Steagall Act, the CHA quickly set about building
apartment complexes for low-income working families throughout the city. The agency’s first
director, Elizabeth Wood, was a progressive housing reformer who espoused the idyllic, if
environmentally determinist, vision that low-income families would “blossom” when
transplanted from slums “into a setting of apartments attractively planned and well-maintained.”2
Her dream for public housing embodies the utopian spirit of the program as a new mode of living
for urban Americans, including white working families and Black families who were
experiencing overcrowding in Chicago’s Black Belt following the Great Migration.
Early projects were segregated, following the federal Neighborhood Composition Rule
that dictated that public housing developments should be populated with tenants who matched

52

the prevailing racial composition of the surrounding neighborhood.3 In extremely segregated
Chicago, this meant that most projects were all-white or all-Black. In the Jane Addams Homes
on the West Side, where the neighborhood was more racially mixed, the project was internally
segregated, with separate stairwells and entrances for Black and white tenants.4 Increasingly,
however, some planners, including Elizabeth Wood, pushed for the projects to racially integrate.
In the context of the 1940s U.S., this was a controversial proposition.
In mid-November of 1946, CHA attempted to move a Black war veteran, Theodore
Turner, and his family into the Airport Homes, a public housing complex for veterans on the
city’s southwest side. Upon receiving his lease, Turner reportedly visited the complex and then
left to retrieve his furniture. After Turner left the complex, twenty white men overturned the car
of CHA’s personnel director, William Graham. Following the incident, ten police officers were
stationed at the Airport Homes to help prevent trouble in the area.5 The following month, two
more Black veterans moved into the Airport Homes. Upon their arrival, further unrest ensued,
including, as the Chicago Tribune reported, “brick throwing, window smashing, and tire
puncturing.”6 Little information about the rioting was provided in the local newspapers because
the Chicago Commission on Human Relations feared that too much news coverage would only
fuel the flames of the unrest.7 However, the disturbances made a few facts plain: first, the unrest
exemplified ongoing resistance to public housing as a program and, even more so, the resistance
to public housing as a mechanism for integration. And finally, in the face of unrest, police were
the city’s and housing authority’s default tool to manage violence.
The police’s ability to promote integration and manage racial unrest, however, was
further tested some years later when, in July of 1953, the first Black family moved into Trumbull
Park Homes in Chicago’s South Deering neighborhood on the far South Side. Much as occurred
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at the Airport Homes seven years prior, the arrival of Donald Howard and his young family was
met with sharp hostilities from the development’s all-White residents. As of August, police were
maintaining a regular guard around the project to forestall other demonstrations.8 After the
Howards moved in, CHA put a “freeze” on additional move-ins for three months, due to the
protests. As historian Arnold Hirsch describes, “In a maze of perhaps intentional bureaucratic
confusion, the CHA commissioners instructed Elizabeth Wood (verbally—they were careful not
to put such orders in writing) not to admit additional black families until she received ‘clearance’
from the police commissioner and Housing Coordinator James Down[e]s.”9 At this moment, the
CHA Board gave police direct control over housing policy, over and above the discretion of its
own leader.
At the same time, the events at Trumbull Park resulted in more police being sent into
public housing. By mid-October, to control ongoing riots, the city moved 800 police officers into
the neighborhood. The head of the Chicago Real Estate Board at the time, Hugh Michels, wrote
to then-Mayor Edward Kelly to protest the move, which he compared to an occupation, saying
that stationing 800 police in the neighborhood constituted a “police state” that, in turn, removed
police from other communities in the city where they were needed.10 Meanwhile, CHA debated
evicting the Howard family on the grounds that Howard had failed to state on his application that
his wife was also employed. The Howards remained in their apartment while appealing their
pending eviction. After the Howards, three additional Black families had moved into Trumbull
Park and by October 30, some 1,100 police were regularly stationed at the development to
maintain order.11
However, despite the new police presence, tensions remained. In early 1954, someone
threw a brick through the window of one of the squad cars patrolling the Trumbull Park Homes.

54

Simultaneously, others in the neighborhood exploded aerial bombs and shot at the Howard
home.12 In response to the ongoing racial unrest, then-Mayor Martin Kennelly released a sixpoint plan that included ending racial segregation throughout CHA developments and conducting
outreach before Black families were moved into white projects. Importantly, the Mayor also
recommended that the Police Commissioner should study the possibility of using auxiliary
emergency forces to protect residents of the housing projects in the case of what the paper called
“disorders.”13 By late February, the city’s Black newspaper, the Chicago Defender, reported that
the ongoing “disturbances” at Trumbull Park were “not a haphazard thing. There is some
element of continuity. There is a consistency. This has changed from a demonstration to an
attack.”14 The property had been bombed almost nightly since the Howard family moved in the
previous August. Elizabeth Wood requested a formal investigation by the Justice Department,
while the CHA General Counsel planned to post warning signs stating that the property is federal
property.15 On a Sunday evening, during more rioting, four police officers, a reporter, and a
young boy were all injured. Police arrested four people out of a mob of 200. Before the rioting
had ended, the mob managed to break 15 windows in the Howard home, broken the windows of
at least four cars, and, the Defender specified, knocked the hat off of the Deputy Police
Commissioner.16
By April, the CHA Board of Commissioners requested help from the State’s Attorney to
quell ongoing racial tensions at Trumbull Park.17 And in May, some 10 months after they had
first moved in, the Howard family gave up. The Defender wrote that the police who had been
charged with protecting the Howards from violence "helped them load their furniture” as they
packed up and prepared to move away from the development. Howard told the paper, “We
moved because we just couldn’t take it anymore.” While some ten other Black families had
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moved into the project since the Howards, the Howard family had remained the target of most
neighborhood ire, as the symbolic breakers of the racial barrier. As a result, police expressed
hopes that tensions would ease when the Howards left. However, four of the ten Black families
remaining at Trumbull told the Defender that they feared continued violence. As one woman,
Mrs. Herman King, put it, “We hated to see the Howards move because it may now lead the
race-baiting citizens out here to believe that they have won a partial victory.” Howard remarked
that “[D]espite the large number of policemen[,] the protection given me and my family was
ineffective and in a large measure characterized by indifferent police officers and belligerent
policemen who seemed more intent upon protecting white families from contact with us than in
protecting my family from the white mobsters and hoodlums that attacked my home.” Howard
detailed for the paper the significant physical and mental suffering he and his family had
endured, as well as financial hardship, while living at Trumbull Park.
Meanwhile, the president of the South Deering Improvement Association, a
neighborhood organization, announced at the group’s meeting that the Howards had moved,
saying “It’s all over” and telling members to halt their demonstrations. The 250 people in
attendance reportedly “cheered and shouted” at the news. The paper reported that the police
would remove outward signs of their detail and use both uniformed and plainclothes officers
inside the project where the remaining Black families lived.18
Seen through today’s lens, it might seem surprising that the primary role for police in
public housing was—ostensibly—to protect Black families and foster integration. However, even
if this was their purported mission in the Airport Homes and Trumbull Park Homes, police
proved utterly incapable of maintaining order, of protecting persons and property, and of
disrupting the color line. Upholding and fostering integration was simply beyond the scope of the

56

police department. As Howard said, from his perspective, police were doing a better job
reinforcing the color line—keeping him and his family away from white tenants—than they were
undoing it. Whatever the case, these early interactions established an important dynamic that has
endured throughout CHA’s history: that calling in ever-more and ever-more-aggressive police
became CHA’s default response to any form of disorder—perceived or otherwise—in public
housing. And, moreover, through this reliance on the police, public housing policies both
legitimized the police department’s role and authority within the city and materially supported its
expansion, as I will detail in the following section.
For their part, the Howard family sued CHA and five Chicago newspapers for conspiracy
and libel, charging that the organizations conspired to deprive them of their home in Trumbull
Park. In May 1955, the Defender explained that while the Howards had lived at Trumbull Park,
“as many as 1,200 [police officers] were assigned to guard the project, but failed to maintain
order,” noting that “The Howards lived behind barricades for almost nine months before leaving
the project voluntarily while an eviction suit against them was still in court. The suit was later
dropped.” While the Howards had left, a constant police guard was still stationed at Trumbull
Park—some two years after the Howards had first moved in—charged with trying to quell the
disturbances that still occurred at least three times per week and that were directed towards the
29 Black families now living in the project.19 In May 1956, nearly three years after the Howards
first moved into Trumbull Park, racial tensions persisted in the community and 100 officers were
still consistently posted at the development. Amidst the push to integrate and ensuing
controversies, Elizabeth Wood was ousted from CHA. Her successor, retired army general
William Kean, noted that “the fact that it is necessary to maintain a police force is persuasive
evidence that the racial tension problems have not been sufficiently alleviated.”20
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Meanwhile two mothers living in CHA housing told the Tribune that they blamed
inadequate police protection, rather than poor management, for juvenile delinquency in their
community.21 Their conclusion is revealing. First, it shows the extent to which white residents—
even those living in public housing—relied upon police to uphold the racial exclusivity of their
domestic space. If they did not have a propertied investment, they nevertheless resorted to a
default, even kneejerk reliance on police to maintain the color line and the whiteness of the
property they occupied. Second, they immediately and uncritically identify police as the
appropriate tool to prevent crime, thus legitimizing what were, by then, already dominant
understandings of police as the de facto anti-crime mechanism, rather than probing into more
structural understandings of the causes of crime in their community.
Thus, early police interventions in public housing were primarily intended to manage
integration-related racial unrest—at least, on their face. Their failure to do so demonstrates an
early failure of policing—even when officers were deployed in large numbers—to secure public
safety for residents of public housing, particularly Black residents. Even more tellingly, in July
of 1955, after the Howards gave up on Trumbull Park, Police Commissioner Timothy O’Connor
publicly stated his belief that it would be a “wonderful idea” to close the Trumbull Park Homes
and sell the buildings to private investors.22 In his comments, O’Connor implicitly leveraged the
failure of police to achieve community safety as justification for privatizing the development, a
move that would have spelled the end of public housing less than two decades after its inception.
Of course, O’Connor saw the troubles at Trumbull Park not as a failure of police but as an
inherent flaw of the housing program itself.
O’Connor was not the only official to be already dubious of public housing by the mid1950s. The year prior, in March of 1954, Chicago’s federal housing and redevelopment
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coordinator, James Downes, recommended to the City Council that income limits for public
housing tenants be increased. Among the reasons he provided, Downes told the City Council that
public housing had not lived up to its promises “to reduce crime and juvenile delinquency.”23
Raising the income of tenants and, by extension, reducing the poverty rate at the developments,
would theoretically improve conditions there, according to his logic. Of course, CHA’s mission
statement had nothing to do with reducing crime—theoretically, this was the job of the police.24
But, by the mid-1950s, as Downes’ comments reveal, a slippage had occurred: in their belief that
public housing could be a springboard for social mobility and respectability, so too had
policymakers begun to believe that public housing could and should alleviate crime.25 Its
perceived failure to do so was then interpreted as a flaw of the housing program itself.
By the time Downes made his remarks, CHA was spending $65,000 for privately
contracted guards to supplement police protection at its developments and some janitors were
being employed in a disciplinary, rather than a maintenance, capacity. The Tribune reported that,
“Mr. Downes says the situation has reached the point where ‘normal’ families are trying to
remove themselves from what they consider to be an unwholesome atmosphere for children.”26
Thus, even at mid-century, several years before the high rises of the Robert Taylor
Homes and Stateway Gardens were built, fears of crime in public housing were being mobilized
as evidence for the failure of the public housing program itself. In turn, even in the very early
days, the inability of police to manage that crime, perceived or otherwise, raised the specter of
demolition and redevelopment: of transforming Trumbull Park and similar housing from a public
good into a commodity and opening public housing and its lands for private investment. Again,
this is not to suggest—as many dominant narratives would have it—that public housing was
inherently a crime-ridden space but rather, to argue that in managing crime exclusively through
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reactionary, punitive measures, policymakers both obfuscated more structural, including statedriven, causes of crime in public housing (as in other impoverished neighborhoods) and avoided
solutions that might have meaningfully improved public safety and quality of life in the projects.
Through their willful blindness, policymakers planted early seeds of doubt, fearing that public
housing might not succeed after all. As the racial composition of public housing changed to be
almost exclusively Black by the 1960s, the racial dynamics of policing changed accordingly.

“Are we being ignored because we are Negroes?”: Under-Protected and Over-Policed,
1960-1969
As Arnold Hirsch describes, by the 1960s, the demographics of CHA—like many of the
neighborhoods where CHA developments were sited on the South and West sides of Chicago—
had changed so the resident population was nearly exclusively Black.27 As this transition took
place, so too did the ways that CHA was policed. Increasingly, residents began to complain of
problems with vandalism, youth ‘rowdiness’ and other minor quality of life crimes in the
developments. Without other available avenues for public safety, residents did then what many
continue to do today: they called for the police to intervene. However, the police response they
received was often indifferent or halfhearted, leaving many residents to feel unprotected and
underserved by the city’s central law enforcement agency. What resulted was a dynamic that has
carried through the decades and remains today, wherein CHA tenants—not unlike other Black
and brown, low-income tenants in the city—complain of feeling both under-protected and overpoliced.28 That is, starting in the 1960s, reports began to circulate of residents feeling that police
were never around when they needed them and sometimes would not even respond if they called.
At the same time, when police did show up in the projects, they were often heavy-handed,
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treating every resident like a criminal and targeting trivial acts of vandalism or disruption rather
than the larger social problems that were beginning to brew as a result of deepening poverty and
high population density.
In the spring of 1960, CHA residents publicly called for more police protection in their
developments, insisting to officials that vandalism was on the rise.29 General Kean had resigned
from CHA in late 1956 following disputes with the Board of Commissioners; his successor,
Alvin Rose, countered tenants’ claims by saying that CHA developments had lower crime rates
than their surrounding areas.30 By this time, CHA employed about 30 guards to patrol its
developments in addition to regular police patrols.31 The following month, CHA started using
trained dogs in its night guard across its 34 developments. Rose told the press that the idea was
popular amongst CHA residents and that vandalism had decreased since it was announced that
the dogs would accompany security guards.32
As the years went on, reports of crime at CHA became more prevalent, however. A
Taylor Homes resident wrote to the Chicago Defender in 1963 of the threats their development
faced from what they identified as “teenage gangs,” saying, “It was unsafe for women and men
to be out after dark and even sometime[s] during daylight hours. The stairways and laundry
rooms were being used for card playing, dice shooting and sex parties by teenagers.” The writer,
who wished to remain anonymous, further explained that truant students from a nearby school
were responsible for pick pocketing, stealing groceries, vandalizing elevators, and throwing
bottles over the building’s galleries. Tenants had reportedly complained to CHA to no avail.
“Everyone you talk to wants to move,” the writer explained, “because there is no protection.
Sometime[s] the police come when they are called. But, they seem unconcerned. Sometimes
people are afraid to complain because their families will be in danger.” The building council had
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started a petition for residents to sign that called for 24-hour police protection, but it was
dismissed by officers at the police station, who said petitions had to be delivered by 25-30
people, not just the five or six who had shown up. All of these events led the writer to ask: “Are
we being ignored because we are Negroes? Why won’t the CHA back us up? They want their
property protected, we want our lives protected. Lives mean more than property.” In conclusion,
the writer asked, “Are we not citizens of Chicago?”33
While the problems this resident complained about to the press are relatively minor—
vandalism, youth “rowdiness,” and petty theft, for example—the central issue they raise is of
feeling unsafe and, moreover, ignored by the central agency theoretically responsible for
ensuring safety: the police. As the writer points out, this is not merely an issue of neglect, but of
citizenship: of not being guaranteed the full amenities theoretically accorded to a resident of the
City of Chicago, of being treated differently—and worse—due to living in public housing, a
status that by the 1960s was already intricately bound up with being poor and Black. And further,
the author points to another central tension of policing at CHA: namely, whether police were
there to protect property, or to protect residents.
Resident dissatisfaction with the police persisted and in January of 1964, about fifty
Taylor Homes residents—mostly women—took to the streets during a snowstorm to protest poor
living conditions at their development. Among their demands, the protestors cited the need for
more and better police protection. The week before, an elderly woman had been brutally
murdered in her second-floor apartment at the development. In a meeting between the
development manager, Robert Murphy, and the protesting tenants, CHA largely blamed the
police department for its inadequate services, while the police department blamed CHA for
failing to protect its tenants. Mrs. Greer, a tenant representative quoted in the paper, said, “I’ll
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bet those people who live on the lakefront have protection for their women and children.”
Murphy told tenants that CHA did not have the funds to pay for additional police services.34 The
next week, following Murphy’s lack of concrete action on their demands, the Taylor Homes
tenants moved their protest to the CHA main office, demanding to meet with Director Rose. The
Director refused to meet with the protestors, but suggested publicly that if they did not like the
services in their development, they should move out.35
However, at the same time that some residents were calling for more and better police
services at the Taylor Homes, a teenager living at the complex wrote to the Defender about how
security guards employed at the complex as well as district police officers regularly beat up
teenagers living there. He explained that, “Usually when the guards make an arrest they call the
lieutenant who also beats the people being arrested.”36 The teenager’s accounts of violence,
particularly directed against young men and boys at the project, speaks to the tension between
being under-protected and over-policed.
In late February of 1964, officials from CHA and the federal housing administration
agreed to draft a plan to eliminate vandalism and increase order at CHA developments. The CHA
Board had been prevented from hiring more janitors, whom they sought not to enhance
maintenance or cleanliness but principally to serve as quasi-security guards at the projects during
the evenings. Federal housing administration officials had told the Board that CHA did not
require additional janitors, but then-CHA Chairman Charles Swibel countered that employing
additional janitors could help avert damage to CHA property. Note that Swibel’s primary
concern in contracting these janitors was to protect property—not residents—from harm. Swibel
explained that CHA employed 40 privately contracted security guards to protect their properties
at night, but that the roving watch did not police the interior of buildings, which would be the
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task of the janitors. Another board member suggested CHA wait until they could determine
whether they should hire more guards or a different kind of employee instead.37
Meanwhile, tenant protests from Robert Taylor residents, now operating under the name
“Robert Taylor Tenants Association to Improve Community Conditions,” continued apace, with
tenants threatening a rent strike if CHA did not promptly attend to their concerns.38 In May, the
group threatened a rent strike involving $358,000 in rent payments after a 10-year-old resident,
Richard Davis, was killed when a 14-year-old resident dropped a drainpipe lid on him from eight
stories above. One representative, Mrs. White, told the Defender that there were only seven
guards for 28 buildings at the Taylor Homes, each of which housed 158 families. One of the
guards was off duty every night, leaving only six to work. According to Mrs. White, tenants had
been told “that the guards’ duty is to protect the property and not the people who live here.” The
tenants said they would continue demonstrations and a possible rent strike until CHA hired 56
guards—two for each building.39
In mid-May, CHA reached an agreement with the protestors that involved promises for
improved police protection, by which CHA meant an increase in the privately contracted security
force provided by Interstate Guard Service. Additionally, the guards would be newly equipped
with police dogs, plainclothes officers would be assigned to DuSable School across the street,
and four CPD squads would be dispatched to the Taylor Homes each night after dusk to augment
the security patrol at the Taylor Homes.40
Yet again, as some residents called for increased protection from police and security
forces, those same forces were inflicting violence upon members of the community. In June, a
security guard at the Ickes Homes unleashed his dog on a group of youth. Then, in August, three
contract security guards shot into a group of teenagers at the Wells Homes, killing a 16-year-old
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boy. A group of eight teenage boys had been playing dice when guards found them and
witnesses said there was no provocation to the attack or any reason to justify why the guards had
drawn their weapons. The guards said they had fired above the boys’ heads in an attempt to scare
them, but a bullet had accidentally struck the victim’s neck and right shoulder, killing him.41 In
response to the incidents, CHA announced that its guards would be required to attend the
Chicago Police Academy for training one day a week for four months and that CPD officers
would provide additional security at the Wells Homes.42
The security guard’s murder of a young boy, simultaneous with community mothers’
calls for increased policing in the developments, demonstrates how, at the same point in time,
some residents felt under-protected while others were, quite clearly, being over-policed: subject
to extreme levels of surveillance and violence at the hands of those charged with policing their
home community. Additionally, these events exemplify how the dynamic of being underprotected and over-policed is also highly segmented by both gender and by age: older, female
members of the community tended to be the ones calling for more police while younger men in
the community were the targets of that policing. This dynamic was and is not unique to public
housing, but rather can be observed in many low-income neighborhoods. Public housing, as
always, was just an extreme manifestation of a larger trend, a place where police and resident
dynamics were particularly stark.
The historical record from the 1960s evokes another characteristic trait of crime and
policing at CHA throughout the decades; namely, that a substantial portion of crime was caused
not by residents themselves, but by outsiders. As Otto Von Dickerson, manager of Stateway
Gardens, described in 1966, crimes in the community were caused by a mixture of “mischevious
teenagers” living in the project and “loiterers coming into the projects from taverns nearby,
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violating stairwells and elevators and making remarks to female residents.”43 So, even as crime
began to attract more attention at CHA, some were quick to recognize that much of the activity
was not endemic to the projects themselves or their residents. Instead, CHA properties were
always bound up with larger social forces that impacted the city as a whole. And, as sites with
high population density, CHA developments were predisposed to higher levels of crime as a
mere result of housing more people than the average neighborhood.
If these early tensions, particularly the evolving dynamic of being over-policed and
under-protected, could have been a warning sign to CHA and other policymakers—an indication
that more guards and police did not necessarily make the developments safer—by the mid-1960s,
it was instead already common sense that crime and violence would be met by police. And, at the
same time, local papers began to report of increasing crime rates at CHA, disproportionate to
those of the surrounding communities. According to the Chicago Defender, for example, CHA’s
179 high-rise buildings “presented a special crime prevention problem for police.” The paper
attributed higher-than-average crime rates at CHA to a few factors, including, “The extremely
high population density and large number of juveniles,” which, it reported, “causes vandalism,
and teen gang crimes in the buildings.” The paper also reported that the built environment at
CHA high-rises made them difficult spaces to police: “The elevators are often used in the
commission of rapes and robberies, and the stairwells become hiding places for criminals, who
would be routed by officers making periodic patrols.”44 Then-Police Superintendent O.W.
Wilson was even more explicit in identifying public housing as a locus of crime, saying that the
occurrence of crime at CHA was “significantly influenced by the architecture of the buildings.”
Though Wilson also blamed youth for many of the developments’ problems, he noted that “the
projects have served as a refuge for criminals who dart into the structures and are easily lost by
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the police.”45 Thus, as early as the 1960s, public discourse positioned crime as inherent to CHA
as a result of its social composition vis-à-vis the high levels of youth and resulting teen gangs,
but also the buildings’ environmental design. Inherently dense living spaces, the prevalence of
stairwells and elevators as well as labyrinthine spaces made the projects difficult to police—at
least, according to CPD.
In August of 1966, in response to an increase in reported crimes, including rapes,
robberies, and stabbings, Swibel and then-Mayor Richard J. Daley announced a plan to employ
additional guards. Daley said CHA would hire 300 to 400 new guards to police elevators and
stairwells in the high rises. The new guards would work from 4 pm to midnight and would
significantly augment the 65 guards currently contracted by CHA.46 While CHA proposed
recruiting the guards from among tenants, who would then be trained by a retired police captain,
the Board ultimately approved hiring more guards from the Interstate Agency.47 CHA had
originally forecasted a cost of $2 million annually for the additional guards, but the final cost
was closer to $6 million, to be paid out of earnings on CHA’s reserve funds.48
In addition to hiring more guards, CHA also responded to rising crime in the
developments with new tactics. In December of 1966, CHA and CPD announced their plan to
start “vertical patrols” in some CHA buildings over four stories high. District watch commanders
were to assign two officers to each patrol. The officers would be equipped with two-way radio
sets and would be in constant communication with a supervising sergeant as well as police
central command. The new patrols would augment, but not replace, street patrols by squad car.49
According to the Tribune, officers assigned to vertical patrols were to fill the role of “the old cop
on the block” who would “know the people on his beat, be familiar with the buildings, and be
acquainted with CHA employees.”50 In other words, cops working the new beat were modelled
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in the image of the Norman Rockwell-era Officer Friendly, now retrofitted for the model of the
modernist high-rise.
The vertical patrols would start on a limited basis in the CHA’s three biggest projects—
Robert Taylor, Henry Horner, and Cabrini-Green—and officials would study their effectiveness.
Quite contrary to the Tribune’s rosy picture of patrol officers as ‘Officer Friendlys,’ Robert
Harness, CPD’s District Commander for the 2nd Police District, told the paper that if vertical
patrols were established, CPD would adopt a “get-tough” policy at CHA. As he explained, “If
someone in the buildings broke the law, there would be no hesitation on our part to make an
arrest.” Harness hoped the presence of police would be a deterrent, particularly to teen gang
members. Thus, the new patrol practice came with an explicitly punitive agenda, whereby police
leaders were explicit about their intention to be tougher in public housing and, by extension, on
public housing residents, than they were when patrolling other parts of the city. Thus, differential
policing was baked into the vertical patrols from their inception, demarcating CHA as a place
where policing would be harsher than elsewhere in the city.51
By February of 1967, the vertical patrols were operational in several CHA developments.
CPD Superintendent Wilson announced that 70 officers and 9 sergeants were assigned to the new
beat and would patrol in teams of two, working their way through the building in random
patterns.52 To make the new patrols work, CHA had to pay the salaries of the CPD officers on
patrol. CPD had a precedent for this: they did something similar in partnership with O’Hare
airport. Meanwhile, establishing vertical patrols also required CPD to hire additional officers.
CHA’s 1967 budget did not include expenditure for patrols, so Rose noted the authority might
need to raise rents to pay for the services.53 Thus, securitizing public housing—in this case,
through the creation of vertical patrols—went hand-in-hand with the expansion of the municipal
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police force as CHA transferred funds to CPD and created the grounds for hiring additional
officers. This too established a precedent that was repeated many times in the years to come,
whereby CHA, assuming that more police would stem crime in the developments, would partner
with CPD to provide additional police patrols above and beyond the police services already
available in the district. To make the arrangement work, CHA transferred (and continues to
transfer) money out of their own budget to the city police department in order to justify the extra
services rendered. At times, as in late 1966, this required expanding the department itself, as
current staffing levels could not accommodate new patrols.
In addition to materially supporting the expansion of the police department, CHA’s
partnership with the police in such cases functioned to further endorse—as Seigel argues—the
police as the human arm of the state, with its monopoly on the use of legitimate violence.54 Of
course, by the 1960s, the police had already held this role for some time, in Chicago as in other
U.S. cities.55 However, CHA reproduced and underscored CPD’s legitimacy by constantly
turning to the police for help and in funneling federal housing resources to the municipal police.
In this way, housing and police policy were forged in the same fire, not so much separate
institutions working together but a set of institutions that were made and remade through a series
of joint actions over the years that brought them ever-closer together.

Guarding Property or People? The (Debated) Role of Private Security
As is already evident from the preceding discussion, police were not the only actors
carrying out the work of ‘policing’—broadly defined—at CHA. From its early years, CHA
employed privately contracted security guards to patrol its developments. Unlike the police
department, which was largely comprised of white officers at the time, many security guards
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were Black. While armed, the guards did not have power of arrest and were instead instructed to
detain suspects until police could arrive on the scene. Guards were not authorized to chase a
fleeing victim and were not directed to shoot except in self-defense.56 Nevertheless, uniformed
guards surveilled the properties, reported instances of vandalism to CHA, and ostensibly
provided an on-site recourse in case of a disturbance. However, even three decades into CHA’s
existence, in the late 1960s, the guard corps was relatively small in number compared to the size
of the housing portfolio. Increasingly, the guards also became the subject of controversy.
In September of 1967, about 100 of CHA’s privately contracted security guards
conducted a wildcat strike, failing to report for their afternoon shift at CHA developments. The
guards, who were unionized with General Service Employees Union, complained of low pay:
$1.65 per hour for the 5 pm to 1 am shift.57 In March of 1968, CHA fired the security
contractor—Interstate—at the Cabrini-Green Homes, after tenants and managers complained of
the guards doing an “incompetent job.” Cabrini-Green residents complained of brutality and
favoritism on the part of guards, as well as a lackadaisical attitude.58 No complaints had been
made about the company at CHA’s other sites, where the same firm provided guards. However,
in July 1968, a guard fatally shot twenty-year-old Gilbert Sanchez while chasing him through the
Lathrop Homes. The guard claimed that Sanchez had been reaching in his back pocket,
ostensibly for a weapon, but Sanchez was unarmed when he was killed.59 The incident sparked
significant outcry, particularly from Sanchez’ friends in the community, who said that the guard
had it out for Sanchez, who did not deserve to die.
Amidst increasing criticism of the private guards, the guards went on strike once again in
August of 1968, saying that present conditions made their work impossible. Carl Davis, who
worked as a guard at the Taylor Homes, said guards got no backing from either the Interstate

70

Agency or CHA, noting the dangerous nature of the work: “Many times our lives are threatened
by tenants and we have no practical way to protect ourselves.” A former employee of the
company, James Wallace, had been shot to death over the weekend while leaving work. Davis
said of Interstate and CHA: “They just stick us out there and they expect us to fend for ourselves.
They don’t really tell us what to do nor do they give us any protection.” Because security guards
often felt unsafe arriving at and leaving work, Davis said many would choose to carry a personal
weapon which, in turn, made them vulnerable to police harassment. As he explained, “Many of
us are forced to carry some type of protection because of the nature of our business and many
times the police department will pick us up for carrying weapons.”60
As the strike went into its third day, the guards told The Defender that the murder of their
colleague would not have occurred if guards were not required to function as “special
policemen,” a role they saw as outside the bounds of their training and job description. One
representative, Willie Hodges, said, “I was hired as a guard and as I understand it, my function is
to guard the property, and be of general service around the place. But the way things are now, we
have to perform the work of policemen. That is, we make arrests for gambling, burglary and
whatever else may pop up. If we have to do this work, then I think we should be compensated.”*
In addition to higher pay, the guards demanded insurance plans, increased personal security, and
a commission from the state that would allow them to carry guns.61
Amidst turmoil around guard services, CHA devised a plan to contract with CPD for
another special task force to patrol public housing. Although the vertical patrols created a
precedent for such a partnership, this would be the first time CHA would directly contract with
CPD for constant services of a special police task force at a cost of $2.5 million per year. Unlike
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Though Hodges uses the language of arrest here, he likely uses the term to refer to guards’ practice of detaining
suspects until the police could arrive, since guards did not have the power of arrest.
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guards, police would have the power to make arrests in public housing. Simultaneously, CHA
and CPD would install a high-tech radio communications system within CHA buildings, wherein
special transmitters on the roofs of six high rises would allow police squads to pick up
emergency signals through receivers fastened to their belts. The communications system would
cost an additional $360,000.62
Guards were less than happy with plans for city police officers to take over their jobs.
Just two months after the special CPD contract was announced, guards employed by Interstate
said they would distribute leaflets at the Robert Taylor Homes, asking residents to oppose the
replacement of private guards by police. However, tenants continued to complain to CHA
leaders about the guards: as one resident, Mrs. Jane Rowell, told the press, “If the individuals did
their job, we wouldn’t care whether they were city police or private guards.” According to her,
the Interstate guards did not enforce curfew rules or attend to their rounds.63
Negotiations with the guard union continued alongside debates over whether to keep or
replace the guards. Making matters even more complicated, another Interstate guard was killed
in February of 1969, in the lobby of a building at Stateway Gardens. The guard, James Booker,
was shot by a resident, who was then shot and wounded—but not killed—by Booker’s partner
Walter Todd.64 The shooting speaks to the real dangers faced by guards as well as to the extent
that they were, as they claimed, being asked to operate as de facto police. In the fall, another
Interstate guard shot and killed a 14-year-old boy, Charles Jackson, at Altgeld Gardens.65 Before
the shooting, parents at Altgeld had reportedly complained to the CHA security office about
guards harassing youth in the community.66 If security work was dangerous for the guards, so too
was it proving to be for residents.
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Perhaps not surprisingly, given the issues surrounding Interstate guards, CHA postponed
renewing its contracts with Interstate in June of 1969. The guards were still negotiating for
higher salaries that would increase their hourly rate from $2.95 to $4.40. As Swibel noted, the
raise would bring the guard salaries in line with what CHA paid police officers, a move that he
said could induce the agency to replace the guards with police. Currently, CHA paid $1.5 million
for security guard services, but residents were split over whether they felt safer with guards or
with police. In part, this broke down on racial lines: compared to police officers, more guards
were Black and most residents were Black, so more police would mean more white officers,
especially white men, patrolling the projects. But, police were authorized with more powers than
guards and more ability to proactively involve themselves in immediate conflicts on site where
guards were directed to stop a crime and report it to the police. Swibel said CHA was evaluating
the New York City Housing Authority’s (NYCHA’s) system of leasing 1,400 New York Police
Department officers to patrol public housing properties, who were paid from the NYCHA
budget. CHA also discussed the possibility of hiring tenants to work as guards, but Swibel said
this had been tried unsuccessfully in the past.67
At the same time, CHA began to make physical upgrades to security and policing
infrastructures at the developments. In October of 1969, CHA awarded a $27,878 contract to
V.G. Systems to install closed circuit television (CCTV) systems in the four elevators at a
Cabrini-Green high rise. Swibel said the monitoring system would be installed on a trial basis,
with the goal of reducing crime in the elevators at the property. If successful, he said the CHA
would install the system in all 400 of its elevators throughout its housing portfolio. Cabrini was
chosen for the pilot project since it had faced many serious security issues for some time, while
an estimated 50 percent of crimes in high rises occurred in the elevators. Once installed, a
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security guard located in a central office in the building would be able to observe all persons
entering, riding, and exiting the elevators. If the guard observed a crime taking place, they would
have the ability to halt and lock the elevator at any floor within the building, thus trapping the
suspected criminals until the police could arrive. The system was comprised of two CCTV
cameras located on top of the elevator cab and separated from the interior of the cab by bulletproof glass. A third camera would then be placed at the top of the elevator shaft. The design was
intended to stop youths from stopping the elevator and climbing onto the top of the cab. Any
attempt to break one of the cameras would set off an alarm at the security guard’s post. The
system was also equipped with a video tape recorder capable of recording crimes in progress.
The representative of the security company said the cameras would have a deterrent effect, since
individuals would refrain from committing crimes once they knew they were being watched.68
Thus, inherent in the CCTV system was CHA’s explicit intention to surveil residents and to let
them know they were being surveilled, a Foucauldian form of discipline enacted not in a prison
but in residents’ home communities.69 Thus, as CHA debated whether private guards or police
were the best actors to police not just their property but also their residents, the agency also
began to make its high-rise towers more prison-like.

“No black person is immune”: Police Brutality
By 1969, CHA projects were becoming known as sites of violence—and particularly,
gang-related violence—with the Defender reporting that at the Taylor Homes, there was a
shooting nearly every day.70 As crime rates were increasing, however, so too were reports of
police brutality. A survey of 200 brutality victims conducted by the Defender led reporters to
conclude that “no black person is immune” from police brutality in Chicago, regardless of social
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class.71 The Tribune likewise reported on police brutality, but presented a sympathetic view of
the police, explaining that, “When they answer a call for a domestic disturbance at the public
housing high-rises, people drop bottles on them, a truly lethal practice.”72 In an incredibly
sensational piece published in September of 1969, the paper reported on brutality but again erred
largely on the side of cops, presenting brutality as a necessary side effect of dangerous police
work. In a representative passage, the reporter describes police work at a CHA high rise, writing,
[Police] talk and speculate until suddenly the radio flings them into action again—a
domestic disturbance in a public housing high-rise where even their car exposes them to
sniper fire and to approach the front door puts them in danger of being hit by a bottle,
into the elevator, reeking of urine, where murder is commonplace, one man carrying the
shotgun because, if they leave it locked in the car, it will surely be stolen before they get
back [after six shotguns were stolen this way, (Police Superintendent) Conlisk ordered
them locked in the trunk]. They enter a foul-smelling apartment furnished with dirty
dishes, dirty laundry, and a better hi-fi than the policemen themselves can afford, there to
confront a husband and wife who live on public welfare and to tell them that their marital
disputes don’t really constitute a police matter but could be better handled by their pastor
or a marriage counselor.73
Per the paper’s depiction, CHA was a dirty, dangerous place where brave cops took on the heroic
task of policing hostile residents. And, lest we forget, residents there lived on “public welfare”—
which supposedly afforded them nicer furnishings than the officers could afford—only to
squander (seemingly) more public money by calling police when other services would be more
appropriate. However, this depiction begs the question: Who did residents have to call in the case
of a domestic dispute, or any altercation, except the police? Still today, police are the de facto
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authority on public safety, the first line of response in the case of a crime or disturbance. Though
the reporter was undoubtedly right that many disputes could be “better handled” by a counselor
than a police officer, CHA residents had but one tool at their disposal in case of an emergency:
the police. By this time, decades of partnerships between CHA and CPD had, after all,
established CPD as the de facto authority on violence in the projects.
Thus, by the late 1960s, a few important precedents had emerged in and about CHA. The
first was that, even as the paint was still drying at some of the high-rise developments, CHA
sites—now populated almost exclusively with Black and a few Latinx tenants—became widely
associated with the twin stereotypes of squalor and violence. The second was that the police,
who already maintained a heightened presence throughout public housing, but particularly at the
high-rise developments, were the default agency residents and policymakers turned to in the case
of criminal activity. In this sense, CHA is not unique: this was true and remains true across U.S.
cities today. What is remarkable is that this was true at the same time that police brutality was
becoming both widespread and widely acknowledged—as the articles quoted above
demonstrate—a fact that made many residents both materially and perceptually less safe. And,
the increasing numbers of guards and police at the developments seemed to have little impact on
crime; in other words, there was no demonstrable success to justify CHA investing ever-more
money, personnel, and trust in policing.

“There is not enough of anything”: 1970
The tensions that had begun to mount throughout the 1960s between CHA residents and
policing actors in the 1960s came to a head in 1970 when, one July evening, two CPD officers
were killed by sniper fire at Cabrini-Green. Sergeant James Severin and Officer Anthony Rizzato

76

had been patrolling the complex when they were shot down. At the time, over 300 apartments at
the complex were vacant and CHA officials had trouble filling them—despite the long waitlist
for public housing—reportedly due to the site’s reputation for violence. Residents, particularly
elderly tenants, had begun leaving in large numbers the year before for newly constructed senior
complexes.74 So, while fear may have been a driving factor, the desire of seniors to live in
seniors-only developments, with new amenities, was also a contributing factor to the
development’s recent population decline.
In response to the shooting, CHA followed a pattern that was, by now, well established:
they called for more security guards and more police. Specifically, Swibel went to HUD to
request an additional $7 million in federal funding to train and finance a 500- to 600-officer
security force that would be under CHA’s control. CPD would train the force and Swibel—in a
reversal of previous statements—announced his intention to hire residents to fill the positions
wherever possible. Intended as a way to decrease their reliance on contracted, private security
firms, Swibel said the proposal had support from residents.75 At present, CHA paid $295,000 per
year for 20 private guards to patrol the buildings of Cabrini-Green from 5 pm to 1 am, seven
days per week. At all other times, the buildings were left unsecured.76 Swibel said it was too
soon to tell whether the new security camera system was having an effect on crime in the
community, though it cost about $3,600 a month to operate—too expensive for CHA to afford
installing the same system in nearby buildings.77
At HUD, then-Secretary George Romney would not immediately commit to giving
Swibel his requested $7 million in new funds but vowed to give the proposal serious
consideration. In the meantime, Swibel called for a special police task force to provide increased
security at Cabrini via a special contract with CPD. As soon as he returned from Washington,
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Swibel pitched a demonstration program to then-CPD Superintendent Conlisk. He reportedly
proposed a task force of 500- to 600- officers comprised of male CHA residents who would be
specially trained and deputized to perform certain duties, as well as a possible separate corps of
female officers who would patrol the projects looking for vandalism. 78 The force would then be
rounded out with CPD officers who, he said, were highly trained and even then, only the most
skilled were sent to work in “sensitive project areas.”79 Simultaneously, Swibel announced his
intention to expand CHA’s security forces, which currently numbered 170 guards to patrol
70,000 people across 16 developments.80 Swibel’s vision never came to fruition as he described
it, though his response to the shooting of the officers demonstrates two key things: first, that
CHA took the shooting of police officers much more seriously than they did the shooting of
residents or even their hired guards, and second, that CHA was willing to seek additional federal
resources to invest in policing.
Following the shooting of the officers at Cabrini-Green, one Cabrini mother told the
Defender that “Everybody’s talking about moving out of these buildings because, you know,
they’re afraid to go out.” According to a police sergeant, there had been 15 to 20 sniping
incidents at the complex within a 30-day period.81 The Reverend Jesse Jackson held a news
conference at the development in which he laid out a six-point program designed to alleviate
hostilities between tenants. Unlike CHA, Reverend Jackson urged solutions that went beyond
additional policing, advocating for a jobs training program and the establishment of a daycare
center run by women in the community. He further advocated for increasing the number of Black
police officers working at Cabrini-Green, believing that diversifying the force would help offset
tensions between residents and police.82
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The shooting also prompted a sensational response from the press. In an article titled
“Cabrini Green—Near North Hell” that was published in the Chicago Tribune, the paper
described the development as “a living hell” where “The more than 17,000 people living there
are waiting for a modern-day Hercules to come and cut out their most hated problem—the gangs
and the terror they generate.” Incredibly stigmatizing in tone, the article describes how it was
unsafe to ride the “slow, dirty, malfunctioning elevators after 9 pm” while “The cinder block
stairwells are just as dangerous.”83 In another article, the Tribune reported that cops knew
Cabrini-Green as “Combat Alley,” describing the development as “that bleak, violence-ridden
public housing project just west of Chicago’s Near North Gold Coast Area.” There, it continued,
“murder, rape, robbery, and mugging—especially in the dirty, slow-moving elevators—has
become almost a daily occurrence.”84
In August, Romney arrived in Chicago where he toured Cabrini-Green himself at the
request of Reverend Jackson. While there, he said that upgrading public housing should involve
more than just adding police and that he also expected the city of Chicago to put up some of the
money that Mayor Daley had proposed to invest in Cabrini. At the end of his visit, which
included hearing proposals from Reverend Jackson, Romney told the press, “I’m convinced that
the solution to the problem is not just more policemen. However, I did not come to offer instant
solutions. I came to listen and learn.”85 In a column for the Defender, Reverend Jackson wrote
that “Law enforcement cannot take place in a vacuum; men must decide that they will live under
law and by what terms they will live so that order that does not give way to public chaos before
law can be established. . . . People cooped up, wall to wall folks with little space not only feel
that they are in prison, they know that they are in prison.”86 Thus, the shooting of officers
Severin and Rizzato seemingly pointed to cracks in CHA’s policing strategy, providing an
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opening for officials to reconsider whether police were the most effective tool for achieving
public safety. Despite Romney’s qualms and Reverend Jackson’s analysis, however, CHA and
CPD largely doubled down their efforts.
Following the shooting of officers Severin and Rizzato, multiple CPD units increased
their surveillance of Cabrini-Green. One of these was the “walk and talk” task force of the 18th
District, led by CPD Sergeant Charles Glass. The task force operated as a proto-community
policing program that CPD ran in the area, before “community policing” was known as such.
Glass, who was Black, was reportedly well-known and respected in the 18th District, which
included Cabrini-Green. Out of 50 volunteers, he hand-selected five white and five Black
officers to join his task force, saying he “wanted men who could apprehend and lock up a
criminal one minute and soothe a kid who was hit by a baseball bat the next.” Moreover, Glass
described of his team that “Our job is not just to apprehend criminals but to respond to
disturbances, help a family having trouble with a teenager, or a hundred other small services you
have a right to expect.” His description speaks to some of the tensions of community policing in
1970 as now—as geographer Steve Herbert and others have pointed out, for example, the idea
that the police can know what the ‘community’ wants or the idea that a single officer should be
responsible for punishment and benevolence simultaneously.87 The “walk and talk” task force
members patrolled the neighborhood on foot and in mixed-race pairs, in uniform and carrying a
radio.88
Through his work on the task force, Glass noted that “The main complaint [among
residents] is a lack of simple police service.” He continued, “The problems are more than just
crime and violence. The problems are those of a poor community. There are not enough jobs.
There is not enough recreation. There is not enough maintenance. There is not enough of
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anything.”89 Again, Glass’ comments seemingly comprise an admission of the real problems at
Cabrini-Green: the entrenched poverty and austere conditions that characterized life for the tens
of thousands of people living at the development and in similar complexes around the city.
However, rather than reconsider whether police were the right agency to intervene, CHA and
CPD again redoubled their efforts to amp up patrols.
While Swibel’s task force did not materialize as such, in November of 1970, he
announced a plan to replace the privately contracted guards at Cabrini-Green with 24-hour
patrols to be conducted by 55 CPD officers. The new patrol was part of a $3 million proposal
submitted to HUD by Swibel and Mayor Daley. Under the new plan, and much like the vertical
patrols previously established at the Taylor Homes, police officers would patrol not only the
grounds but also interior spaces including the elevators, hallways, and stairwells at the
development. The estimated cost for the new patrol was $770,000 annually, compared to
$305,000 currently spent on the 24 private guards who had been patrolling Cabrini-Green. To his
credit, Swibel also called for 300 Cabrini-Green residents to be employed as community service
workers and recreational coordinators. Vacant apartments would be converted for use as
recreation spaces, offices for resident workers, and daycare centers.90 In proposing this latter
program, Swibel admirably aimed to retain some funds within the community by employing
residents. He also suggested something relatively unique in the history of policing at CHA: to
rely on actors other than—exclusively—law enforcement to improve public safety. Nevertheless,
resident would be supplemental; the primary thrust of the effort was the new police patrols.
The 24/7 patrols began as planned on December 1, 1970 at Cabrini-Green, funded by a
$750,000 grant from HUD that was received after nearly five months of planning. CPD
Lieutenant Arthur Thompson, who was put in charge of the new 55-officer unit, met with tenants
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on the first night of patrols to calm their fears. “It sounds as though we are going to be like storm
troopers,” he said. “Well, we’re not storm troopers and we’re not going to become storm
troopers.” Some residents expressed resentment at the increased police presence, while others
wanted reassurance that officers were not there as truant officers “to arrest our children for
curfew violations”—an understandable query that reflects the anxiety felt by residents in the face
of increased surveillance and cops in their homes. Thompson responded that arrests would be
made for “blatant” curfew violations but that officers would show discretion.91

Conclusion
In the austere environment of 1970 Cabrini-Green, where—as Commander Glass put it—
“there [was] not enough of anything,” what CHA continually found more of was funding for
police. If CHA housing had always had to fight to ward off territorial stigma—first, as a breeding
grounds for communism; then, as a frontier of racial turmoil; and now, as a site of Black despair
(at least in the eyes of the outside world)—the CHA and police response to the shooting of
officers Severin and Rizzato only heightened the fear and moral taint surrounding Cabrini-Green
in the public discourse. As portrayed in popular media coverage from the time, this incident
seemingly cemented the growing impression of public housing as an ungovernable, lawless
space; a site where anti-police and anti-establishment sentiment could foment. The events of the
preceding decades set the stage for the largely antagonistic relationship between residents and
police that would unfold over the latter decades of the twentieth century, and which comprises
the subject of the following chapter. In turn, as police interventions increased in scale and
intensity over the years, making public housing ever-more prison-like, and simultaneously failed
to meaningfully improve public safety at CHA, officials increasingly considered the possibility
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that public housing would not succeed—that it was not possible to govern the public housing
population or enforce spatial and social order at the projects.
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Chapter 3. Policing the Bad Guys
By 1970, the Chicago Police Department had already developed a strong relationship
with CHA administration and maintained an established presence at public housing
developments. In this and the following chapter, I draw upon interviews with current and former
CPD officers and CHA residents to analyze the role of CPD in public housing from 1970-2000.
First, this chapter examines how police approached their work in public housing, from
bureaucratic organization to interpersonal interactions. Then, in the following chapter, I consider
the effects of this policing on daily life at CHA, from the perspective of residents.
In both chapters, I privilege first-person narratives in order to juxtapose how cops viewed
their role in public housing versus how residents experienced their policing. In doing so, I follow
Irving Seidman’s assertion that a strength of interviewing lies in its ability to help us “understand
the details of people’s experience from their point of view.”*1 Here, the goal of interviewing is
not to discern an objective ‘truth’ about how CHA housing was policed between 1970 and 2000,
but instead to understand how those most closely involved with the project of policing
understood, experienced, and remember it.2 In many cases, accounts are contradictory; the
perspectives of police versus residents in particular diverge greatly. In foregrounding such
divergent viewpoints, as well as the multiplicity of perspectives articulated by members of each
group, I posit that this messiness is itself important in teaching us about how policing operates as
an institution and how that institution is experienced by people on the ground. Unlike newspaper
data, interviews provide insight into how the history related in this project was lived by real
people and, if memory is never objective, it is informative. Historian Wulf Kansteiner writes that
“Collective memory is not history . . . It is as much a result of conscious manipulation as

*

For more on my interview data, see the concluding Note on Methods.
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unconscious absorption and it is always mediated.”3 Thus, studying memory is also a process of
cultural production which requires triangulation and mediation through historical frameworks
and careful analysis. However, in juxtaposing the perspective of police and residents, it is
important to note that these groups occupied very different positions of power within the city.
Police had tools of physical coercion over residents and did not hesitate to use them. Though not
typically elites themselves, police officers typically espouse dominant viewpoints in interviews
that take for granted both the role of the police as the appropriate and default mechanism of
crime prevention and policing’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. In the media, police
and their spokespeople are frequently upheld as experts, positioned as reliable narrators backed
by the authority of the law itself. Resident voices, by contrast, have frequently been neglected,
silenced, or submerged by mainstream policy, academic, and media coverage alike. By placing
these accounts side-by-side in this project, I do not intend to imply that the two viewpoints were
ever weighted equally in popular discourse or policy circles. Instead, I bring both perspectives
into conversation here in order to highlight the disjuncture between the goals of policing as an
institution, as expressed and enacted by its workers, and its effects on the ground.
In this chapter, I start by examining specific ways that CPD and CHA organized policing
in the projects, from special patrols to the tactics employed by officers. In doing so, I argue that
CPD’s policing of public housing during these years became ever-more intensive and expensive.
Then, based on how police talk about their work, I centrally argue that police saw their role in
public housing as protecting “good” tenants” from “bad” ones, though, as the following chapter
shows, even innocent residents were frequently targets of policing. Police tend to view CHA
residents with a mixture of sympathy and stigma that both echoes and reproduces the territorial
stigma of the projects. If cops saw themselves as heroic, liberatory figures—saving “good”
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tenants and locking up “bad” ones—they nevertheless admit that, even after three decades of
intensive policing by multiple units, police work was ultimately incapable of solving the social
problems present in many CHA developments. The end result was that policing became a de
facto function of public housing, while public housing was both site and mechanism for policing.
Table 3.1 Interviewee Characteristics: Current CPD Officers
Name
Phil Harris*
Robert McDonald*
Stephanie Wright*
Ralph Sampson*

Age at time of
interview
Prefers not to
disclose, mid-50s
45
51
57

Racial/Ethnic Group

Gender

White

Male

White
Black
Black

Male
Female
Male

Table 3.2 Interviewee Characteristics: Former CPD Officers
Name

Age at time of
Racial/Ethnic Group
interview
Sandra Gould*
65
White
Frank Jones*
59
Black
Andrea Schmidt*
58
White
Ed Iverson*
51
White
Ray Cowin
63
White
Paul Johnson*
67
White
George Devereux
61
White
Jennifer Alexander*
61
Black
Ryan Michelson*
66
White
Ronald Davis*
63
Black
Eldon Urbikas
64
White
George Figueroa
69
Hispanic
Melvin Roland
73
Black
Brigid Cronin
60
White
Ramona Jackson*
67
Black
Len Campbell*
65
White
Edward King*
64
Black
Adrienne Neely
58
Black
Wade Ingram
62
Black
* indicates participant has elected to use a pseudonym
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Gender
Female
Male
Female
Male
Male
Male
Male
Female
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Female
Female
Male
Male
Female
Male

Organizational units
Vertical Patrols
As the preceding discussion has shown, by 1970, CHA was already a site of special
attention and activity for police, where nascent partnerships between CHA and CPD led to the
creation of vertical patrols, for example. Following the shooting of Officers Severin and Rizzato
at Cabrini-Green, the agencies devised a 55-officer CPD vertical patrol team—funded by a
federal grant—comprised of a lieutenant, seven sergeants, and 47 patrol officers who patrolled
not just the grounds but the elevators, halls, and stairwells of the high rises. Each team had a
radio connection with the local CPD headquarters at the 18th precinct and all other teams on
duty, as well as with the Cabrini-Green squad room—a special outpost within the development
that had been established some years earlier.4 Squad cars also patrolled the streets of the
neighborhood.5
Just a few years later, in May of 1973, the city announced a $2.5 million plan for new
security measures at Cabrini-Green that would build on the early successes of the vertical
patrols. Of the $2.5 million requested, $956,000 were allocated in federal anti-crime funds; the
rest would be used for social services in the development. The plan had to be approved by the
Illinois Law Enforcement Commission (ILEC), the agency responsible for deciding how federal
anti-crime funds should be spent throughout the state. According to the city’s plan, the money
would be used to furnish CPD’s vertical patrol unit at Cabrini-Green with an additional 29
staffers.6 In August, the pilot was approved at $2.6 million, funded by both HUD and ILEC.
CHA would hire the 29 new patrollers from among residents, who would be trained by CPD to
monitor comings and goings from the buildings but would be unarmed and have no police
powers. Meanwhile, plans specified that CHA would install a 24-hour security station in the
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affected buildings’ lobbies (not every building at Cabrini-Green was covered as yet by the
nascent security program), all equipped with closed circuit television (CCTV) systems.7
In July 1974, CPD, ILEC, and HUD announced plans to spend another $10 million over
three years exclusively to protect families and property at Cabrini-Green. The Chicago Defender
reported that this amount broke down to more than $3,000 per family, noting that “The money
will not go for food, clothing, education, or recreation. It will go for security.” The city already
allocated $900,000 a year for the vertical patrols that had been assigned to police the community
24 hours a day since 1971. Of the plans, The Defender wrote that, “All in all, the dwellers in
Cabrini-Green are surrounded (or soon will be) with the most expensive and modern security
found anywhere outside a prison—which may be one of the reasons so many of its residents see
interesting parallels between their housing project and a penal institution.” In fact, as the paper
pointed out, rising security costs at Cabrini-Green stood to rival those of Stateville Prison, where
the State of Illinois spent about $3,000 per year per inmate on security, compared to about
$1,000 per resident per year at Cabrini-Green before the pilot. The Defender even raised the
possibility of demolishing the buildings in order to, as the paper phrased it somewhat
sardonically, “let the inmates live somewhere else—anywhere else.” CHA’s information director
Robert Lefley, however, dismissed the idea of demolition as “foolish,” saying “Where are you
going to put all these people?”8
Ultimately, the securitization project—known as the “Cabrini-Green High Impact
Program” and coordinated through the Chicago-Cook County Criminal Justice Commission9—
was funded at $11 million, including $3.2 million from HUD and $5.4 million from ILEC, to be
spread over three years. The city was supplying $66,000; CHA $1.1M from their modernization
budget; and another $333,000 from CHA for its CPD vertical patrol unit. Private sources
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contributed an additional $150,000.10 Then, in January 1975, CHA sought an additional $12.7
million in federal funds from HUD to upgrade living conditions at Cabrini-Green, including the
installation of electronic surveillance in the remaining 19 of Cabrini-Green’s 23 high-rises.11
Thus, by the mid-1970s, massive amounts of federal money—much of it from HUD,
ostensibly a non-police agency—was flowing to CHA and, by extension, CPD, for the explicit
purpose of security. In Chicago, however, police already received huge portions of the city
budget as well as auxiliary federal support. Additionally, while local and federal agencies poured
money into securitizing Cabrini-Green, other CHA developments in less affluent parts of the city
struggled with crime but did not become targets for pilot securitization programs. In October of
1974, for example, the Chicago Defender reported on a “crime crisis” at the Taylor Homes,
where residents were “begging for police protection.”12 Thus, during this time, policing of CHA
got both more intensive and more expensive, but resources were not targeted everywhere evenly.
However, these early experiments at Cabrini-Green did set the stage for future policing
interventions across the authority’s portfolio.

The Public Housing Unit
These early CHA and CPD partnerships for special, additional patrols within particular
CHA developments, transformed, by the early 1980s, into a dedicated CPD “Public Housing
Division,” also known as the “Public Housing Unit” or occasionally, CPD’s “Public Housing
Section.” This was a special division within the police department that was assigned to police
CHA developments in designated geographic regions of the city: initially, Public Housing North,
which included the ABLA Homes and all CHA developments north of them, and Public Housing
South, which included all the rest.13 Created in 1981 and initially comprised of just 109 officers,
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teams within the unit operated as additional precincts where cops were assigned just to patrol
public housing developments in the North or South region, respectively.14 While they initially
operated out of a Cabrini-Green building at 365 W. Oak Street, where the Public Housing North
office remained,15 the Public Housing Unit was later headquartered at the Public Housing South
office at 4848 S. State Street in the Robert Taylor Homes.16
Upon the creation of the Public Housing Unit, then-CPD Superintendent Richard
Brzeczek said the establishment of the division stemmed from the success of the vertical patrols
at Cabrini-Green, noting “The objective of this new division is to continue this positive approach
toward reducing crime and the fear of crime and to improve the quality of life in and around
public housing developments.” In essence, this meant that a given CHA development was under
the jurisdiction of two police divisions: the regular police district of the neighborhood in which it
was located and the Public Housing Division. This bureaucratic structure inherently meant that
CHA was more heavily policed than other parts of the city.
The Public Housing Division was initially under the administration of CPD’s Bureau of
Field Tactical Service, but later moved to the Bureau of Operational Services.17 In 1999,
following the dissolution of CHA’s in-house police department (see Chapter 5), the Public
Housing Unit was expanded with the help of a $30 million federal grant. At this time, CPD
added a Public Housing West division and split the unit into offices across five sub-stations: the
Taylor Homes office moved to 4947 South Federal; 901 E. 131st Street (Altgeld Gardens); 365
W. Oak (Cabrini-Green); 770 E. 38th Street (Wells Homes West); and 774 E. 38th St (Wells
Homes East).18
Public Housing Unit officers acted mostly as district police officers, but public housing—
itself already situated in one or more territorial police districts—became their district. George
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Devereux worked for the Public Housing Unit for many years in the 1990s and into the 2000s,
where he worked on a tactical (a.k.a. “TAC”) team and was eventually promoted to sergeant.
Working an evening shift from 6 pm to 2 am in public housing, he says the duties mainly
consisted of foot patrol in and around particular developments, wherein officers would walk up
and down stairwells and through the breezeways of the buildings (much like the vertical patrols).
Officers would also station themselves for periods of time in central, visible areas of the
developments, like basketball courts. Andrea Schmidt*, who worked for many years as a patrol
officer in the police district that contained the Horner Homes, says district cops and public
housing cops would “share information.” As she explains, “[A]s patrol you don’t have the time
to do the investigation. So, then you’d get ahold of your housing guys and say, ‘Hey, listen, I just
heard that so and so’s got an apartment over here or he’s staying with Shanaynay and
Shanaynay’s got—she’s holding the drugs for him.’ You would share all this information. Then
that way they could watch it and then they could type up search warrants and they could go in
and do the hardcore work.” For Schmidt, working with public housing officers was invaluable.
“These officers knew their stuff,” she says. “You could say ‘Bubba’ and they’d say, ‘Oh, from
1912.’ They knew everybody. And they had to be out there and in the communities. They had to
know their stuff because it’s not easy to infiltrate the projects, you know?”19

Other CPD Units
In addition to the Public Housing Unit and regular district police, CHA was also patrolled
by special tactical units, such as CPD’s Gang Crime or Narcotics teams, who ran special
operations in the projects as in other parts of the city. Additionally, CHA has for many years
contracted with CPD to provide “Special Employment” cars. These are patrol cars staffed by off-
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duty officers, who earn overtime pay for taking on the assignment during their days off and who
are assigned to particular developments. Since the year 2000, when record keeping is available,
CHA has transferred between approximately $6 and 14 million per year to CPD to provide these
cars, for an amount totaling an estimated $197,846,352.†20 Given that the arrangement dates back
much longer, it is likely that the total amount transferred from CHA to CPD over the years just to
fund this one program is actually much higher. Special Employment cars are intended to add
police presence to CHA developments but, as I discuss later in the chapter, are largely seen as
ineffective. Cops are assigned to Special Employment by seniority and tend not to take the job
seriously because they work it on their day off. On the whole, officers view Special Employment
as an easy way to earn extra money without exerting much effort—making the high expense of
the program extra problematic.
Thus, from the period of 1970-2000, before the Plan for Transformation formally began,
CHA developments were patrolled by any number of CPD units simultaneously. In other words,
developments were often saturated with cops. Whether their efforts were effective is another
matter and as Chapter 4 demonstrates, residents continued to feel simultaneously over- and
under-policed: dealing with police was simultaneously a part of everyday life and police never
seemed to be around to help when they needed them. In what follows, I explore officers’
experiences of working in Chicago public housing and, in turn, how this shaped their perception
of public housing and the people living there. I first discuss officers’ varied forms of engagement
with CHA residents before turning to officers’ experiences approaching and working in CHA
housing.

†

Due to poor record keeping, pre-2000 records on CHA transfers to CPD are not available.
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“They hated the police”: Engagements with Public Housing
Depending upon their role with the police department, officers’ engagements with CHA
housing and its residents varied greatly. Many young officers started their careers with CPD by
working in public housing. For these officers, CHA developments provided a training ground, a
place full of problems and, along with them, excitement. It was a place where junior officers
were exposed to a plethora of situations and could gain experience—equal parts laboratory and
hazing experience. As Phil Harris* describes of being assigned to Cabrini-Green as a new police
officer, “I was a younger police officer, I wanted to work in the projects. I wanted to run and
chase people and lock people up for guns and drugs and shootings and stuff like that. And there
was so much of that [at Cabrini-Green], you really had an opportunity to get your feet wet.”21
Meanwhile, district officers might respond to specific calls in public housing, other units
were stationed there as a matter of course, running mission-specific operations to uncover drugs
or guns or intervene in prostitution rings, for example. For Phil Harris*, who worked as a CPD
detective for 18 of his 23 years with the department, interactions with CHA were more fleeting.
He explains, “As a detective, we got assigned to the projects all the time for violent crimes and
that type of thing.”22 Because he worked city-wide, he was never in any CHA development long
enough to get to know tenants or form personal relationships.
By contrast, some patrol and tactical units had ongoing engagements in public housing.
For example, Ray Cowin, a 24-year veteran of the department, describes how “There was one
summer where every weekend, the TAC teams were assigned to the public housing units
throughout the city and we would spend the whole weekend at public housing.”23 Cowin says the
goal of being so entrenched at CHA on summer weekends “was to first ensure that everybody
that was coming into the buildings did, in fact, belong there—were residents or guests of
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residents. And then, of course, to keep the violence level down, to keep the gang members from
congregating, and basically to just help the people there live a normal life.” Cowin says the
teams were assigned mostly to Cabrini-Green and the Taylor Homes. Police would also be sent
to the projects en masse on New Year’s Eve, a night known for violence. Cowin notes, “I spent
more New Year’s Eves in Cabrini-Green than I did with my girlfriend.”
The type of engagement officers had with public housing also impacted how they
engaged with public housing; that is, how they policed. Eldon Urbikas, who worked for CPD for
thirty years, says that he and members of his Gang Crimes unit would enter a CHA development
in teams and then split up, lurking in stairwells and other areas of the building: “And then, when
the bad guys started coming out again, that’s when we would try and sneak up on them and grab
them doing something—you know, selling dope mostly or carrying a gun.”24 As Cowin describes
of his time working on the tactical unit in public housing, “A lot of it was just high visibility.”
Comprised of one sergeant and ten officers, the team would “go there and we would stage in
front of the building and then on various floors. . . .[W]e would do foot patrols through the
building periodically, but no system to it. So, there was no pattern that anybody could pick up
on. But basically, it was high visibility in front, and a lot of engagement with people that live
there.”25
Ed Iverson*, who spent 27 years working with CPD on the Public Housing Unit as a
patrol officer, a sergeant, and later, a lieutenant, says that police would often arrive to CHA with
greater numbers than they would in other neighborhoods. As he explains it, “[Y]ou would always
make sure that you had people there because it’s hard to get to you if you’re 15 stories up and
you need help and there’s no elevator.”26 Elevators at CHA developments were perpetually
broken, but they could also be stopped by residents who wished to prevent police from entering
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the buildings. As a result, Iverson says police would “make sure that you had a sufficient amount
of people, but you also didn’t want to be overwhelming,” saying police did not want to appear to
be “storming the beaches of Normandy” when they arrived at public housing. Upon arrival,
Public Housing Unit officers or tactical team members assigned to public housing would pick up
their radio and any other equipment at the police sub-stations within the developments before
going to work on their shift.
These varied engagements in public housing led to a wide variety of interactions between
officers and public housing residents. Andrea Schmidt*, who worked special employment at
Cabrini-Green, says that “Back then, you would stop [the residents]. You would frisk them, you
know? Stop them, frisk them, make sure they weren’t carrying their guns on them and we would
sit back and try to watch and see where they were holding the drugs at. We would . . . walk the
buildings and then any vacant apartments, you would go into those . . . and make sure there was
no guns hidden in there or any drugs.”27 Similarly, when Ramona Jackson* worked as a
detective, she says that “encountering people in CHA was really for the most part . . . a
confrontational situation, not necessarily of my own making. But when people see detectives in
Chicago, you’ve got your business attire on and they know you aren’t coming there just to
handle some little incident or whatever—and I was a homicide detective. . . . So, right off the
bat, with many of the people you encountered, they were angry before you even really opened
your mouth as soon as they saw you were wearing a suit.”28
Cowin likewise says that many adults in the community would get annoyed when police
asked for their identification, explaining that when he and his fellow officers patrolled the
property for squatters and unwanted guests, “the adults, they might get offended. Honestly, they
didn’t like it. Sometimes there would be a little confrontation, but most of the time it would get

97

smoothed out with cooler heads prevailing.”29 For Sandra Gould* residents she met while
working special employment at Cabrini-Green “didn’t really want to interact too much. They just
pretty much gave you the stare-down and just saw that you were there. And that was it. . .
.[T]hey hated the police. So, they didn’t like us being there.”30
In contrast, other officers like Melvin Roland, a patrol officer, got to know residents so
well that he would be invited into their homes for meals when he was on his shift.31 George
Devereux, who worked in a plainclothes unit in CHA developments, says gang members would
tell younger kids not to talk to the police, but he would make a point of being friendly to the kids,
asking them about their days and even passing out candy on Halloween.32 Iverson says that over
time, CHA residents got to know particular officers. As a white officer, he assumed the mostly
Black tenant population would not want to interact with him but says, “That didn’t turn out to be
true either. If you were the person there every day and they saw you every day and you weren’t
staring them down and stopping old ladies, and if you just met people and talk[ed] to them—'Hi,
good morning’—they’d come over and talk to you and say, ‘Hey, can you guys get that car
towed over there?’ ‘Absolutely.’”33 Iverson says residents would tell him what was happening in
the community and about problems they were having with their apartments. At times, he says he
even acted as a liaison for them with CHA, explaining how he would call the agency to get a
maintenance issue fixed on behalf of a tenant, saying, “‘Hey, this is a good person. Can you get
somebody out here?’” Going out of the way to help in these ways made a big difference with
residents, he says. For Cowin, working as a tactical officer meant that “Most of the engagement,
believe it or not, took place with the small children” in the developments. According to him, kids
“loved it when we came there because they could go outside and play and not be afraid of what
potentially was going to happen. We did a lot of makeshift things like playing baseball games
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with them. We used our batons as a bat and we made a baseball out of tape and the kids loved
it.”34
Many officers make a point to say they treated CHA residents respectfully, though they
admit that not all of their colleagues did. Sandra Gould*, who worked for CPD for 26 years, says
that when she responded to calls at CHA, “I always tried to be fair with people because I tried to
treat people the way I’d want to be treated. And I usually worked with people that felt the same
way I did.”35 For her part, Andrea Schmidt says that when she was patrolling the Horner Homes,
“I did a lot of stops, I did a lot of arrests, but [residents] also knew they can come to me. I had
people that used to call me ‘Auntie’ and I was Godmama to some. So, I mean, I bought gifts for
people in the projects.”36 She says that developing personal relationships with residents,
especially seniors, helped her “gain a lot of information,” noting “I had no fear.” Jennifer
Alexander*, who worked for 20 years as a CPD patrol officer and also worked special
employment at Cabrini-Green, says that, working in public housing, “you soon kind of quasi
develop relationships with people, because some people get to see that you are, as they say, ‘She
cool’ or “He cool,’ because they assume—I would use the word ‘trust’—that you will do
right.”37 She says tenants would let one another know which officers they could trust, noting “So,
you try to approach people with respect. And of course, a lot of times you didn’t get it back
depending on what was going on, but you got the job done.”
Schmidt is careful to clarify, however, that getting to know some residents did not blunt
her ability to be punitive, noting “[T]hey knew that if they did the crime, they’re gonna do the
time. I was just gonna arrest them.” She continues, “[Y]ou treated each situation on an individual
basis but, back in the day, ‘You’re gonna stand out here and “motherfuck” me? You’re going to
jail. You’re disorderly. You want to act disorderly, you’re going to jail.’”38 She explains that
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arrestees locked up on disorderly conduct charges would only go to jail for a few hours, return
home with a court date, and the case would eventually go away. “But,” she explains, “it was a
way of keeping the crime down. I mean if you have ten guys standing on the corner selling drugs
and you’ve got the little children riding up and down the block on their bicycle, the chances of [a
child] getting shot are huge because somebody’s gonna come by and shoot at these guys. If you
would go out there and lock them up for disorderly [conduct], now the kids are out there able to
ride their bikes.” Thus, for Schmidt and her fellow officers, making proactive, even aggressive
arrests for minor charges like disorderly conduct was seen as a way to remove perceived
troublemakers from public space, if only briefly.
For Urbikas, being a white cop working with primarily Black residents made him feel
“like a deer in the headlights” when he first started the job. As a result, he felt the need to assert
his authority: “I knew that I had to carry myself like I was the baddest guy around because
otherwise they were gonna eat you alive.”39 To make himself intimidating, Urbikas says he
“worked out a lot. But,” he adds, “residents also knew who [the] new policemen were. All your
leather is new, your uniforms are sharp. You had to carry yourself with an air of authority, to not
take any crap.” Establishing their authority was important for officers, many of whom worked in
the projects as young officers, new to the force. In the following section, I explain how these
officers viewed their role in public housing.

Catching “Bad Guys”
In interviews, police officers commonly explain their job in public housing as protecting
“good” tenants from “bad” ones. Eldon Urbikas says of policing in public housing, “Our job was
to get the bad guys. . . . [O]ur job was to aggressively patrol and lock up the bad guys.” Unlike
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patrol officers who would answer calls, gang investigators like Urbikas entered public housing
with an explicit mission to arrest gang members and remove them from the projects. However,
Urbikas’ understanding of his job is echoed by other officers who were employed in various
capacities across the department. Len Campbell* worked for CPD for 31 years, mostly in
undercover units. He explains how “[T]he good citizens who weren’t criminals were locked
down by the gang members. They were pretty much in terror from the gangs.”40 Campbell here
espouses a common sentiment among CPD officers working in public housing in the 70s, 80s,
90s, and even the early 2000s; specifically, that “good” tenants were at the mercy of “bad” ones,
and it was the job of police to save the good people from the bad. In this moral framing, police
also position themselves as “good guys.” As Urbikas explains: “If people would throw insults at
you, you’d better just kind of look at them like: ‘Yeah, okay, but I’m the police. You’re the bad
guy, and who’s the better person here? . . . I’m the good guy and if you want to be the bad guy,
then I’m taking you to jail.’”
If police saw catching “bad guys” as part of their work across the city, this mission was
even more salient in public housing, where officers felt that the concentration of low-income
households created an environment for predation and terror. Ryan Michelson*, who worked for
CPD for 27 years in a variety of roles, explains that, “Honestly, there were some absolute[ly]
beautiful people in those places, and they were trapped. They were victimized in their own
situation.”41 In this way, officers are careful to note that not all residents of public housing were
“bad” or criminal. Simultaneously, these discourses allow officers to position themselves as hero
figures trying to bring justice to the projects. In a particularly evocative metaphor, Campbell
explains the job of police in public housing as follows: “You try and keep the wolves off the
decent people . . . That’s what you try to do when you’re working the projects.”42
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In turn, police officers say that the split between “good” and “bad” residents largely
determined how they were received in the community. Campbell explains, “I feel the good
people were happy to see the police there in uniform. The gangbangers didn’t—there were
always confrontations.”43 In contrast, as Cowin explains, “most of the residents were very
supportive of when we were there because . . . they had the ability to live a normal life. They
didn’t have to worry about the gangbangers out in front harassing them.”44 Cowin says that when
police were around, “kids didn’t have to have that fear [of the gangs]. They could go out onto the
basketball courts and play basketball. They could play baseball. They could roam around the
property.” Sandra Gould* likewise explains that, “[W]e kept the drug stuff from going on right
outside the building, in the courtyard area. There really wasn’t much of that going on while we
were standing there.”45 By their own accounts at least, police officers served as deterrents,
guarding law-abiding residents of public housing from the rule breakers so that the former could
live a “normal life.”
The belief that their mission was to protect good residents from bad ones—and that their
presence could be enough to keep the “bad guys” at bay—led many police to see themselves as
heroic, even beloved figures in the community. Paul Johnson* spent 25 years as a patrol officer,
mostly working on the west side of the city, including at the Henry Horner Homes, where, as he
describes, “The residents loved me.”46 Johnson says that when he started the job, “Two or three
people a day were getting shot. Kids were getting shot.” To abet the violence, he and his partner
would walk the buildings by foot, going floor by floor during their 5 pm to 1 am shift and talking
to residents along the way. “In the summertime,” he says, “the only time kids [could] come out
and play was when we walked.” Not knowing if police were always around the next corner
created a disciplinary environment that discouraged shooting, Johnson says. Grateful residents,
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who Johnson calls “the normal residents,” would feed him and his partner on their shift. “They
loved us,” he says. Campbell, in turn, says that he “got tired of bullies and I viewed gang
members as bullies.”47 Positioning himself as a kind of schoolyard hero, he continues, “I just got
tired of seeing decent people get—old ladies got hit over the head back in the day with garbage
can lids and got their purses stolen [by] bullies and rats. I know gang members are bullies.” In
what follows, I examine how police officers went about the work of ‘catching bad guys’ in
public housing.

Approaching the Buildings: Double Vision
The interactions between police and residents were, to some extent, conditioned by the
built environment at the high rises. At thirteen or fourteen stories tall, the high rises of CabriniGreen, Robert Taylor, and Stateway Gardens in particular allowed for an ironic form of doublevision. That is, if police were practically omnipresent in CHA housing—answering calls, on
patrol, running undercover operations, conducting investigations, and so on—the apartments,
oriented as they were to the exterior of the buildings, with open-air walkways that looked out
onto courtyards and streets, allowed residents to also surveil the police. Residents could see
police approaching the buildings; officers, in turn, did whatever they could to avoid attracting
attention, including parking their cars several blocks away and walking to the development on
foot. In doing so, residents assert what Nicholas Mirzoeff has termed the “right to look,” which
explicitly counters the police dictate to “Move on, there’s nothing to see here.” The right to look,
in contrast, insists “Only there is; we know it, and so do they. The opposite of the right to look is
not censorship, then, but visuality, that authority to tell us to move on and that exclusive claim to
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be able to look.”48 By surveilling the police, residents asserted some degree of power, reclaiming
the right to look from the forces that would seek to blind them.
In this case, the carceral environment of public housing, with its cage-like interstices,
perpetually broken elevators, and dark stairwells also inspired fear in police, who felt open to
ambush. Sandra Gould*, who worked special employment at Cabrini-Green, says the major
challenge of the job was “Staying safe” because “you didn’t really know what was around the
corner. . . . You’d always get other officers telling you, ‘Be careful in the hallways. The lights
don’t always work. The elevators are down.’”49 Jennifer Alexander* says police responding to a
call “would try to get the victim . . . if they were able to, to come downstairs, so we could make
the report downstairs as opposed to staying in the building.”50 Alexander says police officers
taking a report knew they were being watched, especially in the summer when residents tended
to keep their doors open to let in the breeze. So, if police officers were speaking with someone
on a landing, the entire floor was likely to hear if not see the conversation. Some residents also
operated informal stores out of their apartments, which, Alexander says, led to increased foot
traffic throughout the building. “The building never slept,” she explains, “So you could get a call
and it was always a lot of noise. It was many people just meandering up and down, standing
outside on the lower levels where you had to catch the elevator. So all the time you were
watching for yourself and your partner, because it was very highly populated.”
George Figueroa, who worked for CPD for 38 years, mostly as a gang specialist, likewise
says “it was kind of hard to sneak up” into buildings in Cabrini-Green because residents “can see
you coming. So, if a search warrant was going to be done or if you were going to catch
somebody, say on the first floor that you knew were selling drugs and stuff, you would have to
hit those places simultaneously—the back and the front. The only way that they would be able to
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get away from you would be to run up inside the building.”51 For officers, following a suspect
into the building could mean running up ten flights of stairs, often trying to guess which
apartment a suspect had entered based on what an officer stationed downstairs could see ten
stories above.
Ryan Michelson* describes this form of double vision as “counter-surveillance.”52 The
high rises, he says “were very problematic not only to live there, but to enforce code violations
and criminal behavior” due to their design. However, he says that even low-rise developments
like Altgeld Gardens could pose issues for police because, “they had one way in and one way
out. So, when you’re running a narcotics operation, you got counter-surveillance of people
seeing who comes in and things like that.” By asserting their right to look—in this case, to look
back at the police who were looking at them—residents used the designed environment of public
housing to their advantage. In turn, cops—themselves there to surveil poor tenants—found
themselves in an uncomfortably panoptic environment where they too felt watched at all times.

Entering the Buildings: “It’s a Hostile Environment Sometimes”
Upon entering public housing, police were frequently met with hostility. As a young
officer, Phil Harris*, who still works for CPD, was, for a time, assigned to a tactical team that
worked out of Cabrini-Green and occasionally other CHA housing on Chicago’s North Side. He
says he thinks it was a “small portion of people [in public housing] that really dislike the police,”
noting that “when we go out there and we start knocking on doors and talking to people, most
people are kind of decent with us. But there’s that small percentage that’s out there that just
causes constant problems, constant issues with them.”53 Harris says hostile residents will “try to
get in our face, yell or say whatever they say to us.” Urbikas, meanwhile, says that resident
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hostility stemmed from the fact that police “were trying to help the good people and you were
interfering with the illegal activities—with the drug sales and stuff like that.”54 Brigid Cronin,
who was sometimes sent to CHA during the course of her work as a CPD evidence technician,
says of the residents, “They really don’t like authority and they especially don’t like police
officers.”55 When she arrived on a scene at public housing, Cronin says she would often ask for a
police officer to accompany her for protection and to help her navigate the development.
Hostile residents would frequently throw objects at police as they arrived at the high
rises. As Cowin describes, “We’d be pulling up in our squads and, as we’d walk up, they would
toss bottles . . . from the 10th floor that were filled with urine and they would fall and they would
hit the ground and then the plastic would explode and you’d get soaked with urine.”56 He quickly
qualifies, “[T]hat wasn’t the good citizens that were living in there. That was probably the gang
members.” Melvin Roland likewise says “[T]here have been instances where a whole washing
machine came off one of them floors up there!” but notes, “These are the bad guys. They don’t
want police in the building.”57 Whatever the source, Cowin says that such an entrance “set the
tone” for police work in public housing.
Given the less-than-friendly reception cops often received at the developments, some,
like Sandra Gould*, admit to feeling unsafe while working there. During her special employment
work at Cabrini-Green, she says “It did feel unsafe. But at least I knew I had a partner. And I had
a radio. And backup was not far. But nothing was safe. You had to be on guard all the time.”58
For Cronin, arriving on site as an evidence technician often meant her hands were full with
equipment, leaving her even more vulnerable to being hit with flying objects. “It could be hairy
at times,” she says, “It could be scary.”59 Ryan Michelson* similarly notes that, working in the
projects, “You watched out. Many policemen [have] been shot at in these developments, so you
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got to be aware of yourself.”60 Again, Michelson is quick to emphasize that not all residents were
bad actors, saying that violence came from just a small segment of the population who, he says,
“are literally second and third generation criminals. They’ve never known their father. Their
auntie raised them, so they don’t go to school. So they tend to be in the criminal enterprise . . .
you can make a lot more money selling dope than working at McDonald’s. . . . It's a hostile
environment sometimes. But again, it's only a few of the people.”
George Devereux notes that the animosity of CHA tenants towards police “would make
you upset.”61 One day when he was working, some residents threw cans of beans onto his squad
car from high enough above that they broke the back windshield and part of the front windshield.
His partner, who was Hispanic, felt that the incident might be racially motivated, since the cans
were of refried beans. As Devereux explains, “[My partner] was like ‘We’re coming back here
tomorrow and we’re gonna wreak some havoc.’ So, that’s kind of what he did. He came back the
next day. After some of these incidents, we regrouped, you grabbed a couple of members on
your team to come with you and then it would be like a zero-tolerance type of thing. People
drinking alcohol in public—they would go to jail. And so you would make it known to
everybody in the building it’s like, ‘Hey, we’re gonna be coming back here on a day-to-day
basis. We want to know who did this to our car, blah, blah, blah.’” Of these aggressive policing
tactics, Devereux notes that “Sometimes it worked, sometimes it didn’t.”
Frank Jones*, who worked for CPD for 20 years, first as a patrol officer and then as a
detective, says that working in public housing “was never comfortable.”62 At the same time, he
says it was “not always hostile but you always had to keep an eye out for stuff being thrown off
the porches, guys trying to ambush you in . . . the breezeway.” Gang leaders, Jones says, “could
shut down a building—I mean, shut it down—within about 5 minutes. You couldn’t get in or out.
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. . . They would give a signal and the elevators wouldn’t run, you didn’t want to go up the stairs
because you’d get ambushed going up the stairs, you couldn’t use the elevators—it was quite an
experience in the high rises.” As a result of this environment, Jones says officers would rarely go
inside in pairs, noting “[Y]ou had to go in with maybe five or six people.” Anticipating violence,
CPD officers entered public housing in force. George Figueroa likewise attests that working in
public housing was “daunting,” and lauds the officers on the Public Housing Unit for working at
CHA developments every day. “Each building is a small, concentrated area,” he explains, “and
it’s nothing but poverty and misery everywhere.” Urbikas admits CHA developments were often
not the friendliest of environments for police to work in, adding “but we’re the police. I mean,
your job was to get the bad guys and do your job, try and help the good people.”63

Crime by Design
On a tactical level, officers complain that the built environment of public housing—
particularly in its high-rise form—made it an incredibly difficult place to police. In making these
arguments, police espouse the belief that environmental design dictates or at least influences
crime prevention and control. In 1972, architect Oscar Newman popularized this perspective
when he published Defensible Space: Crime Prevention through Environmental Design, in
which he articulated a theory that residents’ ability to control the areas around their homes is
dictated by the physical layout of communities. For Newman, St. Louis’ Pruitt-Igoe, a high-rise
public housing complex, was the epitome of indefensible space—i.e., space that cultivated crime
in its very design. Then, in March of 1982, Newman published a report that specifically indicted
CHA as one of the nation’s worst-managed public housing authorities and called for
experimentations in the privatization of public housing.64 Newman built on the concept over the
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years and his ideas have even formed the basis of a community of international criminologists
who work under the umbrella of the International Crime Prevention Through Environmental
Design Association.65
The officers who policed Chicago’s public housing echo Newman’s sentiments, in many
cases blaming public housing crime and police’s inability to control crime on the design of the
complexes themselves. For example, Ed Iverson* says that the “high rises [were] always more
difficult. Vertical control is always more difficult than horizontal because the elevators never
worked.”66 George Figueroa similarly states, “I hope and pray that they never have public
housing in these immense buildings ever again. They’re almost impossible to police and you
have so many people there that are absolutely trapped.”67 Ramona Jackson* says police officers
find low-rise buildings more approachable, where officers do not have to worry “an assassin is
lurking around every corner.”68
Thus, for police officers, the environmental design of CHA’s high rises made their jobs
inherently difficult. Ray Cowin says that, though drug dealing was a problem throughout
Chicago’s West Side in the late twentieth century,
It was so concentrated in the housing projects and it was easy to find a dealer in there. It
[had] so many escape routes to get away because of the different buildings. You could
run into a building, run up the stairs, get into a different floor of the building. …
[E]verybody knew which apartments were vacant and so they could go into those vacant
apartments and sometimes there’d be a couple that were adjacent to each other—vacant
apartments—with a hole chipped through the cinderblock walls and you’d see them go in
one door. They’d slam the door. Before you make a determination [of whether to enter],
they’d be already through these other adjacent, vacant apartments and you’d kick in the
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door and there’s no one there and you’d see the hole in the wall, boom, they’re gone into
another place and maybe out the door and down and out of the building even.69
Paul Johnson* in turn describes CHA high rises as “fortresses,” saying “You couldn’t design a
dope house better than this.”70 When police arrived, he says, a lookout would scream “Police!”
and “everybody would hide in their apartments. So, like I say, this was probably the best set-up
for a drug deal.” Ryan Michelson*, meanwhile, explains that “I love the people in the jets”—a
slang term for “projects.” “But,” he qualifies, “how they were built would also dictate the
potential for violence. These high-rise things were almost unenforceable.”71 Eldon Urbikas says
life in the projects was particularly dangerous for people who lived on higher floors, “because
the bad guys knew that it would take the police a long time to get up there.”72

Distrust of the Police
In addition to a difficult built environment, police officers entering public housing during
these decades also encountered a difficult social environment. In particular, and as the previous
discussion suggests, pervasive distrust characterized the relationship between CPD officers and
CHA residents, as it continues to characterize the relationship between CPD officers and many
low-income communities of color in Chicago today. Phil Harris* admits this has a long history,
explaining “When they have generations of seeing the police out there and arresting people and
maybe not treating people great out there—but it’s tough to explain. When you walk out in an
area like that and you deal with a small group of people that don’t like you, [as an officer] you’re
gonna get jaded, you’re gonna—you may treat them differently.”73 While Harris sympathizes
with people who have seen generations of family members get arrested and, he admits, at times
mistreated by police officers, he simultaneously justifies officers’ “jaded” views of public
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housing residents. Frank Jones*, likewise, asserts that residents’ distrust of officers was “decades
in the making. That’s not something that just happened. You know, they hear stories from
relatives and friends. The police department has changed since I came on and back when you
could just go out and do whatever you wanted to somebody, you know, and treat them any way
you wanted without any repercussions. Those days are gone.”74 Residents, as both Harris and
Jones—and multiple other officers—attest, had plenty of good reasons to distrust the police.
Further, racial identification was not enough to overcome distrust of police officers. As
Jennifer Alexander*, herself a Black officer, explains, “If you wear that suit, you’re the enemy
with them. Just because you’re Black, you’re still with [the police] and that makes you part of
[the police].”75 Thus, police officers entering public housing were met with suspicion even from
the people they were ostensibly there to protect, a dynamic that became a source of frustration
for many. Moreover, residents’ abiding distrust of police also affected officers’ ability to
undertake police work in public housing.
The hostility and distrust that many residents felt towards police also manifested in a lack
of cooperation when it came to investigations—something that frustrated police and only soured
resident-police relations even further. Phil Harris*, working as a detective in the projects, says
“[W]e don’t always get the cooperation we’d like” and this lack of cooperation “has a huge
effect” on police’s ability to do their work.76 Jennifer Alexander* says lack of resident
cooperation is, in fact, what made the job of policing in public housing the most difficult.
However, she says she understands that residents lived in fear—not just of police but of the
person they may be calling the police about, be that an abusive partner or an intimidating
neighbor.77 As Ryan Michelson* explains, in the context of public housing, “You had
intimidation, you had recantation, you had threats—because there’s all kinds of eyes and ears in

111

some of that, especially the high-rises.”78 Even an innocent exchange with police could lead
residents to fear retaliation to “their son, their mother, their automobile,” he says, adding, “So,
there’s a lot of mistrust and a lot of intimidation.”
The density of public housing and the sense of constant surveillance—of residents by
police, of police by residents, and of residents by other residents—only heightened fears of
retaliation. As Alexander explains, “It is difficult when people live in constant fear.”79 Iverson
says residents of developments like Cabrini-Green and the Taylor Homes had it hardest due to
the density of these sites, saying “I mean if you’re in a much more dense place, then there’s no
place to go. Everybody knows what’s happening because there’s so many people around.”80
Urbikas further notes, “You have to remember they live there and we didn’t. We were there for
the time being maybe investigating a crime or something, but they had to live there and the
police weren’t there to protect them all the time.”81 As Chapter 4 explores in more depth,
residents had good reasons to distrust the police, and police were aware of their widespread
distrust.
However, despite distrust of officers and widespread fears of retaliation from fellow
residents if they were caught talking to the police, some residents did find ways of cooperating
with CPD investigations. Robert McDonald* has worked with CPD for 21 years as a patrol
officer. He notes that older residents are more likely to provide tips to police, often on the
condition of anonymity, and that officers will cultivate friendships with older residents for this
reason.82 Ray Cowin recalls a time when he and some other officers were playing baseball with
children at Cabrini-Green. During the game, a man approached Cowin from behind and told him
“Don’t turn around. I don’t want people to know that I’m talking to you.”83 At first Cowin said
he was nervous, but the man quickly explained while they stood back-to-back that there was
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another man in the courtyard who had a gun in his possession. “So, it would be done that way,”
Cowin explains, “Sometimes it would be a note passed to us and they would just walk by and
they’d drop the paper on the ground and it would have information on that with no name of who
was providing the information, but it would be a description or the name of somebody that was
nearby that was engaging in something at that time.”
Again, in describing how residents found ways to provide them with information, officers
position themselves as hero figures, there to liberate grateful, good tenants from bad ones. Paul
Johnson* says residents had to find ways to cooperate with the police, explaining, “I mean, they
were getting killed, they were getting shot. They were getting stabbed. . . . So, I think the people
were ready when they sent us out there. They were ready. I mean, they received us like a second
coming.”84 Ryan Michelson* similarly attests, “[T]here were some beautiful people in there [at
Cabrini] that were afraid to call the police. And they would provide information to you about
criminal activities that affect their lives and the liability of their children.”85 For Cowin as well,
“The majority of people living in the housing projects are there based on economics, and they’re
trapped there. They can’t escape because of their economic situation. And they’re good people—
law abiding people. They do like the police. They just can’t show that because if they show that,
it will be perceived or received by the gang members or the criminals that are there that, ‘Oh,
you’re cooperative with the police? We’re not gonna have that’ and there might be retaliation.”86
Thus, police officers took pride in these small moments of cooperation from residents, drawing
validation from the occasional tips and confidences they did receive. Such actions only
reinforced the sense that they were there to save “good” tenants from the “bad” ones who were
oppressing them. Rather than blame resident distrust on their own actions, they tend to blame
residents’ reticence on the chilling effect of gang intimidation.
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Sympathy and Stigma
Through their work in public housing and their interactions with residents there, police
officers developed feelings of both sympathy towards and stigma against public housing
residents, sometimes simultaneously. Many police officers express feeling sorry for the public
housing residents they encountered, particularly given the social problems they observed and the
environmental conditions they witnessed while working in public housing. As George Figueroa
describes, “I don’t know how people could live there. I’d work like a dog day and night to get
my family out of there [if I were a resident], and it was just constant. It was dangerous.”87 He
talks about how pizza restaurants would not deliver to CHA buildings, how kids could not play
outside, saying “[T]here’s a lot of good people, a lot of really good families, but they’re trapped
there.” Eldon Urbikas laments the sub-par conditions in many of the buildings by the late
twentieth century: “The smell of urine in the elevators and the hallways was always terrible,” he
says, adding “[T]hey had garbage chutes and it seemed like there were always fires. So, they
always had the smell of burning garbage, the smell of urine in the hallways and around the
building.”88 If it was an unpleasant place to work, he asks, “What about the people who have to
live there and deal with this?” adding, “I really felt that low-income people needed a better place
to live than these high-rises because you were basically a victim in there.”
Similarly, George Devereux expresses shock over the conditions he witnessed in public
housing, saying the outrage was a motivating force: “I was really driven by—you know, it’s like
I couldn’t believe that this was happening in Chicago where there was so much brazen drug
selling and guys toting guns and it was just inconceivable to me and I felt bad for these young
kids. . . . I mean, how is somebody supposed to pull out from all this stuff, you know? So that
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bothered me.”89 Sandra Gould* says, “Those high rises, with the metal coverings on the hallways
and stuff, the outdoor hallways, it’s like living in a zoo. And I think that’s gotta be very
depressing. And the little apartments that they lived in were garbage. They were horrible.”90
Melvin Roland grew up at Altgeld Gardens, so he was familiar with project life before he
worked for CPD, but he also knew how much it was changing as time went on. “There was a lot
of good families in the buildings, in all of these buildings,” he explains, adding “A lot of these
people were in public housing, not because they wanted to [be], [but] because that’s where they
ended up at because of hard times, lost jobs, whatever, whatever. And at one point, public
housing was a good place to live, you know?”91 Ramona Jackson* puts it most simply, saying, “I
just feel [CHA residents] got short shrift for a long, long time.”92
However, even as they reiterate the point that there were many "good families" in the
projects, police officers espouse highly stigmatizing views of public housing and its residents.
First, some police officers see public housing residents as lazy freeloaders, following popular
stereotypes of welfare recipients. Since many officers themselves come from modest
backgrounds, they contrast the lifestyles of public housing residents with their own
circumstances, positioning themselves as hardworking, law-abiding individuals as opposed to
CHA residents who they portray as dependent and criminalistic. Andrea Schmidt* epitomizes
this perspective, explaining how living at CHA did not “give [residents] any incentive to do
better.”93 She contrasts this with her own experience, saying “Personally, I was raised on welfare
myself. I was not raised with a silver spoon and I had three children on welfare, but I was not in
a project.” Schmidt explains how she worked hard to get off the welfare rolls, saying that she
would try to talk with public housing residents about doing the same.
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Jennifer Alexander* likewise laments what she saw as a lack of motivation in public
housing and, in turn, her inability to convince residents to live differently. “They may be street
smart,” she says of residents, “but education-wise, it’s not very important to them. It was
difficult to see generations of people living in the same building and not moving.”94 Like
Schmidt, she says she would try to talk with residents about how to move on from the projects,
but says she did not get much traction, noting “It makes it difficult when you’re trying to reach
out to someone to say, ‘Hey, there’s a better way.’ I mean, ‘Things could be better for you’ and
you end up being a social worker to a degree as well.” Social work, it seems, fell outside
Alexander’s training at the police academy.
Len Campbell* even argues that public housing “breeds crime,” something he links to the
perceived failures of public assistance. He explains, “Once you put somebody on public
assistance, it gives them incentive for more welfare. That’s how I look at it. I’ve never been on
welfare. I collected unemployment years ago—briefly, for however long it lasted—but it’s got to
stop.”95 While he says he knows “a handful of people” from the projects “who’ve gone on to
become good people,” he says that “Public housing was supposed to be a short-term initiative for
people to come up and get on their feet.” The fact that many families lived in CHA developments
for generations, is, according to these officers a flaw in the program’s design, something that
creates a culture of laziness and criminality. In espousing these beliefs, officers reproduce
popular discourses around the pitfalls of welfare: specifically, that it disincentivizes work and
creates a cycle of dependency.96
Second, officers express shock over the state of living conditions in public housing, often
blaming tenants themselves for unsanitary conditions, which they see as a failure of residents’
moral character. George Devereux says of conditions at the high-rise apartments, “It was tough. .
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. . [Sometimes] you would go in a place and it was pristine and unbelievable, cleaner than your
own damn house, and they took pride in that . . . And then other times it was just deplorable with
filth and things that had never been cleaned on the walls . . . Nobody would paint in there.
Nobody had a desire to paint. Roaches, mice, bugs. I was involved in a lot of search warrants in
the buildings and [there were] bedbugs, the whole nine yards—so, deplorable conditions.”97
Though Devereux admits “it was all an individual thing and it varied,” his disgust and disdain at
some of the apartment conditions remains a strong memory of his time working in the projects.
Brigid Cronin further comments that “One thing I noticed is that residents who live in
these apartments, if they can’t close the doors, they still go on with life as usual and it was not
unusual to see a couple in the throes of attempting to make a baby or practicing to make a baby if
you went by their apartment and their door was open.”98 More than shock or surprise, Cronin
comments with disgust that, “One of the times I saw that, it was two people who were very
amply sized and they were right in the midst of it—going at it—and it was a filthy, dirty
apartment and there were mice and rats crawling around and there were cockroaches crawling on
the people while they had sex. It takes a lot to make me sick and I was really close to being very
sick.” Cronin’s comments build on multiple stereotypes of public housing residents, as of lowincome Black Americans writ large: as gluttonous, as hyper-sexual, and as dirty.99
Disgust over environmental conditions in CHA buildings and, particularly, the belief that
CHA tenants were bad housekeepers, also impacted how police policed. Melvin Roland, who
grew up in public housing himself, notes with dismay that “I’ve witnessed a lot of the officers
[be] disrespectful of the people that resided there.”100 He says officers would refuse to go
upstairs in the high rises, saying things like “Oh, I ain’t going up there. They’re living like this.”
He says he tried to “straighten some of these guys out,” telling them, “You don’t know the
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reason why these people are here” and bringing them to visit apartments where he knew
residents kept their homes extremely clean. In one instance, he says the fellow officer’s “jaw
dropped. He could not believe [what he saw]. It looked like something out of House and Garden,
House Beautiful.” Roland describes the apartment as “very colorful, very beautiful,” complete
with pastel-painted walls and wall-to-wall white carpeting. Roland told the officer, “Everybody
don’t live like you think they live up in here, okay?”
Third, officers also express negative views of public housing residents as products of
concentrated poverty. In doing so, they draw upon popular mid-century discourses—many of
which live on today—of poverty as pathological, something that could infect an entire
neighborhood and result in an inferior “culture of poverty” that would be passed from generation
to generation.101 As Eldon Urbikas says, pithily, if not everyone in public housing was “bad,” “I
think you had a higher percentage of bad people in those buildings.”102 Policymakers of the time
said similar things. Winston Moore, CHA’s then-Chief of Security, told the press in 1985 that
“Crime in public housing reflects the neighborhood it's in” while the Chicago Tribune
editorialized that “Even more than the underclass neighborhoods that surround them, CHA highrises are highly concentrated and segregated communities of poverty, unemployment, instability,
and widespread homelessness.”103 Just a few years later, in 1987, William Julius Wilson
cemented this idea of an urban “underclass” in the American imagination with the publication of
his book The Truly Disadvantaged, which lent the concept academic legitimacy.104
CHA residents, according to “culture of poverty” perspectives espoused by many
officers, did not understand how to live “normally” because they did not know any other way to
live. For example, Cronin says that at CHA, babies would fall out of windows “based on the fact
that nobody’s paying attention to them.”105 She also claims residents would throw young
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children “out of windows because they’re not wanted or the adults who are supposed to be caring
for the child assume that that’s a good way to discipline the child. It’s just a completely different
mindset in communities like that.” While several children did fall out of windows at CHA over
the years, these tragedies occurred due to faulty windows—not poor parenting and certainly not
as a form of punishment.106 Cronin goes on to say that changing the environment is not enough
to change what she sees as public housing residents’ cultural deficiencies. Instead, she says, “It
has to be changed by education and just explaining, showing them, ‘You can’t do that. This is
not how normal people live.’” Here, Cronin explicitly situates public housing residents as
abnormal and aberrant, a sentiment she emphasizes by adding that public housing is “a
community unto itself.”
Ramona Jackson* expresses a similar perspective, albeit in a more sanguine tone. She
explains how, during her thirteen years as a patrol officer, she would ask CHA tenants for their
address and they would only tell her the building number—for example “2245”—as was
common practice within CHA developments. Because CHA housing comprised so much of the
neighborhood in which high-rise projects were sited, and because CHA tenants did not interact
much with folks outside of the neighborhood, it made sense to identify where you lived merely
by the numeric address. The practice irked Jackson, who chafed against its specificity to
residence at CHA. “I would always say, ‘2245 what?’” she describes. “And they’d say, ‘West
Lake,’ and I’d say, ‘You know everyone does not live in a CHA development. So, when you go
out into the world, you can’t assume that everyone knows exactly where you’re talking about’
and ‘Don’t limit yourself like that.’”107 Like other officers, Jackson tried to correct CHA tenants
on what she saw as an aberrant practice and socialize them into mainstream norms. Also like
other officers, Jackson attributes these cultural differences to concentrated poverty, saying, “I
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always felt when people were just piled on top of each other, the only expectations many of them
had—their expectations were what they saw and heard every day in CHA.” As another example,
she cites what she saw as public housing residents’ habit of throwing trash in public spaces rather
than putting it in the garbage chute or bins. Again, she made this a lesson, saying, “I made people
pick garbage up and stuff because I think it was necessary for people to be away from constant
CHA residents so they could see what expectations were from the world in general.” For her, the
fact that people were “stack[ed] . . . on top of each other . . . especially if they are poor people
who haven’t been taught conflict resolution and have seen violence all of their lives” meant that
crime was “more prevalent” at CHA compared to other communities. The idea that public
housing tenants lacked responsible role models later served as one justification for its demolition
and replacement with mixed-income housing, where tenants are supposedly exposed to and will
be inspired by ideals of respectable, middle-class life.108
Based on their perception of public housing as a deleterious environment that bred
laziness, crime, and various forms of deviance in its residents, some police likewise saw public
housing as having a criminogenic effect on its surrounding neighborhoods. For example,
Alexander says crime occurred throughout the beat, but public housing was “like its own city [it]
was [so] concentrated.” In turn, she says that crime “stretched like an octopus from that building
out into the beat.”

Stigma Against Working in Public Housing
The stigma expressed by officers against public housing residents in some cases also
translated to a stigma against working in the projects. Unsurprisingly given the conditions they
encountered at CHA developments, being assigned to public housing was considered an
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unsavory job for many officers. Ramona Jackson* describes how “public housing units were
treated as another world by many police officers” while Frank Jones* attests that “The high rises
were always considered dangerous” by CPD officers.109 George Devereux concurs, saying, “I
think that most people did not want to go to public housing, if you were to ask me. People were
considered dangerous and more dangerous than maybe some other assignments people can deal
with in the police department.”110
Paul Johnson* says that he was initially assigned to the Public Housing Unit as a
punishment. He explains, “I started my career in the 9th district and I had an altercation with
Mayor Daley's nephews. And in those days we did not have a union so the punishment for
policemen that didn't work or play well with others was public housing.”111 In the early 80s,
when Johnson was transferred to work in public housing, he says it was seen as punishment
because district officers would not go into the developments. “If you call[ed] police for anything
less than somebody [being] shot,” he says, “you would have to meet them on the curb. They
wouldn’t go in the building. So, [CHA] buildings were pretty much lawless.”
For others, such as officers with city-wide roles or who worked in districts with public
housing, working at CHA was an occasional and unavoidable part of the job. Phil Harris* says
officers have a mental geography of the city, including which districts are in “shitty area[s].”112
He adds, “We aren’t surprised when we watch the news and see a five-year-old getting her head
cut off in the projects. Because we know things like that happen there.” Through statements such
as these officers unquestioningly reveal, accept, and reproduce the territorial stigma of public
housing, which they reviled even as many enjoyed the “dangerous” or “exciting” aspects of
working there.
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Efficacy of policing: “Band-Aid on Cancer”
If policing public housing was seen as dangerous and difficult, officers are equivocal
when asked about the end result of undertaking this challenging work. When asked if policing
helped to reduce crime in the developments, Ray Cowin answers affirmatively, but adds that
“We might be there from 4 [pm] to midnight or 6 at night until 2 in the morning and—as soon as
we’d be driving away—you would hear gunshots. As soon as you drove away you would hear:
boom, boom, boom. You’d hear five or six gunshots.”113 If police were bringing relief from
violence, it was—by their own admission—only temporary.
Sometimes, even immediate police presence was not sufficient to stop the violence.
Ramona Jackson* describes one particular night when she and her partner were working a
midnight shift at the ABLA Homes. “All the people were out,” she says “They saw us go into the
building. . . . But once we got up to the 14th floor and we were talking, we were on the
breezeway talking to the people we had gone there to talk to, and all of a sudden the parking lot
just lit up with gunfire.”114 She specifies that residents were not shooting at her and her partner,
but at each other in this case. “A woman got shot,” she says, “and I mean they knew we were
right there. . . . We weren’t an immediate danger to them and, of course, all we could do at that
point . . . was call for an ambulance and head down the stairs. So, they were really bold about it.”
Meanwhile, when asked if policing was able to intervene in the drug trade at CHA, Paul
Johnson* says “No, never. . . . Because it was a Medusa. We’d cut the head off, one of the heads
of the snake, another one will pop up. You can’t stop something that people want.”115 Cops on
patrol similarly feel they were unable to make a lasting difference to improve public safety at
CHA. As Jennifer Alexander* explains, “I was there for calls. So when I’m there just to answer a
call, put a Band-Aid on cancer, I don’t have time to constantly go in that building and spend
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time.”116 Ed Iverson* uses the same language, saying that while working on patrol, “Every
complaint gets a police response. So, that's why it became less of a foot patrol-oriented response,
more to a mobile. So, you would be racing the calls and you would never be allowed to really
solve a problem. You were basically putting a Band-Aid on it because you had to go to your next
call.”117
Other types of officers, like Brigid Cronin who worked as an evidence technician,
similarly comment that there was no way for police, particularly those who entered CHA
developments on a one-off basis, to make a difference in the community. “I mean, there’s little
that’s rewarding about being a police officer,” she says, “[G]oing in and doing what I did, that
would contribute to solving a single crime [but it] didn’t necessarily curtail that type of crime . . .
[I]n general, there would not be a lasting effect that was positive.”118 George Figueora
comments, “I have to honestly say I don’t believe that—in the years that I worked—I don’t
believe that things ever got any better there. I think you were able to help some people and you
were able to make a difference in a couple of families’ lives and stuff.”119 Beyond that, he says,
many “really nice … really good people” at CHA were hampered by the “bad” ones that kept
them living in fear.
Finally, despite the vast influx of cash CHA has distributed to CPD to fund the Special
Employment program over the decades, this initiative, which continues today, is known—by
officers and residents alike—to be particularly ineffective. CPD officers compete for the Special
Employment assignments, which are seen as easy and lucrative: the cars are intended to
supplement officers already on the beat and participating officers are paid time-and-a-half during
their shift. Special employment cars report to the district office but typically are not given
assignments as usual beat cars would be. Instead, as Sandra Gould* explains, “You would be
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there for a deterrent. If there was something going on over there, they may give you something to
check out.”120 In the high-rise era, she says a special employment assignment could involve
standing in the lobby for eight hours, occasionally serving as back-up in the event of a
disturbance. Today, most special employment officers stay in their cars for the duration of their
shift.
Because special employment cars are staffed by senior officers, Frank Jones* comments
that they tend to be staffed by “older officers who are not as engaged. . . . They should be out on
foot patrol.”121 Ronald Davis* likewise admits that, when he worked special employment, “Most
of the time the beat cop would get some calls. We would get the calls too, but we were on our
days off. So, we really didn’t want to work as hard as we do when we’re on our regular shift—
our regular tour of duty—but if we had to deal with it, we’d just deal with it.”122 Andrea
Schmidt* used to work special employment at Cabrini-Green, where she says she felt more
vulnerable because residents were not familiar with her. Further, she says residents knew special
employment officers were more lax, saying, “They knew they weren’t gonna get stopped
because it’s technically the officer’s day off. So, he’s not super aggressive. You’re out there.
You’re gonna respond to your calls. You’re gonna do your job, but you’re not gonna go out of
your way to go stop somebody.”123 Adrienne Neely* too says that during the six- or seven-hour
special employment shifts she used to work at the Dearborn Homes or Altgeld Gardens, “it was
basically just sitting in the car sitting outside the projects.”124 Even today, Len Campbell*
describes special employment as “babysitting,” saying that even at the department level, special
employment cars are discouraged from doing anything but answering calls.125
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Conclusion
Recalling their time working in public housing, CPD officers emphasize their mission to
protect “good” tenants from “bad” ones. Meanwhile, their accounts reveal both the sympathy and
the stigma they felt towards public housing tenants, often simultaneously. For police, public
housing was a difficult environment to work in but for many, the challenge was worth it,
enabling them to feel powerful even as they admit their work did little to improve conditions for
residents. During the period from 1970-2000, as the relationship between CHA and CPD grew
ever-closer, the agencies experimented with a number of policing tactics in the projects. Evermore intensive and expensive, however, police efforts were not necessarily more effective at
promoting public safety. Len Campbell* says that outsiders tend to view police tactics during
this time period in the projects as “heavy handed.”126 As he explains, “That’s how an outsider
would have seen it, but when you’re dealing with murderers, and people who rape 4-year-old
kids, and destroy lives, it may seem like it’s heavy handed but it really isn’t.” To qualify his
claim that policing in the projects wasn’t overly aggressive, Campbell emphasizes that officers
knew who to target: “We have the right people. We know who the right criminals are.” George
Devereux likewise argues that police had to be “proactive” in those days “because it was like the
Wild West. . . . [T]here was a great criminal element that was really throughout the fabric of the
high-rise era of public housing.”127 For officers, the ends justified the means, and the ends were
all about punishing “criminals” and “bad guys.” Through the close relationship of CHA and
CPD, as well as the multiplicity of police units and tactics deployed in public housing during this
period, policing increasingly became a de facto function of public housing, whose residents were
nearly constantly surveilled. Meanwhile, public housing was both a site for policing to take place
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and a mechanism whereby police could control and surveil low-income Black Chicagoans en
masse.
As Chapter 4 demonstrates, officers’ understanding of their work often diverges greatly
from how residents experienced policing in the projects. Just as officers concerned themselves
with policing “bad” residents for the sake of the “good,” residents too attempted to discern “bad”
from “good” cops in their neighborhoods. However, there is an important difference: while
officers spoke of delineating “bad guys” from good ones, they functionally policed everyone as
if they were “bad.” Residents, meanwhile, tend to speak of the problems with policing in
institutional terms. That is, rather than attributing the problems of policing to the actions of “bad
apples” in the police department, residents speak of the whole system of policing as rotten. This
is particularly true when it comes to police abuse—corruption, false arrests, use of excessive
force, and so on. For example, Ramona Jackson*, admits abuse was a problem only obliquely,
explaining how she steered clear of dirty cops when she worked on patrol. Later, when she
worked for the Internal Affairs Division as a sergeant, she learned about some officers that had
been stealing from people and planting drugs on them. She conducted interviews with the
victims, who all corroborated the same story: a group of young men had been playing dice in the
breezeway of a CHA building when some officers came by and took their money. When one
complained, officers arrested him on a drug charge. While she was able to prove what had
occurred, the case was ultimately dropped because the victims were unwilling to testify against
the officers.128 For his part, Len Campbell* denies ever seeing or hearing about such abuses. “I
never put a case on anybody,” he says, adding “I don’t know anybody that has. I don’t know
anybody personally that are friends of mine that [have] ever witnessed any of that.”129 However,
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he implicitly admits that such abuses did occur, arguing, “it’s a small group and they tarnish the
badge. . . . It just disgusts me.” As Chapter 4 shows, residents tell a very different story.
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Chapter 4. Policing Everyday Life
For police officers, Chicago’s public housing could feel like another world. For residents,
however, it was home. Cops came in and out of the developments; residents stayed. In this
chapter, I draw upon 32 interviews with current and former CHA residents, to understand how
they experienced policing in public housing between 1970 and 2000, when the Plan for
Transformation began in earnest. As articulated in the previous chapter, if officers found purpose
in protecting “good” tenants from “bad” ones, residents too drew a distinction between “good”
and “bad” officers—or at least, better and worse ones. However, if officers were keen to
distinguish good from bad tenants, their policing efforts impacted everyone in the community
and as a result, residents tend to articulate the problems of policing not in individual terms, but in
institutional ones. As in the previous chapter, I foreground the voices of residents here, in an
effort to juxtapose resident perspectives with police narratives.
For residents, the dynamic of feeling simultaneously over-policed and under-protected
persisted. In the fall of 1970, some months after Officers Severin and Rizzato were killed, 21year-old Stateway Gardens resident Valeta Cramer described how, “Police come around only in
the evening, and then they sit in the parking lot and don’t patrol. They won’t come into the
buildings unless there is a shooting.”1 At the same time, as this chapter demonstrates, tenants
also decried the abuses that they felt were systemic, rather than aberrant, amounting to what
journalist Jamie Kalven has labelled a full-blown human rights catastrophe at CHA during these
decades.2 Even mundane, everyday police interactions contributed towards making the
developments into carceral spaces that increasingly resembled the prison along multiple axes. As
CHA resident Maria Stevens* explains pithily, “Everybody has a story [about the police].”3
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Table 4.1 Interviewee Characteristics: Current and Former CHA Residents
Name

Age at time of
interview

Racial/Ethnic
Group

Gender

Willie “JR”
Fleming
Crystal Palmer

47

Black

69

Black

Male/gender
neutral
Female

Ella Joseph*

65

Black

Female

Yolanda Green*

46

Black

Female

Maria Stevens*

78

Black

Female

Javon Morris

19

Black

Male

Willie Wright

Prefers not to
disclose

Black

Female

Evelyn Brown*

67

Black

Female

Therese Payne*

62

Black

Female

Linda Arroyo*

73

White

Female

Henry Warfield
Isabel Winters*

45
61

Black
Black

Male
Female

Joanne Williams

57

Black

Female

Helen Peters*

61

Black

Female
131

CHA
Development(s)
where the
participant has
lived
Cabrini-Green
Henry Horner
Homes
Stateway
Gardens, Park
Boulevard
CabriniGreen/Parkside
of Old Town
Robert Taylor
Homes,
Lathrop Homes
Parkside of Old
Town
Henry Horner
Homes, West
Haven
Henry Horner
Homes, West
Haven
Henry Horner
Homes, West
Haven
Parkside of Old
Town
(affordable
housing
resident)
Cabrini-Green
Stateway
Gardens, Ickes
Homes,
Wentworth
Gardens
Dearborn
Homes, Ickes
Homes
Cabrini-Green

Irene Betts*

Black

Female

Cabrini-Green,
ABLA Homes

Douglas Ewing*

Prefers not to
disclose, over
50
66

Black

Male

Ruth Atkins*

49

Black

Male

Derek
Harriet Burton*

46
60

Black
Black

Male
Female

Guana Stamps
Bernadette
Williams
Patricia Black

56
53

Black
Black

Female
Female

58

Black

Female

Jalissa Anders*

68

Black

Female

Mirella
Sanchez*
Megan Ellis*

47

Hispanic

Female

53

Black

Female

Andre Jenkins*

52

Black

Male

Angie Bell*

63

Black

Female

Keith Augustine
Walter Burnett
Ken Butler

45
57
59

Black
Black
Black

Male
Male
Male

Annette
Freeman
Tina Grey*

51

Black

Female

Cabrini-Green,
Parkside of Old
Town
Stateway
Gardens, Park
Boulevard
ABLA Homes
Altgeld
Gardens
Cabrini-Green
Altgeld
Gardens
Altgeld
Gardens
Robert Taylor
Homes,
Lathrop Homes
Parkside of Old
Town
Parkside of Old
Town
Robert Taylor
Homes
Ida B. Wells
Homes,
Parkside of Old
Town
Cabrini-Green
Cabrini-Green
Henry Horner
Homes
Cabrini-Green

54

Black

Female

Parkside of Old
Town

Abusive Policing was the Only Policing
To say that residents living at CHA in the latter decades of the twentieth century were
subject to police abuse would be an understatement. Abuse was, indeed, a central trait of policing
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in Chicago’s public housing, particularly directed towards the young men of the projects. In this
section, I chronicle instances of both extreme and completely mundane harassment and physical
violence that characterized policing at CHA during this era. In doing so, I relate these stories not
as exceptional events, but as the kind of behavior that was condoned and tolerated by the
department if not exercised by every individual officer. That is: at CHA, abusive policing was
the only policing.
Now in his mid-40s, Henry Warfield can pinpoint the day when his views of the police
soured. Born and raised at Cabrini-Green, he tells a story that almost all men raised in the
projects seem to have their own version of: their first negative encounter with CPD. For
Warfield, that day came when he was just fifteen years old, walking to a high school football
practice with a group of friends. Some of the boys were Black, like him; others, he says, were
Hispanic. The group was some distance north of Cabrini-Green—but still in the neighborhood—
when they were stopped by the police, who began to interrogate them, asking what gang they
belonged to, where they lived, what drugs they had on them, and who among them had a gun.
Luckily, their football coach drove by just in time to witness the interaction. As Warfield
explains, “[I]f it wasn't for our coach who just happened to be driving up, there is no telling if
that would have been just a friendly catch-and-release or if [it would have taken] a left turn
somewhere.”4 The coach started asking the police officers why they were interrogating his
players and upon realizing the boys played for the local high school team, the officers
apologized. Nevertheless, Warfield and his friends were caught off guard. As he described, the
officers asked the youth who among them had a warrant. “Warrant?” he recalls thinking, “What
the heck is a warrant? I don’t even know what a warrant is.” The encounter stayed with him,
inflecting his interactions with police for years to come. “And then now you have to walk on
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eggshells in your neighborhood,” Warfield explains, “even if you're a good kid, you[’re] getting
decent grades. You stay out of trouble. And it always seems like the police always finds a way
to—bam!—get right in your face.” Today, Warfield’s views of police have improved somewhat,
in part because some of his family members joined the force and he has also made friends with
some officers. However, Warfield’s recollection of young adulthood at Cabrini-Green epitomizes
the experience of many of his compatriots, who likewise felt under constant scrutiny by police in
their home communities—scrutiny that could lead to serious trouble if you weren’t careful, or
sometimes even if you were.
Douglas Ewing*, who also grew up at Cabrini-Green, notes that police surveillance got
especially intense around the time that Mayor Jane Byrne famously moved into an apartment in
one of the high-rises in March of 1981.5 While some still view the Mayor’s brief stay in CHA as
a publicity stunt, her visit had material impacts: in particular, security was notably increased
before, during, and for some time after the Mayor’s stay at the complex. Simultaneously, CHA
also ramped up evictions.6 As Ewing describes, whatever Byrne’s intentions, “the police
presence at the time was super—I mean, it was oppressive. They stopped you for anything;
walking down the street they’d stop you.”7 Indeed, following Byrne’s move into the complex, 20
residents protested the changed state of affairs. Calling themselves the “Concerned Citizens of
Cabrini,” the residents complained that Byrne’s entry to the development had created a “police
state” at Cabrini-Green.8 Nianna Hickman, a representative for the group, expressed that she and
other residents were “all scared to lie down and go to sleep because we don’t know if the police
will come.”9 In contrast, then-CHA Security Chief Winston Moore publicly speculated that,
“Right now, I imagine, Cabrini is the safest place in Chicago.”10 Moore said the increased police
patrols had improved safety for all residents and simultaneously criticized the Illinois
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Department of Corrections for releasing gang leaders into the development on early parole,
saying, “It’s the Cabrini housing development, not the Cabrini penitentiary.”11 Byrne and her
husband stayed just three weeks at Cabrini-Green, but the increased police presence outlasted
them. The Tribune reported that “Before Mayor Byrne’s arrival at the project, gunshots, like
crickets in the country, were part of the night sounds at Cabrini.” Following her stay, the paper
reported that killings and shooting had dropped, noting that “The police are the most visible
change brought to Cabrini-Green by Mrs. Byrne.”12
Police stops were not always innocent exchanges and not all were as lucky as Henry
Warfield, to have a coach or other authority figure swoop in and intervene at the right moment.
As Alderman Walter Burnett, who also grew up at Cabrini-Green, describes, “Back in those
days—sort of like the Catholic schools—the police had a little more discretion of how to
discipline people, right? So, they would walk around with leather gloves on and they’d jack you
up, you know?”13 Keith Augustine, who also lived at Cabrini-Green, has friends who have been
killed by the police. He himself has been the victim of police brutality, describing how police
would “Jump out of the car, grab you, slam you on the wall, stand you on the car, punch on you
and try to get you to act a certain way or tell them what they want to hear.”14 Then, he describes,
officers would bring him and other young men like him to “somewhere . . . where they know
they’ve got the cameras off.” He describes interrogation rooms at the police stations, “where they
get you in there and they beat the shit out of you with the phonebooks and beat you and slam you
and choke you and grab your balls and do all of that shit.” Augustine says this happened to him
in the police substation at Cabrini-Green itself—that is, inside his own apartment complex.
Men were the most frequent, but certainly not the only, targets of police violence. Guana
Stamps, daughter of Cabrini-Green activist Marion Stamps, describes being beaten by police
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along with her mother and sisters. As a result, she says that to this day she is “very much afraid
of the police on all levels.”15 She says that officers used to target her mother due to her political
activism, calling her names like “n***** bitch” and beating her with billy clubs—something she
witnessed throughout her life and has left her with lingering trauma. Stamps says this happened
“many times” and that “the police were very willing to just brutalize, beat my mother,” who, she
says, was seen as a troublemaker by local politicians. “And we, her daughters, we would get beat
too because we’re protecting our mother,” Stamps explains, “So that’s been our story. Our mama
went to jail all the time because one, she believed in what she was doing and two, if she was not
going to fight for the people, who was? And it was hard for us as young girls, but we understood
her calling. So, we had to take the bitter with the sweet. And part of that was the police
brutalizing her.”
In addition to physical violence, verbal harassment and name calling were also common
from police officers. Harriet Burton*, a long-time resident of Altgeld Gardens, says that policing
in the area has long been characterized by “A lot of name calling. Disrespect.”16 She says that
officers, who she calls “unapproachable” and “insensitive,” continue to stop young men in the
community for no reason, something she attributes to “the implicit bias that they bring with them
to people who live in subsidized housing” (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of officer’s feelings of
stigma towards residents). If they fear young men, she says officers continue even today to see
“Every woman out here that they come in contact with [as] a bitch.” Though she thinks things
have improved somewhat over time, Burton says interactions between youth and police remain
fraught.
Interviewees commonly espouse the viewpoint that CHA residents were not only treated
particularly badly but indeed, targeted by police officers during the latter decades of the
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twentieth century. At Cabrini-Green, Stamps says residents were targeted because the
development “had a reputation of being the most notorious housing project in the country. There
was a lot of violence.”17 The crack epidemic only furthered the situation, but Stamps says that
much of the hostility dates back to the 1970 murders of officers Severin and Rizzato. Douglas
Ewing*, meanwhile, asserts that over time, being a CHA resident became its own category of
criminality. “At a certain point,” he says, “you could see [on] an arrest report, up in the upper
righthand corner, it said ‘public housing resident’ or ‘CHA resident’—whichever one it was.
And [the police would] check it. So, literally what they were doing is, if you were arrested for
something, part of what they would ask you is: do you live in CHA?”18 This bureaucratic sorting
of arrestees as CHA tenants displays the extent to which CHA tenants were criminalized as a
class. However, identifying arrestees as CHA residents also helped facilitate One Strike
evictions, wherein the police would report directly to CHA if a tenant was arrested, as discussed
later in this chapter.

The “Set-Up Pigs”
In 2013, former CPD Sergeant Ronald Watts and his partner Officer Kallat Mohammed
were convicted for conducting a long-running extortion ring while policing the Ida B. Wells
Homes.19 For over a decade, the officers preyed on public housing residents, enacting a tax on
drug dealers there, and generating hundreds of false arrests. As of this writing in March 2022, the
Cook County State’s Attorney has vacated the charges of over 100 individuals falsely
imprisoned as a result of Watts and Mohammed’s actions.20 However, interviewees for this
study attest that Watts and Mohammed were symptoms of chronic police abuse at CHA, rather
than exceptions to the rule. In addition to extortion, police were widely known to plant guns or
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drugs on tenants. Several interviewees describe experiencing such forms of corruption directly,
while others saw it or heard about it secondhand. Keith Augustine was one of the former,
describing how, during his teenage years, “I got beat by the police, locked up. I’ve had stuff put
on me.”21 Derek, who grew up at the ABLA Homes and wishes to be known only by his first
name, explains that the police would “plant drugs on us and guns on us. I even witnessed the
police do a lot of extortion: make people pay if they catch you with a gun or if they catch you
with drugs—‘You’ve got to give us the money and we won’t mess with you.’”22
Bernadette Williams, a long-time resident and tenant leader at Altgeld Gardens, confirms
that police behaved similarly in her development, where residents knew to avoid certain police
officers who would “shake them down” and plant guns and drugs on them. She says the problem
was “ongoing,” noting that male residents “would be like ‘Oh. Oh, Lord. Here comes [that one
officer] now.’”23 One day in 1997, she went to visit her mother, who also lived in the
development, when she witnessed a young resident “get smart” with some officers: “So, they
was upset. They arrested him. He was kind of resisting, but I think one of the officers pulled—I
don’t know if it was an eight-ball of cocaine out of his pocket and tried to put it in [the
arrestee’s] pocket. So I’m like ‘They’re planting drugs on him.’” Williams says they let the man
go later that evening. Police saw her watching and, after the incident, they would not let her get
near them and would even block her off if she tried to approach them when there was a dispute
with a tenant.
At the ABLA Homes, Irene Betts* tells a similar story. She too describes how police
would commonly “tak[e] money from drug dealers.”24 Others, she says, “would stick up a drug
house or whatever and [then] what they get from that drug house, they’d take it to a drug spot
where they operate.” She particularly recalls two officers who were known in the ABLA
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neighborhood by the nicknames Batman and Robin, and occasionally a female officer who
worked with them who residents called Blondie (residents often had nicknames for officers they
knew or who had reputations in the neighborhood).25 “They did some awful things,” Betts recalls
of the group, noting that one of the male officers ended up in jail for planting drugs on people. At
one time, her own son was his target: As she describes, her son qualified for disability payments
and one day when he was a teenager, he took some of the money to go shopping with friends on
Maxwell Street, a nearby shopping district. She happened to be walking by, across the street and
in the opposite direction, with a friend when she “heard somebody calling, “Mama, Mama,’ and
we just kept walking because we didn’t see it too clearly yet. And then we heard him saying,
‘Mama, they’re putting drugs on me.’ So we looked across the street and it was my son. They
were planting drugs in his shirt pocket.” Betts crossed the street to question the cops, who in turn
started interrogating her about where her son had gotten “all his fucking money” from. She
explained that it was from his disability check and they allowed her to leave with her son, but
detained his friend and put the drugs—which they had removed from her son’s pocket—on the
friend instead. Betts says she happened to have a camcorder on her, which she used to film the
rest of the interaction from across the street. The police instructed the boy to take off his shoes
and sit on the curb, after which Betts witnessed one of the officers, while ostensibly searching
the boy’s belongings, slip something into his shoe. “And then after that,” she describes, “he
walked over to his partner like he was just pulling it out and showed his partner and they took
that boy to jail.” Far from an isolated incident, Betts says this kind of interaction “would happen
all the time” at CHA and that police would take drugs from one person “and give that person a
chance or whatever and [then] use those drugs to plant on the one [person] they really want.
Yeah, they did do that.”
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Derek, likewise, recalls what he terms the “set-up pigs” who patrolled ABLA: officers
that “mainly came through just to put something on people to be able to arrest them by the
end.”26 He and his friends knew to look out for particular officers and would run away when they
pulled up. At Cabrini-Green, Douglas Ewing* similarly remembers certain officers who
residents strove to avoid: “You see them coming, you go the other way. You try to get the hell
away from them. Them guys, they’ll try and put drugs on you or just harass you and arrest you
for anything. They’d just make stuff up.”27 Down South at Stateway Gardens, Ella Joseph* says
there were “quite a few” officers who residents knew to avoid because they were “carrying drugs
with them.”28 As she explains, “There’s a lot of people that’s in jail now for the simple fact that
[the police] picked them up, you know, [for] selling drugs . . . and they’d plant drugs on them
and get them locked up. There’s many people now sitting in jail because of these rogue cops.”
Derek had a particularly horrible experience one day as a young man when one of these
officers pulled up to the building—“right up on the walk; they didn’t get out at the curb.”29 Upon
seeing the cops arrive, Derek took off running to his mother’s apartment on the fourth floor
because he had gotten into a dispute with one of the officers only recently. However, the officer
chased him through the building and caught up with him at his mother’s door, where he pressed
Derek against the apartment door, even pulling his gun on the then-sixteen-year-old. Derek says
the officer told him, “If you move, I will blow your mother fucking brains all over your mama’s
door.” He describes feeling “terrified,” saying, “I was really, really scared because he was
pressing me in my neck—on the left side of my neck real hard. The look in this man’s face told
me I was dead. I haven’t ever had an encounter with anybody in my whole life that they had that
look on their face like—his eyes were just dead eyes and his bottom lip kept twitching like he
was biting his lip.” Luckily for Derek, his mother happened to be home and opened the door. The
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officer reportedly swore at her, yelling something to the effect, as Derek recalls, of “Close that
damn door!” or “Close the mother fucking door!” Derek speculates that if his mother had not
opened the door when she did, the officer would have killed him. Instead, the officer arrested
Derek, who was briefly placed in juvenile detention but was quickly released. Not all of his
friends at ABLA were so lucky: one, Craig, was shot in the back while running away from the
police in a baseball field in the neighborhood. Another, Robert, was shot in the head when trying
to break free from a hold. According to Derek, police also murdered someone in the
neighborhood who had been working undercover with the police and no longer wanted to do the
job, so some officers hung him from the heating pipes on the first floor of one of the buildings at
ABLA.
Other interviewees, particularly men, tell similar stories of their youth at CHA. In his
younger years at the Taylor Homes, Andre Jenkins* was innocently sitting on the porch with
some friends when a boy ran by, followed by a group of police officers in hot pursuit. The boy
ran onto Jenkins’ porch, stood in front of his door, which was locked at the time, and was
cornered by the police, who caught and arrested him there. As Jenkins describes, one of the
officers then turned around and “slapped the dog shit out of me.”30 The officer reportedly yelled
at Jenkins, asking why he had not identified the boy to the officer. Jenkins, however, had no idea
what was going on at the time. Nevertheless, the officers arrested Jenkins as well and took him to
jail.
For his part, Henry Warfield was just seventeen when he was falsely arrested while
walking to the neighborhood community center near Cabrini-Green with some friends. As he
describes, he and his friends were talking outside amidst a November snowfall when “the cops
pulled up and one cuffed myself and my friend.”31 One of his friends had a gun in his possession,
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so the whole group was arrested on charges of mob action. The case was quickly thrown out, but
the proceedings kept Warfield out of school for two days, while his mom missed work to appear
at his court hearing.
Crystal Palmer, who lived for many years at the Horner Homes, says that her husband
was regularly abused by a CPD officer, who she believes preyed similarly on many men in the
neighborhood. Palmer says that her husband would meet her at the bus stop when she got off
work at 11:30. Before she arrived, her husband would wait for her in the vicinity of the bus stop,
sometimes by a nearby liquor store, and this particular officer would pick him up and take him to
a site to purchase drugs with marked money, returning her husband to the bus stop just in time
for her bus to arrive. “If you didn’t do it,” she says, “they would just plant something on you.”32
She clarifies that her husband was not working undercover for the police, but that police were
giving him marked money that they would then recover in a raid of the drug site, all while
keeping the purchased drugs for their personal use. Palmer says she and her husband never
complained to the police department “because they have too much power.” Again, while it
sounds extreme, the actions she describes were not exceptional but part of the everyday life of
her family and, she suspects, other CHA residents like them. While they do distinguish some
better cops from some worse ones, tenants thus tend to see the problems with policing in CHA
communities as systemic, rather than individual. Again, as Maria Stevens* says, “Everybody has
a story about the police.”33 Planting guns and drugs on tenants, extortion, false and illegal arrests
were all endemic, rather than aberrant aspects of policing in public housing.
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Warrantless Searches
In addition to framing and falsely arresting tenants—particularly young men—policing at
CHA was characterized by regular invasions of tenant privacy that would make headlines if they
took place in any other environment. Jalissa Anders* has lived at the Lathrop Homes for nearly
40 years. She raised sons there who, she says, joined gangs as teenagers. One day in 1994, two
police officers came to her house looking for one of them. As Anders describes it, the officers
arrived wearing ski masks, so when she looked out the window to see who had come to the door,
she recalls thinking “Oh my God, somebody [is] coming to kill us.”34 The officers arrived in the
late evening—Anders thinks it was around 7 or 8 pm—so it was dark outside. One of the officers
pulled up his mask—Anders recognized him from the neighborhood—and demanded she open
the door. Inside, the officers got into an altercation with Anders’ brother, who was staying with
them while undergoing cancer treatments. She explains that her brother couldn’t speak well and
the officers told him to “shut up before I put these shackles on you.” “Shackles?” Anders recalls
thinking, “This ain’t no slave stuff.” As things escalated, Anders says she ultimately resorted to
calling 911—calling the police on the police, an irony that is not lost on her.
At the Lathrop Homes, Maria Stevens* describes the police raiding her apartment by
mistake, when they had intended to enter the apartment next door. She says this was not an
uncommon occurrence, however: something similar happened to her cousin who was nearly
nine-months pregnant when the cops mistakenly entered her apartment, even handcuffing her
while she was naked except for a t-shirt, her frightened children watching from a corner of the
room. The experience was so traumatic that the woman went into labor and gave birth that
night.35 Something similar also happened to JR Fleming when he lived in a high-rise at CabriniGreen. Fleming was at a family gathering when the police came into the apartment by mistake.
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After they called his sister a “Black bitch,” a fight broke out—one of many such altercations
Fleming has had with police officers over the course of his life growing up in the projects.36 For
his part, Andre Jenkins* was entertaining family members at his Taylor Homes apartment one
day, when some kind of altercation took place between those in attendance. All of a sudden,
Jenkins says the police were at his door. “Is there a problem?” he asked the officers, explaining
that, “This is my place. And do you all have a warrant to go in my house? What’s going on?”37
Jenkins says that before he knew it, “one of the police just grabbed me and slammed me to the
wall. Just slammed me to the wall. I’m going to jail for something I didn’t do. Something I don’t
even know what’s going on.” It was the second such false and sudden arrest for Jenkins.
Yolanda Green*, a long-time resident of Cabrini-Green who now lives in the mixedincome replacement properties on site, says it was common for police to “come kick in your
door, want to raid your crib and then [say they don’t need] a search warrant.”38 Green says the
first time this happened, her family was having a party at her sister’s house when, around 6 or 7
pm, “the police came [and] literally kicked [in] her door. And they said ‘Everybody freeze! On
the floor!’” Green says she ran to the back of the apartment where children were playing. “I ain’t
gonna lie,” she says, “I cried, they cried, and a lady officer came in there and told us to ‘Be quiet,
it will be over in a few.’” However, she says it was several hours later that police ultimately
departed. While there, she says police raided the apartment and cut up her sister’s furniture
looking for drugs and guns, threatening to take the adults to jail and send the kids to the
Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS). She says her family asked for a warrant and
was never provided one. There was no noise complaint or other lease violation to precipitate the
raid. Another time, Green says something similar occurred when she was pregnant and the police
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even detained her for an entire weekend; she eventually took the police to court for the illegal
entry of her apartment and her resulting detention.
And finally, Joanne Williams, a long-time resident of the Ickes Homes, recalls a time
when she was entertaining her sister and cousin in her apartment. After her cousin left, she got
up to lock the door only to find police officers walking into her unit. Williams, who prides
herself for being outspoken, recalls questioning the officer, asking him, “Why would you just
twist my knob and walk in my unit?”39 He told her the door wasn’t locked, to which she replied,
“It doesn’t have to be locked. What gives you the right to just come in my unit?” Williams says
she asked for the officer’s badge number and he would not let her see it. Then, when she opened
the door, she found four more officers waiting outside. She eventually got the squad car number
and reported the officers to the police department. A lieutenant was sent out to speak with her
and Williams told him that she felt CHA residents were being treated as second-class citizens
and that the officer’s illegal entry comprised harassment. The lieutenant, however, continued to
press the point that the door was unlocked and that the officers were responding to reports of
drugs being sold out of the apartment. "But if that's the case,” Williams asked him, “why didn't
you knock on the door and tell me what somebody told you?"
As I explore further in Chapter 6, police invasions of domestic privacy, enabled in part by
CHA’s status as a federally subsidized form of housing, eroded residents’ status as full citizens
of the city, let alone the United States, with all the legal protections from unreasonable search
and seizure that citizenship theoretically entails. To make matters worse, when policing did go
wrong, officers would frequently obfuscate and do anything they could to make it difficult for
residents to report the abuse. Much as Williams experienced at the Ickes Homes, Therese
Payne*, a long-term resident of the Horner Homes, says that officers frequently tried to hide
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their identity from residents, covering their name badges with their hand. If asked for a badge
number, Payne says officers would often give residents the wrong one.40 Today, the Chicago
Police Department continues to mistakenly, illegally, and/or violently search private homes:
most recently, the city settled a lawsuit for $3 million over the botched police raid in which
innocent city resident Anjanette Young’s apartment was raided by no fewer than 12 police while
she was at home.41 Young’s raid made headlines, as it should have. However, countless CHA
residents were subject to similar invasions over the decades and few if any received news
coverage. The relative lack of attention or protest to such events likely results from two causes.
First, such invasions were commonplace in the context of CHA, rather than exceptional. And,
police invasions at CHA apartments took place in an environment where residents were
considerably less empowered to protest police abuses compared to their fellow Chicagoans. In
part, this is due to their particularly precarious property relation as public housing tenants
constantly vulnerable to eviction.42 Moreover, as this story demonstrates, tactics developed at
CHA were later exported to other contexts, including private housing in other neighborhoods of
the city.

“They Came to Harass Somebody”: Policing the Everyday
If policing at CHA was characterized by systemic abuse, brutality, and corruption, the
mundane, everyday forms of policing that took place in the developments could be equally
damaging and also contributed to the creation of public housing as a carceral space. For this
reason, there is considerable blurring in interview data between what constitutes an extraordinary
police interaction—Derek being held against his mother’s door at gunpoint, Joanne Williams’
apartment being invaded without warning or warrant—from ordinary, everyday police practices
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in public housing that also felt highly abusive to residents. Far from standout events, these were
the regular negative interactions between police and residents that were so commonplace in
public housing as to feel mundane. For example, when Maria Stevens* was growing up at the
Taylor Homes, she describes witnessing officers who “would constantly ride around and just hop
out [of] their cars on certain people and harass them.”43 Harassment in this case constituted
performing body searches, name calling, and the use of racial slurs. She further describes a
pattern she noticed even after she had moved north to the Lathrop Homes, wherein police in
public housing “knew your whole family, so they judged [you] off of things the other family
members have done. Or people you hang with. Just because you hang with someone, they figure
that you do the same thing they do.” For Stevens, this kind of pre-judgment felt like a form of
discrimination in and of itself. CHA developments were a unique environment in that they felt
more contained, more closed off and discrete than other city neighborhoods. While cops in other
parts of town might get to know individual residents and even some of their relatives, the
environment of public housing fostered this ability for police to identify particular social
networks and make assumptions about residents and their behavior based on who they associated
with. The structure of police services, with its dedicated public housing units, only reinforced
this dynamic, which Stevens says made her and others feel targeted and stereotyped by the cops
working in their communities.
Regular, normalized disrespect towards residents characterizes much of police work at
CHA. Jalissa Anders* describes how officers “treated some residents of public housing
differently than they treated residents in other communities . . . It was like we were lower-class
citizens to them.”44 She says police officers disrespected parents in front of their children, a
dynamic that in turn undermined parents’ authority with their own kids. “It was terrible,” she
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says, describing an incident in which a young man got arrested and, when his mother asked the
police what had happened, they “told her she needed to get on back in the house and don’t worry
about what happened [because] they got this. It’s a lot of incidents like that, not just a particular
one.”
Residents did not take disrespect from officers passively. At Stateway Gardens, Ella
Joseph* admits that police were not always warmly received, confirming police officers’
accounts that residents would throw things at them from the high rises as they approached.
However, she says officers have to take some accountability for the situation: “[Y]ou don’t come
in like gangsters. If you’re coming for an individual that’s in an apartment, you don’t tell
everybody to ‘Get the hell out [of] the way!’ If you’re going for a suspect, go for a suspect, don’t
target everybody.”45 She says police officers too often approached the building “like a gang—
like gangsters.” Similarly, Andre Jenkins* explains that residents at the Taylor Homes would
throw things at police because, “You have these detectives—I ain’t gonna say no names—but
you had these detectives that would literally come in and mess with folks. And I ain’t gonna say
no names, but I know two of them that went down to one of the red buildings down there and
harassed one of the tenants over there and they whooped their ass. Excuse my expression.”46 In
short, officers’ needlessly aggressive and disrespectful attitudes led residents to respond in kind.
Residents also describe how officers would needlessly escalate otherwise mundane
interactions. Patricia Black describes how, rather than politely asking residents to turn their
music down at dusk, officers at Altgeld Gardens would turn threatening, barking at residents to
“turn your music down or you’re going to jail.”47 In another instance, Isabel Winters* was
walking one day on the property at Wentworth Gardens, where she lives, when she saw a young
man that officers had handcuffed and were pushing around. She stopped to ask the officers what
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was going on, figuring that the incident might be racially motivated. The response she received
was hostile: she says police told her “You’d better go ahead ma’am before I lock your ass up.”48
By escalating prosaic warnings or directives into threats, officers escalated hostilities and turned
ordinary interactions into a needlessly punitive experience.
For men in particular, being stopped, hassled, and even searched by police—or the
possibility thereof—was a part of everyday life at CHA. At ABLA, Derek says that “[A]s I got
into being a teenager, I started noticing that we would always get picked on. Say, like me and my
friends would be walking and then we’d get hassled by the police because there were a lot of us.
We can’t help but to think it’s because of the prejudice. If we’d leave our building and go maybe
10 minutes away on the bus to downtown, to State Street . . . They’d come through and . . . try to
get us to tell them who is bad, who is a player or who’s got the guns, or who runs the
neighborhood, or who’s the leader over here.”49 At Cabrini-Green, Keith Augustine reports that
officers would stop and interrogate him “all the time. They want to stop you and they want to
search you. This is what they do. They search you, make sure you don’t have a gun on you. You
know what I’m saying? It was random searches.”50 Augustine says he could just be walking
home or to the store and police “would ride up and put all of us on the wall. ‘Everybody on the
wall! Everybody’s hands on the wall!’” Sometimes, he says, a man would decide to run and the
officers would fire their weapons. “They shot people’s hats off of their heads,” he describes, “I
mean, for something petty like that—you were aiming at somebody’s head!”
Though less common, women were also stopped by police. Shortly after she moved to
Altgeld Gardens in 1992, Patricia Black was walking from a neighbor’s house to her apartment
with her sister when they were stopped by cops. When she asked why, the officer told her he was
going to detain her until a female officer could arrive on the scene to pat her down. “For what
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reason?” Black asked.51 In response, the officer demanded her ID, which she gave to him,
assuring him she did not have a criminal background. When he returned the ID to her, she again
asked why she had been stopped. The officer reportedly told her it was because she reminded
him of his ex-wife, who “had a fucked-up attitude.” In the context of CHA, any and every
resident was subject to frequent and capricious police harassment.
Moreover, harassment characterized policing for many who lived at CHA. Growing up at
the Taylor Homes, Andre Jenkins* says that “When the police came in the building, they came to
harass somebody” and as a result, “Every time they came, their presence wasn’t welcome
because they were harassing somebody.”52 Yolanda Green* admits that members of her family
“got into many a fight with a police officer” at Cabrini-Green because “If you’re walking in a
group, they tend to stop you. They don’t care if you’re male or female.”53
In addition to pervasive disrespect and frequent street harassment, police also targeted
residents through over-policing and surveillance. Henry Warfield lived for a time in the
rowhouses at Cabrini-Green, a group of low-rise townhomes at the edge of the development. The
rowhouses, which still stand today and, though developers are eager to bulldoze and redevelop
them, remain as the last Section 9 housing at Cabrini-Green, are laid out in an almost suburbanstyle, with plentiful dead-end streets and just a few points at which cars can enter or exit.
Warfield says that police never systematically raided the rowhouses as they did the high-rises
(and as is discussed further in Chapter 6), but instead, would station a cop car at the end of the
street, at the entrance to the area. “And so,” he describes, “what they would do [is], they will stop
you and ask for your license and your insurance and if you don’t have any, they will actually
have the city tow trucks at the end of Cambridge and Chicago Avenue. And if you couldn’t
produce the documents, they will tow your car and they had a patty wagon—they would just be
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putting guys in there who had either suspended licenses or didn’t have licenses.”54 In this way,
police cordoned off the neighborhood, requiring residents of the rowhomes to pass through what
constituted a de facto security checkpoint just to leave their house.
In turn, navigating the constant but largely unhelpful police presence characterized
everyday life at CHA. Douglas Ewing* describes how there were some officers at Cabrini that he
genuinely felt were “really good,” particularly Black officers who had their own struggles with
trying to integrate the police department.55 However, he notes that even these “good” cops,
“didn’t fool around. I mean, if you broke the law, they’ll lock you up. They got it coming.”
Implicit in Ewing’s comment is the law-and-order ethos that, contrary to popular portrayals of
public housing, permeated life at CHA. Whether cops were “crooked” or “really good,” what
mattered was that they were cops and they were there—nearly constantly.

Policing “made it worse”: How Policing Spurred Crime
In many cases, policing at public housing was not only ineffective or oppressive, but
actually spurred crime. Ella Joseph* remembers how, in the 1970s at Stateway Gardens, “It was
terrible. I mean, there were so many rogue cops out there. . . .They knew there was a
concentration of people [at CHA], [that] we had been abandoned, we had been shut out of the
main society, everything else. . . . And so the police came and took advantage. They knew there
was drug dealing going on, there was shooting and everything else. Murders and crime—they did
nothing about it. As a matter of fact, they perpetuated it. They had more drugs—they had the
boys and girls . . . selling more drugs than the major dope dealers. They were supplying them
with guns, they were keeping the gang wars going. I’ve seen it with my own eyes.”56 At the
Taylor Homes, Andre Jenkins* tells a similar story, saying that as he grew up and time went on,
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“you’d see more guns. Really, who gets these types of guns? How did all the guns get here?”57
When asked if he thinks the police were bringing them in, Jenkins says simply, “Yeah.
Somebody did because we weren’t going . . . and getting all those guns and [bringing] them in.”
According to Joseph, CHA provided police with a captive population, whereby, “In the 70s, 80s,
and 90s, anytime the police wanted to pay their condo, their mortgage, or their trim bill, they just
came to CHA.” Policing the projects was a profitable enterprise where cops could prey on
residents with impunity, extorting residents, buying and supplying drugs, selling weapons, and
sowing violence and conflict along the way.
The level of violence, including that engendered by police action “looked like Hell,”
according to Joseph, who laments, “You didn’t know where to go, you didn’t know who to turn
to. You couldn’t call police officers. . . . If something was going down, one of their friends might
be the one answering the phone at the station. So it was terrible.”58 Not all officers were bad,
Joseph clarifies, though she estimates that about a third of the force were “really, really bad”—
doing more to contribute to crime and violent conflicts than they were to mitigate them. Joseph
says good officers would take the day off if their partner did, lest they get assigned to work with
an unsavory officer in the interim. Jenkins similarly asserts that some officers quit the force after
realizing their partner was, as he puts it, “crooked.” Joseph also adds that, “You had a lot of
officers that really couldn’t tell on their fellow officer because they could be—they could call out
that they need some cover or backup and they might’ve got shot by one of their own officers. It’s
really bad when officers are afraid they can be shot by their own officers.” Joseph’s account
speaks to the well-documented “code of silence” among CPD officers and particularly those
working in public housing, who feared (and continue to fear) severe consequences should they
report corruption on the force.59 Joseph says that this kind of behavior was “bad all over” the city
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but was “extra bad” on the South Side at the time. As her and Jenkins’ comments attest, residents
were concerned with discerning good cops from bad ones to a certain extent, but at the end of the
day, the problem laid with policing itself.
Joseph similarly maintains that police spurred gang conflicts in public housing by
“play[ing] the [gangs] against each other.” “The police are not the cure” to neighborhood
violence, she says, explaining that policing is “what made it worse.”60 For his part, Jenkins* feels
that the police were responsible for much of the shooting in public housing. “I think that the
police were doing all that shooting back and forth from those buildings,” he says, explaining that
“The reason why the gang bangers kept shooting back and forth at each other—I think [the
police] were the ones doing it, to be honest with you.”61 Likewise, Guana Stamps contests the
popular portrayal of Cabrini-Green and other public housing developments as a site of gang
violence, saying that the police were to blame for much of the fighting.62
Jenkins* further reports that while he lived at the Taylor Homes, “The police used to run
shooting at these boys and sometimes the boys would be shooting back.”63 Police, in other
words, fought violence with violence, quick to draw and use their weapons in the context of
public housing. “And,” Jenkins adds, “I’ve seen them jump fences. I’ve seen them just chasing
folks. And [the] boys [are] like, ‘I ain’t did nothing. These police keep coming over here
bothering me,’ and all this. So, I’ve just seen it all.” Jenkins says he would talk to police officers
when he was a young child, but as he grew up, police began to lie and say he or other residents
had provided information about another resident when they had not. “So we had to leave that
alone,” he says, explaining that “if the boys saw us talking to the police as we were getting older,
they didn’t want us talking to the police anymore because they were like, ‘The police are saying
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that you said this and you said that.’” Fraternizing with police, in other words, had become a
risky proposition.
At Cabrini-Green, Douglas Ewing* says that by stirring up gang hostilities, police made
public housing less safe. While he says that some cops did help mitigate violence, he critiques
the “widely-used tactic” wherein “[The police] would literally pick up a kid that they felt was in
one gang, and they would drive them over—our area [where I lived], it was Disciples [territory].
So, they would pick up a Disciple, and drive [him] over to the area that’s the opposing gang
[territory], which would be the Vice Lords or other groups and whoever and drop them off. And
it would start a fight.”64 The police used this tactic on a friend of Henry Warfield’s, who,
according to Warfield, “was really rebellious against the police.”65 He says the officers were
upset when they could not find a gun or drugs on the man, “And what they would do—they
would take a guy from one opposing street gang and drop them off to the other area.” Ewing says
it got to the point that the gangs grew weary of police starting trouble, saying, “the guys who
were in [opposing] gangs, they’d look at the cop and just wave their hand at them. Like, ‘Go
away, we’re tired of this,’ because they did it to both sides.” When asked if such policing tactics
made Cabrini-Green less safe, Ewing says simply “Oh sure. They were doing that.”
Even when police did exactly what they were supposed to do, residents describe how
police action could—and continues to—put them in harm’s way. Therese Payne*, who lived at
the Henry Horner Homes and now lives in the mixed-income replacement properties on site, says
an ongoing problem with policing in the neighborhood is that, when residents do call the police,
“the first thing they’re going to do is come to that resident and say whatever your situation is. So
if I call—say if I called the police and said there is some gang activities going [on] out in front of
my unit, can you come and move them from my front door? The first thing the officer’s going to
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do is come knock on my door. And now I’m in trouble because you’ve identified me as the
culprit calling on [the gangs]. . . . So now the gang members are looking at me so I’m on the
radar now because I’m calling the police.”66 The problem Payne describes, which continues
today, has long been a reason that many residents do not call the police when there is a conflict.
Rather than solve the problem in a meaningful way, policing can further undermine resident
safety in public housing, as it has for many decades.

“They Ain’t Doing Nothing”: Policing as Ineffective
For all of officers’ heavy-handed tactics and the multiple, oppressive ways policing
affected residents, making them feel like prisoners in their own home communities and even
fueling ongoing violence, residents say that policing was, at its best, ineffective at improving
community safety. On this point, police and residents largely agree. As Isabel Winters*
describes, police action at the high rises might be “helpful for just that day. Once they leave, it’s
all over. It’s back out again.”67 She says police would “come out and move [troublemakers]
around a little bit. Shake them up and they slow down for a while. But give them a day or two
[and] they’re back at it.” For her part, Maria Stevens* says she “would rather not call [the police]
because they never resolve the situation anyway.”68 She recounts one time that her car was
broken into and “all they did was just write up something and that was it. I never heard of
anything.” She says police provide “no help or inform[ation]—there either was no help or
harassment.” When things did get violent at Cabrini-Green, Douglas Ewing* testifies that, “The
thing I remember is when these shootouts were going on, you didn’t see no cop. And [as a]
matter of fact, if you go walking a couple blocks from the building, the cops are just sitting in
their car waiting. They’re just sitting there listening [with] the window down, listening to
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gunshots, and they ain’t moving. They ain’t doing nothing.”69 At the Ickes Homes, Joanne
Williams remembers a time that a young boy came outside and told a police officer that his
mother’s boyfriend was beating her up inside. According to Williams, the officer told the boy to
“Shut up and mind your business.”70 With such a response, particularly to a child, one can
understand why generations of children learned not to look to the police for help in the face of
violence. Irene Betts* notes that the police “were scared to death” to come into the buildings:
“They was afraid. Some police were afraid of the guys, and some guys were afraid of the
police.”71

Policing Evictions
For residents, one of the most pressing worries was that policing could lead to an
eviction. While CHA had long discriminated against housing applicants with criminal records
and pursued evictions proceedings when a tenant did get caught up in crime, the federal One
Strike Rule facilitated and formalized this process. According to the rule—which was really
more of a recommendation than a hard and fast policy—public housing authorities (PHAs) were
to “aggressively root out criminals” from public housing. HUD’s “One Strike And You’re Out
Screening and Evictions Policy,” which was implemented in the spring of 1996 shortly after
President Clinton introduced the idea in his State of the Union address, empowered housing
authorities to not only screen tenants and bar anyone with a history of criminal activity, but also
evict a tenant whenever “the tenant, any member of the tenant’s household, or a guest” engaged
in criminal activity. The policy further specified that, far from the principle of ‘innocent until
proven guilty,’ “Evictions are civil, not criminal, matters. In order to terminate a lease and evict a
tenant, a criminal conviction or arrest is not necessary, and PHAs need not meet the criminal
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standard of ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ in eviction proceedings. PHAs should specify in
their leases that criminal activity is cause for eviction even in the absence of conviction or
arrest.”72 The policy, whose tenets were upheld in the 2002 Supreme Court case HUD v
Rucker,73 enabled housing authorities to establish an extremely low—and vague—bar for
determining criminal activity, relying heavily, as Jamie Kalven has pointed out, on quality
policing on the front end to qualify the conditions for eviction.74 As the preceding discussion has
shown, this presumption was anything but guaranteed.
Meanwhile, the One Strike policy functionally gave police additional leverage over CHA
residents, above and beyond the power they already exert on all residents of the city. For CHA
residents, any engagement with police carried the risk of losing their home. And, by explicit
lease criteria, tenants were made responsible for the actions of their guests. Tenants were
exceedingly aware of these rules. As Douglas Ewing* explains, to evict a CHA tenant at the
time, “[E]vidence normally used in a court of law is not required, and a conviction is not
required. Well I ask you: what are they doing? They’re basically labelling you a criminal without
evidence . . . without a conviction. So, whatever happened to innocent until proven guilty? It
didn’t apply to us. And this is what they did. . . . [T]hey literally took the worst parts of criminal
and civil law and made them all apply to us, and the best parts of those laws were removed.”75
Ewing further theorizes that the ability to prompt evictions incentivized police officers to police
CHA more harshly. As he describes, “[One Strike] became an incentive on the part of the police
department to arrest as many of us as they can for any reason. Because guess what, just the arrest
was enough to get you evicted. It’s an arrest.”
As scholars have shown, evictions tend to reproduce urban poverty. When a poor person
is evicted, they typically bounce around between substandard living arrangements and can even
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become entangled in the criminal-legal system, while landlords and developers stand to profit.76
Ewing sees the One Strike policy and the policing it enabled as a direct mechanism to reclaim
Cabrini-Green and other CHA properties from the public sphere and put them in the hands of the
market, a transformation that centrally relied upon breaking up concentrated Black poverty via
the removal of public housing tenants. “The whole thing,” he says, “was being fueled by the fact
that—[going] all the way back to the late 70s—that [leaders] had their eye on Cabrini because
Cabrini sat on prime real estate. And the only thing that stood in the way is a bunch of poor
Black folks, so hey—attack them, get them out of here, sic the police on them. I mean, a lot of
people back in the 80s were like, ‘I’m getting the hell out of this neighborhood. The cops are just
too hard on people.’ So that was kind of the attitude.”77 Augustine shares Ewing’s perspective on
One Strike policing, saying that police “were on a campaign to basically try to get people evicted
and take people’s houses.”78 Planting guns and drugs and making false arrests allowed police to
“target certain people that they wanted to arrest,” he says, in order to “basically get rid of CHA.
So at the end of the day like I said, the fact of the matter is: Is there any Cabrini-Green right
now?”

Conclusion
As the Plan for Transformation drew closer and plans to demolish the high rises became
public, Andre Jenkins* says that policing at CHA got more and more lax, more and more
oriented to protecting property over people, and that police would take longer than ever to arrive
when called. He says, “When it was time for them to close up the buildings [at Taylor] and stuff,
the police were securing the buildings, the empty buildings, more than they were the people that
were living in the buildings.”79 Lax policing was a symptom of, by this point, the disease of
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government retrenchment—what Ruth Wilson Gilmore, drawing on David Harvey, has termed
“organized abandonment” and which makes places like late 1990s CHA housing “forgotten
places” not because they are outside of history, but because they have “experienced the
abandonment characteristic of contemporary capitalist and neoliberal state reorganization.”80
Abandonment was productive, because it laid the conditions for the ultimate retaking of the land
and its development for other purposes, a dynamic not lost on tenants. As Jenkins explains, “The
government wanted that land, that property, for whatever reason. And so, the police were doing
whatever they were told to do. That’s how I looked at it.” He says that negative public discourse
around the projects was a self-fulfilling prophecy: “If you want something and you want the
people out, they call it a ‘warzone.’ They were calling the place a warzone and all that, but
you’re the one that made it the warzone. The government made it a warzone, not us. You wanted
us to fight against each other because you wanted us off the property, off the land. So, you did it
and you blamed us for it.”
In this chapter, I have charted the myriad ways that policing comprised a major
component of daily life for CHA residents in the latter decades of the twentieth century. Abuse
was a systemic, rather than exceptional feature of policing in the projects. While residents knew
which officers to avoid and spent much time and energy dodging cops, they also understood the
problem to be institutional, rather than individual. And, careful behavior was not sufficient to
ward off police attention as tenants were universally targeted, stopped, harassed, searched, and/or
physically harmed by the police just because they lived at CHA. To be clear, the point is not that
police were unsuccessful in targeting only the “right” criminals of the community. As Gilmore
reminds us, the “trope of relative innocence” only reifies the carceral state by asserting that some
people deserve to be in cages or, in this case, to be harassed and abused by the police.81 Instead,
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what mattered at CHA in the latter decades of the twentieth century is that everyone was targeted
by police, and just because someone may have committed a crime did not make them any more
deserving of abusive policing.
In turn, CHA constituted a protected environment for police, a place where poor, Black
Chicagoans were subject to intensive scrutiny, disrespect, and violence at the hands of officers
who were rarely if ever found out or held accountable for their actions. If city leaders did not
know what was going on, their ignorance was willful as abuse was so widespread as to constitute
a human rights crisis.82 In turn, however, police actions spurred violence in the projects, by
adding to the stores of drugs and guns already available to residents, by fueling conflicts among
rival gangs, and also through police failure to provide an adequate mechanism for public safety.
Residents, as Joseph says, unintentionally echoing Gilmore and Harvey, were “abandoned” by
the city’s purported safety nets, left to fend for themselves in a largely hostile environment. They
did so, for many years, through various forms of community organizing and mutual aid,
including tenant patrols, which I discuss in the concluding chapter. In the meantime, however,
everyday forms of policing at CHA made public housing into a carceral space where residents
were heavily surveilled, disciplined, and indeed, ensnared in the criminal-legal system at a
disproportionately high rate. The end result of this policing was the further dominance of the
narrative that public housing was an ungovernable space, a site that even the city police—
militant as they were—could not control.
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Chapter 5. The Housing Police
In 1988, Vince Lane, an industrious Black real estate developer, was appointed managing
director and chairman of CHA. With this dual role, Lane was given wide rein to rescue what had
come to be seen as the “crisis-plagued” agency.1 Crime quickly became a focal point for Lane,
who proclaimed shortly after his appointment that “Public housing is at a crisis state where the
gangs are in control of some of the buildings. We, the CHA, aren’t in control of some of the
properties.”2 In 1987, crime had reportedly increased at CHA developments by 9 percent, despite
the fact that CHA had spent $9 million on private security.3 Of the security guards, Lane
lamented “It’s almost like having nobody. . . . The security guards are not trained. They’re not
really capable of doing what I want them to do. They’re not motivated.” Meanwhile, the guards,
who were empowered to detain but not arrest suspects, were paid just $5.53 an hour to do
dangerous work and told the press they were unwilling to risk their lives to do so.4 As described
in Chapters 3 and 4, although CPD did operate its Public Housing Unit at the time, residents
complained that CPD officers took a laissez-faire approach and had a slow response time when
called to the projects.
For Lane, improving public safety was the key to solving all other problems at CHA. His
answer was to create the CHA Police Department (CHAPD), an independent force under his own
control. In this chapter, I trace in detail the rise and decade-long run of the CHA Police
Department, drawing on contemporary newspaper coverage, interviews with fourteen former
CHA police officers, and interviews with residents who lived at CHA while the CHAPD
patrolled the developments. Having an in-house, housing authority police force changed how the
projects were policed in important and not altogether straightforward ways—ways that I attempt
to recount in detail in what follows. Even more than CPD, the CHAPD’s policing style was
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highly paternalistic, marked by a blend of consent and coercion that ultimately supported the
hegemony of the entire police apparatus. That is, because they were deeply embedded in the
community, some officers were able to support residents in a meaningful range of non-traditional
policing functions and in doing so, won popular support from the residents they connected with.
At the same time, the force suffered from many of the same inadequacies, corruptions, and
abuses as CPD.
While some of the dynamics between CHAPD and residents mirror those of CPD and
residents, I recount the history of this force and analyze it in detail because, as this chapter
demonstrates, having an in-house police force accomplished several important things for CHA.
First, it contributed to the production of CHA developments as more fully carceral, more
simultaneously over-policed and under-protected. Operating an in-house police force
functionally expanded the mission of the CHA, making the authority both landlord and law
enforcement. Maintaining the force also required changes to the designed environment that made
the spaces of public housing more prison-like, including the installation of holding cells in some
of the developments. And finally, the massive cost of running the force was a political choice for
the housing authority that came at the cost of other funding priorities like building maintenance,
direct aid, or social programs.
Finally, the ultimate inability of the CHAPD to meaningfully reduce crime reinforced the
sense, by the late 1990s, that there was no hope for the projects. If having a dedicated police
force couldn’t solve crime, that is, it seemed that nothing could. By examining the CHAPD in all
of its complexity, I argue that the creation of CHAPD—as well as its later disbanding—was
decisive in structuring the inevitability of certain policy responses; namely, the decision to
demolish the high rises.
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Table 5.1 CHAPD Interviewee Characteristics
Racial/Ethnic
Name

Role

Age Group

Gender

Gwen Powers*

former CHA police

57 Black

female

Marc Meyer*

former CHA police

58 white

male

Ronald Davis*

former CHA and CPD

63 Black

male

Stephanie Wright*

former CHA, current CPD

51 Black

female

Ralph Sampson*

former CHA, current CPD

57 Black

male

Daryl Hill

former CHA police

59 Black

male

Edward King*

former CHA, former CPD

64 Black

male

Fernando Reyes

former CHA police

62 Hispanic

male

Janice Jeffries

former CHA police

54 Black

female

Joe Jackson*

former CHA police

63 Black

male

Elisa Brewer*

former CHA police

59 Black

female

Adrienne Neely

former CHA, former CPD

58 Black

female

Alma Bledsoe*

former CHA police

57 Black

female

Gary Lee*

former CHA police

58 Black

male

* indicates participant requested to use a pseudonym to protect their confidentiality
Origins
Lane was not the first CHA executive to attempt to levy an in-house police force. In
1983, then-Chairman Renault Robinson, himself a former CPD officer and former head of the
African-American Patrolman’s League, proposed the idea of a CHA Police Department to
HUD.5 Robinson envisioned a 350- to 500-member force that would focus on eradicating crime
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in CHA developments: a miniature Chicago Police Department with full powers of arrest, a
parallel hierarchy, and the same salaries and uniforms as CPD.6 Robinson said that if HUD
approved the funding, he would happily give control of the department to CPD to operate as an
independent unit. Robinson estimated the cost of the new force at $10 million annually, noting
that a CHA police unit would eliminate the need for private security, for which CHA was already
paying an estimated $2 million per year. Skeptics, however, said such a force would realistically
cost as much as $40 million per year to operate and that the CHA would do better to spend
money on fixing broken elevators and run-down apartments.7 HUD ultimately did not fund
Robinson’s request for $83 million to start a CHA Police Department and the proposal sat
dormant until Vince Lane came on the job.
In January of 1989, just six months after Lane was hired to lead CHA, HUD agreed to
provide at least $20 million in additional annual subsidies to CHA for the next two years. $13
million of the funds were to be used for management improvements, including the creation of a
new CHA police force of 150 to 200 officers at an estimated cost of $8.4 million. A top HUD
official credited the leadership change and an accompanying shift in attitude at CHA as the
reason for the federal investment.8 The following month, CHA announced that it would begin
accepting applications for its new police force.9 Those selected from the pool would receive over
400 hours of training at the Chicago Police Academy that summer and Lane hoped they would
start work in the developments in early 1990. The new officers were to be paid $24,000 per year
from HUD’s $8.4 million grant, which would also cover start-up funds to purchase cars, guns,
and equipment for the new force.10 Lane predicted a “dramatic decrease in crime” once the new
police force was in place.11 In preparation, Chicago police officials visited New York City to
study and learn from the New York City Housing Authority’s (NYCHA’s) police department,
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where they were reportedly impressed with what they found, noting that NYCHA police even
investigated homicides in public housing, rather than relying on the New York City police to do
so.12
In addition to federal funding, creating the new police force required state approval. In
June of 1989, the Illinois Senate Executive Committee voted unanimously to pass legislation
allowing CHA to create its own police force.13 As Lane scrambled to assemble the force, crime
was reportedly increasing at CHA developments. CPD Commander Hosea Crossley, who headed
CPD’s Public Housing Unit, said he looked forward to the arrival of the new force, telling the
Tribune, “We don’t have the manpower to station police at the buildings that have problems. The
security force will make a difference once (Lane) gets it into place. Someone working directly
for CHA would have a vested interest in what happens at CHA.” CHA had received 1,900
applicants for the first class of police recruits, of which it planned to select around 75 cadets to
enroll at the Police Academy in September.14
Training did not actually start until October 30, 1989 and the first CHA Police
Department class of officers graduated on March 12, 1990.15 The graduating class, which
ultimately consisted of 85 officers, 6 corporals, and 12 sergeants, went to work at 11 pm the
same day. Three of the new officers were CHA residents themselves. A second class of 100
cadets were due to enter the Police Academy the following summer.16 The CHA Board
authorized $750,000 to spend on police cars, a computer records system, and a radio dispatch
system, all funded by HUD’s initial grant. Lane hoped the force would eventually reach 250 to
350 officers, who would work with CPD’s 120-member Public Housing Unit to patrol the
projects, as well as privately contracted and in-house security guards.17
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The new CHA Police—technically a federal law enforcement agency due to the federally
subsidized nature of housing authority land—had full powers of arrest on CHA grounds.
Compared to the city police, the only function they did not perform was traffic policing.18 Lane
hired Ira Harris, a former CPD Deputy Superintendent with 27 years of policing experience, to
head the initial force as CHA Chief of Police.19 The new department had its own radio zone with
its own dispatchers who would send officers out to respond to calls. Initially, CHAPD did not
have access to the city’s 911 system, and could only respond to calls made to the designated
CHA emergency line (“CHA-COPS”). 20 Since most residents were accustomed to calling 911
rather than the CHA line in an emergency, CPD and CHA efforts were easily duplicated, as
critics were quick to point out.21 In 1995, the city and CHA eventually rectified the situation by
linking CHA police systems with the city’s 911 Center, thus allowing for centralized
dispatching.22
After its initial inception, the force grew quickly: in May of 1991, CHAPD graduated its
second class of recruits, an additional 91 officers, bringing the total force to 170 officers.23 By
the end of 1992, the force was up to 325; by October of 1995, there were 400 officers; and by
February of 1996, 450 CHAPD officers were on patrol.24 Additional funding from President
Clinton’s $8.8 billion dollar plan to expand the nation’s law enforcement provided for an
additional $1.5 million for CHAPD to hire 20 more officers in 1996.25 However, even at its peak,
the CHAPD remained quite small compared to the NYCHA Police, which had 2,400 officers and
a budget of $177 million, compared to CHAPD’s force of around five hundred, which cost about
$15.7 million annually.26
The CHA Police Department, created under a Black Mayor and a Black CHA Chairman,
was likewise staffed by mostly Black officers, creating a racial divide between the housing
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authority’s force and the predominantly white CPD force. There were at least two reasons for
this: First, Lane and others believed that Black officers would be more relatable to CHA’s nearly
all-Black resident population. Additionally, Black officers were needed to conduct undercover
work, since white operatives would not have been credible in CHA’s racial context.27 As a result,
while not many officers were hired from the projects themselves, about seventy-five percent of
the total force was comprised of Black officers by the time the CHAPD was fully staffed.28
The racial politics of the CHAPD were important when it came to working with
residents. As Lane and other local leaders suspected, race-based identification did make some
residents feel more comfortable with officers, and vice versa. As Joe Jackson, who held a variety
of roles on the CHAPD force including Watch Commander, explains, he and other Black officers
had to coach white officers on how to interact with tenants: “There was a culture difference . . .
Just because [a tenant’s] pants are hanging down does not mean [that] he’s a gangster or a thug.
That was just more of a style.” However, intra-racial class differences in some cases fractured
the hoped-for racial solidarity between officers and residents. As Ronald Davis*, who worked as
a patrol officer for CHAPD, describes, “Sometimes I was called names [by residents] like, ‘You
Uncle Tom’ and they said, ‘Oh, you still working for the white man?’ I said, ‘I’m working for
myself so I can have a paycheck.’”29 Similarly, Edward King*, who worked for CPD but took a
leave of absence to work with CHAPD as a Commander, explained that, “When I started
patrolling there it was culture shock for me. It was culture shock for me. Think about that. Public
housing: culture shock to the Black guy. Yeah? Well it was.” King blames class differences,
saying, “Black middle-class America was not public housing, but public housing is Black
middle-class America to a lot of people. Because of the perceptions—and those perceptions are
wrong.”30
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Features of the Force
While CPD had sub-stations within public housing developments, the creation of the
CHA Police Department expanded the number of physical spaces for police within public
housing and also formalized a place for police in the heart of CHA. The CHA Police initially
maintained four stations throughout the housing portfolio, at the following developments: Robert
Taylor Homes (headquarters), the ABLA Homes, the Ida B. Wells Homes, and Altgeld Gardens.
From there, they also responded to calls at other developments.31 Andre Jenkins*, who lived at
the Robert Taylor Homes at the time, describes how he and other residents felt about the
installation of police stations in their apartment complex, saying, “First they had the security or
something like that. Then they put the police—CHA Police in there. And we asked them, ‘Can
they come out of the building?’ Because they were harassing folks while you were living in the
building.”32 For Jenkins and others, the creation of these CHA Police stations put cops even
more squarely in the heart of their homes.
At the Taylor Station, which eventually occupied spaces on two stories of the building,
offices were equipped with bulletproof glass.33 Generally, these offices—complete with
temporary lock-up facilities—were in vacant apartments that were converted for police use.
CHAPD would make their own arrests and complete processing paperwork at their own stations
but would then transport the arrestee to a CPD station to be booked, fingerprinted, photographed,
and jailed.34 The CHA Police also had a secret room in the basement of a Taylor Homes building
where they kept weapons they recovered. By June of 1994, when Bill and Hilary Clinton were
taken to visit the room during their tour of Chicago—at which point, the press also learned about
the weapons stash—the collection reportedly included over 1400 recovered guns including uzis,
glocks, rifles with bayonets, shotguns, pistols, handguns, and sniper rifles with scopes.35 The
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stash raised some eyebrows because CPD’s policy was to destroy confiscated weapons: CHAPD
said they planned to begin destroying their stockpile in the fall, but had been watching the pile
grow in the hopes that the “growing mountain of killing machines could plead the need for
increased security funding and innovative security measures” at CHA.36
As described by officers, some of the day-to-day work of the CHA Police—much like
other police forces—was quite mundane. For example, officers were charged with conducting
building checks that involved noting, as one officer put it, “‘Oh, a light is out on the first floor,
the back door on [a] Robert Taylor Homes [building] is off the hinges, there’s running water in
this vacant apartment, and this vacant apartment is not secured.’” As Ralph Sampson*, a former
CHA officer and current CPD officer, who started as a patrol officer and worked his way up to
sergeant on the CHA force, describes, much of CHAPD’s work happened through establishing a
conspicuous presence in the developments. Like CPD officers, CHA officers believed that
merely being visible on their shift could deter gang activity. As Sampson describes, “We could
just sit out in our patrol car in a conspicuous spot in the fire lane and everybody could go [out]
and go grocery shopping and the kids could come out and play. I mean it’s just as simple as
that.”37
However, in addition to building checks and regular, run-of-the-mill patrols, CHA police
officers also participated in special operations through tactical teams. Much like CPD, CHA’s
TAC teams operated out of unmarked police cars, intended to be visible but less conspicuous
than regular patrol officers. As one officer describes, TAC officers, who dressed in plainclothes
while on duty, were selected from amongst the ranks “because of their ability to be
aggressive.”38 For the purposes of the CHA Police, TAC teams most frequently focused on
interrupting drug dealing operations, but might also be charged with interrupting prostitution
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rings or recovering weapons, for example. During their time on the force, Elisa Brewer* and
Adrienne Neely* both worked as special operations agents who would enter the developments to
buy drugs on behalf of the police, all while wearing a wire that transmitted and recorded audio.
Before operatives like Brewer and Neely were sent in, CHAPD would heavily surveil and video
record the area where the operation was to take place. After the transaction, the women—who
were selected for the role because their gender and small statures made them least likely to
arouse suspicion from drug dealers—would return to their teams and describe the people who
had taken their money and given them drugs, as these roles were usually performed by different
people. The information gathered on these missions was tracked and stored for future mass
arrests. According to Brewer, her undercover work precipitated three mass arrest events, in
which about two hundred people were arrested each time.39 Not all of those arrested were
residents of public housing: in fact, as multiple officers will attest, the drug sellers were
frequently non-residents who would recruit or coerce residents to help them with their business.
As Neely describes, a dealer might ask a resident as young as twelve or as old as 89 “to hold the
elevator,” or “get people to stash the drugs in their house for them.”40 Whether or not residents
were the targets of arrest, however, this kind of mission-driven policing entailed regular, heavy
surveillance at the projects.
At times, the CHA Police Department would also team up with other law enforcement
agencies, including CPD but also federal agencies like the FBI, DEA, and ATF to carry out
special operations. For example, the DEA continues to host a program called “High-Intensity
Drug Trafficking Areas” (HIDTA) that would fund special operations and deputize groups of
local officers as U.S. Marshalls to conduct drug busts.41 Another collaboration, known as the
Building Interdiction Team Effort, or “BITE team,” brought together groups of 18 CPD and
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CHA officers to conduct vertical patrols of the buildings looking for drugs, guns, and gang
members (for more on the BITE team, see Chapter 8).42 As the Tribune reported of the CHA’s
unique blend of policing styles, “the BITE teams are just as likely to help a resident get their
stove fixed as they are to bust gangbangers for guns or drugs.”43
In addition to drug-focused operations, the CHA Police also maintained specialized teams
to combat elevator vandalism or escort political dignitaries through the projects when they
visited, to name a few examples.44 For a time, CHAPD had an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) unit: a
mobile unit that patrolled the developments, and moved between them, via ATVs. In its latter
years, CHAPD developed its own Internal Affairs division to process and investigate complaints
about its officers. And finally, the CHA Police Department carried out one unusual policing
function normally reserved for sheriff’s offices: evictions. Because CHA was now both landlord
and police department, Lane directed his in-house police force to serve eviction notices and enact
tenant evictions via a special evictions team. Janice Jeffries, who worked for a time on the
evictions team, says that the job was seen as a “cush position” because the supervisor had a good
reputation and officers assigned to the team got to work days, instead of the irregular schedules
or midnight shifts that many patrol officers were assigned.45
By including evictions under the umbrella of CHA police work, Lane and the CHA
Police Department used the threat of evictions as a disciplinary strategy they could use to police
tenant behavior. Conducting evictions in-house also sped up the process, allowing Lane to more
efficiently rid the projects of problem tenants. Indeed, with the CHAPD evictions team in place,
CHA initiated about 15 for-cause evictions per month—"for-cause” meaning reasons other than
not paying rent. Of those, about half were gun- or drug-related.46
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Collectively, all of these features of the CHA Police Department made it relatively
unique among policing entities. Assigned to patrol a limited jurisdiction within the larger city,
the small force performed a myriad of functions, armed with full police powers within CHA
developments. The inevitable result of such a department, however, was that CHA residents
were, frequently, the targets of this policing, much as the new force was theoretically meant to
protect them. As the Tribune was quick to extoll, the CHAPD made hundreds of arrests within
their first few months of operation.47 As I argue in the following sections, the relationship
between CHA police and CHA residents was complex and nuanced, but on the whole, the
presence of the CHAPD made one fact inescapable: CHA was now more heavily patrolled, its
residents more heavily scrutinized and surveilled, than ever before.

CHAPD and CPD
Despite their many collaborations and linkages, CPD and CHAPD also had, at times, a
strained relationship. As Stephanie Wright*, who served as both a patrol officer and a field
training officer for CHAPD, explains, “It was almost like it was competitive sometimes [between
the two departments]. You know, [they would say], ‘You’re not the real police.’ I always thought
that was funny because we actually attended their training academy to become certified.”48
Tensions between CHAPD and CPD persisted throughout the former agency’s existence. At
times, the relationship was competitive: Right off the bat, the CHA police force responded to
3,000 calls for service per month from residents and arrests were up.49 Wright speculates that
CPD officers were jealous of the high numbers of gun and drug arrests that CHAPD officers
were making.50 Neely similarly says CPD officers were uninterested in coming to the
developments for anything other than a high-profile arrest: “It seemed like if the call wasn’t
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about drugs or guns or whatever, they didn’t want to answer” because “it wasn’t high profile.
What’s the glory in a missing person? Or the glory in a theft?”51 When CPD officers resented
CHAPD officers, they could make their jobs more difficult by, as Wright puts it, “not interfering,
but not being very helpful either,” especially when it came to booking arrestees.52
For their part, CHAPD officers express deep-seated resentment against CPD, and justify
the existence of the CHA Police force on the basis that CPD was not properly policing public
housing. Marc Meyer*, a patrol officer who later led a special operations team for CHAPD,
describes that before CHAPD came on the scene, “There was no active dedicated policing there
for a very long time. It was just a [CPD] beat car [that] would drive through, look, and then drive
out. Nobody was ever assigned there.”53 For his part, Sampson explains that “The city police
didn’t want to come in [to the developments] because it was so dangerous and nobody really was
able to force them to come in so they just kind of went around.”54 According to him, “I had full
grown men tell me, ‘I wouldn’t come in there. No, it’s too dangerous. I’m talking about
policemen—full grown men—say[ing] that.” In contrast, as he explains, CHAPD officers “were
concentrated in the projects. We didn’t have anywhere to go.”
According to Jeffries, CPD was hesitant to answer calls in the projects, while other
officers explain that when they did show up, CPD officers would wait downstairs rather than
enter CHA buildings themselves. As Darryl Hill, who worked as a patrol officer before running
CHAPD’s ATV unit, describes, “If a female is getting her butt whooped in the 16th-story
apartment, the [Chicago] cops will say ‘Come on downstairs and give me a report,’ instead of
going up and doing what they’re supposed to do.”55 Meanwhile, CHAPD officers attest to
adopting a different attitude: As Gwen Powers*, who served as a field training officer, D.A.R.E.
(“Drug Abuse Resistance Education”) officer, and Police Academy liaison while working for
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CHAPD explains, “We weren’t [hesitant to enter the buildings] because we weren’t like CPD.
We were really different. We came charging in.”56
Perceived or otherwise, CPD’s reticence to proactively police the projects was widely
understood by CHA officers to be the key reason CHAPD was formed. In turn, CHAPD’s
territorial and mission-based dedication to CHA differentiated the new force from the city police.
While CPD did have its Public Housing Unit, recall that the unit was small, with just over 100
officers to police all CHA developments throughout the city. Fernando Reyes, who started as a
patrol officer and ended up a founding inspector of CHAPD’s Internal Affairs unit, says, “The
residents, for the most part, wanted you there because it was either you or nothing. Because CPD
wasn’t going to be there.”57 With CHAPD, he says, “That was their job. There was no hoping to
get transferred to a northern district or to a quiet district. You were there. You were it.” For the
same reason, Edward King* recalls his frustrations working with CPD in the projects, saying,
“CPD can come in and run in and run out. And we used to tell them, ‘Hey look, don’t come in
and stir up this nest and we’ve gotta deal with it.’ And quite often, we’d have run-ins, even
though I came from CPD.”58
CHA Police officers also believe they treated residents more respectfully than CPD
officers. As Reyes recalls, by the time CHAPD arrived, “[The residents] were not used to getting
treated like people. CPD would go in there, they would just hurry up and get in there, and kick
ass and create all kinds of headache that they didn’t need to create. Instead of diffusing the
situation, they escalated everything. But we’d go in there, we’d treat everybody right.”59 Neely
said that while she saw officers from both forces disrespecting residents, it more frequently
occurred with CPD, who would call residents names like “jailbird” or say to them, “I’m going to
lock your ass up if you don’t give me your ID,” rather than simply asking to see an ID card.60
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CHA officers, she says, were more likely to be respectful because they were more embedded in
the community. As she describes: “We’re there in the trenches with [the residents] every day.
They know what our cars look like. They know what time we come to work, what time we leave.
So a lot of us, we tried to maintain a positive relationship.”
As a result, CHA officers largely blamed the lack of trust they encountered from
residents on the actions of CPD officers that predated their arrival in the projects. As Meyer
explains, “It was hard to do [the job] to start off with because nobody wanted to talk to us.”61
Gary Lee*, who led several specialized units for CHAPD after starting as a patrol officer,
explains that “The animosity [from residents] came because they have never been policed in that
fashion. They never had the opportunity of the actual beat officers to come and do a community
engagement or a wellness check or whatever.”62 Not everyone was hostile to police: officers
recall generally friendlier receptions from women, children, and older people in the community
as well as those who Ronald Davis*—much like the CPD officers in Chapter 3—called “the
good people there.”63 Understandably, drug dealers were anxious at the new police presence,
which had the potential to disrupt their business. As Darryl Hill explains, “[The dealers] weren’t
used to police coming up there handling their business. They were used to the Chicago Police
sitting there waiting on you to come down to them. So, once we start coming up there and
tackling the problem, it put a dent in their business, do you know what I mean?”64

“The Majority of the People Were Nice”: Building Relationships with Tenants
If the dynamic between CHAPD officers and residents was rocky from the start, it
remained highly uneven over the course of the department’s existence. Former CHA Police
officers widely tout their ability to connect with residents and in some cases, even develop close
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personal relationships. At the same time, many of the officers describe their jobs as dangerous
work in a context where they often felt afraid and where their presence was frequently met with
hostility. In the following section, I explore each of these dynamics in detail, holding them in
tension to illustrate the real contradictions of how CHAPD officers went about their work in the
developments and the effects of this policing on the developments and the residents alike.
Whether friendly or hostile, however, policing was always paternalistic, as police inevitably
wielded power over the tenants. Following the social theorist Antonio Gramsci, who argued that
for hegemony to work, “Coercion has . . . to be ingeniously combined with persuasion and
consent,” befriending residents—however genuine the feelings of warmth on the parts of
officers—also served punitive ends and supported the larger legitimacy of the police apparatus.65
Working in the same, contained communities every day, some CHAPD officers describe
developing close and even lasting relationships with some of the tenants—something they will
also claim CPD officers were never able to do. Gwen Powers* describes that, contrary to popular
stereotypes about public housing, “The majority of the people were nice. And we didn’t mind
talking—we talked with them all the time. We laughed and joked. They were people. We were
people.”66 Janice Jeffries explains that she has a “godson” who she met while patrolling Altgeld
Gardens. “He was seven years old and we pulled up for some reason,” she describes, continuing,
“And he saw me and [said], ‘Oh my goodness, who’s that pretty lady?’ We’ve been close ever
since.”67 Jeffries attributes her ability to form lasting relationships with tenants to the fact that “I
respected them. Some of them really became like an extension of my extended family.” The
same is true for Alma Bledsoe*, who has what she calls three “grandchildren” from the
developments where she worked, and with whom she still spends holidays.68 As Fernando Reyes
explains of working at CHA, “Once [the residents] got to know you, they were like your
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neighbors, your friends. I felt better there than with the residents on a normal beat anywhere else
in the city.”69
As part of their putative community policing orientation, CHAPD officers ran myriad
community programs, particularly targeted at youth living at CHA. These included choir and
midnight basketball leagues, but also bus trips into downtown Chicago, where many of the CHA
kids had never been, and camping trips to Southern Illinois.70 At one point, a group of 20 CHA
Police officers formed a gospel group called “Law and Order” that performed in the community.
One of their members, Donnie Hixson, told the press: “We are a proactive as opposed to a
reactive group. Locking someone up and throwing away the key is not always the answer.”71
CHA Police also describe wanting to help residents by giving them advice that would
improve their circumstances. Joe Jackson says he wanted to “Let [residents] know that . . . this is
not the life that you have to have,” saying he would encourage youth to complete school and go
to college.72 In some cases, officers tried to use themselves as successful role models to inspire
the residents they encountered. Elisa Brewer* explains that, “I actually felt that, when I saw how
individuals live in developments, I actually felt like I can make a difference. I can speak to them.
I can tell them that ‘Here is the individual that is a single parent of two and look at me.’ And so, I
can do that.”73 Adrienne Neely, who served as a Girl Scout leader for public housing residents,
similarly describes, “I wanted [the children] to see me, as an African-American female, that you
can grow up and be whoever you want to be; you’ve just got to put the work in. So, I tried to be
like more of a positive force, mainly for the children while their minds were still forming.”74
Finally, officers frequently found ways to provide material support to residents of their
own accord. While on the job, Gwen Powers* met a young girl named Precious who she
discovered had frequently been absent from school. Powers learned, or perhaps suspected, that
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Precious’ mom had been using drugs and was not getting her daughter to school regularly.
Powers spoke with the girl’s mother, who agreed to let Precious stay with her Monday through
Friday so Powers could ensure she made it to school. During the time Precious stayed with her,
which Powers estimates lasted six months to a year, Powers also bought Precious’ school
uniform and shoes.75
Darryl Hill was working at the Wells Homes on a Saturday morning when he
encountered a young woman crying outside her apartment. When Hill inquired if the tenant was
alright, she told him that she had received a scholarship to what Hill calls a “pretty decent
university.”76 The school had sent her a check to take the bus there and back as well as a full
tuition scholarship. However, her mom and boyfriend had gotten ahold of the check, cashed it,
and used the money to buy drugs. The woman was crying because she could not afford the bus
ticket without the assistance. Upon learning this, Hill says he gave the woman the money she
needed for transportation, drove her to the bus station, and told her not to come back. Reflecting
on the encounter, Hill says, “So, that made a difference. That made me feel like: okay, now I’ve
made my difference.”
For his part, Fernando Reyes recalls finishing up a night shift once with his partner and
watching CHA children walk down State Street wearing nothing but light coats on a cold winter
morning. “They were not dressed for the weather,” he remarks, saying the scene inspired him
and his partner to approach some big stores about donating winter gear to the officers or selling it
to them for cheap.77 The two ultimately were able to gather as many as 50 coats as well as hats,
gloves, and boots that they brought to the resident council to distribute to CHA tenants who
needed them most.
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Finally, Janice Jeffries remembers one day when she was working at Altgeld Gardens and
two women came into the station saying they had taken a drug and one of their friends had taken
too much. Jeffries was shocked the women would reveal their drug use to the officers but
followed them to the unit in question. Upon arriving, she describes, “There were three children in
the house . . . And the children were so hungry. One of the children was very underdeveloped,
and I was so upset that I was like ‘No, we need to call DCFS [the Department of Child and
Family Services] on them.’ And none of the male officers wanted to do it, because they said
nobody’s gonna take these children—because the mother did have a refrigerator full of food. But
they were hungry to the point—we made the mom cook something for the children to eat. They
ate those hotdogs like they hadn’t eaten in two or three days.”78 Janice says that because of her
actions, the kids were ultimately taken away from their mother. She still thinks of them often,
saying, “I pray all the time that those children were able to stay together because they were in a
program that [was] going to try to keep them together. And I regret that often, but I’m hoping
that that was the right thing to do.”
These stories capture some of the ways that CHA Police often exceeded the bounds of
their mission and followed personal impulses to try to help CHA tenants, whether through giving
advice or providing material assistance. In some cases, developing relationships within the
community impacted how police conducted their work. Ronald Davis* describes how, aware of
One Strike Laws that would lead CHA to evict tenants if anyone in the household was charged
with a crime, CHA Police officers would “try to work with [tenants] to calm them down or stop
them from causing whatever disturbance” when they arrived on a scene.79 He says officers would
advise tenants that, if they had to write a police report, the tenants could be evicted from their
apartment. Jeffries, who served on the CHAPD evictions team, describes how, despite the good

181

hours and supervisor, she found the job to be “devastating” and wondered how tenants paying
such low-rent could fall so far behind on payments. “That’s being judgmental,” she says, “but I
found that [work] to be quite devastating.”

“You Have to Wear Many Hats”
Just as CHAPD officers formed close relationships with some residents and took pride in
being able to make a difference with certain individuals, officers also admit that so much of the
work they found meaningful fell outside the training they had received at the Police Academy;
that is, outside the bounds of traditional police work. Ronald Davis* recalls trying to talk CHA
kids into going to school, reflecting, “Being a police officer, you have to wear many hats.” As he
explains,
Sometimes we have to be a mediator. . . . And sometimes we have to be a doctor: ‘Well,
you should get this checked out. We can call an ambulance for you’ or ‘Next time this
happens, you need to go to the doctor to look at your leg or arm or whatever.’ So we do
that. . . [Or] a counselor doing every little thing. You can go to a call and resolve it easy
and then the little girl [there] asks, ‘Hey, how do you do this type of—' [and you] help
her with her homework. ‘How do you do this math problem?’ It can be a little bit of
anything and everything. . . . It’s very interesting all the different hats you have to
wear.”80
Other officers also describe taking on a social work role in public housing. On answering a
domestic call one time in which a couple was fighting over infidelity, Stephanie Wright* recalls
using her position as a woman, and in this case as an older woman, to tell the tenant in question
“You can’t make a man stay with you. If he wants to be with someone else, let him go.”81 Elisa
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Brewer* says she would frequently try to counsel young women in the developments, saying, “I
made it my business to talk to a lot of residents, especially the young ladies, and [to] try to
change their thought pattern as to: You have your whole life, don’t have a baby just to get an
apartment.”82 When CHA switched to a system of bi-monthly rental payments, Janice Jeffries
took it upon herself to educate some residents on household budgeting, saying, “I [helped] with a
couple of them throughout that [first] month—‘Hey, let’s get your budget together so you won’t
find yourself getting financial difficulties with this change.’ So those are the kind of things I
would do with the residents.”83 While officers often derived fulfillment from being able to help
in these ways, they admit that these roles fall outside of traditional police training.
As these stories demonstrate, officers found genuine meaning in their ability to connect
with residents and, when possible, help them in material ways. However, genuine as these stories
may be, they do not negate the abusive policing that was simultaneously taking place. Far from it
and whether they intended it or not, befriending residents was yet another manifestation of
paternalistic policing, which served to legitimize the policing apparatus writ large. Much as
parents rely upon persuasion and punishment, so too did policing in the projects rely upon
consent and coercion.

“It was Life or Death the Entire Time You Were There”: Fear of Residents
Despite the real relationships some individual CHA Police officers forged with individual
CHA residents, the overall picture of officer-resident relations is less rosy, as residents largely
maintained the same skepticism towards CHA officers that they had long felt for other law
enforcement agencies. Indeed, upon entering the high-rise developments, CHAPD officers attest
to experiencing the same reception as many CPD officers over the years. As Ronald Davis*
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explains, “What I learned is every time we go to a building, just keep looking up. Look up just in
case a rock or a bottle or anything come at you.”84 From the top of a high-rise, a cop was a cop
was a cop. Residents might throw food, but they were also known to throw urine, feces, dirty
diapers, or heavy objects at officers. Darryl Hill describes arriving at one of the stations one day,
when “someone threw a can of corn from the 16th floor and missed me by an inch. With the force
of that coming down, it probably would have split my head and I wouldn’t be talking to you
today.”85 Hill retaliated: because he could see where the can came from—a top-floor, cornerwindow unit—he took his team up to the apartment and arrested everyone present. Residents
also threw stuff in an attempt to damage police property. Stephanie Wright* remembers a
particular building at the Horner Homes where “They’d throw sinks out. One officer had them
throw a refrigerator out the window. I mean it was crazy.”86 Fernando Reyes recalls, “You’d go
to a building, and you always had to be careful not to park too close to the building [or] they’d
end up with a refrigerator on top of the squad car.”87
Thus, while some officers may have developed isolated positive relationships with certain
individuals or families living in CHA, the overall dynamic between residents and the force
remained tense at best. Working in such an environment, CHAPD officers—like CPD officers—
express stigmatized and even fearful views of many of the residents they were sworn to protect.
As Darryl Hill describes of CHA at the time, “It [was] two different worlds” compared to the rest
of the city.88 Elisa Brewer*, similarly, says that the “developments [were] like Mars and
Jupiter.”89 She explains that in her perception, residents “didn’t know how to go about everyday
living. The majority of them were dropouts in grade school. . . . Their illiteracy was off the chain,
basic hygiene—all of that. You put people in a box and do not give them materials to understand
life.” Marc Meyer* says that resident disrespect for the police made his job as a CHAPD officer

184

and later, supervisor, difficult, citing residents who would spit on or curse at him. But, he adds,
“you also have to understand what you’re dealing with. You’re dealing with people that have
been allowed to run unchecked, uncontrolled for a very long time and get established. And then
[when] you come in trying to change things, sometimes it doesn’t go over too well.”90 By
“unchecked,” Meyer refers to the lack of policing that he and others believe characterized CHA
before the CHAPD was formed. Thus, former CHA Police officers echo many of the prevailing
stigmas about public housing residents, painting them as a monolithic underclass who lacked
proper civilization. As Brewer and Meyer’s comments reveal, and officers’ attempts to provide
life advice to residents also corroborate, CHAPD officers saw themselves as agents of culture
change in the projects—something that distinguishes their style of policing from that of other law
enforcement agencies that worked in CHA.
Further, officers commonly blame residents’ perceived flaws on their environment of
concentrated poverty. This extends to criminality, which many officers saw as endemic in the
built and social environment of CHA. Meyer describes the South Side projects in particular as
full of “organized criminals,” where entering the projects was akin to “walking into a war zone . .
. and you had to be ready for that.”91 Meyer, a white CHAPD officer and therefore a minority on
the force and in public housing, describes his attitude walking onto the job everyday: “So, you
have to walk into it—don’t take this the wrong way—but you have to have a plan to kill
everybody you meet. And you have to project that mentality towards whoever’s standing in front
of you. You don’t actually do that. This is the attitude and the presence that you have to project.
In other words, if you come off as weak, they’re gonna eat you.” In an inescapably racist
metaphor, Meyer further says of the former CHA developments, “It’s an environment—I don’t
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want to use the word ‘jungle.’ But if you look at the jungle structure hierarchy, it’s get or get got.
And that’s how it is over there [in public housing].”
The danger for officers working in public housing was not imaginary, given the
longstanding bad blood between residents and the police. Edward King* recalls driving up the
fire lane to respond to a homicide at one of the developments and realizing residents were
shooting at his car from one of the buildings.92 As Ralph Sampson* describes, “The danger was
always present. I mean the amount of danger was amazing. I mean we had a lot of guys get shot.
A friend of mine, he got killed.”93 Indeed, CHA officer Jimmie Haynes, a Vietnam Veteran, was
shot and ultimately died of his injuries while working at the Taylor Homes in August of 1991,
not long after the CHA Police Department was created.94 By the end of 1992 alone, nine CHA
security guards and police officers had been shot in the developments, including three police
officers who were wounded in separate shootings while patrolling on New Year’s Eve, 1992.95
These three officers were given the Blue Star award for CHA Police officers injured in the line
of duty at the January 1993 CHA Board Meeting, where then-CHA Police Chief Hosea Crossley,
who had come to CHAPD after leading CPD’s Public Housing Unit, told those assembled that
every CHA officer deserved an award for “facing the potential risks in the CHA’s concrete
jungle.”96
Sampson says of policing at CHA, “When I say they shot at us, I mean you’re seeing
bullets in the cinderblocks two or three feet from your face. When you see that and you see the
rounds coming from the buildings, when you can see that, that’s something. So, the amount of
danger that we faced every minute we were in public housing [was amazing] because everybody
had a gun.”97 Fernando Reyes said he once encountered an Anglican priest walking through one
of the developments who, “confirmed that when we got out of the cars, there were guns pointed
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at us from all over the place. And they would come from anywhere in any of the high-rises. And
shots would just start, and that was it. Then a continuous barrage of bullets and all you had was
the 45 bullets that you carried with you. The 15 in your gun and two magazines. They had
hundreds of them.”98 Reyes says residents most often shot at them at Cabrini-Green, the Taylor
Homes, and Stateway Gardens, but that such violence could happen anywhere. Like Meyer, Gary
Lee* likens the environment to a warzone, wherein confrontations with gang members would
lead to “volleys of weapons drawn on us and gunplay and stuff of that nature—that we [were]
act[ing] like it was somewhere in Afghanistan or somewhere like that.”99
The sense that they worked in a warzone led some officers to adopt a warrior mentality,
something that common police pedagogy also encourages.100 Meyer revealed that one of his
fellow officers had the following passage engraved in stone and hung over the doorway of the
CHAPD headquarters at the Taylor Homes, with the Police Chief’s permission: "We came, we
saw, we kicked their asses and when the screaming stopped the blood dried the dust settled and
the smoke cleared, PEACE WAS RESTORED. When in doubt, GO FULL AUTO or in Worst
Case CLICK CLICK CLICK BOOM!” Of the disturbing passage, Meyer says that “it was like an
inspirational thing before we’d go through the door and go out into it. And you’d look at it, and
that’s how we were. Not verbatim. We didn’t blow anything up. But that’s the mindset we
had.”101

When the Building Comes Down on You
In addition to throwing objects or shooting at police, residents also expressed
dissatisfaction with police work by mobbing police when officers tried to make an arrest they
disapproved of. As Gwen Powers* describes, “Sometimes—and it didn’t happen often—you
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would make an arrest, and the building would decide that something wasn’t right with it. They
didn’t agree. And you would have the whole building come down. That would make life very,
very, very difficult and scary. . . . You have 200 people come down to tell you, ‘You’re not
arresting him today.’ So either you’re good at talking, you get some backup really quick, or they
take him back. There’s nothing you can do because you gotta protect yourself. And you’ve got a
gun that you have to protect. You can’t just have two hands on an arrestee. And you’ve got over
200 people nipping at your heels.”102 This phenomenon—of ‘the building coming down on
you’—could happen if residents thought the arrest was unfair, or if the officer was arresting a
high-ranking gang member—someone with powerful status in the community. In such a
situation, even armed as they were, CHA officers had little choice but to surrender to the crowd.
Ronald Davis* experienced ‘the building coming down on him’ at Cabrini-Green, when
he and some other officers were trying to arrest a person he describes as “a well-known drug
dealer.”103 As Davis explains, “A lot of people liked him. We were taking him in. This one girl
tried to take one of the officer’s guns and they had a little struggle with the gun. The gun went
off and shot her. Me and a partner took the guy in that we arrested and we had to come back to
help out the other officers there and then there were lots of struggles and they started shooting
and then I remember a bullet going right past my head. . . . That was pretty frightening. I’ll never
forget that.” The incident Davis describes, which took place in March of 1997, received copious
press coverage. In addition to the woman—Fernanda Royal—who was shot in the abdomen and
hospitalized in critical condition in the struggle over the officer’s gun, an additional three
individuals were wounded from gunfire from the nearby buildings.104 CPD and Illinois State
Police units were brought in as backup to stop the shooting and find the snipers, while CHA
officers reportedly ran away from the developments.105 In the scuffle that followed between
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police and residents, residents reported that police gunfire came through their windows, causing
them to duck and cover until the shooting died down. Police raided apartments at 534 W.
Division, using battering rams in some cases to knock down doors. Dogs were brought in from
CPD and Illinois State Police K-9 units while a police helicopter circled overhead. Crowd
members reportedly shouted, “We’re not animals. Don’t treat us like animals. You treat us like
criminals. We’re not criminals. We’re the victims.” Royal, who was 26 at the time, was president
of the building and a mother of four. The police had been trying to arrest her cousin Quincy, 16,
when she was shot in the melée.106
After the shootout, CHA announced it would transfer the police who had been stationed
at Cabrini-Green elsewhere and implement sensitivity trainings for the officers who were to
replace them. Roland Pace, the officer who had shot Royal, said he had struggled with a group of
residents who beat him and tried to take his gun. Witnesses, however, said that Pace had been
confronted by fewer than six of the arrestee’s relatives and that he had shot Royal when she
asked why he was arresting her family member.107 The incident invited widespread criticism of
the CHA Police and led many, including Mayor Daley, to question whether the force should
exist at all.108 Darryl Walker, a 21-year-old resident at Cabrini, told the press “It’s a matter of
respect. You have to earn respect. The Chicago cops have our respect. The CHA cops really
don’t. And the little respect we did have for them they lost when they shot that lady.” The
Tribune reported that “For years, gang members have been so dismissive of the CHA cops that
lookouts refer to them as ‘2 ½’ instead of the customary ‘5-0’ to warn of approaching police.” 109
Alderman Walter Burnett, who grew up in Cabrini-Green, recalls the CHA Police dismissively
as “security guards with a license to kill.”110
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Officer Pace was charged in the shooting of Fernanda Royal, with prosecutors arguing
that Pace had deliberately wounded her. After shooting Royal, Pace had reportedly re-holstered
his gun and shouted “I told you [expletive] get back!” Following the charges, Pace was put on
administrative leave from CHAPD and faced six to 30 years in prison if convicted.111
Additionally, Royal sued both Officer Pace and the CHA for damages, claiming her civil rights
were violated and seeking millions of dollars in each suit.112 Later in the year, the Royal family
was again at the center of a scuffle between Cabrini residents and the CHA Police, when CHA
Police officers tried to arrest Royal’s younger brother. A 60-year-old resident told the paper at
the time, “The CHA police are trying to turn this place into Moscow. You got no free movement,
you can’t say nothing or they will pull their clubs out and hit you in the head. They make it hard
on people who try to live in peace and obey the laws.” Another resident who was related to the
Royals explained that “When the CHA police officers arrest somebody, it’s not like they just
frisk them and put the cuffs on them. When they arrest someone in this area, they normally beat
them up. That is the reason there is so much rivalry between the CHA police and the
gangbangers over here.”113 Officer Pace was ultimately acquitted in the shooting.114

“Cops and Robbers”
From building relationships with tenants and taking on a social work function, to dodging
bullets and chasing down ‘bad guys,’ the stories that former CHAPD officers tell emphasize the
pride they took in their work. Like CPD officers, several stress how fun their work was, despite
what they experienced as the constant sense of danger. As Marc Meyer* describes, “At the end
of the day, was I afraid out there? Never. Was I scared out there? Never. To me, it was fun. I
thoroughly enjoyed it. It was fun. It was something fun. I was having fun doing that. Grabbing
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the bad guys, letting somebody know that ‘No, you ain’t gonna get away with this.’ . . .I’m not
gonna say I loved my job but I really, really liked it.”115 Similarly, despite his claims that “the
amount of danger was amazing,” Ralph Sampson* says he also had fun on the job: “Most of
us—we were 25, 26 [years old at the time]. So, back then it was fun. When you first got out of
the [Police] Academy you get out wired, so it was fun. We didn’t realize how dangerous it was
until later when you get home and you—I mean, people got shot around you.”116 For Darryl Hill,
the perceived excitement of police work was part of what drew him away from his job in retail to
join the force in the first place: “I just wanted to do something I thought will be exciting. I don’t
know. My mom said I was crazy, but I thought it was exciting.”117
Gwen Powers*, who worked for a time as Field Training Officer for the CHAPD, thinks
that officers’ approach to policing in the projects was highly gendered. As she explains: “The
guys would be so anxious. They wanted to play cops and robbers. They wanted to shoot them up
and arrest everybody. That was exhausting.”118 She describes trying to make male officers
realize that “this is not a game. And some of them never learn that, unfortunately.” Seeing police
work as a game, she believes, helped some officers “justify the things they do”—including
corrupt and abusive activity.

“Everybody doesn’t take the job to do a good job”: Police Abuse
Even as a CHAPD officer, Joe Jackson admits that resident hostility towards police was
not unwarranted. Recalling the volleys of objects thrown at officers from the high rises, Jackson
comments, “I mean, what led to that? Was it you taking their money, or was it you taking their
drugs, or was [it] that you [were] planting some—putting some stuff of them?”119 Jackson says
he never saw officers committing such abuses but knows that “it actually happened.” Every
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officer I interviewed for this project said the same, though they differ in the extent to which such
abuses went on. As was the case for CPD, police abuse took several forms with CHAPD. Some
was extraordinarily brazen: officers robbing or extorting CHA tenants, planting guns and drugs
on tenants, or sexually assaulting tenants. In other cases, the abuse was much more mundane but
as such, also much more normalized: officers treating residents disrespectfully, calling them
names, using excessive and unwarranted force. And finally, some officers committed corruption
in their duties against CHA, bilking the agency when CHA was already spending millions on
public safety, including the CHA police. In this section, I explore each of these forms of abuse.
What is undisputed is that, even on the small force, abuse was commonplace. What’s more:
leaders knew about it and if they didn’t, they should have.
Every officer interviewed for this study admitted that abuse occurred on the CHA Police
force. As Gwen Powers* describes, “Some of [the officers] were doing illegal stuff, planting
drugs on people. . . . I’m not saying that everybody does it. No. But you do have cops that do it.
Most definitely, without a doubt.”120 For his part, Ralph Sampson* says, “I heard whispers, of
course. Of course. Just like everything else, you will always have some bad apples. You can
never get around that. . . . Everybody doesn’t take the job to do a good job. . . . Did I see it
[happen]? Probably a time or two.”121 When asked about officers planting drugs on CHA tenants,
Darryl Hill explains, “In the projects, there was so much criminal activity going on, and cops
were dirty too, they were taking drugs from the gang bangers. And some of them were taking
drugs or putting drugs [on people]; it happened. It happened a lot. And I didn’t get with that.”122
He says he heard about it happening directly only once and confronted the officer in question,
telling him that “what he did was wrong and dirty. Now he works for the Chicago Police
Department, so I know he’s still dirty.” Elisa Brewer* adds that, “By all means, I’m not saying
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all CHA officers were good; there were bad CHA officers as well. I’m being 100% honest. And
there were the bads.”123 As Hill describes, “The projects is a $1 million a week drug business,
and then you’ve got greedy cops. But you also have the feds, there are snitches in there too. . . .
When you’re dealing with the projects and you’re dealing with $1 million a week, temptation is
no joke.”124
Bernadette Williams, a longtime resident at Altgeld Gardens, says that the CHA Police
was known for being “more aggressive. They were crooked. I had a brush in with them also. I’ve
seen them plant drugs on people.”125 Andre Jenkins* served as a building president at the Robert
Taylor Homes while the CHA Police were on the job, a role in which he frequently heard
“complaints about police smacking guys when they come into the building. And they’re
harassing them. Telling them to do pushups and doing all this.”126 Angry at the constant
harassment from the police, Jenkins said he was afraid he would hit back if the officers ever
messed with him. “They was terrible,” he continues, describing how a CHA Police officer hit his
friend’s son so hard in the head with a telephone that he could hear it ring, just because the boy
was hanging out and playing in a breezeway. Jenkins says he and other residents asked CHA if
they could secure their own building, saying that “Because the police, some of them was half
high. Some of them was getting high. And I’d walk in the building. They’re leaned over with
their guns sticking out and they’re leaned over half high.”
News reports corroborate this anecdotal evidence, though it’s highly unlikely that every
case of abuse made the press. In July of 1995, two CHA Police officers—Martin Moore and
Ralph McCue—were charged with robbing a man after arresting him on false pretense. The
officers were reportedly driving a marked CHA Police car when they approached an unidentified
man on the South Side, handcuffed him, put him in the back seat of the car, and robbed him of

193

$12 in cash and a videocassette recorder. The officers released the man some blocks later and he
reported the robbery to the CHA Police, who traced the stolen items to the two officers.127
In January of 1998, two former CHA Police officers—Marvin Little and Herbert
Redmond—were found guilty of theft and official misconduct for stealing $5,000 from an
Altgeld Gardens resident in October of 1995. The former officers were convicted of searching
the victim’s apartment without a warrant and of taking the money under the pretense of
conducting a narcotics investigation.128 Then, in November of 1999, three former CHA Police
officers—John Rose, Donald McGraw, and Gerald Ward—were charged with robbing drug
dealers of cocaine, heroin, and cash and then giving some of the drugs to an informant in
exchange for information about other dealers who they could then extort. Rose and McGraw had
been filmed by hidden video breaking into a CHA unit in the Ickes Homes while on duty and in
uniform where they attempted to steal nearly $8,600, not realizing they were being trapped in an
FBI sting. All three officers involved were nine-year veterans of the force.129 Rose pled guilty to
selling stolen crack cocaine that he and the other officers had discovered during raids at the
Taylor and Wells Homes over a period of ten months between 1998 and 1999. He further agreed
to testify against his two former partners, who pled not guilty. Rose also admitted to providing an
informant with crack cocaine on three separate occasions in exchange for merchandise that had
been obtained by theft, as well as providing the same informant with a gun.130 Ward eventually
pled guilty of narcotics theft and faced 70 to 87 months in prison.131 McGraw’s case went to trial
and he was sentenced to over 10 years in prison by a federal jury for narcotics conspiracy and
theft.132
Even several years after the CHA Police force was disbanded, abuse and corruption
charges kept rolling in. In September of 2003, eight officers of Chicago-area agencies were
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arrested for stealing money and fake cocaine in an FBI sting called Operation Blue Steal. Two of
the men—Anthony Brown and Jesse Kuykendoll—were former CHA Police officers.133 Brown
and Kuykendoll faced up to ten years in prison apiece.134
Drugs and drug money were not the only temptation for CHA Police officers,
unfortunately. Worse, Elisa Brewer* and Alma Bledsoe* both recall a TAC team member who
was in jail for raping young boys at the developments. As Brewer describes, “We didn’t want to
believe that an officer that swore to protect these people—and you’re raping them.”135 She said
fellow officers’ disbelief let the man get away with continual sexual assaults for a year until he
was eventually caught in the act. In January of 1997, CHA residents alleged a pattern of abuses
committed by CHA police, including sexual assaults and robberies. In two lawsuits filed in U.S.
District Court against the CHA and five of its police officers, the residents called for the
Department of Justice to investigate the charges. In one case, CHA Police officer Rayshawn
Hudgins was charged with kidnapping and sexually assaulting two teenage boys the previous
year. Hudgins, who had most recently been assigned to Stateway Gardens, had been indicted the
previous November on charges of aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual
abuse, armed robbery, and kidnapping. In each case of abuse, Hudgins had reportedly identified
himself to the victims as CHA Police, pointed a gun at the victims, and sexually assaulted them.
He had been suspended from the force without pay since October 28.136
Officers were also known for using excessive force in dealings with CHA tenants. In the
second case in District Court in 1997, four CHA Police officers were charged with using
excessive force in arresting four teenage boys at Robert Taylor when they reportedly took them
to a vacant apartment and beat them.137 As Brewer describes, “I’ve seen officers for no reason hit
a prisoner.”138 Physical abuse was not merely accidental: a power struggle gone too far. Instead,
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CHA Police used physical force as a purposeful policing tactic to demonstrate their power over
residents and keep unruly tenants in line. As Marc Meyer* describes, “The things we did to get
things done would wind us in federal prison right now. Do you want the truth? We’d take a guy
in the hallway that was giving us mouth and tune him up until he told us what we wanted to
know. And then we’d go after his people. And now? Don’t you dare. Don’t you dare.”139 Darryl
Hill describes being called to a horrific scene where a man who had been doing drugs all night
with his friends beat his young daughter to death. Word of the case quickly spread and, as Hill
describes, “Everybody had emotions. Yeah, there was a couple of officers who felt like this guy
was out of control and wanted to tighten him up a little bit. That’s what we called it, tightening
him up. . . . You’ve got that going on everywhere, everyday [officers ‘tightening’ people up].”140
Hill says he personally resisted such tactics, saying that along with “most guys I worked with, we
wouldn’t do that because I figured the pain—it might be a little sore—[but] if you put them away
[in jail] you do more damage to them than punching them in the back of the head.”
Much of CHAPD’s violence was directed at young Black men and occasionally, it turned
lethal. In November of 1990—not long after the CHA Police force was created—a CHA officer
shot and killed 19-year-old Monroe Powe at the Robert Taylor Homes. Officers said Powe had
aimed a gun at them, but a wrongful death lawsuit filed in March of 1991 claimed otherwise.141
Then, in May of 1993, more than 90 ABLA residents protested publicly, saying they had been
victims of police brutality at the hands of both CPD and CHAPD. Some residents carried signs
accusing police of using “Gestapo and terrorist-type tactics” against CHA residents. The
protestors specifically singled out two CPD officers from the Monroe District as well as several
CHA police officers who were accused of harassing residents, using excessive force, stealing
money from residents, and planting drugs on tenants to set up false arrests.142 The following
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year, a CPD officer and then-head of the African-American Patrolmen’s League named Patricia
Hill alleged that her 17-year-old son had been shot at and beaten by CHA Police before being
arrested. The boy and his friend were charged with aggravated assault and unlawful use of a
weapon following a chase; Hill said they were unarmed when the police found them looking for
places to tag with graffiti at 1 am next to a CHA development. Upon finding the teens, CHA
Police reportedly chased them and one officer shot six rounds at Hill’s son. When he
surrendered, Hill said that five officers surrounded him, kicking him and hitting him with a
flashlight that caused injury to the boy’s face and elbow.143 Then, in 1995, CHA Police shot and
killed a 17-year-old boy, Kenneth Johnson, who had been protesting in a crowd of 100 people
outside a CHA Board Meeting. The officer responsible said he saw Johnson reach for his belt but
no weapon was found on the body.144
Understandably, abusive and violent behavior on the part of some CHA Police officers
further soured the relationship between tenants and the department. In 1995, Florence Wright, a
tenant leader at the Horner Homes, told the Tribune of the CHA Police, “When they first started
coming into the buildings and asking questions, people answered them. They were giving the
police respect.” But, she said, when officers “started coming in and cussing [at] people and
breaking down doors and beating people for no reason. . . . (Residents) started slamming their
doors when they saw police coming. I know I close my door.”145 Susan Sago, also a tenant leader
at the Horner Homes, told the press, “They’re not here to protect and serve the people. They’re
abusing the right they have to bear arms and to carry a badge. And they’re abusing our rights as
citizens.”146 For her part, Janice Jeffries’ recollections of working on the force align with these
residents’ complaints. As she says regretfully, some CHAPD officers “treat[ed] people like they
were not human.”147 Ronald Davis* says he often objected to the language his fellow officers
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would use when talking to residents, noting that they would use “lots of profanity or they
wouldn’t give the other person a chance to talk.”148 When asked what she remembers of the
CHA Police from her childhood at Cabrini-Green, Guana Stamps replies, “They were a fucking
joke.”149 According to Stamps, the CHA Police were known for “having sex with all the girls
over there [at Cabrini-Green]. . . .They were part of the drug trade over there.” Derek, who grew
up at ABLA, paints a similar picture, explaining how, “[The CHA Police] were horrible. They
were out there trying to make the females in the neighborhood–‘You get down with me . . . and I
won’t take your guy to jail’– meaning, like you either have sex with me or I’m locking your man
up. They would do all that kind of stuff.”150

Corruption
Finally, while much more trivial when compared to the physical harm inflicted by
CHAPD officers, there was also at least one discovered case of corruption amongst the force. In
1994, ten CHA Police officers were accused of falsifying time sheets, an act that was estimated
to have cost CHA $200,000 to $250,000 in 1993.151 After an investigation, six police officers
and a timekeeper—all of whom had been assigned to the ABLA Homes Police Station—were
ultimately suspended for paying the timekeeper thousands of dollars to make their timesheets
reflect more overtime than they had actually worked.152 Given that the agency was spending $70
million per year on security (including the police department, private security guards, and CHA
security guards), the fraud may appear trivial. However, every cent of funds used for policing
was money the struggling housing authority theoretically could have used in another way.
In December of 1996, Leroy O’Shield, a former CPD District Commander, was
appointed Chief of the CHA Police.153 Shortly after O’Shield’s appointment, his former
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district—the Austin District—was subject to an overtime fraud scandal not unlike that which
CHAPD had experienced several years earlier. Some in the press, including Mayor Daley,
former CPD Superintendent Fred Rice, and CPD Commander Michael Hoke of CPD’s Internal
Affairs Division, laid at least some of the blame for the scandal on O’Shield.154 As Hoke told the
press, “[T]here was some terrible, incompetent management, and it went all the way up to the
person in charge of the district: Commander O’Shield.” O’Shield had taken a leave from CPD to
serve as the CHAPD Chief and could therefore not be disciplined unless he returned to the
department. However, his involvement—or at best, willful ignorance—of the fraud that had
taken place on his watch, quickly sullied his reputation with CHA.155

The Code of Blue
Given the widespread abuse and corruption taking place amidst the relatively small CHA
Police force, I asked former officers whether or not they reported what they saw or heard to be
taking place and, if they did, what response they received from their leadership. Several officers,
particularly female officers, told me they expressly avoided being put in such a position by
making it known that they would not tolerate abusive activity in their presence and would tell
their supervisors if they saw it happen. As Gwen Powers* describes, “I put the word out . . .—
telling everyone ‘I’m a tattletale. I’m a tattletale. I’m telling. I’m telling.’ . . . So I just made it
real clear . . . and so, it gave me a reputation.”156 As a result, she says, she never had to report
any abusive activity because “The people who were doing stuff, they didn’t want to work with
me.” Powers says she would also refuse to work with certain officers who she suspected of
misconduct. Several other officers likewise report utilizing a similar system to avoid dealing with
corrupt officers. By admitting to willful ignorance, these officers ironically underscore that
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corruption was endemic to policing. That is, even the officers who considered themselves to be
“good apples,” did nothing to stop misbehavior when they knew about or suspected it. As Elisa
Brewer* says of the officer who was caught sexually assaulting young boys, “I felt that [other
officers on the force] should have [known], but everybody claimed they didn’t.”157 Whether due
to disbelief, peer pressure, or fear of being implicated themselves, every incentive was for
officers to avoid firsthand knowledge of misconduct.
On one occasion, however, Powers was paired with an officer on a TAC team who, as
she puts it, had a reputation for “planting drugs and taking people’s money. And I told him I
wasn’t having it. I wasn’t gonna be part of any of that. And sure enough, something happened.
We had an arrest. To this day, I’m so glad I wasn’t with him [when it happened]. I happened to
be on another side of a brick wall. He came around and all of a sudden, he has an arrest. And this
guy has drugs on him.”158 Powers describes how the officer wanted her to sign the paperwork for
the arrest as the arresting officer but she refused. Her sergeant ordered her to sign the papers and
she refused again, saying, “‘I didn’t even see it. I don’t care if I’m his partner today. If I wasn’t
there, I didn’t see it, I’m not signing shit.’” Powers describes her fellow officers growing angry
with her, but adds, “I don’t know what their little scheme was. I just wanted to make sure I
wasn’t a part of it.” She says that residents would also tell her about corrupt cops, “hinting
around that ‘This is what’s going on, or this person is—something’s going on with this person.’
But if they’re not willing to back it up, then that’s opening up a hornet’s nest because you’re
dealing with people who have guns.” Just like police officers lament residents’ unwillingness to
snitch on gang members, so too do officers rely on resident testimony to turn in corrupt cops.
Like the gang members, dirty cops wielded immense power over residents and, as Powers
testifies here, even had the ability to intimidate their fellow officers. The situation demonstrates
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how, even if not every officer was dirty, the system of policing insulates those causing harm and
fails to empower those who are victimized.
When asked why they might not report misconduct if they knew about it, CHAPD
officers speak to the well-documented code of silence that exists among police and that
discourages ‘snitching’ on another officer.159 As Ralph Sampson* describes of reporting on a
colleague, “There’s repercussions to being honest.”160 Elisa Brewer* explains, “The code of blue
is much stronger than anybody would ever know. The code of blue exists. And I would tell any
of them this; I’m not one to be afraid of saying what I say. The code of blue exists. So, if I see a
situation is turning funny, I walk away. So [that way] if you ask me what I’ve seen, I didn’t see
nothing because I walked away. . . . But did it happen? Of course.”161 While Brewer says that
abuse was rare on the force, she underscores the improbability of misconduct being reported,
saying “[I]t was understood that you don’t tell on another officer.” Adrienne Neely puts the
situation in starker terms. When asking what would happen if you reported misconduct on the
force, Neely says, “You’d probably get your face bashed in by your coworkers.” 162Neely has
worked for both CHAPD and CPD and says she witnessed more abuse on the latter than the
former force. She adds, “I mean, who wants to go to work and be called a rat, or hav[e] someone
not want to work with you because you have told the truth?” If officers feared retaliatory
violence from their colleagues, simple peer pressure also contributed to their reticence to report.
Finally, particularly as news reports surfaced of abuse allegations and corruption on the
CHA Police force, police leaders justified such misconduct publicly as a permanent, acceptable,
even expected part of policing. As then-CHAPD Chief George Murray told the press in 1995,
“Do I think there are a few CHA police officers who are dirty? Yes. Just like there would be a
few officers in any police department in America.” He said the department investigated “each
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and every complaint.”163 Murray’s comments reveal a common refrain about police work today:
abuse is inevitable, the goal is to minimize rather than eradicate it.
Compared to CPD, however, CHAPD significantly lacked accountability mechanisms.
Depending on the type of misconduct, CHAPD officers might be investigated by CPD or by the
CHA’s Office of the Inspector General.164 In fact, it was not until 1998 that CHAPD founded its
own Internal Affairs division to investigate allegations of misconduct.165
Additionally, as in other departments, CHAPD faced perverse incentives. From the
perspective of CHA leadership looking to ‘clean up’ the projects via policing, numbers mattered:
numbers of arrests, evictions, weapon and drug recoveries, and so on. Police, in other words,
were rewarded for making arrests and confiscations. In the context of a concentrated,
marginalized population, the environment was ripe for abuse. CHAPD officers understood the
pressures to be tough on residents. As Marc Meyer* describes, “When [Vince] Lane came down
there, his idea was ‘Go in there and kick ass.’ I’m like ‘Well, that’s nice. That’s fun. But that’s
not what we’re here for.’ They had one instance at Robert Taylor [when CHA leadership] wanted
us to go floor by floor by floor kicking doors and taking guns. I’m like, ‘Sure. Got the warrants?’
‘Uh, uh, uh, no.’ ‘Well, then it’s not gonna happen.’”166 Meyer, by his own admission no
stranger to ‘tuning residents up,’ indicates that even he was reticent to carry out unconstitutional
practices of search and seizure. While the evidence shows that such raids did happen, Meyer’s
comments indicate that CHAPD officers—as brutal and unethical as many on the force could
be—at times attempted to restrain CHA, i.e., their employer, from illegal forms of policing.
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Dismantling of the CHA Police Force
The 1990s were a tumultuous decade for CHA. In 1995, CHA was deemed to be failing
and entered a federal receivership, a process wherein HUD takes control of a local public
housing authority. Lane and his Board resigned and HUD appointed Joseph Shuldiner as
Executive Director.167 While Lane had begun to push plans for mixed-income conversion during
his time leading the agency, plans to ultimately redevelop most of Chicago’s public housing
portfolio as mixed-income proceeded apace under the receivership. Simultaneously, the CHAPD
came under more and more scrutiny due to incidents like the shootout involving the Royals at
Cabrini-Green. Complaints about the department’s inability to keep tenants safe, despite the high
cost of operating an in-house police force, led to public debate over whether the force should be
dismantled.168 In a March 1997 editorial, the Sun-Times editors wrote that “Chicago police are
sworn to protect all of the city’s residents, including the people in CHA high-rise buildings. Yet
since 1990, the CHA had operated its own police as if it were a separate city. Not only does this
separate system serve to isolate nearly 100,000 of the city’s residents, but it raises questions
about whether they are receiving a separate but unequal standard of police protection.”169
Under Shuldiner, the CHAPD slowly began to shrink. In August of 1998, the CHA fired
63 officers, over police union objections.170 Fewer than 350 officers remained on the force.171
Shuldiner defended the cuts to CHA’s security budget, explaining to the press “We think the
money is needed to fix the buildings. We have the direct order from [HUD] to do it this way.”
The City of Chicago ultimately regained control of CHA in 1999 after four years of
federal receivership.172 Under federal management, CHA had managed to clean up its act enough
to earn a passing score on a public housing management assessment. Additionally, as a condition
of its return to local control, CHA promised to submit a plan to remove failing units from its
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portfolio.173 When plans to demolish the high-rises became public in October of 1999, CHAPD
officers were unsurprised.174 Stephanie Wright* explains, “Nearing the end of the department,
they were starting to treat us more like security guards than police. They had us walk to the
stairs, make sure nobody was hanging out in the hallways and stuff like that.” Gwen Powers*
says CHA Police officers were directed not to make any arrests in the time leading up to the
department’s dismantling.175 On October 13, 1999, Shuldiner’s replacement, Phil Jackson,
officially announced that the CHAPD would be disbanded, thanking the officers for their “years
of dedicated service” but explaining that CPD had “sufficient personnel to ensure the safety and
well-being of every resident of CHA.”176 CPD announced their plan a few days later to hire 375
new officers to specifically police CHA developments, funded with the help of a $30 million
federal grant from the Department of Justice.177 The new Public Housing Unit officers would
work out of the very same stations used by the CHAPD.178
For their part, CHAPD officers expected to be absorbed by CPD, a move that many local
elected officials advocated. However, on October 17, CPD Chief Harvey Radney said the
remaining 275 CHA officers would not be automatically transferred to CPD, although they were
encouraged to test and apply for a position on the force.179 CHAPD was due to be dismantled on
October 29, but instead was disbanded on an emergency basis on the evening of October 18.
About half of the force, disgruntled over the dissolution of their department and the lukewarm
reception from CPD, had called in sick, leaving the remaining officers in jeopardy.180 And thus,
the ten-year run of CHAPD came to end.
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“It Never Stopped”
Like CPD officers, CHAPD officers are equivocal about the end results of their efforts.
While officers maintain their pride in their work and their belief that the CHA Police, as a hyperlocal, CHA-specific force was a useful complement to CPD, their feelings about the efficacy of
their own nwork are decidedly ambiguous. Ralph Sampson* brags about the “record number of
guns” the CHAPD confiscated, saying “So, in theory, yeah it made a difference.” But, he quickly
pivots, “Did it slow the drug trade down? No. No, it didn’t. We made record numbers of arrests
in the ‘90s and it didn’t slow the drug trade down, not a tiny bit.”181 Darryl Hill similarly attests,
“It never stopped, it just slowed it down for a minute. Because you take one off the street, two
more pop up.”182 Hill says he can sympathize with why some CHA residents joined the drug
trade, saying, “There were no other opportunities for them. And I can understand it, but it’s a cat
and mouse game.” Reflecting on the dangerous, undercover operations she participated in,
Adrienne Neely says she does not think they were particularly effective, “because you’d get rid
of one drug dealer, [and] here come two more to take their place. When you get one off [the
street], they’ve got another one out there already.”183
This sense that their work was futile is offset by the individual relationships forged with
residents and the highly localized aid that some officers provided. Sampson believes that, “For
daily lives, [CHAPD] made it a little bit better for the people.”184 For his part, Hill explains that
“I just think that if I can help one person in the projects come out and make a difference, then
I’ve successfully done my job. Because you’re not a savior.”185 In interviews, officers expressed
real frustration at what they see as their inability to make lasting change in the lives of the
residents they served, even while they maintain the importance of policing and the heroism of
their work in the face of danger.
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Meanwhile, the force was small enough that some residents never knew it existed—
particularly if they lived in developments without a police station. In other cases, residents
confuse the CHA Police with CHA security guards in interviews. For example, Maria Stevens*,
a lifelong CHA resident who has lived at both the Robert Taylor Homes and the Lathrop Homes,
explains, “I didn’t even know we had any [police] at that time. The older I got, that’s when I
started seeing armed security guards and stuff like that, but I never saw a CHA Police officer.”186
For others, particularly those living in developments where CHAPD maintained outposts and ran
operations, CHAPD were a part of everyday life in the projects. However, as with the city police,
CHAPD’s presence alone was ineffective—at times, even counterproductive—to promote safety.
For his part, Andre Jenkins* says CHA Police were ineffective at stopping gun violence and
shooting. “If [gangs] wanted to shoot, they were gonna shoot,” he explains. For him, the CHA
Police force “was a waste of money. They was harassing the folks that lived in the building.
They really wasn’t securing the building. . . . It was a waste of time putting them in there.”187

Conclusion
Much like public housing, the decade-long career of the CHA Police Department can be
read as a policy experiment. As this chapter has shown, maintaining an in-house police
department was not straightforwardly good or bad for CHA, but it did shape the institution and
the lives of its residents in important ways. First, running an in-house police force meant that the
head of the housing authority became a de facto police chief, a job that none of CHA’s executive
directors were trained to do. The existence of the force can thus be said to have functionally
expanded the mission of the housing authority, which had policed and surveilled its residents for
years, but with the creation of the CHAPD, formally adopted policing the CHA resident
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population as part of its mandate. In both of these ways, establishing an in-house police
department formalized the housing authority’s role in the carceral state and thus, made public
housing more carceral.
Beyond its close relationship with the city police department, with the establishment of
the CHAPD, CHA created a class of workers dedicated to surveilling and punishing its own
population. If the high-rises resembled jails, CHAPD were the prison guards. Establishing police
stations within the developments, complete with holding cells, made this transition literal.
Pervasive drug bust operations required pervasive surveillance, meaning that all CHA residents
were constantly at risk of being watched. In short, the effect of establishing an in-house police
force for CHA, even if the impulse was protective, was that residents were inevitably the target
of that policing—their apartment complexes ever-more reminiscent of carceral facilities. As
such, the presence of the CHAPD increased the level of punishment vulnerability at CHA and for
CHA residents. Coined by sociologist Jessica Simes, “punishment vulnerability” refers to “those
characteristics and experiences of communities that enable them to respond to and recover from
mass incarceration.”188
Resident experience speaks to the ways in which the CHA Police made their housing
environment more carceral and more punitive. Jalissa Anders*, a CHA resident who has lived in
the Lathrop Homes for over 30 years, explains that in her experience, CPD and CHAPD were
“About the same.”189 She continues, “They got to the point where they were—some of them, not
all of them, was harassing residents. So, through it all, the residents caught the blunt end of
everything.” Keith Augustine, who lived at Cabrini-Green for thirty years, describes
experiencing the CHA Police as yet another layer of law enforcement intervention into his home
life, one that has had lasting material consequences for him. As he explains,

207

We also were policed not only by the Chicago Police, we were policed by a crooked
agency, which was the CHA Police—which I don’t understand, because a lot of Black
men, a lot of Black females’ lives were changed because of the CHA Police. These
people came into these people’s houses. They gave people bogus chases.… They came
through with bogus indictments. They violated people’s houses. They raided. They put
their hands on people, and then, a lot of people got felonies on their back . . . including
myself, [I] have a felony on my background because of the CHA Police, and they are not
even an agency anymore. How do I still have a background—how do I still have an ‘X’
on my back from a company, an agency that doesn’t even exist anymore?190
Augustine describes the situation that led to his charges, saying that the CHA Police were
running an undercover operation known as Operation Stormy Monday at Cabrini-Green to
identify narcotics sellers. According to Augustine, the operation led the police to falsely charge
hundreds of residents for drug dealing, including himself—charges that still haunt him and
appear on his record to this day.
Second, in addition to rendering public housing more like a prison, operating an in-house
police force was extremely expensive for the CHA. While the force existed, CHA spent a total of
about $70 to $75 million annually on security, which included private security guards, CHA
security guards, and the CHA Police and worked out to about $855 per resident per year.191
About $20 million of that was for the CHAPD in particular.192 In 1994, HUD officials allowed
CHA to divert $21 million in modernization funds—money that would otherwise be spent on the
buildings themselves—to fund security efforts. The money would come out of the $130 million
that HUD provided each year for rehabilitation. The agency also sent an additional $8 million to
Lane, earmarked for him to spend on public safety.193 Some residents said the shift to fund public
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safety was appropriate, while others said the money would be better spent on maintenance. As
Maxine Curry of the Taylor Homes told the press, “My main concern is they don’t just shift
money, because our buildings are in such awful condition. We need the money that’s earmarked
for modernization to be used for rehabilitation.” 194 Even Lane lamented the tradeoff, noting,
“You’re trading a cop for a roof,” though he clearly saw the funding as justified and publicly
critiqued CPD for not providing sufficient services to CHA.195
Thus, money spent on operating an in-house, albeit small-scale police force drew down
funds that could have been spent on other things, including building maintenance and social
services for residents. While many are quick to blame the ‘failure’ of public housing on what are
widely portrayed as the inherent financial difficulties of running a state-owned and -managed
housing program for low-income renters, the amount of money spent on policing recasts
financial shortfalls as a matter of political priorities. By the late 1990s, CHA justified the need to
demolish the high-rises in part by citing years of deferred maintenance that made the buildings
simply too expensive to renovate. Administrators offered but one option: demolition.
Third, hosting an in-house police force made CHA both landlord and police. Under Vince
Lane in particular, the authority exploited this position to carry out in-house evictions as well as
otherwise illegal raids, which are the subject of the following chapter. And finally, the existence
of the CHAPD—a separate force explicitly intended to police CHA—reinforced, as its critics in
the press were quick to point out, the sense that CHA was its own city within a city, complete
with its own set of parallel institutions. In a seeming paradox, the CHAPD was founded in part
because residents and CHA leadership complained that CPD was not adequately policing the
projects. Ten years later, the narrative changed, as local leadership blamed CHA Police for
ongoing crime in the projects as well as police abuse and ineptitude, asking why CHA residents
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should be treated any differently than other city residents, who were policed by CPD. The truth
was that, between private security, CHA security guards, regular CPD patrols, special CPD units
focused on public housing, the CHA Police while they existed, as well as any number of other
local, state, and federal agencies, public housing was always more heavily and intensively
policed than any other part of Chicago.
A year after CHAPD disbanded, CPD officials bragged of dramatic increases in arrests at
CHA and dramatic reductions in certain types of violent crime. If this sounds like déjà vu, it
should: the newly formed CHA Police had bragged of similar numbers a year into their own
tenure. At a press conference at Cabrini-Green, Deidre Matthews, a resident and organizer there,
said “It is better. I see the police patrol much more this year. But a lot of those are people
arrested for just coming around where they shouldn’t. They still don’t go after the ones who are
causing the trouble, the dope dealers, the ones shooting everywhere.” Some residents speculated
that the increase in arrests was due to overzealous policing, rather than a proportional response to
crime.196 Additionally, police officials did not have data on how many of the increased arrests
had led to a conviction, and city officials were having trouble recruiting CPD officers for public
housing duty: in fact, only 290 officers were assigned to the patrols as of February 2001
compared to the full CHAPD force of 450 at its height.197
Finally, if public housing had long been a training ground for police officers, who were
sent there in the early days of their careers to earn their stripes before receiving cushier
assignments elsewhere, the existence of the CHA Police deepened this dynamic. In other words,
even as policing contributed to producing public housing spatially, socially, and politically, so
too did public housing produce policing in Chicago. I mean this in several ways: first, many
officers were trained to police within the environment of public housing either as junior CPD
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officers assigned to public housing units or in districts with high levels of public housing, or on
the CHAPD force, for those who transitioned to CPD or other law enforcement agencies after
CHAPD was disbanded. In addition to personnel, policing tactics developed in Chicago public
housing were exported to other contexts, including other parts of Chicago and public housing in
other cities. Edward King* credits CHAPD with developing many of the community policing
practices now employed by CPD, as well as specific patrol tactics. As he describes, “[CHAPD]
were the first to embrace the whole idea of bike patrols, the whole thing of being assigned to a
building, and that’s your building, you get to know everybody and those things, so they were
way ahead of the time. They were ahead of their time with less than lethal weapons. . . . They
were carrying mace before Chicago started carrying as a routine issuance.”198
Overall, much as public housing can be read as a microcosm of the larger city of
Chicago, so too can the career of the CHAPD be read as a microcosm of urban policing. If some
residents felt more safe with CHAPD officers present and some officers found meaning in the
relationships they formed with tenants, finding opportunities to help them in ways that fell
outside the ostensible mission of policing, corruption and abuse were also endemic to the force.
This process was inherently complex and contradictory. Consent and coercion were equal parts
of the work of policing, while the threat of violence embodied in the officer, combined with
officers’ capacity to directly ensnare tenants—legally or otherwise—into the carceral system,
meant that many residents felt threatened by officers, who they experienced as an occupying
force.
Starting in the 1990s, a new political commonsense emerged. That commonsense was
summed up pithily by the Chicago Tribune editorial board, who opined as early as 1995 that
“There will be no true security for [CHA] residents until the worst high-rises are torn down and
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the families moved to humane alternatives, be it low-rise replacement housing or private housing
made affordable with government vouchers.”199 Thus, paternalistic policing transformed into
paternalistic policymaking, wherein city elites—assuming they knew what was in CHA
residents’ best interests—concluded that there was seemingly just one way to make residents
safer: destroy their homes.
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Chapter 6. Policing the Poor: Raids in Public Housing
In the mid-1980s, Maria Stevens* was a teenager living at the Robert Taylor Homes on
Chicago’s South Side. One morning, when she was a freshman in high school, Maria awoke to
the sound of her apartment door being kicked in by police. “I think they called it a raid,” she
says, “because they were looking for all the gang members to—I guess—to lock them up. I
remember that—that’s like embedded in my head. That was a horrifying experience. To wake up
with someone standing over your face with guns. And I would never forgive that, because some
of our residents [were] snatched out of our homes. Some people didn’t have any clothes on.
People’s kids were screaming, babies. I still remember that to this day.” 1 Likening the scene to
something out of a movie, Maria recalls being told to wait in her bedroom while police searched
the rest of her family’s three-bedroom apartment, rifling through closets. She says, “You’re just
an innocent family trying to live your life in your apartment and this is how you get treated.”
Police raids like the one Maria remembers were not aberrant or incidental, but rather a
common practice throughout Chicago public housing for many years. Not only did the Chicago
Housing Authority (CHA) condone the practice, but in many cases, CHA ordered the raids
themselves, collaborating with police to conduct warrantless searches. This chapter traces the
evolution and institutionalization of these raids, also known as “sweeps” or the more sanguine
“inspections,” as common police practice in public housing. While the idea of raids had long
been proposed and debated at CHA, it was not until the early 1980s that the authority began
directing police raids and not until the late 1980s that the practice became commonplace. While
numerous police actors raided CHA housing during this period of time—including federal
agencies like the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and Bureau of Firearms,
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Explosives (ATF), as well as local law enforcement agencies—this
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chapter will focus primarily on raids conducted by the Chicago Police Department (CPD) and,
for some time, the Chicago Housing Authority Police Department (CHAPD), working in
partnership with and frequently at the direction of the CHA.
This chapter makes three key arguments about these police raids: First, it shows how
raids contributed to making public housing more like a prison—a carceral space of discipline,
surveillance, and punishment rather than a domestic space of privacy, safety, and retreat. Second,
this chapter argues that raids were one of many policing practices that, while extreme in nature,
proved ineffective to mitigating crime in public housing. While residents’ homes were upended,
children traumatized, and possessions destroyed, there is little evidence that the raids made
public housing residents safer in any sort of lasting or meaningful way. They were, in their own
way, a form of violence enacted upon residents. However, unlike the actions deemed ‘criminal’
in public housing, this violence was state-sanctioned, an example of what Graziani et al term the
“lawlessness of the law.”2 Finally, this chapter argues that the CHA and City of Chicago
privileged this kind of policing over other potential investments in public safety. These raids
were not only dramatic—they were expensive. As with other policing interventions, paying for
the raids came at the expense of funding much-needed capital improvements at the housing
developments or social services for residents. In all of these ways, rather than saving public
housing, these police raids reinforced, by the late 1990s, the sense that public housing was
ungovernable and beyond repair—that the only remaining solution was to tear the buildings
down and start over.
Violence in the Bricks
By the early 1980s, Chicago’s public housing was both increasingly impoverished and
increasingly crime ridden. No site came to epitomize this more in the public imagination than

219

Cabrini-Green. Situated in the city’s Near North Side neighborhood, with views of the
downtown skyline and surrounded by affluent white communities, Cabrini-Green gained an
outsized reputation for violence.* As Reverend James Fleming of the nearby Fourth Presbyterian
Church said of Cabrini-Green, “Life at best over there is a jungle.”3 Fleming’s comment, with its
evidently racist overtones, also reveals the site’s intense territorial stigmatization. As urban
economies shifted over the course of the twentieth century and industry abandoned city centers,
Black and low-income residents were relegated to the inner-city while more affluent whites were
able to access homeownership opportunities in the suburbs. These patterns followed historical
legacies of redlining and blockbusting that had alternately prevented Black homeownership or
relegated Black homeowners to disinvested neighborhoods. These patterns were reinforced in the
1970s by a series of Supreme Court decisions that upheld de facto segregation, including the
1974 Miliken v. Bradley decision that upheld the segregation of Detroit public schools by
disallowing a busing remedy that would have mixed inner-city students of color with those from
white suburban districts.4 As Wacquant describes, the result of these shifts was the dual and selfreinforcing stigmatization of the people and places left behind, whose material conditions
worsened with the retreat of the welfare state.5 Nowhere were these trends more apparent than at
Cabrini-Green, which Chicago Police Department Lieutenant Robert Jones described as follows:
“[Y]ou have poor, uneducated people stacked one on top of another. You couldn’t do that with
anyone and not have them turn on each other.”6 According to media reports, Cabrini-Green was
a social experiment gone wrong and—even more importantly, for the public imagination—
turned violent.

*

As a writer for the Chicago Tribune later noted, “Cabrini-Green, because of its location in the gentrified Near North Side,
receives an inordinate amount of public attention” despite having average crime rates for a CHA development (Patrick Reardon,
“Without Sweeps, CHA Crime Might Be Worse,” Chicago Tribune, October 26, 1992: 1).
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In June of 1980, a Chicago Tribune journalist, Dorothy Collin, followed two CPD
Neighborhood Relations officers on their beat at Cabrini-Green. Collin noted of the project that,
“[Cabrini-Green], which houses more than 14,000 people, appears peaceful. It is deceptive. The
threat of violence is as much a part of Cabrini as the red bricks.”7 The officers told Collin that
police struggled to control gang activity at the complex, and also reported what would become a
common refrain in CHA housing: that parolees returning to the complex from prison were to
blame for an uptick in gang violence.8 The following spring, the paper reported on a recent
increase in sniping at Cabrini-Green, quoting a property manager who suspected gang strife.9
The question was: what was to be done?
At least publicly, CHA proposed one solution: a planned crack-down on unauthorized
guests—the presumed troublemakers behind the gang-related violence.10 In March of 1981,
Charles Swibel, CHA’s then-Board Chairman, noted that CHA was authorized to conduct
periodic inspections to root out unauthorized guests, and indicated the agency would commence
such checks at Cabrini-Green, where it would also search vacant apartments and public spaces
for weapons or gang members hiding there.11 The same month, Mayor Jane Byrne’s team met to
discuss the constitutionality of such searches; the Mayor’s legal advisors concluded that
apartment searches would not violate CHA tenants’ rights.12 The talks occurred as Mayor Byrne
planned her own move to Cabrini-Green; two days prior to her move, police raided the complex
at dawn.13 Though few details are available about the raid, some residents complained that the
Mayor’s arrival at Cabrini-Green turned their apartment complex into a “police state” as she
brought with her a huge increase in the number of police officers regularly stationed there. While
Byrne and her husband stayed at Cabrini-Green for only three weeks, departing in late April,
heightened police patrols remained at the development into the fall.14
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Byrne’s move to Cabrini-Green arguably accomplished what the Mayor intended: it
brought attention to the complex and its problems, and also made it appear that the City cared to
do something about them. But the City’s solution—increased policing—struck some as if it
aimed more at optics than outcomes, particularly as residents expressed doubt about whether the
police were there to protect them or the Mayor. In any case, crime at Cabrini-Green did not end
with the Mayor’s visit, even with the temporarily increased police presence, and nor did the
practice of police raids that preceded her stay there. However, it was not until later in the decade
that the CHA and CPD adopted the practice of regular police sweeps across CHA properties and
by this time, new administrations controlled the city and its sister agencies.
In late 1987, Eugene Sawyer was appointed Mayor by special election following the
sudden death of Chicago’s first Black mayor, Harold Washington, who had succeeded Byrne. In
May of 1988, Sawyer selected Vince Lane to head the CHA. In June, the CHA Board confirmed
Lane to the dual role of Executive Director and Board Chairman. Born to a poor family in the
South, Lane pledged to be a strong advocate for public housing families. For him, as Chapter 5
demonstrates, a tough-on-crime stance was essential to protecting what he saw as the decent
residents of public housing from the criminals that would prey upon them. Together, Sawyer and
Lane pledged to clean up the CHA.

“The projects were like a prison”: Operation Clean Sweep
In September of 1988, Mayor Sawyer, working with Lane and the Chicago Police
Department, ordered the first police raid at a Rockwell Gardens building on the city’s West
Side.15 The Chicago Tribune called the raid an “assault” on a “gang-infested building,” which,
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the paper reported, had been the site of several shootings, two murders, and one bombing in the
previous few weeks as rival gangs battled for control over a particular building.16
Whether officials planned it this way or not, this first raid at Rockwell Gardens
established a blueprint for the many raids that would eventually follow. During the raid, 60
Chicago Police officers surrounded the targeted building, while CHA security officers inspected
apartments individually, including 28 vacant and 135 occupied units.17 Lane justified the
apartment searches by invoking a clause in the CHA lease that allowed security officers to enter
units during “emergency” situations.18 As one resident noted, however, “they can call anything
they want an emergency.”19 While the raid resulted in only one arrest and netted just two
weapons, Lane used the strike as an opportunity to implement new security measures at the
building. While officers went door-to-door, residents were asked to report to a makeshift
headquarters that CHA set up inside a vacant unit on the first floor. There, they were checked
against a list of current tenants, registered, photographed, and issued ID cards. The Tribune also
reported that CHA and police utilized an eye scanner, “which identifies a person by reading the
blood vessels in the eye’s retina,” to identify tenants. Those returning from outside the building
were asked to show ID before they could reenter, were checked by police metal detectors, and, in
some cases, were frisked by police officers before being allowed to reenter their building.20
During the sweep, CHA also installed new locks on vacant units.21 Wade Ingram, a former CPD
officer present at this first raid admitted that the “emergency inspection”—as with the many that
eventually followed—was invasive, that officers would look under mattresses and inside
drawers, noting “it was just like a police state. I don’t know how they got away with it, but they
did.”22 Ingram says that he was new to the force at the time and merely following the orders of
his superiors. He says he did not have a problem participating in such raids at first, but “When I
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thought about it like, ‘Man.’ Well, of course, you know some guys were overzealous. I mean
they were going in there and destroying people’s property. Now you know, come on now. But
they told us it was legal, so we did it.”
After the raid at Rockwell Gardens had ended, Mayor Sawyer commented that “Today
we cleaned up a building and we are one step closer to cleaning up a neighborhood.”23 Sawyer’s
comments exemplify the tough-on-crime approach adopted by city leaders at the time. Raiding
comprised yet another method for police officers and the city elites who directed them to “clean”
public housing by ridding it of its criminal elements; an obviously oversimplified vision that
neglects the messy realities of life there. It is true that many residents were law-abiding victims,
trying to go about their lives, but many others were complicit or participated in drug dealing and
gang-related crimes. It is likewise true that parolees would start trouble in public housing, but
many of these people were born and raised in the projects and were merely returning home.
Nevertheless, Sawyer’s “sanitizing” metaphor was a powerful one, particularly appealing to a
fearful public and a frustrated policy community growing tired of the related, ongoing problems
with crime and property destruction across CHA’s portfolio.
In any case, residents did not unanimously share Sawyer’s victorious sentiment. As
Rockwell Gardens resident Steve White told the press after the raid, “[The authorities] wait until
everyone gets killed, vandalized, or has bombs thrown in their window before they do this. It’s
too late; one building isn’t going to solve the problem.”24 Additionally, then-CPD Superintendent
Leroy Martin speculated that tenants may have been tipped off to the raid by CHA employees,
resulting in the low number of arrests and confiscations.25 In response, Sawyer directed Lane and
Martin to randomize the sweeps across all CHA buildings.26 This raid was to be the first of
many.
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Just a few months later, in early December, CHA conducted a second raid, this time at
Prairie Courts where, according to the Chicago Sun-Times, “The sight of hypodermic needles
flying toward the ground . . . told police and Chicago Housing Authority officials that this time
their arrival was a surprise.”27 During the sweep, police officers went door-to-door throughout
the 13-story, 208-unit building, where they arrested 19 individuals and rounded up another 14
children who were found to be truant from school. Six of these arrests were for drug and firearms
violations; the remainder were criminal trespass charges. Some of those arrested were walked
directly to the Prairie District police station, which, the paper noted, was conveniently not more
than 50 yards from the rear of the Prairie Courts building where the sweep took place.
Additionally, police escorted nonresidents from the building, but did not arrest them. Following
the raid, Lane detailed a number of planned changes to the building’s security, including
enclosing the first floor, installing security doors and window gratings to prevent trespassing and
squatting, and issuing ID cards to all residents. Security guards would now require any visitors to
sign in at the front desk and visitors would not be allowed to remain after midnight. Lane
estimated the cost of these new security measures at between $160,000 and $200,000.28
These early raids also delivered some unintended consequences that pleased
policymakers. Following the first sweep at Rockwell Gardens, eight unmarried couples had
chosen to wed so the man would be allowed to continue living with his girlfriend at the property.
Lane noted this fact gleefully, telling the press after the Prairie Courts raid that, “We expect to
see some weddings as a result of today’s action.”29 Thus, the raids served as a top-down attempt
to reform every aspect of life at CHA, as much as they were also a tough-on-crime spectacle. If
they hoped to root out guns, drugs, and unwanted guests, Sawyer, Lane, and Martin equally
touted the collateral consequences of the raids, such as encouraging marriage between unwed
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couples—particularly those with children—and policing truancy among youth. If the raids could
serve the dual purpose of regulating family life at the complexes, where the media regularly
blamed low marriage rates and high numbers of children for extant social problems, all the
better. In celebrating the social externalities of their punitive policies, these policymakers reflect
dominant narratives depicting poverty as a symptom of ‘pathologies’ within Black families. This
theory, which was widely influential to twentieth century social policy, was popularized by
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who, in a famous report written while he was serving as the U.S.
Assistant Secretary for Labor, espoused the idea that when poor people lived in close proximity,
it bred a ‘culture’ or ‘pathology’ of poverty that manifested in criminal and anti-social behaviors,
single-female-headed households with absentee fathers, and intergenerational sloth. The eventual
result, as explored in the following chapter, was the breaking up of poor Black communities. An
intermediate step, however, was to police them.
Indeed, by randomizing the raids, Sawyer, Lane, and Martin intended to put residents on
alert, creating a disciplinary environment where (these leaders hoped), residents would police
themselves, knowing that a raid could occur at any time—including in the early hours of the
morning. Growing up in Cabrini-Green, Keith Augustine says that he saw police every day. “The
projects,” he says, “were like a prison. We were policed by the police like they were the warden.
They came in and out. They violated. They chained the houses. They raided where they wanted
to raid or whenever someone gave them a reason.”30 Another tenant, who spoke to the Chicago
Defender about the raids in 1988, but wanted to remain anonymous for fear of retaliation,
commented that “They’re [tenants] saying that the developments have become a penitentiary
more than ever before.”31 Willie Burrell of the Near West Citizens Action Council told the paper
at the time that “The guards go there [to the complexes] with a mentality to punish someone.”32
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Following the first sweeps at Prairie Courts, 50 residents staged a protest calling for an end to
public housing sweeps. Residents told the media they were “tired of living like prisoners in their
own homes.”33 Beverly Herring, a resident who helped organize the rally, told the Defender that
“Plain and simple, we’re tired of being disrespected, abused and ignored when it comes to
having a voice in the direction of our living conditions.” She said that plans to secure the
complexes were welcome but should include the residents and not make them feel like “bad
guys.”34 For residents, intensive policing was a regular part of everyday life in CHA housing.
Raids were thus just an extension of the practice, a further invasion into their most private of
quarters that, in turn, rendered those quarters less domestic, and more carceral.
The raids continued apace. Just days after the Prairie Courts sweep, the CHA raided a 10story building at 1015-17 N. Larrabee Street at Cabrini-Green–a building that had, over the last
two months, been the site of two homicides, six rapes, thirty-one battery cases, twelve
aggravated battery cases, and thirty-one sniper shootings, according to official police statistics.35
During the raid, 150 housing and police officials descended on the complex at 10 am, where they
inspected each of the building’s 140 units. However, much like the first raid at Rockwell
Gardens, the action turned up just two weapons, while police detained eleven schoolchildren for
truancy and arrested eight adults for criminal trespassing.36 As was the case at Rockwell and
Prairie Courts, residents of the swept building at Cabrini were issued ID cards. Additionally,
officials informed residents that from then on, their guests would only be allowed inside the
building between 9 am and midnight and that guest access would now be moderated by private
security guards stationed at the building’s entrance.37 Lane noted his surprise that the sweep had
not unearthed more contraband, adding that “If any gang member out there is listening, we want
them to know we will come back to Cabrini at any time.”38 CHA’s message was loud and clear:
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the administration and police were watching residents and were liable to arrive unannounced and
unexpected. Again, raids were a specific policing tactic: not just to weed out guns, drugs, and
unwanted guests during the raid itself, but to discipline, in a Foucauldian sense, residents into
policing their own behavior, knowing that CHA and CPD could descend at any time.39 This was
public housing as panopticon.
Despite his threat, Lane—in an ironic twist—simultaneously explained to the press that,
as the Tribune reported, the sweeps “were not raids but the CHA exercising its right as landlord
to inspect its property.”40 To his mind, raiding was not violent, but rather administrative:
evidence of a responsible landlord caring for their property. Lane noted that no doors were being
kicked in, and doors where knocks went unanswered were opened with keys.41 Resident
testimony largely negates this official narrative. As Augustine recalls,
It was—shit—the raids were uncomfortable. It’s a matter of you being in your bed with
your husband and your kids and they were all sleeping, and just in the middle of the night
or the early morning, somebody says ‘Boom.’ Your door is off the hinge and they are
running in your house. You don’t know if it’s somebody coming to harm you or kill you
or the police. . . . And then, sometimes you are half asleep and you are waking up with a
gun in your face and was getting dragged out of your bed. . . . The stuff there, your whole
house being ransacked.42
Some residents accepted the raids as a tradeoff for increased safety: as Cabrini-Green resident
Paulette Marshall told the paper after that first raid at 1015-17 N. Larrabee, the sweeps were “not
what everyone wants.” However, in her opinion, CHA and CPD were not violating residents’
rights because “They don’t have any rights, because the gangs have taken them all away.”43 In
the absence of any kind of public safety, the sweeps seemed—to some at least—a necessary evil.
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Just days after CHA swept 1015-17 N. Larrabee, it raided another building at CabriniGreen: 500 W. Oak Street. The raid resulted in the arrest of seven people, including the janitor
for the building, who was charged with theft for illegally renting one of the apartments. The
other six arrestees were charged with criminal trespass, while officers detained two truant
students. The raid only netted one gun, with police again suspecting that residents had been
tipped off, this time perhaps by the arrested janitor. Following the raid, the Chicago Tribune
reported that the ACLU was receiving complaints about the raids and was considering taking
action against CHA.44
The ACLU did not waste time delivering on its threat. By mid-December, the
organization filed a federal lawsuit against CHA, calling its restrictions on visitors
unconstitutional. The suit claimed that, because tenants were required to identify each visitor and
could not bring guests into their buildings between midnight and 9 am, CHA was violating
tenants’ rights to free association. CHA had also required tenants to advise the authority if they
had guests staying longer than 24 hours, so that the guest could be issued an ID card that they
would be required to show security guards upon entry and exit to the building. Under the
restrictions, one tenant had been forced to find a babysitter for her nieces and nephews after the
CHA ordered the children to leave her apartment. Another had been barred from spending
weeknights with their elderly parents. A tenant grandparent was not allowed to have overnight
visits from their grandchildren over the holidays. In response to the lawsuit, CHA agreed to drop
the restriction on visitors between midnight and 9 am and said they would allow guests for two
weeks at a time.45
The lawsuit also took aim at the raids themselves, which were now known collectively as
“Operation Clean Sweep”: ACLU contended that CHA and CPD indiscriminately detained
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people and searched tenants’ drawers, closets, clothing, bedclothes, mattresses, and even
refrigerators during the raids. While CHA was unwilling to immediately drop its practice of
sweeping the buildings, the agency agreed to discuss the searches with the ACLU in the hopes of
reaching a consent decree. Then-ACLU director Harvey Grossman said that “No landlord, in
public or private housing, has the right to take police into a tenant’s apartment and have them
search through dresser draws, closets or a tenant’s personal effects under the guise of a housing
inspection.” ACLU charged that the CHA and police were violating tenant’s rights to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures since the sweeps were conducted without probable
cause or even a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.46 For the ACLU and its supporters the
searches were an overreach of police power, an extension of punitive authority that extended the
reach of the carceral state into people’s very homes. In short, it was a practice that made public
housing less like a home, and more like a prison.† However, convinced of the raids’ efficacy and
necessity, CHA was not willing to drop the practice so easily. Thus began over a decade of legal
battles between CHA and ACLU over the policing practice.

†

Such police raids were not without historical precedent. As Saidiya Hartman describes of life in turn-of-the-century
Harlem, “Jump raids were commonplace. In a ‘jump raid,’ plainclothes officers, having identified a suspicious
person and place, knocked at the door of a private residence, and when it opened, they forced their way across the
threshold or they followed behind a woman as she entered her apartment. It was common to see the doors of rented
rooms and apartments scarred, broken, and hanging off the hinges after the police officers entered homes by force
and without warrants. In its annual report, the Committee of Fourteen endorsed the jump raid as a reasonable
response to the black presence in the city. While ordinarily a police raid without a warrant would be a ‘dangerous
procedure’ because it violated basic civil liberties, and the ‘unrestricted use of this custom would probably lead to
police oppression,’ the Committee found these measures were warranted. By their assessment, the police exercised
good judgment in conducting raids in such manner because ’the conditions found to exist in the resorts so raided
have fully justified the action taken.’ For those under the surveillance of the police, there was no difference between
‘good judgment’ and police oppression. Black tenants were policed more intensely and violently than their white
neighbors, so it is not surprising that as a result of these regular encounters with the law, the buildings in which they
lived contain more ‘disorderly houses’ and ‘disorderly persons’” (Hartman 2017, 251-252).
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To What Ends? Debating the Raids
After ACLU filed its initial suit, public debate over the raids escalated quickly. In
December of 1988, the Sun-Times reported that the Chicago Fire Department supported the raids.
According to the paper, Fire Department paramedics had recently been pelted with rocks and
eggs when trying to enter a CHA building to assist a 9-year-old boy suffering from an asthma
attack. Forced to flee, the paramedics had to wait to enter the building until the police arrived to
escort them inside, while the flying objects left “quarter- to half-dollar-sized dents” on their
ambulance. After waiting eleven minutes for the police to arrive, the paramedics carried the boy
down five flights of stairs and rushed him to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead. The
boy’s mother filed a lawsuit against the Fire Department, claiming the paramedics had
abandoned her son. The Fire Commissioner defended the crew, saying his team had followed
proper protocol and that in the last year, paramedics responding to calls at CHA buildings had
been the targets of 155 assaults. Based on these and similar experiences, they found the practice
of CHA building sweeps to be justified.47
In January of 1989, then-ACLU President Diane Geraghty wrote a column for the
Tribune, in which she argued that Operation Clean Sweep had “visited its own form of
lawlessness on innocent tenants.” Geraghty objected to the invasiveness of the sweeps, but she
also wrote about children returning from school only to be kept out in the cold for hours, waiting
to be allowed back inside their apartments, and of parents prevented from going to work when
their babysitters were locked out. “[M]ore than mere ‘inconvenience’ to residents,” she likened
the searches to government tyranny in violation of the Fourth Amendment, actions that—she
argued—would never be tolerated in more affluent communities.48 In line with this assessment,
Harriet Burton*, a longtime resident of Altgeld Gardens, remembers the raids as “frightening
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because everybody had to let [the police] in their house. And I let them in my house. They went
up, checked drawers, checked all the furniture, pulled stuff out and didn’t put it back and went to
the next house.”49
Despite the ACLU’s objections, Operation Clean Sweep moved ahead, with Lane
restating his commitment to the sweeps in March of 1989.50 In his fervor for the raids, Lane was
encouraged by support from HUD: when HUD Secretary Jack Kemp toured parts of two highrise buildings at Rockwell Gardens the same month, he publicly praised Operation Clean Sweep
as a means of restoring order to the complex. Surrounded by what the paper described as a
“phalanx of Chicago police and security officers,” Kemp announced, “I am a strong supporter of
what Mr. Lane and the police are doing to recapture these buildings from the hoodlums” adding,
“and we don’t want to violate anyone’s constitutional rights.” Prior to Kemp’s visit, CHA had
freshly painted the building’s white walls and installed armed security officers to guard the
entrance. Kemp commented, “The work being done here at Rockwell Gardens is a model for the
rest of the country,” continuing “Ultimately, it is attitudinal. You have to give people the
environment where they can . . . feel a sense of control over their own lives.”‡51
The editors of the Chicago Tribune and Chicago Defender newspapers likewise publicly
supported the searches, even as the ACLU continued to raise objections. In April of 1989, the

‡

A few years later, in March of 1994, Carlos Vivoni, who served as the then-Secretary of Housing for the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, visited CHA to see “Operation Clean Sweep” in action. In his view, the operation
was mild compared to security sweeps in Puerto Rico. As the Sun-Times reported, “Sweeps in Chicago CHA
management and police converge on a development for a door-to-door, visual inspection of apartments to weed out
illegal tenants, make repairs and confiscate drugs, weapons and contraband found in the open. Sweeps in Puerto
Rico: Helicopters swoop down in the predawn hours. National Guardsmen are stationed on roofs. Search warrants
are executed. Doors are kicked in. Weapons and drugs are seized, arrests made, and the entire development fenced
in.” One Puerto Rican public housing resident among the delegation said that residents initially rejected it, but came
around to the policy once “we saw all the weapons and drugs taken out.” Juan Garcia, director of recreation and
sports for the Puerto Rican government, said, “It’s what happens when you stack poor people in tall buildings and
forget about them. For too long we told them, ‘Public housing is for you. Do whatever you want, as long as we don’t
have to deal with you.’ Now we have to deal with it” (Ihejirika 1994, 24).
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Tribune editors praised Lane and Operation Clean Sweep, writing, “If Lane keeps it up, he just
might turn back the clock in the Chicago Housing Authority to the days when it provided decent
places to live for poor people.” Following Lane’s raids, the paper reported that “Now he is
tightening the screws a notch more on CHA terrorists with a new round of raids, this time in
cooperation with federal authorities.” A Defender editorial likewise announced the paper’s
“vigorous support” for the raids, noting that “There is a real need for such raids to continue until
residents can move about the CHA in safety.”52 Cleaning out the buildings, they asserted, was a
matter of “public interest.” To complement the raids, CHA had begun employing drug forfeiture
laws that enabled the agency to evict tenants suspected of drug dealing from their apartments, a
practice the paper hailed as “an innovative application” of the law. That is, far from scaling back
on the raids, Lane and the CHA were finding new ways to increase the consequences for anyone
found to be violating a lease provision. By the spring of 1989, and as is detailed in Chapter 5,
Lane was also in the process of building the CHA Police Department. The paper noted how this
new force would augment the raids, concluding that “After years of offering drug dealers a
virtually free and open market to ply their trade and terrorize law-abiding residents, it is
refreshing to see the CHA send clear signals that they may soon find themselves homeless.”53
The raids found a detractor in the NRA, who said that sweeps denied CHA tenants their
constitutional right to bear arms. However, then-CHA Police Chief Ira Harris countered the
NRA’s assertion, pointing out that guns had been banned in public housing for 20 years in CHA
leases, so the raids introduced no new policy in that respect.54
Also in April of 1989, CHA conducted two more sweeps in Ogden Courts on the city’s
west side. Following the raid, Lane commented: “We’re regaining control of our buildings for
the residents. I really enjoy this. I feel good when we can respond to our tenants’ needs.” These
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raids were the first for Ogden Courts and the sixth sweeps conducted by CHA overall. Lane told
the press that he currently had funding to conduct nine additional sweeps in 1989 and was
seeking alternative funds to finance as many as 40 more sweeps within the year.55 In May, U.S.
Representative John Edward Porter, who represented Illinois’ 10th district, wrote a column for
the Sun-Times in which he praised Lane as a leader who demonstrated the difference between, in
his words, “a bureaucrat and a real administrator.” Porter supported Operation Clean Sweep,
noting that “The ACLU should understand what tenants know all too well: no one has rights as
long as the criminals are in control.”56
However, in addition to the legal and moral concerns raised by the raids, there was
another point to consider, and one that the local papers increasingly began to raise for public
discussion: Were the sweeps actually effective? That is, what were the raids achieving vis-à-vis
public safety? In June of 1989, the Tribune reported that a building at Rockwell Gardens—117
S. Rockwell—hosted “rampant and open drug dealing . . . 15 hours a day.” Known as the “PCP
building,” the paper reported that children and mothers traversed the open drug market daily. The
paper noted the irony of this, since CHA had just swept several buildings at Rockwell the
previous fall. This particular building had not been swept: its neighbor, which had, was “cleaned
up, painted, fenced in and given guards and a security system.” Sergeant Gary Morris of CPD’s
Public Housing North unit commented that, “The trouble is securing one or two buildings in a
public housing complex doesn’t change things. The drug dealers and the criminals run out of the
back door of the place you clean up and run into the front door of the next building. You are
going to have to secure all of them in one complex if you are going to make a dent.”57 Former
CHA Police Officer Fernando Reyes notes that “The building would be safe for, let’s say, a day
or two, but once it was over, it was just—that building would no longer be safe as it was a couple
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days before and we’d go on to another building and do the same thing. I mean, it’d be nothing to
arrest several hundred people during a swarm. But to me, it was a revolving door.”
Residents largely agreed. Andre Jenkins* says sweeps at the Taylor Homes made him
feel safer “for what, a day or two? But three days after they got through with the sweep and went
in everybody’s apartment and all that, maybe what—three weeks later it went back the same
way.”58 Irene Betts*, who lived at the ABLA Homes during the years Operation Clean Sweep
was in effect, calls the raids “a lot of money wasted, because as soon as the sweep was over,
everything went back to where it was supposed to be. . . . They weren’t very effective.”59 For
these and many other critics, police raids of individual CHA buildings comprised a game of
public safety whack-a-mole.
Additionally, police had struggled to truly surprise residents during the raids. According
to the papers, paid lookouts often tipped drug dealers off to the arrival of police cars, making
buildings like those at Rockwell Gardens into “a citadel—virtually safe from any surprise visit
by the police.” 60 Captain Kenneth Alexander of CPD’s Gang Crimes West unit commented,
“We’ve been making arrests over there for the last several weeks but it is a difficult battle. They
have an amazing lookout system in all directions, and going in there to end this drug dealing in
the building is like disappearing into the catacombs.”61 Plainclothes police officers regularly
made arrests but because no police were permanently stationed in the buildings, sellers would
return to their posts as soon as police left and sales would resume.
By June, the Tribune presented more data, finding that, despite Lane’s crime fighting
efforts at CHA, violent crime in public housing had risen 28 percent at CHA sites during the first
quarter of 1989 over the same period the previous year. The increase came after a drop in
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reported crimes the previous year following Lane’s appointment.§ Lane speculated that the
increase in crime was due to increased levels of reporting from residents, noting, “The number of
calls we get is astronomical.” Police felt differently, attributing the increase in crime “in part, to
Lane’s controversial sweeps of CHA high-rises, which are followed by tighter security measures.
. . . Gang members purged from the secured high-rises because their names do not appear on a
CHA lease often move to unsecured buildings in the same development. If the turf they invade
belongs to a rival gang, warfare ensues.” Thus, while most available evidence is anecdotal, there
is no clear data showing that raids made public housing residents safer, at least not in a lasting
way. Even the police admitted that raids were not stopping drug dealing and its accompanying
violence, but rather, moving it around.
Indeed, on June 16, residents of a Rockwell Gardens building reportedly woke up to find
about two dozen unfamiliar gang members gathered who had been pushed out of a nearby
building the previous day. One resident said, “They worked our building over in a matter of
hours. They knocked the lights off in the stairwells. They set it up just like they wanted.”62 In
July, the Tribune again reported on crime statistics at CHA, concluding that crime was more
accurately described as shifting rather than declining following the introduction of Operation
Clean Sweep. Swept buildings were experiencing decreases in crime, but crime was increasing at
nearby buildings where, the paper wrote, “relocated gangs are helping to make life even more
dangerous for residents.”63
Lane admitted to the paper that he had “no plans” for dealing with shifting gang
violence.64 In response to questions about the sweeps’ efficacy, Lane commented that “The key
is to take [the buildings] over until we get them all.”65 He further stated, “I wish I could wave a

§

Crime had also risen citywide during the first quarter of the year.

236

wand and secure all the buildings, but this is a one step process. Unless you give me some
money, there’s nothing I can do about it.”66 Far from retreating from the sweeps, Lane saw their
equivocal results as justification to enact even more raids. The problem did not lie with the raids
themselves, in Lane’s view, but the fact that he could not sweep and secure more of the
buildings, more quickly.

Public Safety at What Cost?
While the ACLU, some CHA residents, and other concerned citizens raised objections to
the raids on legal and moral grounds, and the press debated the efficacy of the raids as a crimefighting strategy, the policing practice was running up steep bills at CHA. In short, raids were
expensive, as were the securitizing measures that accompanied them. Lane estimated it cost
CHA about $200,000 to sweep and repair a 13-story high-rise and an additional $350,000 to
$500,000 per year for security. The CHA had 153 family high-rises, 128 of which had serious
gang problems, according to Lane.67 At that rate, it would cost over $25 million to raid and
secure each problem building in the housing portfolio.
Luckily, CHA was not alone in funding the raids and their ensuing building security
upgrades. In February of 1989, the Chicago City Council approved $589,000 for security
improvements at CHA buildings targeted in the sweeps. The funds would be used for elevator
repairs, the construction of new security gates, and the hiring of security guards—all common
practices after each raid.68 HUD also signaled its support for Operation Clean Sweep when, in
August of 1989—with the federal agency’s approval—the CHA Board approved a record
modernization budget of $47.8 million for the agency. Nearly half of the modernization funds—
typically intended for building improvements—was earmarked for the new CHA police force as
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well as enclosing and securing the lobbies of 27 of the agency’s high-rises. The funds would also
pay to enclose the elevators at thirteen of the Taylor Homes high-rises, where elevators were
currently exposed to the outside of the buildings, as well as to install electronic security systems
on each floor. HUD’s Midwest office had invited CHA to request the higher-than-usual amount
of funding, and was expected to approve the budget by September 30, a move that signaled the
federal agency’s support for the raids and Lane’s tough-on-crime, public safety focus more
generally. Ten high-rises had been swept so far; the new funds would enable CHA to expand the
operation to 14 more buildings in the next year, including some at Cabrini-Green and the Ida B.
Wells Homes that had been identified as targets. Lane said the funding “should make a
tremendous impact. There’s a lot of money to spend. This will definitely make a dent.” He did
note, however, that the funding came with tradeoffs: with so much of their modernization budget
used primarily for security and emergency repairs from the previous year, Lane noted the agency
had little left to spend on emergency repairs in the coming months.69 Thus, spending on raids
came at a direct cost of building upkeep.
Nevertheless, CHA remained committed to its strategy and the raids continued. As CHA
awaited HUD’s budget approval in August, CHA and CPD raided another building at Rockwell
Gardens, where they seized the most contraband to date, including “plastic explosives,
detonators, guns, ammunitions and drug paraphernalia, as well as a sophisticated two-way radio
system.” Gang activity had reportedly risen in the building following the sweep of a neighboring
building in June. This was the fourth sweep at Rockwell Gardens, where Lane had promised to
secure all eight of the complex’s family high-rises by September.70 In this way, Rockwell was to
be a test case for CHA: by concentrating their efforts at one development, CHA hoped to prove
success that would convince HUD to continue funding raids throughout their developments.71
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Meanwhile, the federal court approved an agreement between the ACLU, CHA, and CPD
to set guidelines on how CHA personnel could conduct apartment searches. Under the terms of
the agreement, Lane would have to approve an emergency inspection in writing after
determining that there was reasonable cause to believe of the existence of an immediate threat to
the safety or welfare of anyone on site. Officers conducting the inspection would only be allowed
to check for apartment condition and remove unauthorized occupants, but would not be
permitted to inspect the person or personal property of a resident.72 With these new limitations in
mind, CHA swept another building at Rockwell Gardens in late August, resulting in eight
arrests.73 With this raid, Lane met his preliminary goal: as of August 31, 1989, Rockwell
Gardens was the first CHA development to have all of its high-rises swept and secured.74
In September, the Sun-Times declared victory for CHA, reporting that sniper fire had
decreased at Rockwell Gardens and in its immediate neighborhood due to CHA “virtually
eliminat[ing] gangs and drug dealers from all eight Rockwell high-rises.”75 The Tribune likewise
celebrated the positive developments in the broader Rockwell Gardens neighborhood, writing
that “a community is being reborn.”76 HUD Secretary Kemp told a group of CHA workers and
tenant leaders, “You’ve changed these fields from killing fields to fields of dreams. This is the
kind of Renaissance we want to see all over the country.” Lane called the ostensible success at
Rockwell Gardens “a blueprint for CHA’s future” and “the flagship of public housing in this
country.” Indeed, the Washington, DC housing authority had already followed CHA’s example
by using similar tactics to raid and secure two of its buildings. As the Tribune rhapsodized,
Back are the white-washed walls and stench-free stairwells, the blooming flower beds
and grassy lawns that made Rockwell a model development when it opened in 1961.
Gone is the terror that swept the development last summer, when rival gangs turned the
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high-rise into a violence-torn fortress, driving out frightened residents. No longer do
tenants carry flashlights to make their way up and down the pitch-black stairwells or hide
in closets and bathtubs to evade stray bullets.77
Waiting lists had reportedly swelled and vacancies dropped at Rockwell Gardens. “But,” the
paper cautioned, “if the changes are to be permanent, it will be necessary to change the mind-set
of the tenants. And changing the attitudes of generations who have learned to live with neglect
and crime will be more difficult than erecting gates or applying a fresh coat of paint.”78 The
problem, per the media, fundamentally rested not with the structural environment of poverty
found in CHA developments—the lack of jobs, lack of services, or the deprivations that
accompanied the rescaling of the welfare state. Instead, the problem was one of mindset, of
attitudes. Virginia Peoples, Rockwell’s new property manager, agreed with this assessment,
noting “It’s going to take a while. We have tenants who don’t know what it is to be a good
tenant.”79 Thus, at least as the paper presented it, securitization efforts were as much about
reforming public housing residents as they were about ridding public housing of its ostensible
criminal element. According to the paper, “results are beginning to show. Residents have begun
requesting paint to decorate their apartments, and business has shot up at local social service
agencies.”80
A few months on, the Sun-Times likewise touted the positive effects of Operation Clean
Sweep, highlighting a library near Rockwell Gardens that had noticed increased traffic from
neighborhood kids. Officials said crime was down, rent collection up, vacancies down, and
maintenance improved. A nearby elementary school principal said students’ attitudes had
improved. Mary Baldwin, president of Rockwell’s resident advisory council, said “No doubt
about it, before there was someone getting shot every day and parents were afraid to let their
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children outside alone. Now you see kids all over.” Deputy Chief Sherwood Williams of CPD’s
Public Housing Unit said he was “amazed” by the improvements and hoped to repeat the sweeps
at every development.81
Despite this early declared victory, CHA still faced the problem of how to fund Operation
Clean Sweep on a large scale: HUD had earmarked $50 million to distribute among 3,300 public
housing authorities nationwide, a figure that would never sufficiently fund CHA to sweep all of
its troubled buildings. Further, CHA was also due to lose another $8 million in federal subsidies
due to budget cuts under the Gramm-Rudman law, which set binding constraints on the federal
budget.82
In addition to budgetary shortfalls, there were other concerns about the raids following
the completion of the sweeps at Rockwell. Even Lane admitted the complex still had problems,
including gang activity and outstanding complaints against residents, and had been slow to form
a tenant council—an important sign of resident involvement. Meanwhile, some crime had shifted
to the unsecured buildings nearby.83 Further, the Tribune noted that the winter would pose a test
for the newly implemented security protocols, since drug trafficking usually moved indoors
during the colder months. At Rockwell, some residents also resented the new security measures,
which they felt were overly strict. One tenant reported being handcuffed by security guards for
not having her ID card, which had been stolen along with her purse. Another resident said her
son was strongly reprimanded by guards for bouncing a ball off the walls. Others said their
relatives found it too difficult to visit. Recent flyers had circulated, calling the new security
program a plot to rid Rockwell of poor tenants and make way for affluent gentrifiers. Despite
these misgivings, Lane remained confident in Operation Clean Sweep, saying that resident
mistrust was misplaced.84
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Table 6.1 Non-exhaustive Timeline of Raids
March 1981

Raid at Cabrini-Green before Mayor Byrne
moves in
September 1988
Operation Clean Sweep begins with raid at
Rockwell Gardens
December 1988
Raids at Prairie Courts, Cabrini-Green
April 1989
Raids at Ogden Courts
Summer 1989
Raids at Rockwell Gardens
By January 1990, 21 buildings were swept and CHA begins to re-sweep some buildings.
March 1990
Repeat raids at Washington Park
August 1990
Repeat raids at Rockwell
By December 1990, 28 buildings swept.
April 1991
Raids at Stateway Gardens
August 1991
Raids at Cabrini-Green, Robert Taylor
Homes.
By the end of 1991, 42 buildings total had been swept in 1991 and 76 total since Operation
Clean Sweep began.
April 1992
Raid at Wells Homes through “Operation
Weed and Seed.”
September 1992
Sweeps at Taylor Homes
October 1992
Raid at Altgeld Gardens
The Raids Continue
Despite ongoing legal disputes, questions about the efficacy of the sweeps, and the high
cost of funding sweeps and their ensuing securitization measures, the raids continued. By the end
of January 1990, 21 CHA buildings had been secured under Operation Clean Sweep.85 CHA also
began to re-sweep previously raided buildings such as one at Washington Park, where CPD and
the new CHA Police banded together to conduct their first joint sweep in late March of 1990.
Though it had been just eight months since the building was last raided, CHA reported that gang
members and drug dealers had returned to the building and “just stayed.” By re-raiding the
building, they hoped to rid the site of unauthorized guests although, according to the consent
decree with ACLU, visitors were allowed to visit at all hours and stay for up to two weeks.86
Thus, weeding out unauthorized guests had become a highly discretionary enterprise that
pressured the bounds of what the court allowed.
242

In late August, CHA conducted another sweep at Rockwell just before 10 am, in a
building that had been swept one year prior. 70 CPD officers as well as CHA officials conducted
the sweep, which came in response to a rise in shootings.87 CPD Commander Hosea Crossley
said again that the goal of the raid was to rid the building of unauthorized guests, explaining,
“We have a lot of gang members who are not authorized residents, but they come here and stay
because there are a lot of single females here.” During the sweep, teams of CHA officials went
door to door questioning residents about who was living in their apartments. According to the
terms of a new consent decree with ACLU, only CHA personnel were now allowed to enter
apartments during an inspection—but not police. Additionally, tenants were to receive at least
two days’ notice of the inspection unless Lane determined that an “emergency” existed. As
officials knocked on doors, teams of trades workers from CHA came into the building to repair
broken doors where people had been entering the building without passing the private security
guards stationed at the entrance. Wilbert Allen of CHA’s General Counsel’s office said “Most of
the residents will welcome this. The good residents are the victims of the gang members.” Some
residents bemoaned the emphasis on guest registration. For example, one woman complained,
“They keep us caged up here like animals, but never repair things.” She pointed out broken light
fixtures, holes in walls, and rotting doors in a building where, per the Sun-Times, “The walls of
the stairwells were covered with gang graffiti and smelled of human waste.”88 For many
residents living in the authority’s poorly maintained buildings, the ongoing, dramatic security
interventions felt misplaced.
By December, CHA had swept 28 buildings.89 Still, the effects of the raids were
uncertain. In January 1991, CPD Superintendent Martin speculated to the press that Operation
Clean Sweep may have inadvertently driven up Chicago’s homicide rate by driving drug dealers
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out of CHA buildings and forcing them to “shoot their way in” to areas under the control of rival
dealers. However, he said the sweeps had otherwise been successful, noting that the sweeps had
successfully reduced both violent crime and property crimes within the CHA developments.90 A
small activist group known as the Campaign to End CHA Lockdowns had formed to protest the
raids, accusing Lane of using “Gestapo-like tactics to lock up poor.”91 Other critics publicly
compared the raids to a war on Black people,92 lynching,93 and apartheid-style government.94
A horrible series of events triggered raids at Stateway Gardens later that spring.95 Over
the course of a week in April, an 8-year-old boy was injured by stray bullets that entered his
apartment and a 3-year-old boy was killed in his apartment by a stray bullet while his mother
was dressing him. In response, 220 police officers (140 CPD and 80 CHA) raided the complex at
10 am in what the Tribune called “one of the most successful Chicago Housing Authority sweeps
to date.” 41 people were arrested on drug, mob action, and weapons charges and police
confiscated several handguns, two semiautomatic weapons, and ‘large quantities’ of drugs.96
This sweep was a first for CHA because, while CPD normally assisted CHA with the sweeps,
this was the first time the agency’s police force served their own warrants during sweeps. Also
for the first time, police ran general background checks on any unauthorized residents before
they were issued guest passes. As had become a common refrain when justifying the sweeps, a
CHA spokesperson told the press of the agency’s need to rid the buildings of unauthorized
residents “because they are the cause of 80 percent of the crime problems.”97 Indeed, from the
beginning, raids were a key tool for CHA to precipitate evictions, foreshadowing the formal
enactment of the One Strike Rule in 1996 under President Clinton.98 While on site for the raids,
CHA employees painted over graffiti, cleaned sewers, and installed chain-link fences.99

244

As usual, resident views diverged as to the necessity and efficacy of the raids. One
Stateway resident, Pam Smith, submitted to an apartment search by police who showed her a
warrant. She said “I’m glad they did it. I’m tired of running and dodging and ducking bullets.” 100
Another resident questioned, “Why do we have to wait until someone gets killed to do
something?”101 Despite the critiques of some residents, many at the time called publicly for the
raids to continue, including at a June 1991 conference where over 1,000 CHA residents
demanded public officials do something to address high crime rates at the developments. Among
their resolutions was a call for the CHA to begin an immediate sweep of all high-rise
buildings.102 Meanwhile, other residents continued to object to what they saw as overly invasive
measures. In July of 1991, some Rockwell Gardens tenants told the Chicago Defender of a new
CHA security policy that required guards to search their bodies each time they entered the
building. One resident, Delois Cole, told the paper “If I come in and show my I.D., fine. But to
line us up against the wall is absurd.” Another, Clarence Taylor, told the paper “I don’t think I
should be patted down every time I come home. Everyone in the building is not a criminal. I
know there are problems, but you cannot violate my rights.”103
Increasingly, raids began to follow specific episodes of violence. In August, CPD officers
swept buildings at Cabrini-Green three times over the course of a few days after a weekend
shooting in which two men were killed.104 The same month, CPD and CHA conducted the
largest-ever sweep to date after CHA Police Officer Jimmie Haynes was critically wounded by
sniper fire at the Robert Taylor Homes. During the raid, more than 100 CHA police officers and
dozens of city police officers, as well as CHA administrators, conducted a door-to-door
inspection of five Taylor Homes buildings. Officers found no suspects in the Haynes shooting
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but did make six other arrests.105 In the wake of the shooting, Lane admitted “I’m concerned
about being the gestapo, but this is the only way we can get the weapons and drugs.”106
In 1991 alone, CHA swept a total of 42 buildings—76 total since Operation Clean Sweep
began. Other municipalities were eager to adopt a similar program: In addition to Washington,
DC, Newark, New Jersey began implementing raids, and HUD sent a training film featuring the
CHA sweeps to public housing authorities throughout the nation. According to CHA, crime had
dropped in nine swept Rockwell buildings by 11 to 56 percent six months after the raids.
Sherwood Williams, Chief of CPD’s Public Housing unit, said that thefts on nearby Western
Avenue had also dropped after the CHA sweeps at Rockwell. HUD again indicated its approval
of the sweeps when it awarded CHA $5.9 million in drug elimination funds in November 1991 (a
$2 million increase), and $114.1 million in modernization funds (twice the amount awarded three
years prior). CHA spokesperson Andre Garner said “a big chunk” of that money would pay for
more sweeps. HUD also awarded CHA a grant to do formal evaluation on the sweeps.107
Chicago Police Superintendent LeRoy Martin was hired as CHA’s Police Chief in 1992 after
reaching the mandatory police retirement age of 63. According to him, CHA buildings were
“much safer” than they were before Operation Clean Sweep began.”108
Despite Martin’s confidence, CHA high-rise complexes continued to suffer violent
episodes. In September, what the Sun-Times called “gang warfare” broke out at the Taylor
Homes: “Gunfire poured from the upper floors of the buildings, from behind shrubs and bushes
outside the structures and from nearby railroad tracks.” 109 Following reports that one gang’s
arsenal had been moved to another building, CPD officers from the Special Functions Division
conducted what their division chief called a “mini-sweep” of the building. During the ‘minisweep,’ officers arrested a woman for keeping the guns, charging her with multiple weapons
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violations.110 CHA officials and police conducted another sweep at a Taylor high-rise following
the gang violence, arresting 10 people and seizing a stash of weapons. This was the 16th building
to be swept at Taylor. One resident, Helena Burton, said, “You don’t wait (for a sweep) until
people get shot and killed. This is all just a Band-Aid.”111 After four years, residents were tired
of the shooting and the raids alike — both, in their own way, were violent practices.
While CHA orchestrated its raids through Operation Clean Sweep, multiple law
enforcement agencies collaborated on raids through other programs. For example, in April of
1992, over 300 police officers had staged a raid at the Wells Homes, seizing $500,000 in drugs,
$50,000 in cash, and over 70 guns. Not part of Operation Clean Sweep, this raid belonged to a
different enterprise: the federal “Operation Weed and Seed,” which brought officers from the
CPD and CHA Police, FBI, the U.S. Attorney’s office, the DEA, the Cook County Sheriff’s
police, the Illinois State Police, the IRS, the State’s Attorney’s Office, the U.S. Marshalls, and
the ATF alike. 112 Then, in October, over 300 officers conducted a pre-dawn raid at Altgeld
Gardens, seizing 44 guns and “small quantities” of drugs. Thirty-five people were arrested and
another thirty-five were sought. The raid followed a monthlong investigation. Nine agencies took
part in the raid: CPD, ATF, CHA Police, FBI, U.S. Attorney’s office, DEA, Cook County
Sheriff’s Police, Illinois State Police, and the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office. Following
the sweep, Lane announced that a new satellite police station would be opened at Altgeld
Gardens.113
Given the frequency of the raids, the disciplinary atmosphere they created at CHA
developments, the extent to which they invaded residents’ privacy (even with the restrictions
ACLU imposed), and the number of law enforcement agencies turning their attention to CHA
during this period, it is no wonder that many residents recall the practice bitterly. As longtime
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Altgeld Gardens resident and tenant leader Bernadette Williams recalls, the raids were
“horrible.” She remembers one particular raid at Altgeld, saying,
I woke up one day and I saw the police out and around my area where I lived. I didn’t
think anything of it. I had gotten up, got my daughter ready, took her [to preschool]. . . . I
still didn’t know what was going on. . . . I found out what happened when I got to the
school. They were telling me that [the police] were going to people’s houses. So, when I
made it back to my house, they had been to my unit. They arrested my daughter’s father
because he wouldn’t open up the door. He didn’t know what was going on. I was trying
to get back to let him know that the police were going to be coming there, but they just
arrested him for trespassing.114
Williams’ memory speaks to the confusion incurred by raids which, at least initially, surprised
tenants with their ferocity, even if they later became commonplace. Her recollection also speaks
to the different set of rules public housing residents had to live by, compared to any other
residents of the city. For a CHA resident, being unmarried, and living with your unmarried
partner, was a liability—one that could result in arrest and/or eviction.
For Irene Betts,* who lived at the ABLA Homes, the CHA and CPD’s maniacal pursuit
of unauthorized guests was “stupid. I mean, what if you were visiting me? You’re over there and
you’re visiting me and [the police] come in: ‘Are you on the list? Can I see your ID?’ If you
can’t present an ID, you have to go. Not knowing that somebody probably lost their ID or
something like that.”115 Betts’ testimony speaks to the extent to which the practice of police raids
functionally criminalized all CHA residents. Meanwhile, assigning and checking ID cards for
everyone made the buildings feel more institutional and less domestic.
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Thus, in the process of trying to keep residents safe, CHA treated all of its residents like
criminals. Douglas Ewing*, a longtime Cabrini-Green resident, remembers the raids as
“awful.”116 He recounts one evening when he spent a “private night” with a girlfriend. The two
were watching television, she wearing nothing but her underwear on the couch, when they heard
a knock on the door. As he remembers, “I open the door, [and] the cop just pushes me out of the
way and walks right in my house. I go ‘Who the hell are you?’” Ewing’s girlfriend quickly
covered up with a sheet, while the police officer, who Ewing describes as “some white guy, he’s
got no badge on, he’s in undercover garb” barged into the apartment. His girlfriend called 911,
telling the police they were having a home invasion, when, as Ewing describes, “We get a knock
on the door, and guess who it is? It’s the officers who were doing this, and they’re trying to
explain to me how they’re doing this to try and stop drugs and gangbanging.” Another time, as
Ewing describes, “just a random day on a Sunday or whatever,” the police again knocked on his
door. This time, four or five officers came in and, as Ewing recalls,
. . . just walk all up in my house and start walking through my house–the whole house.
And I’m like ‘What the hell are you [doing]?’ This time, they got on uniforms. So they’re
telling me to shut my ass up, and I get on the phone, and I call the cops. They tell me—I
mean, they were very stern. They didn’t pull their guns out, but they were very serious.
Like, violence was going to be coming my way if I didn’t put the phone down so that 911
could hear everything that was going on. And so, they proceed again to threaten me, ask
me ‘Why is your house dirty?’ I make speakers for a living, so there was sawdust on the
ground.
Ewing told the officers it was none of their business why his house was dirty, but explained he
made speakers. The officers continued to pester him, asking why he didn’t wash the dishes.
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“Finally,” he says, “I got so upset about it—and by the way, they got my door wide open, so
there’s four cops in my apartment, and there’s two cops on the outside of my apartment, and then
of course now there’s a crowd gathering outside looking.” Ewing describes his embarrassment at
the scene, but later found solidarity with his neighbors after the raid, who told him “‘Yeah, they
knocked on everybody’s door. Did the same thing. Came in and just walk all up in your house
and harass you.” Experiencing repeated raids of this kind fueled Ewing’s distrust of the police, as
it did for many CHA residents. He and others testify that the raids were not gentle, periodic
inspections but rather random, invasive, and even violent strikes during which residents were
harassed by police and feared for their safety at the hands of the officers.
Like Ewing, Keith Augustine says that the police raids of his Cabrini-Green home
contributed to his long-term distrust of the police, who he said assaulted the women in his
community and put false charges on himself and his friends.117 He admits that sometimes
residents did commit wrongdoing or harbor contraband, but emphasizes the violent nature of the
raids themselves:
You are at your house. You are chilling and they come in your house and they tear your
house up because you have nice things, and they are seeing that. And they come in your
house—it’s a whole bunch of people that’s not your color. . . . And you might have nice
paintings or nice vases and stuff that’s valuable to you, and they are not respecting your
stuff. They come in and just knocking your vases over. They tear your pictures up. How
would you feel? . . . When they leave, that’s it: ‘Oh we didn’t find nothing.’ ‘Damn, so
you all didn’t find nothing, and you all just tore my whole house up? Who is going to pay
for all the stuff you broke?’ They don’t care. ‘Who is going to pay for this door you all
broke?’ They don’t care.
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If police raids were justified as a way to protect residents, they achieved quite the opposite effect
for many. Rather than making residents feel safe, the raids made many CHA tenants feel
threatened in their own homes by police who destroyed their possessions and CHA property
alike. As Augustine alludes to here, the racial divide between CHA residents, who were
predominantly Black, and CPD officers, who were predominantly white, only fueled suspicion.
Operation Clean Sweep also impacted family life, not just by incentivizing marriage
between unwed partners or by policing truancy among students, but by challenging family
dynamics. Again, as Augustine explains of the raids,
Your kid is traumatized now. The kid is crying. How are your kids going to be alright
after ten police just came in there and treated their protector—their father—and treated
their mother—the mother is supposed to protect them, nourish and feed them—treated
them like shit in front of them? How are you supposed to respect your parents?118
For Augustine, police authority supplanted parental authority within the household, challenging
dynamics within the family itself. Seeing their parents submit to police harassment made
children lose respect for their parents and lose faith in their parents’ ability to protect them from
outside forces. In all of these ways, as these residents attest, the raids were violent events, albeit
state sanctioned. As a complement to other forms of intensive policing and surveillance, the raids
contributed to making public housing into a carceral space, a space that felt, in Augustine’s
words “like a prison” rather than a home. The raids understandably fueled resident distrust and
dislike of the police, heightening hostilities between the two groups, while the invasive practice
directly resulted in the incarceration of scores of housing residents and their guests, creating a
direct pipeline from the projects to the prison.
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Conclusion
The following chapter explores the events that followed in the wake of a tragedy at
Cabrini-Green: the accidental shooting death of 7-year-old resident Dantrell Davis. While many
other children had died and even been killed at CHA, Dantrell’s slaying ignited a maelstrom like
no other. The events surrounding Dantrell’s death—including the drastic, repeated police raids of
Cabrini-Green in the days following his murder—would never have been possible if not for the
four years of raids preceding Dantrell’s death, and even the earlier ones that laid the groundwork
for Operation Clean Sweep and the other multi-agency operations that raided CHA housing
during the same years.
Despite the repeated legal challenges mounted by the ACLU, Operation Clean Sweep
created a blueprint for police raids in public housing that became a nationwide model. The raids
lacked evidence of efficacy—clearly so if four years of raids could not prevent a child’s murder.
They were also extremely expensive, costing money that the cash-strapped CHA could have
spent in many other ways. But perhaps more than anything, the raids were themselves violent,
involving everything from destruction of resident property to verbal harassment to intimidation
to physical abuse. During raids, residents feared for their safety at the hands of officers who
invaded their domestic spaces. Knowing they could be raided at any time, residents felt
surveilled in their own homes, and were stripped of the sense of privacy and domesticity
afforded to most housed Americans in the private realms of our lives. Subject to intense police
scrutiny, public housing residents were arrested at high rates and ensnared in the auspices of the
prison system. In all of these ways, then, raids contributed to making public housing into not just
a violent space, but a carceral space.
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Chapter 7. Policing the Tragedy: A Son’s Murder, A Mother’s Eviction
On the morning of Tuesday, October 13, 1992, seven-year-old Cabrini-Green resident
Dantrell Davis was walking to first grade at nearby Jenner Elementary, holding his mother’s
hand, when he was shot and killed by a stray bullet.1 Sadly, Dantrell was far from the first child
to die at CHA. Other young children had been casualties of gang warfare over the years, such as
13-year-old Kevin Payton, who was killed by sniper fire at Cabrini-Green in November of 1984
when shooting broke out between three rival gangs.2 Also in 1984, 13-year-old Peggy Golden
was killed at the Robert Taylor Homes when a 14-year-old boy fired a gun into a crowd and
accidentally struck her in the back of the head.3 In August of 1985, 9-year-old Laketa Crosby
died of a gunshot wound at Cabrini-Green, becoming the 81st homicide victim at the complex
since January of the previous year.4 Just a few months later, in December, a 16-year-old CabriniGreen resident shot and killed a 12-year-old resident.5 In July of 1986, 8-year-old Yarnell
Carpton was seriously wounded when caught in gang crossfire while visiting his grandmother at
the Henry Horner Homes, but was lucky enough to survive the incident.6 In April of 1991, a 3year-old boy was killed by stray bullets and an 8-year-old seriously injured at Stateway
Gardens.7 Over the years, several teenagers were shot and killed by security guards or police. 8
Others still had fallen victim to CHA’s poor management; becoming trapped in apartment fires,
falling down broken elevator shafts, or falling out of windows and off of balconies that either
lacked or had faulty safety guards.9 None of these deaths provoked the same kind of response as
Dantrell’s shooting.
If Chicago public housing had garnered a reputation for violence, Dantrell’s murder set
off a national media maelstrom and provoked an intense public safety crackdown from CHA,
CPD, and the City of Chicago.10 Following the incident, the Chicago Tribune editorial board
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wrote that “Among the 772 murders in Chicago this year, few seems so devastating, so numbing
in its sense of hopelessness, as the death of 7-year-old Dantrell Davis.”11 The editors wrote that
despite the protections in place, “None of them could shield Dantrell from a sniper firing—who
knows why—from an abandoned apartment in one of Cabrini’s high-rise hellholes.” They asked
how any kid was supposed to grow up in “such a devastating environment.”12
This chapter will demonstrate how Dantrell’s death became what journalist Mick Dumke
would eventually call “the shot that brought the projects down.”13 In telling this story, I trace
three interrelated policy responses to Dantrell’s death, all ostensibly aimed at promoting public
safety in public housing: intensified policing, intensified evictions, and, ultimately, the
demolition of Chicago’s high-rise public housing. In charting the events that unfolded following
Dantrell’s tragic killing, I argue that the combination of policing and evictions represent the
apotheosis of carceral practices in CHA housing—practices that criminalized every resident, up
to and including the person most victimized by Dantrell’s death: his mother, Annette Freeman. In
turn, Dantrell’s death created an opening for a broader housing transformation that CHA
administrators and city officials had long hoped for. In making this argument, I do not mean to
suggest a conspiratorial interpretation of the events surrounding Dantrell’s death: that city
officials knowingly capitalized on or even caused his death to enact their gentrifying agendas.
However, I do suggest that, given the carceral logics already in place in public housing by the
time of the tragedy, Dantrell’s death further solidified the growing policy consensus that the only
solution to ameliorate crime in the projects was to tear them down.
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Policing “the CHA problem”
In so many ways, policing failed to prevent Dantrell’s death. As explored in the previous
chapters, by the time Dantrell was shot, Cabrini-Green had been the site of intensive policing for
decades, including multiple CHA sweeps in the years immediately preceding his death. Indeed,
according to newspaper accounts, police were even on site at the time he was killed, standing
guard while parents walked their children to school—a guard that had been established that fall,
along with a parent and teacher safety patrol to escort the children en route.14 Also at the time of
the shooting, a police squad car was reportedly parked just 20 feet away from where Dantrell
walked, hand-in-hand with his mom.*15 So, in this case at least, the shooting cannot be blamed on
lack of police presence or under-policing, but rather occurred despite the significant police
presence dispatched in the area and the intensive policing regimes extant at Cabrini-Green for
many years prior. Additionally, while CHA knew that vacant apartments encouraged criminal
activity, the agency had increasingly stopped filling vacancies at Cabrini-Green—whether for
lack of maintenance funds or in anticipation of demolition and redevelopment. As a result, the
building from which the shot was fired was 84 percent vacant at the time of the shooting.16
However, if CPD and CHA failed to prevent Dantrell’s shooting, both agencies—
working in coordination with Mayor Daley’s office—responded swiftly and furiously in its
aftermath. Almost immediately after the shooting on that October morning, more than 60 officers
were dispatched to search several Cabrini-Green buildings for the shooter, to no avail. Empty
cartridges were found in a 10th-floor apartment of the building from which the shot was fired, but
no suspect or weapon was immediately recoverable. That same day, CHA Chairman Vince Lane
vowed to close the nearly empty building and move out the remaining families.17 CHA made

*

Contrary to newspaper accounts, Dantrell’s mother, Annette Freeman, says she does not remember police being on
site until “after the fact” (Annette Freeman, interview with author, April 21, 2021).
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good on Lane’s promise two days later, on October 15, moving the last families into other units
in the complex with no more than a couple of days’ notice. Both police and CHA officials argued
it was impossible to secure the building with such a high vacancy rate and thus, in the interest of
everyone’s safety, it had to be emptied.18 Also on October 15, 33-year-old Anthony Garrett was
charged with Dantrell’s murder.† 19
If the raids were intended to catch Dantrell’s killer, the policing of Cabrini-Green did not
end with Garrett’s arrest. Instead, officials launched a campaign to ensure such an incident would
never occur at the site again. Lane, who had championed police sweeps in public housing for the
last several years, pivoted slightly, proclaiming that the standard raids would be insufficient in
and of themselves to achieve public safety. Instead, he requested the Governor deploy the
National Guard to secure Cabrini-Green.20 He argued the Guard could help by sweeping the
entire development all at once with 700 to 1000 officers. Lane also wanted 400 troops to remain
at Cabrini-Green for four months following the shooting, announcing at a press conference that
“This is a crisis, and it calls for desperate measures.” 21 A resident leader, Artensa Randolph,
endorsed the use of National Guard troops, though Mayor Daley equivocated, pushing for
caution before deploying the military. Lane insisted this would not be an occupation, but that the
Guard would simply provide more manpower to carry out the sweeps.22 In a four-hour
emergency summit held the Sunday after Dantrell’s death at City Hall, Mayor Daley, Lane, and
the city council ultimately agreed not to bring the Guard to Cabrini-Green.23 However, their
response was no less militaristic.

†

Garrett had served three years in the military and initially confessed to the crime. Three days later, however, he
pled not guilty in court, saying police forced him into signing a confession (Lee Bey, “Dantrell’s mother – ‘Hey, we
are killing our own,” Chicago Sun-Times, February 3, 1993: 5). Some residents believe Garrett killed Dantrell;
others conspiratorially suggest that police shot the child and framed Garrett to cover it up.
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Rather than deploy the National Guard, Daley opted instead to hire 270 off-duty CPD
officers to conduct a one-week weapons search at Cabrini-Green. On top of this, the Illinois State
Police agreed to provide an additional 50 officers per day during the sweeps.24 For their part,
CHA agreed to vacate and seal four of the low-occupancy high-rises at Cabrini-Green, install
one-way turnstiles at all rear exits of buildings as well as metal detectors at the entrances, begin a
resident identification program, expand tenant patrols, and upgrade lighting across
developments.25 CPD Commander Robert Guthrie, who oversaw the police department’s public
housing unit, was assigned to supervise the implementation of the security measures. CHA also
promised to boost social supports by bringing social service agencies along on the police sweeps,
forming tenant management corporations at all buildings in Cabrini-Green, and expanding
recreational programming for residents.26 Even with all of these programs in place, Daley
warned the public that there would be no silver bullet solution to violence at Cabrini-Green,
while even the police were skeptical of the ability of these plans to promote sustainable public
safety: as then-police union president John Dineen told the press, “You can’t have the police go
in there and create a police state and think that’s going to be the answer, because eventually the
police are going to have to leave.”27 On the other hand, the Sun-Times editors praised what they
saw as Daley’s multi-pronged plan to “attack . . . the CHA problem.”‡ 28 As had always been the
case at CHA, more police and more intensive policing was to be the primary solution to public
safety woes, despite the inability of the police and many preceding years of intensive policing to
prevent this tragedy from occurring in the first place.
Indeed, over the next ten days, CHA, CPD, and the City of Chicago policed CabriniGreen in ways that were highly carceral, implementing changes to the development’s

‡

Emphasis added.
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environmental design, management, and policies that resembled those of a prison and that also
resulted in dozens of arrests. First, to oversee the crackdown at Cabrini-Green following
Dantrell’s death, CPD Commander Guthrie moved his offices to a police substation within the
complex and told the media he would aim for “curb-to-curb” law enforcement. This would
include, he said, directing his officers to enforce minor laws against truancy and curfew
violations at the complex.29 Sweeps started at 9 am on October 20, exactly one week after
Dantrell’s killing.30 At the paper’s estimate, about 150 to 175 police officers were deployed to
the site.31 Officers from the DEA, ATF, and FBI were on hand, yet all they recovered was a
single handgun replica incapable of firing ammunition, a scope for a rifle, and some
ammunition.32 Commander Guthrie said residents had too much advance warning of the raid and
police would have surprise on their side in the future.33 During the raid, CHA officials entered
apartments looking for building and maintenance issues, but notified police if any illegal
activities or objects were noted on the premises. Unauthorized residents were removed from the
property.34 In short, the sweep was a powerful show of force on the part of its organizers and,
like past raids, functionally criminalized all Cabrini-Green tenants in the name of assuring their
collective safety.
To their credit, CHA and the city did also use the raid as an opportunity to implement
improvements at Cabrini in non-punitive ways. During that first day of sweeps, in addition to the
police officers present, 100 workers from the city’s Streets and Sanitation department were sent
to the complex to install floodlights, set out rat poison, identify abandoned cars on the premises,
and repair potholes.35 The city’s Human Services department also sent three teams of counselors
to help residents cope with the tragedy of Dantrell’s death. One journalist commented that the
first day of sweeps resembled “the day after a natural disaster.”36 Efforts to light, clean, and
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repair the premises, as well as care for the residents’ mental health were surely needed, but it
took a child’s death—and a highly public one at that—for the city to invest such resources.
Neglect, after all, is also a carceral logic, and repair only came when accompanied by intensive
policing.
Unsurprisingly, given the high cost of raids in general, the police sweeps that followed
Dantrell’s death cost CHA and the City of Chicago $57,000 per day to conduct, racking up over
half a million dollars of expenses over the course of the crackdown.37 Lane said CHA was
paying its share by transferring money earmarked for other purposes, like maintenance and
repairs, to pay instead for the sweeps. Thus, as it had in the past, funding for the sweeps came at
the cost of general property maintenance and other CHA funds. In the weeks that followed,
Daley and Lane announced their intention to request additional funding from Congress to pay for
multimillion dollar police sweeps of CHA properties. Funds would cover the cost of law
enforcement to conduct the sweeps and for the installation of metal detectors and floor-to-ceiling
turnstiles. Unlike in the years prior, when sweeps were conducted on an ad hoc and piecemeal
basis, this was an all-out, intensive assault. CHA, CPD, and the City were in crisis mode.
HUD, meanwhile, urged CHA to undertake studies to ensure their properties were
receiving a fair share of the city’s police services.38 The suggestion was, in many ways,
ridiculous: it implied that lack of police attention—rather than ineffective policing—was
responsible for the lack of public safety at CHA. As previous chapters have shown, public
housing received intensive attention from CPD. And, CHA had scores of in-house and private
security, its own in-house police force, agreements with CPD for extra services, and of course,
had been subject to years of multi-agency sweeps. So, while residents may not have been happy
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with the quality of policing or the response time when they called for service, there is no doubt
that the sites were saturated with police.
Operating in a crisis framework, CHA also took Dantrell’s death as an opportunity to
push back against the limits emplaced by their consent decree with ACLU. By the terms set in
the decree, police could only be called in if contraband was found in plain sight. As one CHA
attorney argued, “Even in secured buildings, drugs and guns are still getting in.” Rather than
view this as an indictment of the sweeps’ inability to meaningfully promote public safety, CHA
saw the ACLU’s restrictions as the problem.39
As had become typical, resident opinions on the sweeps were mixed. In the immediate
aftermath of the shooting, some Cabrini residents had called for a lockdown of the complex:
angered that seemingly anyone could enter their buildings, these residents requested the police to
conduct raids.40 As one resident told the Sun-Times, “They should have done it a long time ago.
I’ve got bullet holes in my window, I’ve got bullet holes in my air conditioner, I’ve got bullet
holes in my bathroom, I’ve got bullet holes in the bedrooms.”41 Some favored the raids but
criticized their implementation, agreeing with Commander Guthrie that the plans had been too
public and jeopardized the element of surprise.42 Others, meanwhile, objected to the invasive
police crackdown. Community activist Marion Stamps said of the security forces combing the
complex: “I think it’s a travesty, dehumanizing and a set-up.”43 Others, like 21-year-resident
Rosie Franklin, said, “Now they’re locking us in. Doesn’t it look like a jail?” She continued,
“Every right I ever had in my life they violated. I felt so hurt today, I just wanted to throw all my
furniture in the street and leave.”44 As with past sweeps, CHA and the police walked a fine line
between ensuring public safety and violating personal privacy, creating a secure residential
community and turning public housing into a prison, all while criminalizing residents—as a
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class—in the process. A Sun-Times columnist noted the discrepancy between official perceptions
of Cabrini-Green and how it was experienced by those who lived there, writing, “To Mayor
Daley and much of the city, certain Cabrini-Green high-rises are symbols of horror—largelyvacant havens for gangs and drugs that must be sealed up and shut down. But to the people who
live there, they are home.”45 And indeed, some residents began to fear what the sweeps presaged
for the place they called home: as a 20-year-old resident told the paper, “This is ours. They took
the Indians’ land. Now they’re coming for ours.”46
On October 21, hundreds of law enforcement officials undertook a second day of raids,
sweeping three more buildings at Cabrini-Green, including the one where Dantrell had lived with
his mother.47 119 police recruits were pulled out of the CPD training academy to help regularly
employed officers conduct the sweeps. Two of the buildings they swept had been previously
raided by police some months earlier; officers made four arrests in one building and five at
another, mostly for drug-related activity. In one of the cases, officers arrested a man carrying a
baby and a schoolbag that officers suspected contained drugs.48 Then, on October 22, police
raided five more Cabrini-Green high-rises in the third day of sweeps. By early afternoon, they
had made three arrests: one for possession of a pellet gun and two for disorderly conduct when
two men refused to be frisked.49
By the fourth day of sweeps on October 23, eleven of 31 Cabrini-Green buildings had
been swept and secured. Daley, meanwhile, also announced a task force to address drugs and
crime in the city’s public housing in which federal agents, including the Secret Service, would
work with Commander Guthrie to coordinate security at CHA developments.50 Known as the
Chicago Housing Authority Neighborhood Gang Enforcement (CHANGE) task force, the group
would focus on whole communities, rather than targeting individual gangs as past task forces had
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done. The Secret Service, meanwhile, would make recommendations on how to secure buildings
following the sweeps. Of the efforts, Daley said, “You have to dig deeper into the soil where the
gangs germinate. We must work to create a better environment at the Chicago Housing
Authority—one where drug and gang activity isn’t fed by desperate economic conditions and
limited educational opportunities.”51
In the days that followed, CHA continued to sweep buildings, making minimal arrests on
mostly non-violent charges like narcotics possession and disorderly conduct and seizing the
occasional weapon.52 By the end of the fifth day of sweeps, 16 of 31 buildings had been swept.53
On the sixth day, October 25, local gang leaders—in an unprecedented move—publicly declared
a truce and apologized to the Black community at Cabrini-Green.54 After ten days of sweeps, the
Sun-Times reported on October 30 that the police crackdown at Cabrini-Green was set to end that
day. In those ten days, police had arrested 44 people and seized 8 weapons and a variety of
drugs. 55 All but two high-rises had been swept and secured, metal detectors installed, private
security replaced by CHA police officers, and CPD had nearly doubled their Cabrini-Green
force. One sergeant and eight officers were being added to each CPD shift at Cabrini. Normal
staffing was nine officers during the day and 16 at night. The paper noted that “breezeways have
been fortified and four troubled high-rises are being closed.” Two CHA police officers were now
to be on duty in each lobby. “Crime in Cabrini has plummeted during the last two weeks,”
Commander Guthrie said, noting “There hasn’t even been a shooting.” He told the press that his
goal was to keep the gangs “on the move,” though he warned neighboring residents and business
owners of a likely rise in crime related to gangs and drug activity, as had been experienced in
other parts of the city after public housing buildings were swept.56 Overall, Guthrie said of the
raids, “It’s been very productive, everything has gone well. The residents are happy. The city
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fathers are happy. So I’m happy.”57 The police crackdown did not end there, however. Following
the raids at Cabrini-Green, the police began new rounds of sweeps at Rockwell Gardens and then
the Henry Horner Homes, both on the city’s West Side.58 By the end of November, all but 12
high-rises across the city’s entire portfolio had been swept.59
Thus, Dantrell’s death provoked a police response on an unprecedented scale, extending
and intensifying the tactics that had already been in place for several years. If raids, as I argued
in the previous chapter, were a disciplinary tool, they were also punitive, resulting in scores of
arrests and inflicting trauma on CHA residents. If welcomed by some, the sweeps nevertheless
prisonized public housing for everyone. It was a high price to pay in pursuit of public safety.
And finally, the raids were intended to do more than just catch Dantrell’s killer: had this been the
case, they could have ceased after Garrett was arrested just two days after the boy’s death.
Depending on the reading, the raids can be seen either as retribution, a way for city officials to
enact their fury and frustration on CHA’s captive population, or as a desperate attempt on the
part of city leaders to do something—anything—in the face of such tragedy. Either way, the raids
comprised both a symbolic show of force and a material intervention into the lives of tenants
across CHA’s portfolio.

Evicting the Problem
If the days that followed Dantrell’s death were characterized by a military-style
insurgence of police into the projects, officials also increasingly levied softer measures to police
residents. One of these measures was evictions. Thus, as the buildings were being fortified in
ways that resembled carceral facilities in order to keep undesirable individuals out, evictions
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comprised a secondary spatial tactic for ridding the complex of perceived troublemakers from
within.
While CHA had long embraced eviction as a means to oust ‘problem’ families, during the
sweeps that followed Dantrell’s death, CHA officials leveraged a recent shift in tenancy
agreements that allowed the agency to more aggressively pursue evictions than they had in the
past.§ In April of 1992, CHA had amended their leases to allow the agency to evict tenants who
were found to be involved in criminal activity anywhere on the property.60 The policy was
immediately controversial: much like the federal One Strike Rule that would be introduced a few
years later, the CHA’s eviction policy punished residents for any crimes committed in their
homes, including by friends or relatives, under the assumption that children and visitors should
be under the leaseholder’s control. As a result, for example, one Cabrini mother had to fight an
eviction after her 20-year-old son was arrested on drug charges and a weapons possession in her
apartment.61
The new evictions procedure encouraged authorities to catch tenants in criminal activity
since, to meet the grounds for eviction, CHA had to take an individual to court and prove they or
someone under their control had committed a crime. CPD and CHA Police agreed to quickly
notify the CHA General Counsel’s office of any criminal charges filed against tenants. Willis
Caruso, the CHA General Counsel, had even gone so far as to hire a private detective to
videotape a resident lowering drugs out of her window to provide evidence to pursue her eviction

§

These punitive evictions measures also had federal precedent, demonstrating the push-pull between federal and
local policies. As Michelle Alexander explains, years before the federal One Strike policy was passed in 1996, “The
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, passed by Congress as part of the War on Drugs, called for strict lease enforcement
and eviction of public housing tenants who engage in criminal activity. The act granted public housing agencies the
authority to use leases to evict any tenant, household member, or guest engaged in any criminal activity on or near
public housing premises” (Alexander 2012 [2010], p. 145).
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in court. Thus, evictions provided a mechanism to ensnare tenants in the criminal-legal system,
while the criminal-legal system also provided the necessary grounds for eviction.62
Within a year of the punitive lease amendment taking effect, 7,000 Cabrini residents filed
a class action lawsuit to fight the added eviction provision, calling it unconstitutional. Attorney
Richard Wheelock of the Legal Assistance Foundation argued that “Punishing innocent family
members violates due process and goes to the heart of right to association in the 1st and 4th
amendments.”63 Constitutional or not, the new lease provisions worked hand-in-hand with the
police sweeps that followed Dantrell’s death to facilitate the removal of any tenants CHA
deemed unworthy or a threat to public safety.
Ironically, if the new eviction provisions intended to keep the community safer for
children like Dantrell, this punitive policy would prove to have perverse outcomes for one
member of the community in particular: Dantrell’s mother, Annette Freeman. On December 11,
1992, just two months after her son’s death, 23-year-old Freeman was arrested for possession of
crack cocaine.64 In media coverage of her arrest, Freeman was widely portrayed as a distraught
young mother with a checkered past. Indeed, it had been a rough few years for Freeman, though
her public portrayal was certainly inflected with prevalent negative stereotypes about young,
single Black mothers living in public housing. In particular, in coverage pertaining to Freeman,
the media focused heavily on an incident that had occurred in 1991, when she had been charged
with neglect after she had left Dantrell home alone and he had started a housefire while playing
with matches.65 He had been badly burned and the Department of Child and Family Services had
sought a court order to put Dantrell in permanent foster care, but Freeman had won back custody
in July of 1991. 66 By focusing on this part of her past, the media cast Freeman as an unreliable
narrator in the story of her own son’s death, her drug arrest, and her subsequent fight to maintain
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her Cabrini-Green home. In fact, Freeman had suffered multiple losses in quick succession: in
September of 1991, not long after the fire, Dantrell’s father Kelvin Davis had died suddenly of a
heart attack. Less than a year later, Dantrell was killed before her eyes.
Upon her arrest, Freeman refused to comment to the press about her past neglect case or
her current drug charges.67 Today, she maintains that she was innocent of the drug possession
charge.68 At the time of her December arrest, Freeman had been preparing to file a personal
injury lawsuit against CHA, citing negligence in the death of her son.69 Eventually filed in
January, the lawsuit charged that CHA’s failure to close and lock vacant apartments, as well as to
inspect those apartments, and to keep non-residents off the property, all contributed to Dantrell’s
demise. CHA attorneys said they had faced similar lawsuits in the past, all of which had been
dismissed. Charging CHA with “utter indifference” for public safety, Freeman said she hoped
the lawsuit would force CHA to seal off all of its nearly vacant buildings and unoccupied units.70
Freeman believes that CHA, knowing she planned to sue the agency on these grounds,
had the police plant drugs on her.71 As a longtime resident of Cabrini-Green, this story—which
might ring of conspiracy theory to outsiders—makes perfect sense to Freeman, who had plenty
of experience with the cops at Cabrini by the time she caught this drug charge (see also Chapter
4). She recalls of her interactions with local cops that “They were worse than the gang bangers
because they would hit us [residents], they would say things bad about us and belittle us in the
same way. They’re just gang bangers. I’ve never felt comfortable with the police there.” Like
many other residents, she recalls knowing which cops to avoid, especially a pair that the
residents had nicknamed “Bonnie and Clyde” and that, she describes, “used to smack on” her. Of
the frequent police harassment, she says “We just didn’t have anybody to complain to. They’ve
been kicking our ass over there, but we [didn’t] have anybody to complain to. We didn’t have
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anybody.” Freeman says she had a confrontational relationship with the police at Cabrini-Green
because she would stand up for tenants she saw being beaten or harassed.
Moreover, Freeman says the police were ineffective at solving or preventing crimes at the
development. “First of all,” she explains, “when [the police were] there, it was after the fact. And
then they [would take] it out on the people that were present.”72 She says shootings were never
solved, even when residents were killed or seriously injured. “There was never anybody going to
jail,” she says, “but they didn’t care.” In addition to being ineffective, Freeman recalls more than
one occasion when police planted drugs on Cabrini-Green residents, including herself. “I’ve been
through it at Cabrini-Green,” she notes, adding “I’ve got a [criminal] record because of CabriniGreen for something that I didn’t do.” Of the drug charge following Dantrell’s death, she
explains, “I can’t really remember now, but they busted in my apartment. I didn’t have any
[drugs]. They didn’t have a warrant or anything to come up in there, but [they never did]. They
used to just come when they wanted to because they [were at] CHA, that’s state property. And
[they] took me to jail and I didn’t have no drugs on me.”
Innocent or not, under the provisions of the new lease, Freeman’s drug charge triggered
eviction proceedings, which began on February 9, 1993. Ironically, as CHA sought to remove
Freeman from her public housing apartment, the City Council passed an ordinance renaming a
section of North Cleveland Street “Dantrell Davis Way.” Of the honor, Freeman says, “It’s cool,
isn’t it? It shows they haven’t forgotten about my boy. It’s only a small section of the street, but
it’ll be there forever.”73 The drug charges against Freeman were dropped in February, but CHA
pursued her eviction nonetheless.74 By this time, CHA had sought to evict about 240 tenants
under the new lease provision. Of those, 29 had been evicted and the rest had moved voluntarily.
In late February, a housing court judge postponed the eviction decision when Freeman asked to
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speak with an attorney. She told CHA lawyers that she wanted a jury trial, explaining, “I just
want to keep my apartment. It has sentimental value to me.”**75 Freeman had spent much of her
childhood at Cabrini but left in 1984 to live in her grandmother’s house on the South Side. She
returned to Cabrini in 1989 with then-4-year-old Dantrell. She was excited to have her own place
and live independently as a young mother. She also liked the idea of sending Dantrell to Jenner
Elementary, where she had been schooled. She reportedly had concerns about safety when
considering whether to move back, but a CHA interviewer had reassured her that the agency had
hired security guards.76
Today, Freeman recalls wanting to leave Cabrini-Green in the wake of her son’s death,
saying, “I wanted to leave. To walk out of the building and see the blood stain every day, that’s
painful.”77 However, whether leaving Cabrini-Green was her choice or not, the CHA eviction has
had lasting material consequences for her: since receiving the drug charge and undergoing the
subsequent eviction case, Freeman has been unable to rent in public housing elsewhere,
including in Michigan, where she briefly applied for assistance. “My mind was so messed up at
that time,” Freeman recalls of the months following her son’s death, adding “And to this day, I
can’t get public housing because of that. They won’t even give me an opportunity because of that
eviction. . . . I was distressed. I was out of my mind for years.” Thus, if the policing practices
employed by CHA, CPD, and the city in the wake of Dantrell’s death were intended to secure the
complex for future generations of residents and remedy the harm that had been done, they
perversely ended up criminalizing the person who had lost the most. In this way, this story
epitomizes the carceral logics that had come to guide how CHA, working with CPD and with the
backing of the Mayor’s office, approached public safety in public housing. In such an

**

Today, Freeman maintains that she left Cabrini-Green after her son’s death and never looked back, so her
recollection and the newspaper record diverge on this point (Annette Freeman interview).
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environment, everyone was considered guilty and many like Freeman were punished—rightly or
wrongly—with both material and psychic harms that endure today. If public housing
increasingly resembled a prison, it also funneled residents into the criminal-legal system through
the policing practices implemented there.

Demolishing the Problem
Since leaving Cabrini-Green, Freeman has mostly lived in low-rent housing on the city’s
South Side, though she returns to the Cabrini footprint occasionally to visit friends or her son’s
commemorative street sign. The neighborhood she visits, however, looks quite different than the
one she left behind.78 As this chapter has explored, Dantrell’s death invoked a swift response
from the Mayor, CHA, and the police, who descended in droves not just to catch Dantrell’s
killer, but to attempt to eradicate crime and violence from Cabrini-Green for good. However,
Dantrell’s death also sparked larger, longer, and more lasting changes to Cabrini-Green, serving
as the public justification for the Mayor and CHA to implement plans to remake the complex that
had already been in the works for several years prior. In a press conference just days after the
Dantrell’s death, Daley referenced the need to develop a “long-term master plan for public
housing in Chicago,” while Lane told the press that “We have got to change the fundamental
flaw that stacks poor people on top of poor people.”79 As CHA worked to clean up the properties
and install new security features, Lane also said the agency wanted to attract more working
families, as it had in the newly renovated Lake Parc Place on the city’s South Side.80 Lane and
Daley told the press that economic mixing was needed to improve CHA’s developments so that
“welfare families will have working-class neighbors who can serve as role models, instead of
gang leaders and drug dealers.”81 On October 28, in the midst of the ten-day police crackdown,
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Lane announced that he would involve Cabrini-Green residents in creating a long-term plan for
preventing crime, including better integrating Cabrini-Green into the fabric and community of its
surrounding neighborhood.82 Lane noted that the hardest part of this “integration” would be
attracting working-class residents to live near the poor. He further indicated that the plans would
involve “selective demolition” and the construction of some new low-rise housing.83 During the
sweeps, four buildings at Cabrini-Green were closed off entirely and Lane said more would need
to be closed down and replaced with more ‘live-able’ buildings. He also told the press that he
hoped to reduce density in public housing in the long run.84 Just a few months later, in February
1993, the Tribune reported Lane’s plan to, over the next 10 years, “transform the entire CabriniGreen public housing development from an isolated enclave of poverty into an economically
integrated community and a ‘normal neighborhood.’”85
For Lane and likeminded planners, creating a ‘normal neighborhood’ meant breaking up
the concentrated poverty inherent in high-rise public housing complexes like Cabrini-Green. A
racist bogeyman of urban policy since the days of the Moynihan Report, concentrated poverty
had been—and remains—widely seen as a paradigmatic urban problem.86 Influential in scholarly
and policy circles alike, Moynihan’s text promoted the idea that concentrated poverty (rather
than, for example, concentrated wealth) was the key problem for urban planners to solve.
And so, when it came to ‘fixing’ Cabrini-Green in the wake of Dantrell’s murder, Lane—
genuinely fueled by outrage over the child’s death—proposed a set of solutions right in line with
these ideas. Specifically, Lane wanted low-income families to comprise just 15-25 percent of the
population in a redeveloped neighborhood on the Cabrini-Green footprint. He said that he would
work with the city to create new housing options for low-income families, noting, “We can no
longer isolate poor people within the boundaries of public housing.”87 Cabrini-Green would be
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the start: Lane hoped to undertake similar projects at the ABLA, Horner, and Lathrop Homes.
The Tribune acknowledged that the plan would be met with skepticism if not opposition from
residents and developers alike, but noted that it was the first “major attempt to attack the central
cause of the social ills that afflict high-rise public housing for families: The high concentration of
poverty.”88 In Washington, D.C. for a meeting with HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros, Mayor
Daley told the press that, “High-rises have not worked in this country. Everybody knows that.”
Lane, meanwhile, noted that a key ingredient in renovating Cabrini-Green, in order to make it
attractive to working-class families, would be to ensure that adequate crime prevention measures
were in place.89 Public housing, in other words, had failed: crime was one manifestation of this.
The solution was to end public housing—at least in its current form. If economic mixing would
require a safer community, Lane and his fellow planners also implied that a redeveloped,
economically diverse community would result in lower crime.
While it took more than a few years to remake Cabrini-Green—indeed, the
redevelopment far surpassed Lane’s tenure with the agency—the transformation he advocated
did indeed come to fruition. Today, mixed-income communities on the former Cabrini-Green
footprint contain a mix of apartments and condominiums, rental and for-sale units, with lower
density than the high-rises that preceded them. Sleek new buildings with trendy features like
green rooves are now intermixed with chain retailers like Target and Panera Bread. While the
rowhouses still stand, Cabrini’s final high-rise was demolished in March 2011.90
Due to construction delays and bureaucratic failures during the redevelopment process, as
well as an overall reduction in the number of public housing units on site, many former CabriniGreen tenants were unable to return to the redeveloped site. Due to her eviction, Freeman is one
of those people. As she describes, “It’s all white people over there. They’re not even giving
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Black people, low-income people [housing] over there like that. They won’t even give me an
opportunity to come into beautiful—they’ve made it so beautiful over there. They’ve made it so
comfortable.”91 Freeman says she admires the redeveloped neighborhood when she comes to
look at Dantrell’s sign. When she visits, she says she notices the police presence in the area,
noting that, as far as she can tell at least, “[Police are] still neglecting the row houses that are still
there. They’re over there just guarding those white people and their property and their cars.” In
contrast to the years that she spent there, when she felt like police always arrived on the scene of
a crime too late to do anything, or were only there to harass tenants, Freeman says “I’ve seen so
many police over there when I’m riding through there to see my son’s sign.”
For Freeman, the root cause of crime at Cabrini-Green was always “poverty.” As she
explains, there was a “lack of beauty. We had dirt. We had grass. We didn’t have a clean
apartment. They didn’t clean our buildings right. We were living in poverty, so we acted like
poverty.”92 Freeman is glad for the improvements she has seen in the neighborhood, saying, “Of
course [the neighborhood] is better. How can it not be better if there’s not people stacked on top
of each other in poverty?” However, she wishes that more Black folks like herself, former
Cabrini residents, could enjoy the neighborhood as it is today. “Why we can’t have it beautiful?”
she asks, adding that where she lives now, she’s “paying a ton for something that I can’t even
afford to live [in]. They’re still here gang banging and shooting. I deserve to be over there living
nice … [but] they won’t give it to me.”
Freeman believes that Dantrell’s death played a role in instigating Cabrini-Green’s
redevelopment, saying simply, “That’s why [the high-rises] aren’t there anymore, because of the
death of my son.”93 In some ways, this knowledge allows her to derive meaning from his death:
the neighborhood upgrades, she says, “let me know [Dantrell] didn’t die in vain.” However, her
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frustrations persist, thinking about the ways that she and others have been excluded from the
benefits of redevelopment. Of the neighborhood’s new residents, she says, “They don’t know the
struggle that we’ve been through. They don’t even know what the sign, Dantrell Davis, what it
means. They don’t know about the struggles and how they got it so easy through our pain.
Through the death of my son, they’re living like that.”

Conclusion: “Let them Enjoy Cabrini Good”
Six months after Dantrell’s death, by late April of 1993, crime had markedly reduced at
Cabrini and residents, including Freeman, commented on the dip in shootings in particular.94
“You can see the change, a big change,” Freeman told the press. “When I go down there, I don’t
have to duck bullets every three minutes.”95 There had been only two shootings and no deaths
since October 20 and crime in the first quarter of 1993 was down by more than a third over the
previous year, according to police statistics. However, it is not clear that the intensive policing
that followed Dantrell’s death was responsible for the dip in crime. While the police went about
their sweeps, local activist Marion Stamps had negotiated a gang truce, convincing sparring
factions to set aside their differences in the wake of such an enormous community tragedy.
Police were reluctant to credit Stamps and the gangs for the reduction in crime, however, instead
claiming that their sweeps and heightened security measures were responsible for the downtick
in violence. Whatever the case, Mayor Daley reported that many of the street gangs had
dispersed and “moved many of their operations” out of CHA buildings.96 He praised the efforts
of residents as well as his own “CHANGE” taskforce.97 Since Dantrell’s death, the city and CHA
had spent a whopping $26 million on security at Cabrini-Green alone. 170 officers still patrolled
the complex daily, leading Lane to comment that CHA could not afford to “maintain an armed
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camp [there] indefinitely.”98 The peace, if tentative, carried through to the fall of 1993. In
response to the rumored plans to redevelop Cabrini-Green in the ways Lane had begun to
advocate, 75-year-old resident Jeanette Woods commented “I pray this city will let [the children]
enjoy Cabrini good—just like it let them suffer the bad.”99
In October of 1993—one year after Dantrell’s death—the Secret Service, who had been
commissioned to investigate safety at the complex, delivered their recommendations for securing
Cabrini-Green.100 The report highlighted the potential of physical improvements like creating
cul-de-sacs to limit drive-through traffic and installing iron fencing, as well as stationing police
behind bullet-proof glass in every building lobby and forcing residents to pass through metal
detectors upon entering. Some of these measures, like the metal detectors, had already been
adopted in some buildings. In response, the Tribune editors cautioned against such a “fortress
approach,” which they rightly critiqued as potentially “further isolating and stigmatizing public
housing.” Instead, the editors concluded that “The solution will be achieved only when public
housing is made indistinguishable from the neighborhoods that surround it.”101
Thus, as preceding chapters have shown, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, policing
contributed to producing Chicago’s public housing as a carceral space. The raiding of public
housing, which would continue through the late 1990s and was tentatively legal at best; the
intense and frequently abusive policing of the developments from in-house, municipal, state, and
federal agencies; the fortification and securitization of the sites; and the punitive management
and eviction policies levied against tenants all belie a pervasive carceral logic that governed
Chicago public housing by the time of Dantrell’s death in the fall of 1992. Operating in such a
framework, officials believed that public safety could only be achieved by effectively
criminalizing all CHA residents, many of whom compared living in the projects to living in a
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prison. Doing so put residents in a bind: they too wanted an end to the violence, but their
collective criminalization made it nearly impossible to push for police alternatives. That is,
residents were faced with a choice: they could align themselves with police or not. While some,
like Marion Stamps, pushed back, city leaders’ Manichean worldview made it extremely difficult
for residents to articulate alternative sets of reforms.
Beyond making residents feel like criminals, public housing also served as a feeder
institution where, subject to levels of surveillance and extra-punitive laws not applicable in other
parts of the city (here we can think of the designation of public housing as a drug-free zone, for
example, where penalties for drug possession were higher than in other areas) residents were
arrested at high rates and funneled into the auspices of the prison system. While CHA and the
city spent millions on policing, buildings fell into disarray and residents went without needed
social and material supports. However, in the aftermath of Dantrell’s death and the police
crackdown that followed, there was a new sense on the part of commentators that—even if they
didn’t frame it this way explicitly—such forms of policing had failed. Just one solution
seemingly remained for public housing: tear it down.
Thus, I argue that Dantrell’s death served as a lynchpin in the story of Chicago public
housing, a moment when pervasive doubts about public housing on the part of officials and the
wider public solidified into a narrative of public housing’s failure. Perhaps it was the public
nature of the shooting (in broad daylight, in a crowd of other students and parents), or Dantrell’s
young age, or perhaps everyone was just fed up. Whatever the reason, officials’ genuine outrage
over the boy’s death and heightened policy response marked a turning point in public housing in
Chicago and, arguably, in the United States. Ultimately, the bullet that slayed Dantrell was,
indeed, “the shot that brought the projects down.”102
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Chapter 8. Policing the Panic: Gangs, Violence, and the State
In the years following Dantrell Davis’ death, police sweeps in Chicago public housing
became ever-more draconian, the debates around their legality ever-more contentious. While the
media increasingly likened public housing to a war zone—constructing it, through their
representations, as a violent place in need of subduing and conquest—residents complained of
being made to feel like prisoners in their own homes thanks to the actions of gangs and police
alike. In this chapter, I draw on the work of Stuart Hall and his colleagues to argue that, for
politicians in Chicago and beyond, “gang violence”—or in the common parlance of the time,
“gangbanging”—functioned in 1990s Chicago analogously to how Hall et al argue that
“muggings” operated culturally in 1970s Great Britain.1 That is: while gang-related violence was
real, it was also more complex than the media and politicians allowed, comprising a moral panic
fueled by the media, elected officials, and even the police themselves. In policing the “crisis” of
gang violence, I argue that police were actually responding to a crisis of state hegemony, much
as they had done in Britain decades earlier in the reaction to public fears about muggings. The
crisis was not brand-new; it was, in fact, precisely the history of policing and violence told across
the preceding chapters. What was new, by the 1990s, was its urgency.
To make these arguments, I first provide some examples of the ubiquitous yet sensational
media portrayal of Chicago public housing in the early to mid-1990s as a “war zone” due to the
gang-related violence there. Next, I explain the policy context for Chicago’s war on gangs,
arguing that despite their longstanding presence, gangs were under particularly intense police
scrutiny by the early 1990s. This focus on policing street gangs manifested in the increasingly
desperate and draconian policing practices utilized in public housing in the years following
Dantrell’s death, from illegal searches to the creation of brand-new police patrols and tactical
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units, which, I argue, fueled the fear of gang violence as much as they responded to it. As the
courts struck down the constitutionality of the searches, the federal government intervened,
upholding Chicago and its public housing as the quintessential site of gang violence in the
national imagination. As such, Chicago public housing became a pawn in President Clinton’s
attempts to pass crime control legislation in the form of the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act, thus re-scaling Chicago’s gang violence from a local to a national issue.
This chapter thus builds on the previous two to offer an ongoing story of the tactics and
strategies employed by police officers working in public housing. However, drawing on Hall
(and before him, Gramsci) it also employs conjunctural analysis—“broadly defined as the
analysis of convergent and divergent tendencies shaping the totality of power relations within a
given social field during a particular period of time”—to offer an explanation of why the end of
public housing unfolded as it did.2 Ultimately, I argue that the police tactics employed to counter
gang violence at CHA in the 1990s largely mirrored the actions of the very gangs police sought
to confront, comprising yet another way that policing made public housing feel more like a
prison, and less like a home, to its residents. CHA Director Vince Lane recognized the same
comparison but saw this as a good thing, bragging publicly that CPD was “the baddest gang in
town.”3 Gang violence in public housing became a metonym for structural problems of poverty
that officials acknowledged but largely refused to address with any tool other than increased
policing. At the same time, the ongoing violence served as a challenge to state authority, posing
a crisis of hegemony that, if it could not be solved through policing, the state would need to
resolve in other ways, up to and including the demolition of the properties.
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The Human Combat Zone
If CHA had long been stigmatized in the media, Dantrell’s death only made things worse.
Sensational headlines and reportage in local papers widely portrayed CHA housing as a “war
zone” in the early 1990s. As Hall et al argue, media coverage is itself a process of cultural
production that produces events as much as it ‘covers’ them.4 As discussed in Chapter 1, in
selecting what to cover and writing the stories, with all of the editorial decisions such processes
imply, “The media define for the majority of the population what significant events are taking
place, but, also, they offer powerful interpretations of how to understand these events.”5 Crime,
Hall et al argue, is particularly newsworthy, because it “evokes threats to, but also reaffirms, the
consensual morality of the society.”6 Thus, the media does not just report on the news, but
creates it, defining categories of newsworthiness and portraying particular places and events in
ways that are often monopolistic; that is, we rely on news coverage to explain sites and situations
we cannot or did not experience firsthand.
To give just a few examples of how local papers covered CHA in the years following
Dantrell’s death: In 1994, the Sun-Times reported that gun battles between gang members at
CHA developments “resemble the violence in Sarajevo.”7 In another instance, the Sun-Times
editors argued that the “warlike conditions” in public housing justified CHA’s practice of raids,
and that “While the CHA and ACLU feud in court [over the legality of police searches], the reallife violence at the Robert Taylor Homes more aptly resembles the horrific images emerging
from Bosnia, Somalia and, now, South Africa.”8 Not only did this reporting sensationalize what
was happening in public housing and portray public housing as a uniformly dangerous place, it
also likened CHA developments to foreign countries—alien nations within our very cities.
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Likewise, in an article with the incredibly unsubtle title “Cabrini-Green is a Symbol of
Failed Hopes,” the Tribune reported that “At Cabrini-Green and other public housing projects in
Chicago, the crack of gunfire is as commonplace as the swish of jump-rope. Drugs are sold
openly. Women fear being raped or beaten in stairwells. And gangs roam freely, in what some
have called a ‘human combat zone.’”9 Yet another article reported that “the Chicago Housing
Authority’s developments have become synonymous with violent crime.”10 In short, coverage of
CHA news at the time focused almost exclusively on violence, and that coverage was extremely
melodramatic. In its uniformity, reportage on CHA developments, to borrow Hall et al’s
framework, both evoked a sense of threat to society as well as reaffirmed the “consensual
morality of society”: demarcating the line between safety and danger, civilization and its other.11
According to the papers, the latter were located at CHA.
Such was the mainstream public discourse about Chicago’s public housing in the early
1990s and certainly, gangs were an important part of daily life at CHA by this time. Street gangs
had been present at CHA developments since as early as the 1960s, but by the 1990s, at the
height of the crack cocaine epidemic, gang members not only resided in public housing, but also
claimed control over specific buildings, capitalizing on CHA’s vacant apartments and what
historian D. Bradford Hunt has identified as CHA’s “ready supply of impoverished youths.”12
There, rival gangs feuded with resident and non-resident gang members alike over control of the
drug trade, with gang leaders becoming, “de facto authority figures in the buildings they
occupied.”13 And indeed, residents attest that gangs did contribute to violence at CHA housing:
Andre Jenkins*, who lived at the Taylor Homes for 33 years, recalls how he “ducked and dodged
bullets” at the complex due to ongoing gang feuds.14
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However, living amongst gangs was a more nuanced experience than media portrayals
suggested. In particular, residents from the time attest that, while imperfect, gangs offered a form
of social organization otherwise absent from their communities and, moreover, abided by rules
of conduct that were known within the community. Crystal Palmer, a longtime tenant at the
Horner Homes, recalls that “[W]hen it came to gangs and shootings, the gangs would let people
know, [let] the parents know that kids were outside [and] that, you know, you had to get the kids
in the house because something is about to happen. . . . So, you didn't worry about a kid getting
killed.”15 Former Cabrini-Green resident Keith Augustine concurs, explaining, “A lot of times
when . . . a shooting was going to happen or somebody was going to get to fighting, the gangs
would tell people to go in their house. They would tell all of the women, all the kids, all the
people that’s not about that [gang] life, ‘You all go in the house.’ Because at the end of the day,
that’s their family. It’s not like they just telling some strangers [to] go in [the] house. They are
telling their cousins and their mommas and their kids, ‘You all go in the house.’ Every building
was a family.”16 Henry Warfield, who also grew up at Cabrini-Green, describes that, in the
absence of adequate police protection, gang members “were the guys who really policed our
community. When they knew we was about to get ready to [have] a gang war or a gang fight,
they’d tell the parents like, ‘Take your children inside because this has happened on that side of
the street.’ . . . So, they would just tell the adults, ‘Take your children in until this thing just
blows over.’”17
Protecting women and children was an especially important rule of gang conduct—at
least, in theory. As Palmer describes, this is part of the reason why Dantrell’s accidental shooting
death made such an impact throughout the community, because it violated those implicit rules.
Guana Stamps, who lived at Cabrini-Green as a child, says she never felt unsafe there, “Because
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everybody took care of each other. Women and children were off limits. There were gangs. But
whenever there was an issue with the gangs, everybody knew that women and children were off
limits. That meant if y’all know something’s getting ready to go down, you need to secure the
women and the children. I never worried about being shot or seeing a dead body or being raped
or any of that when I was growing up in Cabrini-Green.”18 As much as residents attest to an
unspoken ‘rules of engagement’ followed by the gangs, it is important to note that the reality of
gang conflict was often not so orderly. Women and children did get hurt, either directly, as in the
case of Dantrell, or indirectly, as they shaped their daily lives around extant gang violence, a
source of omnipresent stress.
Nevertheless, gangs did provide a form of social control, organization, and for some,
belonging. Derek, who requested to be identified by his first name only, likewise says of growing
up at the ABLA Homes, “I wasn’t worried about anybody in the neighborhood because we all
grew up together. It was like one big old, gigantic massive family in ABLA homes, even though,
just like in real families, people get into it and fight, and make up, and you’re back to regular.”19
Gangs could also, perversely, provide recourse when formal law enforcement fell short. Yolanda
Green*, who moved into Cabrini-Green in 1992, notes that she would often forgo calling 911 in
a crisis, instead turning to gang members to help her in a pinch. “[T]he gangs up in the building,
they can resolve issues way better than the officer,” she explains, adding “As a female, if you
didn’t want a guy in your crib and you wanted to have him removed . . . they made sure that that
person was removed and he wasn’t able to enter the building again.”20
For Augustine, who himself was gang-involved, gang membership provided “structure.”
He explains:
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It was right and wrong. It was do’s and don’ts. It was teaching me how to be a man. . . .
If you do certain things and you violate these rules of being a man and violate these rules
of the community, you will be dealt with. So, if you know you don’t want to be dealt
with, you knew not to do certain things and there were rules and roles. If somebody goes
through a neighborhood and just goes shooting and you go shoot and hit some little kid or
you hit somebody’s momma or somebody’s sister, they are supposed to be dealt with.
One way or the other. I don’t care. I’m not saying violence.21
Augustine is quick to clarify that he does not defend the gangs or all of their actions, saying,
“I’m not trying to preach and say that the gangs were all good because like I said, a lot of the bad
stuff that [gangs were] doing, that’s why it doesn’t exist now. . . . But at the end of the day, there
was some structure, and you had some good elder guys out there that was preaching that good
word like a preacher.” For him personally, older gang members helped him to develop positive
practices like maintaining good hygiene and attending school. As Augustine explains, “When I
was coming up in the gangs, the older guys made us go to school. . . . If we didn’t go to school,
they would violate us. They would kick our ass. You know like a big brother will beat on his
little brother? You know what I’m saying?” For Derek, joining a gang in his youth at the ABLA
Homes, “was more of an ‘everybody was doing it’ thing. It was like – again, I didn’t need to be
protected from nobody in my area because we all lived together and we all knew each other.”22
Initiation, he says, did not involve violence of any kind, as commonly portrayed in the media.
Instead, he went to an open meeting at his development, where, he says, “We’d stand in a circle
and we’d repeat what we had to repeat. . . . It isn’t like you have to get jumped in, like a lot of
people are saying. It wasn’t about that with us. Like I said, it was like a big family.”
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Jenkins says he was highly aware of gangs but never felt bothered by them at the Taylor
Homes. As he explains, “I still say that the gangs wouldn’t bother you, not unless you came there
trying to do something. I have experienced a lot. I haven’t had a problem with a gang member . .
. We were like a family, okay? Everybody knew everybody.” Jalissa Anders*, who has lived at
both the Taylor Homes and the Lathrop Homes, describes becoming accustomed to living around
gangs, saying “When I first moved here, I felt unsafe with the gangs. As you move in and
become a resident, the gangs were part of the community.”23 Augustine summarizes,
“[Outsiders] tried to make the gangs sound bad but, at some point in time, the gangs kept
families in peace too.” He describes how gangs would purposefully exclude kids they saw as
particularly dedicated to school or sports: “[T]he gangs would say, ‘Leave him alone. Don’t mess
with him. Let him go to school. He's not about that.’ Or ‘Leave him alone. He plays baseball; He
plays basketball; He plays football.’”24
Even Edward King*, a former CHAPD and CPD officer admits that gang members and
drug dealers could be a positive influence, saying, “I actually saw them trying to help people if
that makes sense. … Not that I’m saying we got a kind of Robin Hood kind of complex. But I
actually saw some of them doing good work in the community.”25 King describes how, “There
were a couple of instances where there were some vicious crimes that happened—there was a
sexual assault of a young lady—and we went to one guy and he said, ‘We’ll handle it.’ And they
certainly did.” Fernando Reyes, also a former CHA police officer, similarly explains that in one
building that was known for especially lucrative drug sales, “[The dealers] didn’t want the police
to ever go into that building. But if the police were called there, you would go in the building and
the person you were gonna go look for was already in handcuffs on the first floor waiting for
you.”26 As Reyes attests, gang members were indeed the ones performing the work of policing in
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the community, delivering a form of vigilante justice. At times, this took place with the police’s
tacit approval.
Thus, as other scholars have documented, living around and participating in street gangs
was a nuanced experience.27 For low-income public housing residents, who were largely
excluded from the formal economy, gangs provided a source of informal employment and, for
many, a sense of social order and community. They could also act, as expressed by residents and
even some police alike, as a more reliable form of in-house policing than the CHA or city police
provided, even if they also instigated much of the violence. If gang violence in and of itself was
indefensible, gang members were also residents, family members, and acquaintances—in other
words, known members of the community and not nameless, faceless threats as they were for
outsiders.
For this reason, media representation became especially important. That is, as Hall et al
describe, “[T]he media are often presenting information about events which occur outside the
direct experience of the majority of the society. The media thus represent the primary, and often
the only, source of information about many important events and topics.”28 Thus, in choosing
what to cover and how to cover it—what Hall et al call the “interpretive” function of media—
media sources provide, for many readers, the only view that outsiders will ever have.29 While
countless former residents compare public housing buildings to families, settings in which
everyone knew everyone, this familiarity was largely lost in mainstream reporting on public
housing and the gang activity occurring therein.
Further, as Hall et al detail, the media plays an important ideological role not only by
‘Othering’ certain places or events, making them seem foreign or sensational, but also by
providing “a crucial mediating link between the apparatus of social control and the public.”30
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That is, owned and operated as it is by powerful elites, the media not only controls the means of
production for news and information, but also what Hall et al, drawing on Marx, call the means
of “mental production.”31 In this way, media production is also a class project, in which
dominant categories and bourgeois morals are produced and reproduced. As Hall et al explain,
“The media thus help to reproduce and sustain the definitions of the situation which favor the
powerful, not only by actively recruiting the powerful in the initial stages where topics are
structured, but by favoring certain ways of setting up topics, and maintaining certain strategic
areas of silence.”32 Having established that gang violence at CHA was newsworthy—as opposed
to other potential topics or aspects of daily life there—the media contributed to producing and
amplifying gang violence as a category of crime worthy of public attention, fear, and further
policing. Thus, to outsiders, and particularly politicians and the police, gangs were nothing but a
threat, and a serious one at that.

Policing Gang Violence
As much as media portrayals helped construct the public discourse around gang violence
and link it to CHA, so too did policing play a role in producing the crime itself. As Hall et al
write, what distinguishes one particular crime from another is, in some cases, how the police
choose to categorize it: in the case of their study on mugging, they write that an individual event
of mugging “is mediated by the police in investigating it; they provide the mugging label, and
hence the legitimation for its use by the press.”33 Thus, police categorization of violence as gangrelated—as well as the police response to thusly categorized violence—legitimates the media’s
subsequent portrayal of that violence. If gang violence is partially produced, then, through police
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categorization and practice, Chicago police had, by the time of Dantrell’s death in 1992, long
maintained an interest in street gangs and developed various if shifting tactics to police them.34
As far back as the 1950s, police department reports reveal an ongoing interest in Chicago
street gangs. The 1955 report, for example, testified that, “In this year the Juvenile Unit
intensified it’s [sic] drive on teenage gangs throughout the city. Around-the-clock surveillance
was maintained of known hang-outs and other locations appealing to this type of offender.”35 In
1961, the police department formed a sub-group within its Youth Division called the “Group
Intelligence Unit,” which was responsible for “collect[ing] strategic intelligence about youth
gangs in the city.”36 During 1967, the police department established tactical units in each police
district to provide a “ready, mobile reserve to handle specific problems of crime without
reducing the blanket of patrol provided by beat officers.”37 One of these was the Gang
Intelligence Unit, a 10-officer unit “organized in response to an increasing number of murders
and assaults committed by teenage boys” and intended to gather evidence on gang leadership,
relationships amongst gangs, and the factors behind gang crime. As historian Simon Balto writes,
“From the outset, the GIU was deeply controversial. In the eyes of many members of the black
community, it misdiagnosed the causes of gang violence and was extremely counterproductive in
combating it.”38 Among other things, the GIU disrupted some of the community-oriented
programs run by gangs, such as job training programs, that could have meaningfully intervened
in structural violence.39 In 1968, the department increased the size of the GIU from 38 to 200
officers when the Criminal Intelligence and Youth Gang Intelligence Units were disbanded and
their personnel transferred to the GIU.40 Over the years, the GIU came to have so much power
that, as Balto writes, “the unit’s function came to look more like the Red Squad than a standard
police unit.”41
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Throughout the early 1970s, CPD annual reports make little if any mention of gangs or
organized street crime, despite the fact that gang wars were prominent in public housing
developments during these years due to narcotics traffic.42 Then, in 1977, under Superintendent
James O’Grady, CPD started publicly reporting “motivation for murder” in their annual
statistical reports, including a category called “gangland.”43 Just two years later, in 1979, the
department formed a new Narcotics-Gang Crimes Division “to curtail a billion-dollar narcotics
business which uses Chicago as a distribution point for heroin.”44 As CPD explained, the new
division would be under the Bureau of Inspectional Services. Narcotics and gang crimes were
now considered “top Department priorities.”45
Yet, only a year later in 1980, CPD reorganized again, forming the Organized Crime
Division, which absorbed the Department’s Narcotics section from the Narcotics-Gang Crimes
Division.46 The Gang Crimes section was now its own entity, comprised of three geographically
dispersed policing units that would be staffed by detectives specializing in gang-related crimes.
The goal of the units was to identify members of street gangs and their operations. The Gang
Crime Section worked closely with the Gang Special Prosecution Unit of the Cook County State
Attorney’s Office to prosecute cases related to street gangs. CPD bragged that “Concentrating on
good investigation, reporting, and case presentations resulted in 95 gang members being
sentenced to the State Penitentiary” that year alone.47 In 1981, CPD formed a new Bureau of
Field Tactical Services, which itself was composed of three divisions: Gang Crime Enforcement
North and South, and the Public Housing Crime Division (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of the
Public Housing Division, or “Public Housing Unit”). According to CPD, the purpose of all three
divisions was “to make a solid impact on street gang-related crimes.”48 In 1985, the department
further established a Community Gang Control Program (CGCP), which combined an emphasis
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on enforcement through “intensified arrests and vigorous prosecution of hard-core gang leaders”
as well as programs for youth to provide alternatives to gang enrollment.49 Starting in 1986, CPD
stopped reporting on the number of murders considered to be “gangland” motivated. Instead, the
Department touted what they saw as the success of the CGCP.50
Table 8.1. Number of times “gangland” was provided as a “motivation for murder” in CPD
annual report, by year.
Year
# Murders
1977
12
1978
9
1979
0
1980
1
1981
2
1982
0
1983
0
1984
1
1985
2
From 1987 to 1992, the annual reports make no mention of gangs, except to occasionally
mention the number of youths involved in the CGCP. Despite what they reported publicly, CPD
maintained their interest in policing gangs, however. In 1991, the Gang Crimes Section was
expanded to include a new unit, the Concentrated Gang Enforcement Program or “Flying
Squad,” in which uniformed tactical police officers would saturate and patrol geographically
delimited areas of about 5 square blocks in unmarked vehicles from 5:30 pm to 2 am.51
Anti-gang policing was augmented by new legislation when, in June of 1992, the
Chicago City Council passed a “gang loitering” ordinance, which legislated that “Whenever a
police officer observes a member of a criminal street gang engaged in gang loitering with one or
more persons in any public place designated for the enforcement of this section . . . the police
officer shall . . . (i) inform all such persons that they are engaged in gang loitering within an area
in which loitering by groups containing criminal street gang members is prohibited; (ii) order all
such persons to disperse and remove themselves from within sight and hearing of the place at
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which the order was issued; and (iii) inform those persons that they will be subject to arrest if
they fail to obey the order promptly or engage in further gang loitering” at the location within the
next eight hours. Under the ordinance, the police superintendent was directed to designate areas
of the city where the ordinance was to be enforced. To do so, the superintendent was to consult
with others who had knowledge of the area, including gang crime specialists, local politicians,
and “participants in the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy”—or “CAPS,” Chicago’s
community policing program—who were familiar with the area. “Gang loitering” was defined in
the ordinance as “remaining in any one place under circumstances that would warrant a
reasonable person to believe that the purpose or effect of that behavior is to enable a criminal
street gang to establish control over identifiable areas, to intimidate others from entering those
areas, or to conceal illegal activities.” “Public place” was defined as “the public way and any
other location open to the public, whether publicly or privately owned.”52
On a flyer created to popularize the new legislation and get the community involved,
Chicago Police advertised a new hotline they had created for gang-related tips: 773-533-GANG.
The flyer told residents that “Through attending CAPS beat meetings, residents can help police
identify ‘hot spots’ where the ordinance can be enforced.” The flyer asserted, “These ordinances
are necessary: Gang members and drug dealers rarely commit crimes in full view of police
officers. Instead, by ‘marking turf’ and using ‘lookouts’ who loiter on our city streets, they
conceal illegal activities and intimidate law abiding residents.”53 Despite the police department’s
insistence that the ordinances had been written in ways that protected city residents’
constitutional rights, the Supreme Court ultimately struck down the legislation’s legality in City
of Chicago v. Morales et al (heard in 1998 and decided in 1999). In a 6-3 decision, the judges
upheld a previous decision by the Illinois Supreme Court saying that the ordinance violated due
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process and was impermissibly vague, thus imposing an arbitrary restriction on personal
liberties.54
In 1994, CPD released a combined report for the years 1993 and 1994. The report was the
first to track gang-motivated murders since 1985, listing some 129 murders and 293 murders as
“street gang” motivated in 1993 and 1994, respectively.55 Indeed, in the Department’s
assessment, “Street gang violence and altercations were among the most common causative
factors” for murders during those years.56 CPD provided the caveat that “The large increase in
street gang and organized crime figures in 1994 partially reflects changes in the definitions of
those categories.”57 Yet, the Department clearly saw this as a turning point. A decade later, in a
2005 info sheet on gang-motivated murders in the city, the Department wrote that gangmotivated murders had jumped from 15% of the total murders to about 37% between 1992 and
1993 and rose to 45% at its peak in 1994.58 Nowhere did this 2005 report, which aimed to trace
citywide trends in gang-motivated murders, mention the categorical shift that, at least partially,
produced this spike in the data. By 1995, two divisions within the police department’s Bureau of
Investigative Services were tasked with monitoring and addressing gang crime: the Organized
Crime Division and the Youth Division.59
Thus, if CPD had long maintained an interest in policing gangs, and if street gangs had
maintained a presence at CHA housing since at least the 1960s, anti-gang policing reached a
peak in the early 1990s. Street gangs and gang-related crimes were in sharp focus for police and
politicians alike, as seen in the proliferation of gang-oriented tactical units and programs that the
police department created and maintained; the passage of the gang loitering ordinance, which
strengthened the ability of CPD to police individuals suspected of gang membership; and the
ways in which the police department increasingly categorized more and more crimes as gang-
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related. These bureaucratic and policy changes manifested on the ground in material ways at
CHA. Indeed, the fear of gang violence in public housing drove policing strategy there in the
years following Dantrell Davis’ death. The police response to gang violence was also violent. To
illustrate this point, in what follows I chart two key manifestations of CPD’s emphasis on gang
policing: the ongoing illegal, warrantless searches and new patrols that formed to intensively
surveil CHA residents with a goal of weeding out gang members.

Sweeping Out Gangs
Once Cabrini-Green had been swept in the weeks following Dantrell’s shooting, police
and officials moved on to Rockwell Gardens, the Henry Horner Homes, the Taylor Homes, and
ABLA.60 In mid-November, the ACLU charged that police violated their agreement by
indiscriminately searching tenants and visitors at Cabrini-Green following Dantrell’s death. They
alleged that both CHAPD and CPD officers had been frisking tenants and their guests,
particularly young Black men, but also women and babies as young as two months old, without a
reasonable suspicion.61 By the end of November 1992, all but twelve high-rises across the
agency had been swept.62 A Chicago Tribune writer argued that without the sweeps, violence at
CHA developments would be even higher than it was, citing statistics that showed that violence
in public housing had risen 21 percent since the sweeps, but 31 percent throughout the city as a
whole. CHA’s then-Chief Operating Officer Robert Whitfield supported the journalist’s
conclusions, saying, “We slowed the growth of crime through these sweeps.”63
Guided equally by their belief in the efficacy of the sweeps and, arguably, the difficulty
of making a more structural intervention in gang violence, CHA continued raiding public
housing throughout 1993. In the wake of Dantrell’s death, the sweeps became even more rabid,
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continually testing the limits of CHA’s consent decree with ACLU. In mid-August of 1993,
CHA launched an illegal sweep at the Taylor Homes, wherein “police officers and federal agents
[searched] apartments without warrants.”64 The search followed an incident wherein alleged
gang members had shot at workers who were installing child-proof windows the day before.
Police and CHA officials justified the action as an emergency intervention, making it
theoretically allowable under the terms of the consent decree, which permitted CHA to search
common areas and vacant apartments and to conduct “emergency housing inspections.”65 Even
officials equivocated on the raid’s legality, however: As CHA Police Chief Hosea Crossley told
the press, “Yes [the sweep] is illegal. We’re in an emergency situation out here. Any time you’re
prevented from installing measures to save lives because of some young punks with guns, it’s an
emergency.”66 Lane commented, “We consider this an action very similar to bomb threats from
terrorists. Authorities evacuate people and search the building. They don’t stop to say, ‘Can we
go look for the bomb?’”67 CPD Superintendent Matt Rodriguez defended the searches and,
unlike Chief Crossley, asserted not only their necessity but their legality, calling the situation
“exceptional” and noting that “As far as I’m concerned, there was no intention of doing anything
illegal.”68 He continued that “I would not participate in anything blatantly illegal. I would not let
our officers participate in anything that was illegal. I hope there was not a sense of it being
anything illegal.”69
Before the warrantless Taylor raid began, residents were asked to sign a consent for
police to search their apartments and belongings for weapons. Everyone who was asked for their
consent had agreed, thus, as the Sun-Times aptly noted, “rendering moot the question of what
would have happened if they didn’t.”70 However, police also searched apartments where
residents were not home at the time. As Maurice Scott, a 20-year-old resident of the Taylor
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Homes, told the press, “My parents weren’t home. [The police] told me that if I didn’t open the
door, they were going to break in and change the locks. When I didn’t sign a consent, they did (a
search) anyway.”71 ACLU representatives said they would like to know if residents were
agreeing voluntarily or if they were being coerced to accept the conditions of the sweeps.72 As
ACLU Attorney Harvey Grossman told the press, “There are not exceptions to the Constitution
when you’re dealing with public housing residents.”73
After the raid, CHA filed a motion in federal court for after-the-fact approval to conduct
such warrantless searches on an “emergency” basis.74 In response, in November of 1993, ACLU
again sued the CHA, charging that police officers had illegally searched closets, refrigerators,
and sealed containers during the two-day weapons search at the Taylor Homes in August. Lane
told the press, “I’m responsible for the safety of CHA residents. If there’s random gunfire, we’re
going in.”75
Lane’s fervor was not upheld in court, however. On February 14, 1994, U.S. District
Judge Wayne R. Anderson issued a temporary restraining order preventing the CHA from
conducting warrantless weapons searches and urging CHA and ACLU lawyers to come up with a
compromise by May 1 to “let the CHA know what it can do to enhance safety within
constitutional” guidelines. Andersen said that, as a judge, he must view the abuse of
governmental power “as a greater evil than the danger of criminal activity.”76 Some residents
protested the decision, saying that ACLU did not represent the vast majority of CHA residents,
who they said were convinced that sweeps had reduced violence in their housing communities.
As in the past, a significant group of residents—in this case, represented by the elected leaders of
18 CHA developments—were willing to trade privacy and deal with police invasions for at least
an attempt at safety. The ACLU contended that resident opinion was irrelevant to the case, since
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residents who supported sweeps could still individually consent to searches of their own
apartments.77
Residents’ varied response to the sweeps can be explained, in part, through class politics.
As Hall et al write, “The reaction of the working class to the law is an extremely complex one,
involving particular forms of connection and disconnection. . . . To understand this contradictory
relation, we must look at how the law articulates with a sense of a working-class ‘code of
behavior.’ The fundamental code of respectable and acceptable behavior by and for members of
a ‘community’ has a content which does not exactly parallel that of the law.”78 That is, for some
members of the poor and working classes, acceptable behavior and legal behavior are not always
colinear. However, for others, crime is especially spurned insofar as any connection to criminal
activity is seen as “one route downwards out of the respectable life” and away from the
possibility of middle-class success.79 And, recall from the preceding chapters that the actions of
CHA and police agencies were criminalizing CHA residents as a class, providing few if any
alternatives to accepting policing as the correct strategy for public safety. As Hall et al explain,
“Respectability is therefore one of the key values which dovetails and inserts one social class
into the social image of another class. It is part of what Gramsci called the ‘cement’ of
society.”80 In her ethnographic work on intra-racial class dynamics in gentrifying neighborhoods
on Chicago’s South Side, sociologist Mary Patillo confirms that upwardly mobile Black
residents seek “revenge against gang members and drug dealers—the most frequently named
perpetrators of neighborhood violence” through “increased police action, falling right in line
with the tough-on-crime approach at the national level.”81 While her research took place after
much of Chicago’s high-rise public housing had been demolished, it shows how such intra-racial
class dynamics, oriented around the politics of respectability, have continued throughout changes
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in the built environment of these neighborhoods. Indeed, CHA tenants throughout the decades
frequently and repeatedly called for tough-on-crime, law-and-order responses to gang violence in
public housing. Drawing on James Forman Jr.’s arguments about how the Black middle class
helped build the U.S. carceral state, Balto points out that in their desperate search for public
safety, CHA tenant activists in the 1970s “inadvertently helped create the context for today’s
sprawling punitive state.”82 By intervening in the lawsuit in support of the CHA raids, elected
tenant leaders fell in line with the respectability politics described above, joining the state in its
push for law and order at any cost.
However, what residents thought of the sweeps—good or bad—ultimately mattered less
than the court’s opinion. Following Judge Andersen’s temporary restraining order, when gunfire
broke out at CHA, housing authority officials would ask the judge to lift the order so they could
perform a sweep. At an emergency hearing, Andersen said that “Sweeping buildings two or three
days after an event is not reasonable. But if 15 or 20 officers responded to an incident soon after .
. . (a search of the premises) strikes me as a reasonable response.”83 Mayor Daley pleaded with
Andersen to “be reasonable” and lift the restraining order against CHA, pleading “There has to
be more sweeps because the more guns you pull out, the more lives you’re going to save.” Daley
also chastised the ACLU, asking, “Why doesn’t the ACLU go there (to Robert Taylor) and
patrol?”84
A number of high-profile Chicagoans were present for the hearing on the ACLU case,
including Senator Carol Moseley-Braun and U.S. Representative Bobby Rush. At the hearing,
ACLU’s Grossman argued that CHA required not emergency raids, but tighter security above
and beyond what was currently being provided by the police and CHA’s hired security guards.
CHA attorneys, meanwhile, argued that the sweeps were effective to stop shooting.85 Ultimately,
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Judge Andersen stuck to his original position, vowing to permanently ban warrantless searches
of CHA buildings.86 This was not the end of the sweeps, but Judge Andersen’s ruling did
emplace formal limits on the extent of the searches.
As in the past, the impacts of the raids on fighting crime were tentative at best. If police
statistics pointed to moderate decreases in crime at CHA, the press and residents alike chronicled
how gang members would often move back into buildings immediately after a raid.87 There, they
would resume operations as quickly as they had been removed, “deal[ing] drugs right in front of
many of these guards and openly carry[ing] weapons past them.” The Tribune reported that
“Many of the guards, who are paid barely the minimum wage, would rather live than risk
stopping the crime.”88 Horner Homes resident Arlene Johnson confirmed these reports, telling
the paper that it took just a smile to convince guards to let someone into the buildings without
checking their ID. “The (metal detector) buzzer keeps going off,” she explained, adding “People
go in and out with guns.” Again, the raids were expensive: CHA had spent nearly $70 million on
security in 1993 alone and $145 million on security measures between 1991 and 1993.89 Lane
said CHA would spend between $70 and $75M on security in 1994 and that it would take $150M
a year to make all CHA buildings safe by hiring an additional 500 to 800 CHA police officers.90

New Beats, New Tactics
The controversial sweeps were increasingly complemented by new police practices to
confront gang violence at CHA in the years following Dantrell’s death. By April of 1994, CHA
and city police established new beats—not patrols, but entirely separate police beats—to
collaboratively police the Taylor Homes. To police these beats, CPD established additional
vertical patrols consisting of 16 officers and two sergeants, drawn from both forces, who would
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walk floor to floor in the 16-story high-rises. A Sun-Times columnist doubted the officers would
find much in the public areas they patrolled, while she worried “about how well other
neighborhoods are being protected while extra police are on duty 24 hours a day at Taylor
Homes and other CHA trouble spots.”91 The columnist speculated, “While police attention is
focused on the CHA, who’s minding the other neighborhoods? How long will it be before the
gangs wise up, stop the CHA violence and slink away to some neighborhood that is less wellpatrolled? I just hope it’s not my neighborhood.”92 Founded or not, the columnist’s worries
highlight the extra police attention being paid to CHA over and beyond other parts of the city,
and the extent to which the city’s collective attention was focused on CHA as a site of crime and
violence.
Also in 1994, CPD established a new strategy called the “Building Interdiction Team
Effort” or “BITE” team, which would send 18-officer teams into the CHA high-rises for
extended periods of time “to run gang members out and secure common areas, as beat patrols
might secure neighborhood streets.”93 Collectively, these new beats and special squads were
intended to confront the problem of gang crime, which police understood to be concentrated at
CHA.
Thus, through ever more intensive and expensive raids, plus the added beats and BITE
team patrols, CHA—viewed as a hotspot for gang violence—was under police scrutiny like
never before—a remarkable statement for a site that was hardly new to police attention. As Hall
et al explain, creating new squads to police particular categories of crime is not a neutral
decision. The establishment of new beats and patrols did not merely respond to gang violence
but indeed, amplified it. As Hall et al explain of the case with muggings in the UK, “One
possible amplifying factor is, precisely, the decision to set up special squads in the first place.
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Special ‘Anti-Mugging’ Squads were almost certain to produce more ‘muggings’: an unintended
but inevitable consequence of specialist mobilization.”94 So too did increasing patrols aimed
specifically at rooting out gang members and intervening in gang crime almost certainly lead to
increased attention to gang violence and likely the increase in reported gang violence as well.
Amidst these new tactics to police gangs, CHA’s COO Robert Whitfield admitted that
public safety in the developments would require “a combination of resident involvement,
economic development, and employment programs. Police action alone won’t solve it.”95
However, CHA’s actions and spending indicated otherwise: the agency was determined to work
with police to fight fire with fire, meeting gang crimes and violence with their own forms of
lawlessness and violence. It’s not that CHA did not support social programs: Officials did
concurrently support initiatives like CHA’s Midnight Basketball league, for example, which
involved young male residents in sports, particularly in the late-night hours when, it was thought,
they might otherwise get into trouble.96 However, such programs, where present, were dwarfed
in comparison with the energy and moneys being directed towards policing. Midnight Basketball
cost just $80,000 in pilot funds to start, of which CHA contributed a measly $25,000 and
corporate donations made up the rest.97 Later, the federal government picked up the tab,
investing $5 million over the course of two years to run midnight basketball leagues, with local
businesses again providing sponsorships for uniforms and shoes.98 And, programs like Midnight
Basketball, while worthy in their own right, were insufficient to confront the structural problems
that scholars have shown to contribute to gang participation, including entrenched poverty, lack
of formal economic opportunities, and a need for parallel social structures that provide respect
and recognition to those who are marginalized within society.99
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Re-scaling the Crisis
As the legal battles between CHA and ACLU escalated, the issue of gang violence
increasingly began to transcend Chicago to take on national significance. Having won the
presidency on a strong law-and-order platform, President Clinton was in the process of
developing a sweeping crime bill to address urban violence in the United States.100 While Judge
Andersen continued to restrain CHA’s ability to conduct sweeps, Clinton intervened, ordering
Attorney General Janet Reno and HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros to develop a plan for legal
sweeps to uncover weapons in public housing.101 Cisneros promised to deliver the plan for legal
searches to Clinton within ten days.102
Meanwhile, Clinton went as far as to suggest, in comments made by phone to participants
at a town hall on Chicago’s south side, that Judge Andersen’s ban on warrantless weapons
searches in CHA housing developments may have contributed to a recent spate of shootings at
the Taylor Homes. Eighty CHA residents, U.S. Senator Carol Moseley-Braun, U.S.
Representative Bobby Rush, and Vince Lane were all in attendance at the town hall when the
President made his speculative remarks. On a recent visit to Chicago, Cisneros had accompanied
the BITE team on a mission to sweep vacant apartments and those of residents who agreed to
have their units searched. He told the press, “We walked through buildings last night where the
lights were taken out of the stairwells and they were pitch dark. Yet we ask mothers to come
home from work into those settings. It’s not right. It’s not right that people have to be frisked at
the doorways to buildings, only it’s not officers of the law [doing it], it’s gang members.”103 On
the other hand, nationally syndicated Tribune columnist Clarence Page commented on President
Clinton’s public speculation that the increase in violence at Taylor was related to judge
Andersen’s decision to prohibit warrantless searches, calling the president’s words “pure
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demagoguery, apparently intended to show everyone how liberal he isn’t. If the president really
believes the Constitution’s protections have become an impediment to effective crime-fighting,
the good guys have already lost.”104
Clinton also devoted a Saturday radio address to urban crime, citing violence at Robert
Taylor as evidence of the need for his crime bill, which he urged Congress to pass the following
week. He told the audience he had been to CHA projects and that, as a result, “I know the
difference between those that have been swept free of illegal weapons and criminals and those
which have not. I have been in places where the sweeps occurred and the housing units were
cleaned up.”105 As of mid-April, Mayor Daley joined the president as well as other mayors and
police officials to lobby the House to pass the crime bill.106
At the same time, Attorney General Reno’s office proposed an anti-violence policy for
public housing that would include asking tenants for advance consent for police to search their
apartments and frisk “suspicious people” in public areas of their buildings. As Clinton’s
administration reviewed the policy, Reno explained, “We want to make sure that consentual [sic]
searches can still go forward.” What was not immediately clear was whether such advance
consent would be made a requirement in the CHA lease. Lane said he hoped it would be, telling
the press that “We could modify a lease, saying this is part of the deal: There may be times when
we have to do warrantless searches for weapons. If you don’t like it, you don’t live here.” Others,
like Loyola University Law Professor James Carey opined that such a lease provision would
place undue coercion on poor people, who would face accepting the condition or living on the
street.107 Speaking for the ACLU, Grossman said advance consent forms would be acceptable
only if they were not required as a condition of tenancy and if tenants could revoke their consent
at any time.108 Indeed, ACLU vowed to challenge a policy that made search consent a condition
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of living in public housing, which, it argued, would mean consent was given involuntarily and
that the resulting searches would be unconstitutional.109 Meanwhile, Cisneros announced a $28
million package of new and rechanneled funds to assist with crime prevention at CHA.110
On April 16, President Clinton unveiled a seven-point plan to address crime in public
housing including installing protective fencing, including prior search consent in leases, issuing
warrants by phone, and frisking suspicious individuals. The housing authority could also install
metal detectors, search packages and clothing and refuse entrance to anyone who did not agree to
be inspected.111 CHA residents, Vince Lane, and reporters listened together from an office in
Stateway Gardens as Clinton announced his plans by radio. Clinton promised more police as
well as more programs, like midnight basketball leagues, “to help young people say no to gangs,
guns, and drugs.” The Sun-Times noted the extent to which Chicago public housing had become
synecdoche for all urban crime, writing that “The Clinton administration has been focusing
massive attention on CHA crime this week as part of the White House push to pass its crime
bill.”112 Alderman Dorothy Tillman of Chicago’s 3rd Ward saw the situation somewhat more
cynically, saying the president “might be using our CHA development to push his three-strikesand-you’re-out crime bill.”113
Indeed, Clinton’s call for a search consent in public housing leases drew mixed responses
from CHA residents. Ethel Washington, president of the elected residents’ council for the
southern half of the Taylor Homes, asked “Is Mr. Clinton the only one who has the right to
privacy under the Constitution?” Gloria Williams, a tenant representative at the Ickes Homes, on
the other hand, asked “If you don’t have anything to hide, I mean what’s the big deal? Why
would you object to something that is going to make it a safer place for you to live?” Beverley
Dorsey, a tenant representative from Madden Park, said, “In order for the CHA to manage and
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control their property, they have to regain control.” Bertha Cromwell, a resident of the Dearborn
Homes, said “What else can you do? It’s a violation of my rights when I can’t go outside when I
want to.” Dushanti Russell, a resident of Rockwell Gardens, said he supported Clinton’s plan
overall but took issue with the consent clause, saying, “I think it is an invasion of your privacy.
They can come in unexpected, and it is in the contract that they can do it.”114
Lane agreed not to ask residents to consent to searches as a condition of housing—at least
in the short-term—but instead said CHA would ask them to sign a separate consent that would
last for the year’s duration of their lease.115 Lane said he expected to eventually be allowed to
require search consent as a lease provision, but for now, he said he expected at least 80 percent
of tenants to voluntarily allow their apartments to be searched. He said he would work with
tenants’ associations to build support for the proposal and that he had submitted a proposed rider
to the CHA lease to the Justice Department for its review and expected final approval within a
few weeks. Lane planned to drum up support amongst current tenants to get signatures on
supplementary forms in the meantime and otherwise would add the rider to leases when they
were up for renewal. Grossman said that residents should have the right to revoke their consent
at any time, noting “Each time that a police officer enters one’s home, one has a right to make
that decision.”116 For his part, Cisneros told the press that “Probably access to an apartment
cannot be conditional” to a public housing lease.117
In June, Clinton visited Chicago and specifically, the Taylor Homes, which the SunTimes called “the toughest of the CHA projects.” There, Clinton was shown a display of
confiscated weapons in a CHA police station; he noted that his crime bill would ban such
weapons. When asked about CHA’s sweeps, Clinton said that everyone makes concessions for
safety, noting “No American complains anymore about going through a metal detector at an
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airport.”118 Meanwhile, Vice President Gore unveiled the $840 million Operation Safe Home
plan to fund securitization programs at 3,400 public housing authorities around the country.
CHA spent $67 million in 1993 on security and $35 million in 1991, yet the Tribune reported
that “crime remains a problem, and gangs armed with guns still plague the residents despite
highly publicized efforts to rid the developments of both.” Reported to be an “adjunct” to the
broader proposed crime bill, Gore said he hoped the program would have spillover effects,
making the neighborhoods surrounding public housing safer as well.119
Ultimately signed into law on September 13, 1994, Clinton’s Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act was a sweeping law-and-order policy that authorized over $30.2 billion in
nationwide spending over six years on police and prisons, banned 19 different assault weapons,
and established the Violence Against Women Act.120 A central tenet of the legislation was to put
as many as 100,000 new police officers on the streets, many of whom would operate under
problem-oriented policing frameworks focused on disorder policing and policing of so-called
“hot-spots.”121 For Clinton, the bill was a way to free people “imprisoned in their own
apartments behind locked doors” such as those living in Chicago’s public housing.122 However,
the effect of the bill was to expand the reach and capacity of the carceral state by growing police
forces and prisons, creating new capital crimes, and mandating life-sentences for some threetime offenders under the “three strikes and you’re out” framework.123 As legal scholar Jonathan
Simon writes of the bill, “there is no optimism in this law that crime can be eliminated. Instead,
it reflects what David Garland (2012) has called the ‘culture of control,’ a presumption that
management of crime risk must be built into the fabric of everyday life.”124 In all of these ways,
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act solidified Clinton’s commitment to what
Jordan Camp has called “the bipartisan consensus to advancing the neoliberal project that had
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been shored up during the age of Reaganism,” a project that merged the elimination of welfare,
the rise of domestic militarization via urban police forces, and the expansion of the punitive
carceral state.125 The dovetailing between federal crime control policy and the policing of
Chicago public housing thus constitutes what Hall, drawing on Gramsci called a “conjuncture”—
a moment in which power relations are shaken up and therefore, revealed; as Hall puts it, an
“accumulation of contradictions.”126 By using Chicago as a platform for his campaign to pass the
Crime Bill, Clinton and his administration effectively re-scaled the crisis from one of local to one
of national concern. No longer could Chicago or the United States ignore the conditions of CHA
housing, including the violence therein.

When the Police are a Gang, and Home is a Prison
The new policing tactics oriented around eradicating gangs from public housing, as well
as the broader political context of a moral panic around ‘gangbanging,’ had material effects for
the daily life of CHA residents. In particular, residents began to experience their developments as
increasingly carceral. Navigating gang violence made life at CHA prison-like, but so too did
police actions at CHA developments. At Rockwell Gardens, resident Wanda Mattox told the
press that the police, “treat us like animals. Stopping us, frisking us, keeping us from going in
and keeping us out in the cold.”127
Ironically, to combat gang violence, police employed many of the same tactics of the
gangs themselves. As resident Keith Augustine said of living in public housing at the time,
“They were a gang. The police are a gang. . . . They are just another one of those gangs of
Chicago built on corruption and gangs and all that. The police, you call them the police, it’s just
another gang.”128 Growing up at Cabrini-Green, Guana Stamps explains that her mother worried
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about the young men in the community. As she explains, “Being a male, Black child growing up
in Cabrini-Green, your days were numbered. And it wasn’t numbered by the gangs. It was
numbered by the police.”129 Thus, as a result of state actions, CHA residents of the early 1990s
were caught in a double bind, forced to live amongst the violence and lawlessness wrought by
gangs and police alike.
During the sweeps that followed Dantrell’s death, residents reported being searched by
police or security guards up to nine times a day, leaving some tenants afraid to leave their
homes.130 ACLU attorneys argued, “We do not need to intern 135,000 people in their homes and
systematically take away their constitutional rights in order to provide safe housing.”131
Grossman further told the press that, “We want more security . . . We are only asking that it be
the same type of security provided to people in private housing, who live in the finest part of
town.” 132 Mark Pratt, a lifelong Cabrini-Green resident, told the press that “I think [the sweeps]
are a huge violation of our civil rights. They treat us all like we are prisoners—like we’re all
drug dealers and gun dealers, and we’re not.”133 Pratt said that officers had even wanted to search
his “terrified” two-year-old son, while he himself had been subjected to invasive pat-downs as
many as seven times in a single day. Another resident, Joseph Benton, reported being subjected
to nine searches in a day, including two that took place outside of CHA property. Benton’s
daughter had been having repeated nightmares since the sweeps began.134 Earlinda Tate, a 28year-old Taylor resident, told the paper that “I have a lease. I pay my rent. I’m a citizen of the
United States. I have rights. I understand they’re looking for criminals. But I am not one. I want
out of here so bad. Vince Lane treats this like a prison.” 135 Meanwhile, CHA attorneys told the
press that it was crime, not the sweeps, that was turning residents into prisoners in their own
homes.136
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In late March of 1994, Pratt wrote to the Sun-Times that, “Like any high-rise tenant, I like
elevators that work, clean, safe playgrounds and a feeling of security and privacy. As a CHA
resident, I have none of this.” He wrote that rather than solving problems, CHA had helped to
create them. He wrote,
CHA has declared war on my family and other law-abiding tenants by doing ‘sweep
searches.’ Police and security guards enter our homes whenever they want and search our
belongings and bodies. These ‘sweeps’ treat residents like criminals. They also do
nothing to stop the violence. After the cameras and reporters leave, the crime and
violence continue. The security guards left to protect the entrances to the buildings make
very little money. It does not surprise me that they are not willing to risk life or limb to
stop somebody from taking a weapon into a building.
Pratt said the “cost in human dignity” was too high to justify the searches, citing pat-downs and
an instance when officers took off a resident’s baby’s clothes to look in his diaper. Pratt said he
agreed public housing should be made safe and that he and his neighbors would help CHA come
up with a plan. “Competent and professional security, regular maintenance and social programs
supporting and encouraging residents to improve their lives are just starting points,” he wrote. “I
know that the problems at CHA are huge and that they will take a long time to fix. But, my home
is still my refuge.”137

Class Struggle and Crises of Hegemony
In a column published in April of 1994, Clarence Page expressed his support for residents
who did not want to submit to warrantless searches. “For almost 30 years,” he wrote, “violent
crime has run rampant in the Chicago Housing Authority’s high-rise apartment buildings.
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Chicago police were notoriously lethargic about patrolling them. Gangs ran many buildings.
Children were afraid to play outdoors. Gang leaders actually told residents when they could
come and go to avoid disturbing drug deals.” Then came Lane’s sweeps and, “having already
lost their right to live in a safe place, a number of residents have been willing to sacrifice their
own rights to privacy, even if it means turning existing public housing into little police states.
But if the result is only a loss of rights to both the gangs and the police, what’s gained?”138 The
question was prescient, particularly as policing gang violence in Chicago public housing became
a question of national significance via President Clinton’s campaign to pass his 1994 crime bill.
But why, by the 1990s, had gang violence become such a point of focus for local and national
policymaking?
To be sure, gang violence was rampant by the mid-1990s, even if gangs were more
nuanced actors than the media often acknowledged. In arguing that gang violence constituted a
moral panic, I do not mean to suggest that it was not real, or a problem. However, following in
the vein of Hall and his coauthors, it is the reaction to gang violence that I suggest is of interest
here, rather than the violence itself. Again following Hall et al, I suggest that, as muggings were
for the UK in the 1970s, gang violence in 1990s Chicago manifested a crisis of hegemony, which
“marks a moment of profound rupture in the political and economic life of society, an
accumulation of contradictions.”139 Crises of hegemony thus are “moments when the equilibrium
of consent is disturbed . . . moments when the whole basis of political leadership and cultural
authority becomes exposed and contested.”140 In such moments, the state loses its ability to
govern via consent and instead “tilt[s] . . . toward the pole of coercion.”141 Hall and his coauthors
insist that as the state employs more coercive measures to assert its control and reinstate its
legitimacy, crises of hegemony also involve a process of “unmasking” in which “The masks of

313

liberal consent and popular consensus slip to reveal the reserves of coercion and force on which
the cohesion of the state and its legal authority finally depends.”142 That is, crises of hegemony
are also moments of revelation, exposing the extent to which the state always relies upon
coercion, even when it does not directly invoke it.
Hegemony is not just about subduing or controlling a population, however; it is,
crucially, about shaping society in such a way that guarantees the ongoing expansion and
reproduction of capitalist social relations.143 As Ruth Wilson Gilmore and Craig Gilmore
explain, “Among the crises police interventions contain are legitimation crises, during which the
foundations of the racial capitalist state apparatus shake and crack. The lack of consensus about
what the state should be or do requires greater coercion of some of that state’s subjects.”144 Thus,
how CHA housing could or should be policed was, in the early to mid-1990s, fundamentally a
crisis of state legitimacy. In the eyes of lawmakers and law enforcers, street gangs seemingly
threatened the hegemony of the racial capitalist state to maintain its authority via law and order.
Meanwhile, it was the failures of that very state to provide for public housing tenants, themselves
the surplus workers of an increasingly neoliberal economy, that created the conditions for gangs
to emerge in the first place: the void of meaningful work and social services that the gangs
informally filled.
To counter the gangs in a space increasingly portrayed as a ‘war zone,’ state agents
reacted the only way they knew how: through increasingly militant policing. As Hall and his
coauthors explain, “This is where the cycle of moral panics issues directly into a law-and-order
society. For if the threat to society ‘from below’ is at the same time the subversion of the state
from within, then only a general exercise of authority and discipline, only a very wide-ranging
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brief to the state to ‘set things to right’—if necessary at the temporary expense of certain of those
liberties which, in more relaxed times, we all enjoyed—is likely to succeed.”145
If the policing of CHA housing in the early 1990s was an attempt to assert state
hegemony, it was also, crucially, a racial project, just as it had always been, dating back to the
days of policing integration in early CHA projects, as discussed in Chapter 2. Given that, as Hall
et al explain, race is “the medium in which class relations are experienced” under racial
capitalism, it was no accident that CHA residents—by the late twentieth century, among the
poorest of the city’s poor—were nearly all Black.146 However, Black crime also operated as a
vehicle of division amongst residents themselves, who reacted in oppositional ways to the
policing practices imposed upon them, much as it also fueled intraracial class differentiation in
the wider city.147
Simultaneously, CHA housing, which had received dwindling amounts of Congressional
funding since the 1970s and was spending hundreds of millions annually on security, appeared
increasingly economically unviable.148 Some CHA developments—particularly Cabrini-Green
and the Lathrop Homes on the North Side—occupied otherwise valuable swaths of city land.
Media portrayals of Cabrini-Green in particular wrote of the complex as an “island” amidst the
cultural and literal riches of Chicago’s Gold Coast.149 In other words, deteriorating public
housing high-rises, stigmatized as violent and dangerous, occupied acres of city land that could
otherwise be developed and rented for much higher prices, comprising a classic “rent gap,”
where the city was losing potential income at the same time that it fought to maintain law and
order at these sites.150
Thus, in 1994, in the midst of court battles between the CHA and ACLU over the
constitutionality of warrantless sweeps, the Tribune editors argued that the solution to CHA’s

315

ongoing security troubles was in changing the built environment itself. As the editors wrote,
“Lane hopes to supplant the cramped isolation of the high-rise with the know-your-neighbor feel
of a traditional neighborhood. If he succeeds, much of the crime problem, which thrives on
anonymity and despair, ought to solve itself.”151 Amid the release of the Clinton administration’s
plans to improve public safety at CHA housing in 1994, Vince Lane noted that “this is merely a
short-term solution to get control. The ultimate solution is to undo the bad public housing.” He
said public housing residents deserved a range of housing options from condos to single-family
homes to two-flats [duplexes], in a range of neighborhoods. “We’re talking about having public
housing families live in units that are indistinguishable from any other unit,” he explained.152 In
another editorial some months later, the Tribune editors wrote that “Residents don’t need
occasional sweeps so much as they need ongoing police protection. And they need re-designed,
re-thought public housing that takes families out of the high-rises and into mixed-income
developments, as Lane wants to do. If President Clinton wants to improve the safety of publichousing residents, as he says he does, then these are the kinds of reforms he should be
pressing.”153 A Sun-Times writer described the Taylor Homes as “such a hell-spot image of gang
terror, shootings and civic grief that the White House has proposed a $60 billion program to
remake public housing nationwide. If the plan works out—a big if—giant pileups like Taylor and
Cabrini-Green gradually may yield to scattered, low-rise family housing. It would be a
breakthrough—a latest spin in a long story that never should have been.”154 After Clinton
announced his plans to curb violence in public housing, the Sun-Times editors applauded his
administration’s proposals, but added that redevelopment of the housing itself was essential to
improving safety. As they wrote, “Most of public housing’s problems can be traced to public
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policies that isolated the poor. The solution is to start anew by attracting mixed-income families.
Welfare mothers, gang-bangers and drug dealers have been running things for too long.”155
Thus, increasingly, the demolition of public housing and its redevelopment into mixedincome communities was posed not only as a better way to house the poor but, indeed, as an
intervention into urban crime. Policymakers and police were tired of chasing the problem of
violence and drug-dealing in public housing and failing, in the eyes of the public, to solve it.
Residents were tired of gang and police-related violence alike. Meanwhile, crumbling public
housing buildings sat on otherwise valuable swaths of city land. The recent introduction in 1992
of the federal HOPE VI program, which provided funds for demolition and redevelopment,
seemed to provide an answer that would allow the city to simultaneously close the rent gap,
reduce crime through a new environmental and social design, and reassert their hegemony by
reclaiming unruly spaces of the city. Explicitly aimed at “severely distressed” public housing,
HOPE VI did not require one-for-one replacement of public housing units, thus rendering the
gentrification of public housing neighborhoods nearly inevitable.156 And thus, as discussed
further in the following, concluding chapter, the Plan for Transformation was born, using HOPE
VI funds to convert public housing high rises into mixed-income communities across the city and
forever changing the landscape of Chicago’s public housing.
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Chapter 9. Conclusion: Policing the Project
On July 31, 2020, what remains of Cabrini-Green—the rowhouses—was subject to yet
another horrific child death when 9-year-old Janari Ricks was shot and killed there by a stray
bullet. An eerie reminiscence of Dantrell Davis’ slaying nearly three decades earlier, Ricks’
death is the tragic epitome of the disconnect between the spatial transformations that have
defined the Near North Side in recent decades and the social stagnation of those who the plans
have left behind. Ricks, whose grandmother, Annie, was the last person to move out of the
Cabrini-Green high-rises in 2010, comes from a long line of Cabrini residents. He was playing
outside of his mother’s apartment in the rowhouses when he was shot by sniper fire. In the days
that followed, residents conducted a march against violence in Janari’s name—a march led in
part by Tara Stamps, daughter of the late Cabrini activist Marion Stamps.1
In this project, I have argued that Chicago’s Plan for Transformation was intended,
among other things, to reduce crime and violence by changing the built environment of public
housing. Influenced by the principles of Oscar Newman, who preached that correctly designed
environments could prevent crime, policymakers and many police officers alike believed that
high-rise housing projects were criminogenic: that is, not only that they were sites of crime, but
that they caused crime. Rather than attribute public housing violence to structural poverty or
organized abandonment on the part of the state, these stakeholders instead blamed a “culture of
poverty” among low-income people living in dense conditions and, indeed, on the buildings
themselves. Scholarly literature about the downfall of public housing, in Chicago and elsewhere,
has likewise largely overlooked the role of the police in these spaces, or taken as a foregone
conclusion that police were there to help mitigate crime and that their failure to do so justified
public housing’s demolition. Ricks’ death thus provides an opportunity, albeit a tragic one, to

322

reflect on how policing of public housing facilitated the Plan for Transformation and whether the
Plan has accomplished what it sought to achieve vis-à-vis public safety.

Public Housing as a Vice Zone
Established by progressive reformers as a way to eradicate slum poverty, public housing
was never intended as a mechanism to police the urban poor. Nevertheless, this was an
unanticipated result of the program since, by design, densely concentrated public housing offered
a convenient spatial arrangement whereby police could surveil, target, and prey upon
impoverished residents. If officers complain about the dangers and difficulties of policing the
developments, many also report that the high rises provided a space where crime was more easily
contained compared to other urban neighborhoods. In contrast, they largely see the Plan for
Transformation as detrimental insofar as it dispersed the “bad guys” across the city.* As George
Devereux, who worked for CPD for over 33 years before retiring in 2019 explains, “[Public
housing] was convenient for me and I got to interact with a whole bunch of different families and
a whole bunch of different crooks. But now [following the Plan for Transformation] they’re
going to be sprinkled all over the place.”2 CPD Officer Phil Harris* similarly explains that,
With the high-rises, it was almost a little bit easier [for us to police]; it was much more
concentrated. So, if you're working off of Larrabee and Division, you knew exactly what
it was, you knew all the gangs in that building, or you knew which gang was in that
building. So, you knew kind of who you were dealing with a little bit easier. When they
got rid of those and the people that lived there started going to different areas, kind of
spreading out, it became a little more difficult because you're mixing different people

*

As Susan Popkin points out, the belief that public housing demolition “spread crime” around the city is a racist dog
whistle that is not backed by evidence (personal interview with the author, November 18, 2020).
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from different housing areas together. And it was just – for us, it was a little more
complicated.3
Current CPD Officer and former CHA Police Officer Stephanie Wright* explains of public
housing tenants, “I guess it’s hard to put into words because it [sounds] like they’re almost being
described as chattel, but when they’re corralled together you have better control, if that makes
sense.”4 In other words, if the high rises were dangerous and emotionally draining places to
work, they nevertheless served as an effective mechanism, according to many police officers, for
controlling crime as a whole. At the scale of the projects; crime appeared out of control to
outsiders. At the scale of the city, the projects kept crime conveniently contained: as Jamie
Kalven describes, “It was an open secret that high-rise public housing was allowed to function
as a vice zone in order to keep the open sale of narcotics contained.”5
Derek, who experienced this policing as a CHA resident, affirms the reading of public
housing as a de facto vice zone, noting, “Everything is so systemic. When it comes to the
projects, it’s like . . . as long as it’s contained in those areas, we don’t have to worry about it, and
we can make sure that the world only sees what we want the world to see about these places,
these areas.”6 Thus, if policymakers did not intend for public housing to be a means for the city
to police the poor, the program’s midcentury design certainly lent itself to this result. As such,
for much of the twentieth century, public housing became a place where—again, as Jamie
Kalven writes, “The shadow play of narcotics enforcement . . . served as a tool of social control
– anyone on the grounds of a public housing development could be stopped at any time,
anyone’s home could be searched, any door could be broken down.”7 And, also as Kalven
explains, by criminalizing CHA residents as a population, policing rendered them non-credible,
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allowing for systemic police abuses to take place while functionally denying them any form of
recourse or accountability.8
In turn, as my analysis demonstrates, public housing served as a training ground for many
new police recruits who had to ‘serve their time’ on the Public Housing Unit. Countless officers
effectively learned how to police—typically in an aggressive manner, inflected with anti-poor
and anti-Black stereotypes—at public housing. Meanwhile, tactics tested in public housing were
often implemented in other contexts, from other low-income neighborhoods in the city to public
housing developments across the country. In this way, this study shows how public housing
produced officers and shaped the institution of modern policing as much as policing shaped
public housing.

Crisis in Public Housing
However, in the 1990s, and particularly after Dantrell Davis’ death, CHA could no longer
serve as a de facto vice zone, a place where policymakers contained social problems, including
crime, in prescribed urban areas, more-or-less cordoned off from the more affluent
neighborhoods and business districts of the city. As reviewed in Chapter 7, Davis was far from
the first child to be killed in public housing; his young age alone is therefore insufficient to
account for the policing maelstrom the tragedy set off. Amidst the national attention Davis’ death
received and President Clinton’s simultaneous rise to power on a law-and-order platform,
Chicago’s public housing violence became too great a stain on the city and the nation alike. In
the media and public discourse, crime seemed like an actor in its own right, a force that
threatened the viability of public housing, rather than an after-effect of state policy and—as I
have argued here—of policing itself. Additionally, with budgets dwindling as a result of
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longstanding federal defunding, public housing appeared to be a losing proposition, financially.
Particularly at sites like Cabrini-Green, located as it was in the heart of the Gold Coast, but even
in places like Stateway Gardens or the Robert Taylor Homes on the State Street corridor, the gap
between potential rent and actualized rent was growing ever-larger. That is, public housing
wasn’t “doomed to fail” but instead, policing, along with a host of other policy decisions, created
a situation that was ultimately untenable.
The introduction in 1992 of HOPE VI funding, which provided local public housing
authorities with federal funds for demolition and redevelopment, gave local governments a new
opportunity to remake their subsidized housing landscapes. With the Plan for Transformation,
Chicago was a leader in mixed-income public housing conversions, funded first through federal
HOPE VI grants and later through the Choice Neighborhood Initiative program and Rental
Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program after HOPE VI ended in 2010. The result, as many
scholars have documented, was a reduction in the number of public housing units on former
high-rise sites; a concordant de-densification of public housing; the transformation of most of the
subsidized housing stock from Section 9 public housing to Section 8 housing vouchers; a
wholesale transition to private management across the authority’s housing portfolio; and the
dispersal of CHA residents across the city—most to other low-income, predominantly Black
neighborhoods. While some residents did manage to return to their former neighborhoods when
redevelopment was finally complete, many others did not. Private developers, meanwhile, were
able to capitalize on the newly available lands, where they were also newly allowed to charge
higher rents and even build some market-rate housing for sale, rather than for rent. The result, in
other words, was not only a transformation in the property relation of public housing, but also the
further abstraction of urban space.
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Policing and the Abstraction of Space
While Lefebvre argues that capitalism encourages, even necessitates, the abstraction of
space—that is, the remaking of space as more homogenous and exchangeable—capitalism also
requires its opposite: differential space. Thus, in making the argument that the Plan for
Transformation resulted in the further abstraction of Chicago’s urban spaces, I do not argue that
these spaces reached some kind of fully abstract state in the privatization. For Lefebvre, class
struggle prevents the abstraction of space from, as Don Mitchell writes, “taking over the whole
planet and papering over all of the differences which are not intrinsic to economic growth.”9
Thus, much like homelessness, low-income housing presents a persistent challenge to capitalism,
just as it also absorbs surplus workers and thus mitigates crises of capital. In the case of Chicago,
the Plan for Transformation rendered the spaces of low-income housing more abstract and in the
process, changed the composition of neighborhoods. Meanwhile, it also—simultaneously—did
what capitalist housing reforms always do: it “merely shifted [the housing question] elsewhere!”
During reconstruction and following mass displacement, many former CHA tenants were pushed
into sub-standard apartments in poor neighborhoods of color on the South and West Sides, where
they now rent on the private market with housing choice vouchers.10
Many have written about Chicago’s public housing transformation and what it means for
the city socially and spatially. In this project, I have introduced a new, but, I believe, essential
factor in the story of the rise and fall of Chicago’s public housing: policing. Throughout, I have
attempted to show how policing laid the groundwork for the Plan, ushering in the transformation
of urban space, facilitating the remaking of Chicago’s public housing into more fully abstract,
capitalist space. Importantly, it does not matter whether or not police officers or leaders did this
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intentionally. In fact, my evidence would suggest that police officers and leaders did not
intentionally set out to remake urban space or vengefully retake the spaces of the urban poor.
Instead, policing, as an arm of the capitalist state, effected this transformation in several key
ways.
First, as my study shows, policing contributed to making public housing into a carceral
space, one that resembled the prison in design and management and criminalized residents as a
class. That is; policing, along with other forces, produced the spaces of Chicago’s public
housing. Through pervasive surveillance, brutality, and arrests, policing in public housing not
only marked residents as suspect, but also funneled many residents into the auspices of the
criminal-legal system. Policing not only failed to mitigate violence in public housing, but fueled
it. Meanwhile, policing contributed to remaking the built environment of public housing in ways
that resembled a prison through, for example, the installation of security booths in lobbies, oneway turnstiles at building exits, the implementation of police sub-stations complete with lockup
facilities within the buildings, the widespread use of closed-circuit television systems for
surveillance and the implementation and enforcement of resident identification programs.
Second, in doing so, policing ultimately served property, not people. This is not to say
that policing protected property in the obvious sense, as police were largely helpless to maintain
the buildings themselves. Instead, policing served the interests of capitalist property in that it
facilitated—whether intentionally or not—the demolition and remaking of Chicago’s public
housing landscape into a form more compatible with racial capitalist property relations. The
result should not have been surprising; after all, as far back as 1955, Police Commissioner
Timothy O’Connor had publicly proposed selling CHA land to developers as a result of racial
unrest, as discussed in Chapter 2. By the 1990s, then, from the perspective of city and federal
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officials, the widespread understanding of public housing as an inherently criminal space, a
lawless and ungovernable space—an understanding produced and refined, as we have seen in
detail, by decades of policing interventions that tended to heighten rather than reduce violence—
fed the policy consensus that public housing had failed, and that the only way to improve the
living conditions of public housing residents was, perversely, to destroy their homes. In the
process, the city reclaimed land for upscale development, fueled the construction of private
housing development, gentrified neighborhoods, and displaced the urban poor—all symptoms of
the further abstraction of space. When it was all done, city leaders even built a new, improved
police headquarters for the 18th District on the footprint of the demolished Cabrini-Green. Here
again, public housing contributed to the production of new, more abstract kinds of spaces.
And finally, in all of these ways, policing served the interests of the real estate state.11
Over the decades recounted in this history, policing helped to both create and reinforce the real
estate state, something that has not gone unnoticed by residents. For example, Guana Stamps
says of Cabrini-Green that, “Because of the drastic gentrification that has taken place, the people
that were there all their lives don’t feel like that’s their community [anymore]. And is it safer
now here? Yeah, it is, because you’ve got million-dollar homes over there now. And you have
the millennials there. You have all these rich people who want to stay close to downtown looking
at you like you don’t belong there. That’s why I will never live over there now. People don’t
want to say, ‘Oh, that’s racism.’ Well, what though do you want me to call it? You understand
what I’m saying?”12 As Stamps and many other residents attest, policing, as a failed institution of
crime control, led to the transformation of public housing in ways that served capital—that is,
racial capitalism—rather than people.
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Policy Implications
To counter the abstraction of urban space, Mitchell, drawing on Lefebvre, argues that
“Alternative conceptions are not enough. Only alternative practice—practice that remakes space
against, or in spite of, or within, capitalist abstract space—can create a different kind of space.”13
Based on the data uncovered in this study, I thus suggest several alternative practices that might
counter the abstraction of urban space, particularly spaces that house the urban poor, and reduce
our reliance on the police as a vector for public safety.
The first relates to social housing futures; the second, to the role of police in our cities.
While I discuss these separately, I suggest that they are, inherently, two sides of the same coin.
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, policing and public housing—two ostensibly
disparate urban institutions—have always been deeply intertwined in U.S. cities like Chicago.
While not originally intended this way, Chicago’s public housing became a de facto way to
police the housed urban poor, while the two agencies’ missions, leadership, and budgets grew
ever more entangled. This should not be taken to reinforce the thesis that public housing is a
failed policy; instead, my research suggests that failures of policing centrally undergirded public
housing’s downfall.
Even as policymakers continue to dismiss public housing as a failed policy—a relic of
misguided twentieth century planning—and instead call for market-based forms of housing
provision, housing organizers are issuing calls for a reinvestment in public or “social” housing. I
employ the latter formulation here, as it both connects with international calls for housing justice
and presents a reformulation of the past, rather than its repetition. Movements for social housing
follow David Madden and Peter Marcuse’s call to “at once critique, defend, and expand public
housing.”14 In the United States, movements like the Homes Guarantee advocate for the
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construction of 12 million new social housing units and the reinvestment in existing public
housing communities as a path to end homelessness.15 Meanwhile, proponents of the Green New
Deal advocate for a reinvestment in public housing that could spur green construction industries,
creating homes that are sustainable across multiple axes.16
Far from something to abandon, then, social housing provides a means to further housing
justice by expanding housing access and removing housing from the grips of the private market.
Much as it did in the 1930s and 1940s, a social housing movement would also spur construction
industries; this time, housing should be built with materials that are both sustainable and
beautiful, making social housing an attractive and viable place to live for the long-term. While
the prescribed income mix of Chicago’s HOPE VI mixed-income communities has largely not
delivered on its promises, a renewed social housing program should appeal to a broad swath of
the working classes as well as the under-employed, something that would both ensure its fiscal
sustainability in the long run and also reduce the stigma of living in state-owned and -managed
housing. A social housing program would thus contribute to the realization of housing as both
public good and as a human right.
Social housing will not alone be a silver bullet for housing injustice. Amidst broader
capitalist pressures and neoliberal state retrenchments, an expansive social housing program,
even if implemented, will undoubtedly suffer its own setbacks and failures. As Nicholas Blomley
reminds us, property is contradictory; it can be both oppressive and liberatory and thus,
comprises an ongoing site of struggle.17 As such, I suggest that we envision social housing not as
a solution in and of itself, but as a space where we can think through what we want, what we are
fighting for, and what demands we can make of the state vis-à-vis housing justice. Ultimately,
the values that underlie non-commodified housing are nothing short of vital.
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All of this raises the question: How might we keep social housing developments, as their
larger cities, safe? This research has largely documented the failures of state efforts to secure
public housing which, I have argued, were ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst.
Because most of those efforts came through the guise of law enforcement, this study contributes
to a burgeoning body of literature showing that policing, as an institution, is ineffective to keep
our cities safe.18 Police not only fail to prevent or solve most crimes, but policing also fuels
racial, class, and gender inequalities. As scholars have shown and as this work reaffirms, the
problem with policing lies not with individual bias on the part of officers or even the extent to
which policing has disparate impacts on various urban groups. Instead, policing is a systemically
flawed approach to public safety, one that makes many urban communities—and, in doing so,
the entire city—less safe.
If police are not the answer, my data suggest a few models from history that we might
look to as a loose blueprint for future public safety arrangements. In particular, safety solutions
developed within public housing communities tended to have the most buy-in and accountability
amongst residents. After Dantrell Davis’ death, for example, neighborhood activist Marion
Stamps brokered a landmark truce between local gangs, all of whom voluntarily agreed to a
ceasefire in the wake of the child’s murder. While police were reticent to concede that the gang
truce had an effect, preferring to take credit themselves for the reduction in neighborhood
violence, residents testify to the importance of the truce and of grassroots, bottom-up solutions to
violence more generally. As Guana Stamps remembers of her mother’s work, “The people was
the police. And I remember my mother telling the police, ‘We police ourselves.’”19
Additionally, when asked what public safety efforts did make a difference in the
community, many interviewees answered that tenant patrols were a helpful remedy. Tenant
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patrols, staffed primarily by women in the community, were comprised of largely self-organized
tenants who would walk the halls of their buildings, noting maintenance issues and checking in
with their neighbors. In exchange for their part-time work, CHA provided tenant patrollers with
modest rent relief. The unarmed tenant patrollers were instructed not to put themselves in harm’s
way and certainly, were not equipped to intervene in an active crime scene. However, they
provided an ideal of “eyes on the street” in the model of Jane Jacobs, a form of community
accountability that came from within.20
As Keith Augustine describes of tenant patrols at Cabrini-Green, “They were very helpful
because nine times out of ten, [they were] people from the building. They [were] the people that
want to see the change. They [were] the people that want to see the clean hallways.”21 Ella
Joseph* worked as a tenant patroller at Stateway Gardens where, she says, “We made sure the
buildings were clean, the lights were on, that people had their doors. . . . It cut down on a lot of
[criminal] activity. . . . They would kind of run and hide from us.”22 At the Horner Homes,
Therese Payne* says tenant patrol “worked out really well.”23 She says that tenant patrols helped
neighbors get to know one another and gave residents a point person if they needed help, be it
with a maintenance issue, a public safety concern, or getting a package delivered. She says tenant
patrollers would watch over children and let parents know if their child was getting in trouble. “It
was just an open line of communication,” she says. Rather than “snitch” to the police, tenant
patrollers would handle problems within the community, thus reducing the risk of future
hostilities.
Crucially, residents respected the tenant patrollers, who they knew as neighbors, friends,
and sometimes, family. As JR Fleming describes, “It’s hard to sell dope when mama and auntie
are walking up and down the stairs at the building. It’s hard to have a big gun on you, with
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mama, auntie and them walking up and down the building and your cousin and security. It’s hard
to do a lot of shit.”24 Thus, tenant patrollers could have a deterrent effect; more so, in some cases,
than police officers, because these women were known and respected in the community. As
Douglas Ewing* notes of tenant patrollers at Cabrini-Green, “Those ladies kept order really quite
well.”25 He says kids did not want to be embarrassed by community parents in front of their
friends, so they would behave better when patrollers were out. While also not a silver bullet,
tenant patrols provide a promising model for community justice that could reduce reliance on the
police in urban neighborhoods.
Finally, residents attest that the roots of public safety lie not with law enforcement, but
with structural solutions to urban poverty. Longtime Altgeld Gardens resident Harriet Burton
says the main cause of violence at Altgeld is “the disinvestment in the community.”26 She
laments the removal of vocational training programs from the local schools, leaving students
with few options if they decide not to pursue higher education. Calling Altgeld’s far South Side
neighborhood a “forgotten neighborhood,” she also cites legacies of redlining and zoning that
encouraged capital flight from the area. To the extent that jobs remain in the community, local
industries mostly refuse to hire local residents.
Other residents agree that lack of economic opportunities centrally contributed to crime
and violence in Chicago’s historic public housing developments as it does in the remaining
complexes today. At Altgeld Gardens, Bernadette Williams cites lack of jobs as well as local
school closings among the causes of crime, while at Wentworth Gardens, Isabel Winters* says
simply, “These young people need some jobs.”27 At Stateway Gardens, Ella Joseph* says that
lack of jobs led to the sense that, in the high-rise era, “People in there [were] lost, people [had]
nothing to do.”28 In addition to being bored and unproductive, she affirms scholarly accounts that
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some public housing residents turned to drug sales just to have “something to do.” Without
opportunities to join the formal workforce, residents turned to the informal economy to provide
for their families and to feel powerful and productive.
Thus, meaningful public safety has always and will always stem from structural causes—
safe, affordable housing; substantive economic opportunities; and access to quality social
services like health care and education. Law enforcement, by contrast, has always and will
always be a “band-aid” solution at best (as officers themselves attest), and counterproductive at
worst. Reforms that reduce our reliance on policing, with the end goal of abolishing the police,
are our best hope for meaningfully securing communities. Building on the results of this project,
future studies would helpfully explore how policing of the housed urban poor has changed
following the Plan for Transformation, something that is beyond the scope of this project. What
is certain, however, is that policing remains a blunt instrument for promoting safety and that
racism and class warfare are baked into the very institution of policing in the United States.

Policing the Right to Urban Life
According to Lefebvre, the “right to the city” is best conceptualized as the “right to urban
life.”29 Given the ways that policing—as we have seen—produced Chicago’s public housing as a
carceral, violent space, Janari Ricks’ senseless murder would seem to indicate that the Plan for
Transformation has not fully delivered on its promise to meaningfully improve community safety
for children like Dantrell and Janari, for whom the right to urban life was, quite literally,
snatched away. As former Cabrini resident Keith Augustine describes, “Overall, if you look at
the numbers and the stats of the tragedies and the kids that lost their lives, and the people that
were injured and hurt, you ask yourself that question: Were they making the right impact [with
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the Plan]? Is Cabrini-Green not being there now—is that making a good impact on the City of
Chicago, as a whole, in that community? Did that stop the violence in that area? Those are the
questions we’ve got to ask ourselves.”30
Public housing, I have suggested, was a large-scale social and policy experiment,
dreamed up by progressive reformers in the New Deal era who genuinely believed that a new
environment would help lift the urban poor out of poverty while acculturing them to middle-class
norms of respectability. From the beginning, then, policing was a crucial—if unacknowledged—
variable in this experiment. Police worked in close partnership with the housing authority from
the program’s early days and, over the years, police work in public housing lent authority and
legitimacy to the police as an institution of public safety, all while public housing became
stigmatized as ungovernable, lawless, crime-ridden housing of last resort. Policing, thus, policed
the very boundaries of the project of public housing itself. But these were all choices—choices
that, if they seemed commonsense or even inevitable at the time—supported racial capitalist
property regimes and, thus, the interests of city elites and the real estate state. To dream of social
housing futures is to dream of alternate sets of choices, even choices that are capable of
pressuring capitalist property relations from within. As Angela Davis reminds us, “Radical
merely means ‘grasping things at the root.’”31 When we understand the root of oppressive
structures, we can better grasp at and therefore change them. So, here’s to grasping at the root of
oppressive urban policies in order to more fully realize the right to urban life.
1

CBS Chicago, “Darrell Johnson, 39, Charged in Murder of 9-year-old Janari Ricks,” CBS News, August 4, 2020,
https://www.cbsnews.com/chicago/news/darrell-johnson-39-charged-in-murder-of-9-year-old-janari-ricks/; Jeremy
Gorner, “Suspect in Custody for Shooting Death of 9-year-old Janari Ricks, Police Say,” Chicago Tribune, August
3, 2020, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-janari-ricks-boy-killed-suspect-202008035pms42owirbtlivblc57vpqbzm-story.html; Natalie Moore, “Cabrini Residents Continue to Show Their Resilience in
the Wake of Tragedy,” WBEZ, August 13, 2020, https://www.wbez.org/stories/cabrini-residents-continue-to-showtheir-resilience-in-the-wake-of-tragedy/37a20900-75ed-4d44-9cd9-a99cbb6bbf41; see also Ben Austen, HighRisers: Cabrini-Green and the Fate of American Housing ( New York: HarperCollins, 2018).
2
George Devereux, interview with the author, October 16, 2020.

336

3

Phil Harris*, interview with the author, September 25, 2020.
Stephanie Wright*, interview with the author, October 22, 2020.
5
Jamie Kalven, “The Geography of Fear: Policing the Segregated City,” WTTW, February 24, 2022,
https://interactive.wttw.com/firsthand/segregation/the-geography-of-fear-policing-the-segregated-city.
6
Derek, interview with the author, March 13, 2021.
7
Kalven, “The Geography of Fear.”
8
Jamie Kalven, personal conversation with the author, January 21, 2022.
9
Don Mitchell, Mean Streets: Homelessness, Public Space, and the Limits of Capital (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 2020); 38-39.
10
Friedrich Engels, The Housing Question (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970 [1872]).
11
See Samuel Stein, Capital City: Gentrification and the Real Estate State (New York: Verso, 2019).
12
Guana Stamps, interview with the author, March 16, 2021.
13
Mitchell, Mean Streets, 98.
14
David Madden and Peter Marcuse, In Defense of Housing (New York: Verso, 2016), 206.
15
People’s Action, “A National Homes Guarantee,” Homes Guarantee, September 2019,
https://homesguarantee.com/.
16
Green New Deal for Public Housing, “Green New Deal for Public Housing,” https://www.gnd4ph.com/.
17
See Nicholas Blomley, Unsettling the City: Urban Land And the Politics of Property (New York: Routledge,
2004); Nicholas Blomley, "Precarious Territory: Property Law, Housing, and the Socio-Spatial Order," Antipode 52,
no. 1 (2020): 36-57.
18
See Mariame Kaba, We Do This ‘Til We Free Us: Abolitionist Organizing and Transforming Justice (Chicago:
Haymarket Books, 2021); Geo Maher, A World Without Police: How Strong Communities Make Cops Obsolete
(New York: Verso, 2021); Derecka Purnell, Becoming Abolitionists: Police, Protests, and the Pursuit of Freedom
(New York: Astra House, 2021); Alex Vitale, The End of Policing (New York: Verso, 2017).
19
Guana Stamps interview.
20
Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage, 1992 [1961]).
21
Keith Augustine, interview with the author, March 29, 2021.
22
Ella Joseph*, interview with the author, January 1, 2021.
23
Therese Payne*, interview with the author, February 22, 2021.
24
JR Fleming, interview with the author, November 30, 2020.
25
Douglas Ewing*, interview with the author, March 12, 2021.
26
Harriet Burton*, interview with the author, March 15, 2021.
27
Bernadette Williams, interview with the author, March 16, 2021; Isabel Winters*, interview with the author,
March 5, 2021.
28
Ella Joseph* interview.
29
Henri Lefebvre, Writings on Cities, transl. eds. Elenore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers Ltd, 1996 [1968]).
30
Keith Augustine interview.
31
Angela Davis, Women, Culture, Politics (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2011), 14.
4

337

A Note on Methods
I conducted research for this project from roughly September 2020 through September
2021. Conducting qualitative research during the global Covid-19 pandemic brought with it both
challenges and opportunities. The pandemic largely confined me to my home in upstate New
York during these months. Unable to travel to Chicago, I interviewed participants via Zoom and
over the phone and participated in CHA’s monthly Safety and Security Strategies meetings
virtually, along with everyone else, taking field notes as if the meeting were happening in person.
Archives were closed—some, like the Chicago History Museum, are still closed for renovations
as of this writing, rendering several of the collections I hoped to access inaccessible.
At first, the distance and collective isolation made it difficult to locate and recruit
participants. However, using snowball sampling, I was ultimately able to conduct 81 semistructured interviews and a handful of other background interviews, most of which lasted
between forty-five minutes and one hour, with some lasting up to two hours. My previous
experience working as a Policy Analyst at BPI, a Chicago-area law and policy center, where I
worked with CHA and participated in public safety-related meetings, helped immensely.
Because I had this experience, I already had a sense of who the key players were and how to
contact them. Like every qualitative researcher, I experienced my fair share of unanswered
emails and dead ends; in this way, this Covid-era research project was like any other. Ultimately,
I spoke to current and former CHA residents, current and former CHA employees, current and
former Chicago police officers, former CHA police officers, private security workers,
developers, and property management staff.
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Participant occupation
Number of participants
CHA current/former resident
32
CHA staff
5
Property management staff
6
Social services staff
2
Private security staff
2
Current CPD
4
Former CPD
19
Former CHA Police
14
Policy/law community
3
Other (neighbors, academic, etc)
3
Note: some interviewees held more than one role.
Participant identity
Male
Female
White
African-American
Latinx

Number of participants
39
44
21
58
4

As expected, police officers were the most difficult group to access and recruit to the
study and indeed, others have documented the difficulties of conducting interviews with and
getting unfiltered responses from police.1 I started by sending my recruitment flyer to police
affiliation groups across Chicago, including the Jewish First Responders Society, German
American Police Association, Latin American Police Association, Polish American Police
Association, Scandinavian American Police Association, Police Chaplains Ministry, Asian
American Police Association, and the Italian American Police Association of Illinois. Only one
or two of the groups responded and agreed to circulate my recruitment flyer to their members.
However, initial interviewees offered to post my recruitment flyer on a private Facebook group
for Chicago police officers. I was never granted access to this group directly but received dozens
of referrals from the post and used snowball sampling to recruit additional officers from there.
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While I cannot be sure what enticed officers to speak with me, and to be so open with me,
I have several ideas. First, recruiting primarily retired officers helped overcome the reticence of
some police to speak with a researcher. Retired officers do not have the worry of losing their job
as a result of speaking about their work. Second, I offered all police and resident interviewees a
digital $25 Visa gift card, something that was appreciated by officers and residents alike. Only a
few officers declined the gift card or said they would give it to someone else; most seemed to
appreciate the incentive. Third, the opportunity to speak over the phone or by Zoom at a time of
their convenience lowered the burden of participation and also—especially in the case of phone
interviews, which comprised the majority of my interviews—allowed for a heightened sense of
confidentiality. I cannot be sure how responses would compare with in-person interviews, but I
suspect that some officers felt more comfortable opening up in this format.
Fourth, because of the Covid-19 pandemic, many people were staying at home more than
usual, with more time on their hands. Several retired officers noted that the security jobs they
would normally work for extra money—for example, providing security at Chicago Cubs
games—were not happening at the time. And finally, I conducted interviews with officers in the
year immediately following George Floyd’s murder at the hands of police in Minneapolis and a
summer that saw widespread calls to defund and/or abolish the police. Several officers expressed
frustration about the uprisings and a desire to tell “their side of the story.” As the person I call
Phil Harris* told me, “Yeah, you can’t leave us out of stuff like [this study] because people—you
watch TV and you see this other stuff, and the police are always wrong and everything’s going
wrong, but we get stuff. We certainly have a very unique view of what’s happening out there.
You can’t leave us out of this.”2 One or two police interviewees asked me up front if this was
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going to be an “anti-police study.” I told them the truth: that I was trying to understand how
CHA housing had been policed over time and the role policing had played in these spaces.
Interviewing police officers raises particular methodological issues. In the case of this
study, I turned to interviews with individual officers to shed light on policing as an institution.
Institutions, of course, are comprised of individuals, and particularly in the case of the police, it
is often the quick decisions made by individuals on the ground that animate the institution itself,
even as officers’ actions are themselves shaped by the rules, norms, and culture of the institution
they are part of. That is, police policy is one thing; police actions are another. For the purposes of
this study, both are important. In addition to reading news reports and gathering policy memos,
budgets, and police newsletters, therefore, I needed to understand how officers collectively
understood their role in CHA projects to really understand how public housing was policed. At
the same time—and in this way, police interviews are like all interviews—I had to interpret
police officers’ recollections and frequently self-aggrandizing perspectives on their work with a
critical eye, constantly keeping in mind that what people say and what people do often diverge.
Part of what sets this study apart is the extensive interview data I was able to collect with police
officers, who are often inaccessible to researchers or the public. While fraught, their perspectives
are essential to understanding how policing operated on the ground and how institutional norms
are operationalized, maintained, transgressed, and transformed. Interviewing police officers
highlights how violent institutions are mobilized through the actions of individual people who, in
some cases, genuinely intend to do good. In this way, my research speaks to how societal
violence gets carried out, normalized, and maintained by ordinary people through their
participation in violent institutions.
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Residents were somewhat easier to recruit than police officers, though this recruitment
process likewise required some patience and trial-and-error. I recruited participants through
personal contacts, by contacting elected resident leaders across the developments, through a
recruitment flyer that circulated via email and was posted by staff in some of the mixed-income
developments, and through snowball sampling. Like officers, residents too were eager to share
their experiences with and perspectives on the police, even when memories were difficult. The
variety of those experiences and perspectives serves as an important reminder that the urban poor
are not a monolithic group with a singular political sensibility.
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 8, relying on newspaper data for this project was a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, in the absence of being physically in Chicago and without
access to certain archival resources, digitized historical newspaper archives, accessed via the
Chicago Public Library, comprised an incredibly rich data set of nearly 1,800 articles. However,
as I discuss in the project, news archives are always both partial and socially constructed; they
reflect dominant priorities and discourses as much if not more than they provide an accurate
record of facts and events. In reporting the news, papers also decide what is “newsworthy.” To
provide just a few examples: As I discuss in Chapter 2, in 1964, a group of public housing
residents—led and organized primarily by women—threatened a rent strike if conditions at the
Taylor Homes, including safety and security, were not improved. The Chicago Defender, the
city’s Black newspaper, covered the strike; the Chicago Tribune and Chicago Sun-Times did not.
Thus, by triangulating these sources, my hope is that I was able to construct a relatively more
complete, if still partial, record of events in public housing. Even still, however, these sources
contain minimal coverage over the years of police abuse and particularly the ways in which
corrupt police operated with impunity in public housing in the latter decades of the twentieth
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century. Most of the slim reporting on this topic comes from Jamie Kalven’s Code of Silence
reporting, a landmark series for which we all owe him a great debt. In contrast, every time a
police officer was harmed or killed in public housing, the event received significant coverage in
the papers. Thus, while relying on newspaper data will always risk reproducing these blind spots
and gaps, I hope that I have overcome this problem—to the greatest extent possible—through
first, triangulating newspaper data with interview data; second, by contextualizing this dataset as
partial and contextual; and third, by attending to the silences, such as the lack of coverage of
police abuse.3
Finally, in addition to interview and newspaper data, I draw on historic planning and
policy documents. ChicagoCop.com, a police resource site, has usefully digitized police
cartographs, annual reports, police newsletters, and organizational charts, all of which came in
handy for trying to understand how CPD approached policing in public housing at various points
in time. In September 2021, I visited several archives in Chicago, particularly the Municipal
Reference Collection and Special Collections at the Chicago Public Library. These visits were as
informative for what they held as for what they did not. The collections are overall slim when it
comes to information on policing at CHA. I did, however, locate documents related to the
Cabrini-Green High Impact Program in the 1970s—a policing pilot program co-sponsored by the
Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, which I discuss briefly in Chapter 3. The Library also
houses the Resident’s Journal Collection, which contains papers collected by the staff of the
Resident’s Journal, a resident-run newspaper that published in the late 1990s through the 2010s.
In this collection, I found several relevant memoranda related to the Chicago Housing Authority
Police.
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During the data collection for this project, I was in regular contact with CHA’s Research
Director and FOIA Officer. When possible, the Director answered my questions directly. In a
few cases, he directed me to make a FOIA request for information. I did so, for example, to
request records related to the CHA Police Department. The response I received turned up only 4
documents: two related to the establishment and two related to the dissolution of the force. Doing
archival research with CHA is difficult because the agency has destroyed many of their records
and moved others to an off-site storage facility, where the majority (at least I’m told) is unsorted
and without a finding aid. While previous scholars studying the CHA have had direct access to
the archives, this new arrangement and the fact that I could not be present in Chicago made me
reliant upon what the agency was willing to dig up and send me. I also submitted a FOIA request
to the Chicago Police Department for records related to their Public Housing Unit. The
Department claims it has no such records.
As I collected data for this project, I also had interviews transcribed. I downloaded and
read every relevant newspaper article I could find, creating a master document with summaries
of all pertinent articles related to policing, crime, and public safety at CHA developments from
the 1930s to the present. Once complete, I iteratively coded the data in Atlas.ti. To help organize
the vast amount of material, I generated codes for key actors including individuals like Elizabeth
Wood, Renault Robinson, and Vince Lane, key sites such as Altgeld Gardens or Cabrini-Green,
and key institutions like the CHA Police. I also coded the data for key themes, such as “raids,”
“gangs,” and “evictions.” Ultimately, I generated 212 codes, which accomplished a couple of
things for the project: First, it forced me to review the data (sometimes, multiple times) in close
detail, helping me construct a key timeline of actors and events. While I was not interested in
quantifying the analysis (for example, by counting the number of times a certain event, person,
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or subject was mentioned), coding the data in this way helped make key themes apparent:
elevators, for example, cropped up much more than I had initially expected, while Cabrini-Green
received the bulk of newspaper coverage, indicating its significance as a focal point in the city
and certainly the public housing site most of interest to policymakers and the broader public.
Tagging the data with these codes also facilitated the writing process, making it easier to sift
through and return to key data points and locate relevant quotations. Coded interview and
newspaper data thus provided the basis I needed to start organizing chapters and writing the
project.
I cannot reflect upon the methodologies employed for this project without also reflecting
upon my own positionality as a researcher. I am a white, cisgender woman in my early thirties,
which marks me as different from most of my interviewees in a few key ways. I am younger,
first of all, than almost everyone I interviewed. The public housing residents I interviewed were
almost exclusively Black, which matches the prevailing demographics of public housing in
Chicago, as were a good portion of the officers I interviewed. Conducting interviews by phone
meant that the participant—unless we had met before—did not know my age or race, though
they could probably deduce my identity from my name, manner of speech, and other factors.
Thus, conducting phone interviews did not negate the importance of my positionality so much as
change it, adding one more layer of obfuscation between researcher and participant. Gift cards
comprised both incentive for interviewees’ participation and renumeration for the time and effort
involved in providing an interview. Given the sensitivity of the subject matter, I emphasized—in
line with IRB provisions—that interviews were optional and voluntary, that I would uphold
participants’ confidentiality in every way possible if they so chose, and that we could take breaks
during the interviews or stop the interviews at any time. My sense is that residents were, on the
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whole, glad for an opportunity to speak about their experiences and I was never asked to stop or
pause an interview.
My whiteness, undoubtedly, opened doors for me with this project. Particularly when it
came to accessing city elites and navigating institutions like the CHA, I came to this project
knowing how to speak the language of policymakers and, though I wish it were not this way,
looking the part of a credible policy scholar. No one questioned my qualifications or mistook me
for a resident, for example. While I cannot ever know how my whiteness played with police
officers, I suspect it made white officers in particular more comfortable opening up to me.
Finally, many interviewees were curious to know my experience in Chicago; the fact that I had
lived and worked in the city previously lent me some credibility.
Something I came to realize over the course of my research is that there are two police
departments in the U.S.: the police I interact with (extremely rarely) as a white, upper-middle
class person and the police working in poor Black and brown communities. As I realized the
depth of this disparity, I also realized the depth of my own naïveté. I tell this story, in part, in the
hopes that other people who look like me will have their eyes opened, not only when there is an
extreme event like a high-profile police killing, but also—drawing on Mariame Kaba and Saidiya
Hartman—to the mundane day-to-day police violence enacted on poor communities of color in
this country.4
1

Mat Coleman, (2016). State Power in Blue. Political Geography 51: 76-86; Tom Cockcroft, (2005). Using oral
history to investigate police culture. Qualitative Research, 5(3), 365- 385; Randy K. Lippert, Kevin Walby, and
Blair Wilkinson (2015). “Spins, stalls, and shutdowns: Pitfalls of qualitative policing and security research.”
Qualitative Social Research, 17(1), np.
2
Phil Harris*, interview with the author, September 25, 2020.
3
See Matthew Kurtz, “Situating Practices: The Archive and the File Cabinet,” Historical Geography 29: 26-37;
Saidiya Hartman, “Venus in Two Acts,” Small Axe 26 (12, no.2): 1-14.
4
Mariame Kaba, We Do This ‘Til We Free Us: Abolitionist Organizing and Transforming Justice, Chicago:
Haymarket Books, 2021; Saidiya Hartman, 2017. Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments. New York: W. W.
Norton.
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Appendix 1. Table of Participant Characteristics
* indicates participant has elected to use a pseudonym
¨ indicates participant is cross-listed in two or more categories
Total interviewees: 81
Current and former CHA Residents (n=32)
Name
Age at time of
Racial/Ethnic
interview
Group

Gender

Willie “JR”
47
Fleming
Crystal Palmer¨ 69

Black
Black

Male/gender
neutral
Female

Ella Joseph*

65

Black

Female

Yolanda Green*

46

Black

Female

Maria Stevens*

78

Black

Female

Javon Morris

19

Black

Male

Willie Wright

Prefers not to
disclose

Black

Female

Evelyn Brown*

67

Black

Female

Therese Payne*

62

Black

Female

Linda Arroyo*

73

White

Female

Henry Warfield

45

Black

Male
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CHA
Development(s)
where the
participant has
lived
Cabrini-Green
Henry Horner
Homes
Stateway
Gardens, Park
Boulevard
CabriniGreen/Parkside
of Old Town
Robert Taylor
Homes,
Lathrop Homes
Parkside of Old
Town
Henry Horner
Homes, West
Haven
Henry Horner
Homes, West
Haven
Henry Horner
Homes, West
Haven
Parkside of Old
Town
(affordable
housing
resident)
Cabrini-Green

Isabel Winters*

61

Black

Female

Joanne Williams

57

Black

Female

Helen Peters*
Irene Betts*

Black
Black

Female
Female

Douglas Ewing*

61
Prefers not to
disclose, over
50
66

Black

Male

Ruth Atkins*

49

Black

Male

Derek
Harriet Burton*

46
60

Black
Black

Male
Female

Guana Stamps
Bernadette
Williams
Patricia Black

56
53

Black
Black

Female
Female

58

Black

Female

Jalissa Anders*

68

Black

Female

Mirella
Sanchez*
Megan Ellis*

47

Hispanic

Female

53

Black

Female

Andre Jenkins*

52

Black

Male

Angie Bell*

63

Black

Female

Keith Augustine
Walter Burnett
Ken Butler¨

45
57
59

Black
Black
Black

Male
Male
Male

Annette
Freeman

51

Black

Female
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Stateway
Gardens, Ickes
Homes,
Wentworth
Gardens
Dearborn
Homes, Ickes
Homes
Cabrini-Green
Cabrini-Green,
ABLA Homes
Cabrini-Green,
Parkside of Old
Town
Stateway
Gardens, Park
Boulevard
ABLA Homes
Altgeld
Gardens
Cabrini-Green
Altgeld
Gardens
Altgeld
Gardens
Robert Taylor
Homes,
Lathrop Homes
Parkside of Old
Town
Parkside of Old
Town
Robert Taylor
Homes
Ida B. Wells
Homes,
Parkside of Old
Town
Cabrini-Green
Cabrini-Green
Henry Horner
Homes
Cabrini-Green

Tina Grey*

54

Black

Current CPD Officers (n=4)
Name
Age at time of
interview
Phil Harris*
Prefers not to
disclose, mid-50s
Robert McDonald*
45
Stephanie Wright*¨ 51
57
Ralph Sampson*¨
Former CPD Officers (n=19)
Name
Age at time of
interview
Sandra Gould*
65
59
Frank Jones*¨
Andrea Schmidt*
58
Ed Iverson*
51
Ray Cowin
63
Paul Johnson*
67
George Devereux
61
Jennifer Alexander*
61
Ryan Michelson*
66
63
Ronald Davis*¨
Eldon Urbikas
64
George Figueroa
69
Melvin Roland
73
Brigid Cronin
60
Ramona Jackson*
67
Len Campbell*
65
64
Edward King*¨
58
Adrienne Neely¨
62
Wade Ingram ¨
Former CHA Police Officers (n=14)
Name
Age at time of
interview
Marc Meyer*
58
63
Ronald Davis*¨
Gwen Powers*
57
Stephanie Wright*¨ 51
57
Ralph Sampson*¨
Darryl Hill
59

Female

Parkside of Old
Town

Racial/Ethnic Group

Gender

White

Male

White
Black
Black

Male
Female
Male

Racial/Ethnic Group

Gender

White
Black
White
White
White
White
White
Black
White
Black
White
Hispanic
Black
White
Black
White
Black
Black
Black

Female
Male
Female
Male
Male
Male
Male
Female
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Female
Female
Male
Male
Female
Male

Racial/Ethnic Group

Gender

White
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black

Male
Male
Female
Female
Male
Male
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Edward King*¨
Fernando Reyes
Janice Jeffries
Joe Jackson
Elisa Brewer*
Adrienne Neely¨
Alma Bledsoe*
Gary Lee*

64
62
54
63
59
58
57
58

Current and Former CHA Staff (n=5)
Name
Age at time of
interview
59
Frank Jones*¨
Bradley Simmons*
77
Vince Lane
79
Joseph Shuldiner
76
69
Crystal Palmer¨
Property Management Staff (n=6)
Name
Age at time of
interview
Alicia Thomas*
55
Peter Holsten
Not provided
Rich Sciortino
63
Lauren Wang*
58
Johanna Stewart*
46
Chris Harvey*
47
Social Services Workers (n=2)
Name
Age at time of
interview
Amanda Wright*
45
Ken Butler
59
Private Security Officers (n=2)
Name
Age at time of
interview
Jordan Wylie*
30
62
Wade Ingram¨

Black
Hispanic
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black

Male
Male
Female
Male
Female
Female
Female
Male

Racial/Ethnic Group

Gender

Black
Black
Black
White
Black

Male
Male
Male
Male
Female

Racial/Ethnic Group

Gender

Black
White
White
Black
Black
Black

Female
Male
Male
Female
Female
Male

Racial/Ethnic Group

Gender

Black
Black

Female
Male

Racial/Ethnic Group

Gender

Black
Black

Male
Male

Members of the Law and Policy Community (n=3)
Name
Age at time of
Racial/Ethnic Group
interview
Alex Polikoff
Not collected
White
Kate Walz
Not collected
White
350

Gender
Male
Female

Julie Brown
Other (n=3)
Name

63

White

Female

Racial/Ethnic
Group
Black

Gender

Role

Rosalie Jordan*

Age at time of
interview
75

Female

Hilaria Valdez*

Not collected

Hispanic

Female

Susan Popkin

Not collected

White

Female

Neighbor,
mixed-income
community
working
group member
Former
NYCHA PD
Academic
expert
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https://escholarship.org/uc/item/41g6f5cj.
Hamlin, Madeleine. “The Abolition Geographies of Covid-19.” Society + Space.
https://www.societyandspace.org/articles/the-abolition-geographies-of-covid-19.

2019

Hamlin, Madeleine and Tyrone Muhammad. “From the Big House to No House: A
Critical Geography of Reentry Housing in Chicago.” Society + Space.
http://societyandspace.org/2019/05/15/from-the-big-house-to-no-house-a-criticalgeography-of-reentry-housing-in-chicago/.
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2018

Hamlin, Madeleine et al. “No Place to Call Home: Navigating Reentry Housing in
Chicago.” Roosevelt University & BPI. https://www.bpichicago.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/No-Place-To-Call-Home.pdf.

2017

Hamlin, Madeleine. “In Chicago, Another Public Housing Experiment: Prisoner
Reentry.” CityLab. https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/08/in-chicago-anotherpublic-housing-experiment-prisoner-reentry/535947/.

Grants and Awards
2021

Harry Frank Guggenheim Emerging Scholars Fellowship, $25,000
Graduate Dean’s Award for Excellence in Research and Creative Work,
Syracuse University, $500

2020

Roscoe-Martin Fund for Research, Syracuse University, $1,200
Pruitt Dissertation Fellowship, Society of Woman Geographers, $14,500
Sopher Paper Award, Syracuse University Department of Geography, $1,800

2019

Dissertation Research Grant, American Association of Geographers, $1,000
Roscoe-Martin Fund for Research, Syracuse University, $1,200
Applied Geography Specialty Group Travel Award, American Association of
Geographers, $250

2018-2019

University Fellowship, Syracuse University, $25,0000

2017

Runner-up, with Jesse Lecy, “Cross-sector Collaboration and Urban Revitalization
in Buffalo, NY,” EPARCC Case Study Competition, $1000

2015

Master’s-Level Research Award, Cultural Geography Specialty Group, American
Association of Geographers, $250

2014

Roscoe-Martin Fund for Research, Syracuse University, $750

Teaching Experience
Mohawk Correctional Facility, Rome, NY
Instructor of Record
Spring 2021
Regional Geography
Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY
Fall 2021
Summer 2021

Instructor of Record
Critical Issues in the United States
World Urban Geography
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Spring 2021
Fall 2020, Fall 2016, & Spring 2015
Fall 2019
Spring 2017

Teaching Assistantships
Human Geographies
World Urban Geography
World Cultures
Environment & Society

Spring 2020
Spring 2020
Fall 2014
Fall 2014

Grading Experience
Gender in a Globalizing World
European Union
Human Geographies
Political Geography

Other Professional Experience
2020-2021

Program Assistant, City Scripts, Syracuse University (Syracuse, NY)

2018

Research Associate, Policy Research Collaborative, Roosevelt University (Chicago,
IL)

2017-2018

Policy Analyst and Polikoff-Gautreaux Fellow, Business & Professional People for the
Public Interest (Chicago, IL)

2015-2016

Research Assistant, Center for Policy Research, Syracuse University (Syracuse, NY)

2014

Associate Editor, Routledge (New York, NY)

2012-2013

Editorial Assistant, Routledge (New York, NY)

Presentations
Invited presentations
September 2021, invited presenter. “Policing the Projects.” Society of Woman Geographers. Chicago, IL.
October 2019, invited presenter. “Geographies of Housing (In)Justice: Housing the Public in Two Cities.”
ARC 575: Urban Housing. School of Architecture. Syracuse University. Syracuse, NY.
October 2019, invited presenter. “Dwelling: Home, Place, and Memory.” GEO 272: World Cultures. The
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. Syracuse University. Syracuse, NY.
April 2017, invited presenter. “Economic Development and Urban Revitalization in Buffalo, NY.” PAI
786: Urban Policy. The Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. Syracuse University.
Syracuse, NY.
April 2017, invited moderator. “Private Prisons and Community-Police Relations in Syracuse.”
Sustaining Action: A Teach-In. The Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. Syracuse
University. Syracuse, NY.
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Conference presentations
February 2022, “Policing Race in Chicago Public Housing: 1937-1960.” Session title: “Planning, White
Supremacy, and the U.S. City.” American Association of Geographers Annual Meeting. (virtual
conference)
August 2021, with Gretchen Purser, “A Program, Not the Projects: Reentry in the Post-Public Housing
Era.” Session title: “The Reproduction of Disadvantage” (Refereed Roundtable). American Sociological
Association. (virtual conference)
April 2019, “‘No Place to Call Home,’ or the Chicago Reentry Atlas: Participatory Mapping and Policy
Change from Below.” Session title: “Doing Critical Community Geography to Inform Policy.” American
Association of Geographers Annual Meeting, Washington, DC.
April 2017, “Second Chances in the Second City: Mapping Chicago’s Carceral Continuum.” Session title:
“The Where of Rights and the Right to the City.” American Association of Geographers Annual Meeting,
Boston, Massachusetts.
April 2015, “Geographies of Mobility in James Joyce’s Dubliners.” Session title: “Wordly Literary
Geographies.” American Association of Geographers Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois.
Conference session organization
April 2019, “Doing Critical Community Geography to Inform Policy.” American Association of
Geographers Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, with Jonnell Robinson.
April 2015, “The Politics of Utopia and Dystopia.” American Association of Geographers Annual
Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, with Jared Van Ramshorst.
Service
Journal manuscript reviewer: Political Geography, Housing Policy Debate, Health and Place, Journal of
Urbanism
Graduate Admissions Committee, Syracuse University Department of Geography (2020, 2022)
Graduate Representative, Syracuse University Geography Graduate Students Organization (2019)
Dean’s Search Committee, Syracuse University Maxwell School (2015-2016)
Co-Chair, Supporting Women in Geography (2015-2016)
Professional Organizations
American Association of Geographers, American Geographical Society, Society of Woman Geographers,
American Sociological Association, Unequal Cities Network, Law and Society Association
Workshop Participation
June 2022, Antipode Summer Institute, Housing Justice in Unequal Cities, Barcelona, Spain, admitted
through competitive selection process *Postponed from June 2020 due to COVID-19
May 2022, “Evicted Planet,” virtual (global) workshop, invited participant.
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October 2021, New Directions in Law and Society: A Graduate Student and Junior Scholar Workshop,
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, admitted through competitive selection process
March 2021, Writing from Qualitative Methods, American Association of Geographers
March 2021, Race & Ethnicity Dialogue Group, Maxwell School at Syracuse University
September 2020, Graduate Research During a Pandemic, American Association of Geographers
August 2019, UCLA, Summer Institute on Methodologies for Housing Justice, led by Professors Ananya
Roy and Raquel Rolnik, admitted through competitive selection process
References
Dr. Don Mitchell, Dept of Social and Economic Geography, Uppsala University,
don.mitchell@kultgeog.uu.se
Dr. Jamie Winders, Dept of Geography and the Environment, Syracuse University, jwinders@syr.edu
Dr. Gretchen Purser, Dept of Sociology, Syracuse University, gwpurser@syr.edu
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